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Silence can be a plan 
rigorously executed 
 
The blueprint to a life 
 
It is a presence 
it has a history    a form 
 
Do not confuse it 
with any kind of absence. 
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In this thesis, the author takes a journey through both biblical and contemporary 
patriarchal cultures, contemplating the commonality of rape survivors’ experiences 
across space and time, and, in particular, evaluating the insidious and pervasive 
influences of patriarchy, which have long served to deny these women a voice with 
which to relate their narrative of suffering.  Consideration is given to some of the 
common contemporary cultural attitudes and misperceptions regarding sexual 
violence, commonly known as ‘rape myths’, which appear to be rooted within the 
deeply entrenched gender stereotypes of patriarchal cultures the world over, and 
which survivors of sexual violence regard as lying at the very heart of their own 
voicelessness.  The author examines the means by which these rape myths silence 
victims of sexual violence, then, using these myths as a hermeneutical tool, 
evaluates whether they are likewise given voice within both the text and interpretive 
traditions of Genesis 34, a biblical narrative recounting the rape of Jacob’s daughter 
Dinah.  When these myths do appear to be represented within this narrative, 
consideration is then given to the impact that they may likewise have had upon 
Dinah’s own experience of her violation and thus, upon her ability to share her story.  
Moreover, the author evaluates the representations of Dinah in her interpretive 
afterlife, assessing the ways in which biblical interpreters may or may not appeal to 
these same myths in order both to attend to her silence and to make sense of her 
experience.  This thesis therefore has two primary aims.  Firstly, there is an attempt 
to paint a picture of the world in which Dinah experienced her sexual assault, by 
casting light upon the attitudes and ideologies that she would have faced from others 
within her own community.  In addition, consideration is also given to the narrative 
world, which Dinah continues to occupy in the minds of those who read her story, 
by looking at the responses she has received and continues to receive from this 
interpretive community.  This thesis therefore attempts to provide a deeper insight 
into Dinah’s own experience of sexual violence, in order that contemporary readers 
can better comprehend the meaningfulness and complexity of her silence and grant 
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Later I went through the ritual of talking to people.  It always 
seemed as if I were talking through glass or underwater.  I could 
never tell my mother; she couldn’t bear the pain.  Others, it seemed 
to me, drew away.  I could not bear to be alone, but in company I 
felt abandoned, estranged.  For months, I looked to my husband for 
comfort he could or would not give.  A year later, we began a 
divorce.1 
I had to keep this a secret … If I told, everything would fall apart.  
If I couldn’t hold it together, everything would fall apart … I 
wasn’t about to let the world that I knew fall apart.2 
I had tried to talk to people close to me about [my rape], but I 
couldn’t, because nobody would listen.  I didn’t even talk to my 
mother because she had made it very clear that she didn’t want to 
deal with it … When I tried to talk to other people about it, I felt 
like I was talking about something I wasn’t supposed to be talking 
about.3 
As soon as I started talking about my [rape], a hush came over the 
room … After I finished there was a long silence … “Well”, our 
hostess said, smoothing out the napkin on her lap and turning to 
the person on my left.  “Shall we get off rape to something …” She 
paused, apparently at a loss for words.  I feared the next word 
would be “agreeable”.  It was.4 
 
                                                
1 Deena Metzger, “It Is Always the Woman Who Is Raped”, American Journal of Psychiatry 133 
(1976): 405. 
2 Cited in Kristen J. Leslie, When Violence is No Stranger: Pastoral Counselling with Survivors of 
Acquaintance Rape (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 66. 
3 Cited in Diana E.H. Russell, The Politics of Rape: The Victim’s Perspective (New York: Stein and 
Day, 1975), 194. 





Reading the personal testimonies of rape victims1 really brings home to me just how 
terrifying and traumatic the experience of sexual violence is for all those who endure 
it.  ‘Seeing’ the event through a survivor’s eyes and hearing, in her own words, the 
nature of her experience, facilitates a deeper appreciation that she is the one who can 
vocalize the pain, the terror and the wrongfulness of rape because she and she alone 
lived through it, experiencing at a visceral and emotional level every moment of its 
horror.  Bearing this in mind, the narrative of any rape event then surely belongs in 
the first place to this woman; it is her story to tell, her voice that ought to be heard. 
While such a statement may seem somewhat axiomatic, it would appear to bear 
repeating when we take stock of the issues raised so clearly by the testimonies I 
quoted at the start.  As is all too obvious, victims of sexual violence may frequently 
find themselves deprived of a voice with which to tell their story, either because they 
are too afraid to do so, for fear of social stigma, suspicion, and blame, or, when they 
do try to speak out, they are silenced, sometimes by those very people who are 
meant to be a source of support and healing. 2   No one, it seems, wants to hear about 
this most intimate invasion of the victim’s body; to speak about it is considered both 
distasteful and unwelcome, the speaker veering dangerously close to those most 
ancient taboos of forbidden sexuality and interior female body spaces.3  As writer 
Nancy Venable Raine notes, ‘Rape has long been considered a crime so 
unspeakable, so shameful to its victims that they are rendered mute and cloaked in 
anonymity’.4  Or, in the words of Deena Metzger, the author of the first testimony, 
‘After rape, there is a terrible silence’.5 
                                                
1 Throughout this work, I use the terms ‘victim’ and ‘survivor’ interchangeably to refer to women 
who have experienced sexual violence.  I believe that it is important to identify these women as 
victims because they do suffer as the result of their rape.  However, as Liz Kelly notes, the term 
‘victim’ ‘makes invisible the other side of women’s victimisation: the active and positive ways in 
which women resist, cope and survive’.  These women should therefore not be identified as passive 
victims, inherently vulnerable and helpless, but as women who have lived through a terrible and life-
threatening wrong being perpetrated against them and despite this, have survived.  See Liz Kelly, 
Surviving Sexual Violence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 163. 
2 See for example, Ruth Schmidt, “After the Fact: To Speak of Rape”, Christian Century 110 (January 
6-13, 1993): 14-16; Diana E.H. Russell, 20, 23, 194, 226-27; Daniel C. Silverman, “Sharing the Crisis 
of Rape: Counselling the Mates and Families of Victims”, in Sexual Assault and Abuse: A Handbook 
for Clergy and Religious Professionals, ed. Mary D. Pellauer, Barbara Chester, and Jane A. Boyajian 
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 140-65. 
3 Raine, 6. 
4 Raine, 119, 201. 
5 Metzger, 405. 
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Thinking about such a contemporary silencing of rape survivors leads me in turn to 
contemplate Dinah’s representation as a rape victim in Genesis 34.  This biblical tale 
is made up of a dizzying succession of scenes, which present the reader with vivid 
images of sexual violence, sexual desire, and brutal murder on a genocidal scale.  
The action starts innocently enough, when Dinah, the daughter of Jacob and Leah, 
goes out to make the acquaintance of the indigenous Hivite women in the city near 
to where her father has settled his family.  Her sojourn is cut dramatically short, 
however, when Shechem, the local Hivite prince, catches sight of her, abducts her 
and rapes her.  Yet, rather unexpectedly, we are then told that he falls in love with 
Dinah and is desperate to marry her.  Dinah’s brothers, furious at the events that 
have transpired, conspire a bizarre yet fatally effective act of vengeance, which they 
carry out, with a dramatic zeal, not only against their sister’s rapist, but also against 
the entire Hivite people.  At the end of this very bloody drama, all the Hivite males 
lay slain by the Jacobite sword, their possessions plundered, their women and 
children carried off as booty.  Jacob, meanwhile, vents his fury against his sons for 
their precipitate act of revenge, while they, in turn, remain adamant that their 
response was justified.  And Dinah?  Well, all we are told about Dinah is that her 
brothers return her to the safety of the family fold, where she would then appear to 
vanish without trace.  
Despite this rather inauspicious end to Dinah’s role in the patriarchal narrative, we 
would all agree, I am sure, that, within this narrative, the occasion of her rape is of 
central importance, casting a bitter pall over the entire story, as it triggers and shapes 
all subsequent events.  However, to call Genesis 34 a story about a woman’s rape is 
to say something about the text that the author himself takes measures to exclude 
from representation.  While without the rape event, there would be no story, the tale 
that is told is not Dinah’s story; it is her father’s story, her brothers’ story, even her 
rapist’s story.6  There is a pervasive narrative silence about this young woman’s 
personal experience of her ordeal and a denial of, or at least a contextual disinterest 
in, the fact that Shechem’s act of sexual assault was a forcible violation of her bodily 
integrity and that it would have been a source of immense physical, emotional and 
spiritual distress for her.7  Dinah is a catalyst in this narrative, not a subject of 
consciousness; as an object, others act upon her and it is their actions that guide the 
                                                
6 Ita Sheres, Dinah’s Rebellion: A Biblical Parable for Our Time (New York: Crossroad, 1990), 94; 
Nehama Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window: Biblical Tales of Oppression and Escape (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1998), 47. 
7 Meir Sternberg, “Biblical Poetics and Sexual Politics: From Reading to Counterreading”, Journal of 
Biblical Literature 111 (1992): 480.   
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unfolding sequence of events.8  The reader barely catches a glimpse of her; she is 
always just outside the field of vision, kept offstage, while the events to which she is 
so consciously and painfully a participant in revolve around her.  Furthermore, the 
space where her voice ought to have been heard is instead filled with other voices, 
male voices, while her exclusively female experience as a victim of sexual violence 
effectively remains little more than a narrative periphrasis.9  Unnoticed and ignored 
among the shadows of this story, Dinah’s silence thus becomes nothing less than a 
form of oppression, the mark of her exclusion from honest representation within the 
text.10     
With the above discussion in mind, we are then left with the question: is there 
anything the reader of Genesis 34 can do to redress this androcentric imbalance 
within the text, in order to grant Dinah an audience and refocalize the rape event 
through her eyes?  In other words, can Dinah’s silence at last be broken?   
Some biblical scholars, alas, have answered this question with an emphatic ‘no’.  
Thus, for example, Meir Sternberg appears to cast doubt on the veracity of any 
interpretive approach to Genesis 34, which attempts to read the narrative from a 
perspective other than that of the narrator himself.  While recognising Dinah’s 
silence within this text, he argues that interpretive readings must simply accept this 
silence, even if it comes at the expense of perpetuating patriarchal ideologies, which 
reduce women to voiceless, passive sexual objects.11  If interpreters find such an 
ideology ‘unpalatable’, argues Sternberg, then they ‘nevertheless must swallow it as 
a sociohistorical premise for the nonce, a reading directive on a par with all others, 
and take comfort from the progress made since’.12  If, however, readers are still 
unwilling to do this, and insist upon searching for Dinah’s voice within this text, 
                                                
8 Ibid.   
9 Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 47; Esther Fuchs, Sexual Politics in the Biblical Narrative: 
Reading the Hebrew Bible as a Woman (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 219; Sheres, 
109; Leslie, 8; Marie Marshall Fortune, Sexual Violence: The Unmentionable Sin (Cleveland: Pilgrim 
Press, 1983), 51; Ulrike Bail, “The Breath after the Comma: Psalm 55 and Violence Against 
Women”, Journal of Religion and Abuse 1 (1999): 7; Frank Yamada, “Dealing with Rape (in) 
Narrative (Genesis 34): Ethics of the Other and a Text in Conflict”, in The Meanings We Choose: 
Hermeneutical Ethics, Indeterminacy and the Conflict of Interpretation, ed. Charles H. Cosgrove 
(London: T&T Clark, 2004), 164; Molly Dragiewicz, “Women’s Voices, Women’s Words: Reading 
Acquaintance Rape Discourse”, in Feminist Interpretations of Mary Daly, ed. Sarah Lucia Hoagland 
and Marilyn Frye (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2000), 204, 209. 
10 Patricia Laurence, “Women’s Silence as a Ritual of Truth: A Study of Literary Expression in 
Austen, Brönte, and Woolf”, in Listening to Silences: New Essays in Feminist Criticism, ed. Elaine 
Hedges and Shelly Fisher Fishkin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 156.   
11 Sternberg, “Biblical Poetics and Sexual Politics”, 480. 
12 Ibid.   
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their only option, he suggests, is to abandon biblical interpretation and re-write the 
text, ‘fiction-maker style’.13  Paul Noble concurs, suggesting that any attempts to fill 
in the narrative gaps left by Dinah’s silence are simply an exercise in ‘feminist 
fictions’.14  While he has no inherent objection to scholars ‘authoring the secret 
diaries of Dinah’, he does not believe that such an exercise ought to be recognised as 
making any worthwhile contribution to the hermeneutical debate.15  Sharing a 
similar, though slightly more sympathetic, perspective as Sternberg and Noble, John 
Van Seters likewise voices doubts as to whether the reader can break Dinah’s silence 
and thus participate in an interpretive dialogue with her.  Although he admits to 
being ‘uncomfortable’ with her narrative silencing, he admits, ‘I cannot invent a 
voice for Dinah, which the social history suggests she does not have’.16   
Thus, according to scholars such as Noble, Sternberg, and Van Seters, it is 
imprudent, if not anachronistic even to attempt to recover the voices of biblical rape 
survivors, such as Dinah.  Appealing to an empiricist positivist epistemology, which 
insists upon searching for the historical or ‘original’ meaning of the text by using a 
wholly literal and disinterested hermeneutic of interpretation,17 they maintain that 
any interpretive approach to Genesis 34 has to remain constrained within the 
limitations of the historical and ideological framework of the narrative itself.  It has 
naught to do with the ‘woman-shaped’ blanks and silences within that narrative – 
blanks and silences, which, according to this argument, are of no hermeneutical 
value and which thereby ought to remain unfilled. 
Yet, to quote the 17th Century French philosopher Blaise Pascal, ‘The eternal silence 
of these infinite spaces terrifies me’.18  I am referring, of course, not to the heavens, 
as Pascal was, but to the ‘infinite spaces’ within the text and traditions of Genesis 
34, where, instead of hearing Dinah’s voice, we are confronted by a silence that is 
absolute.  Adhering to the methodological constraints endorsed by Sternberg, Noble, 
                                                
13 Ibid., 481. 
14 Paul Noble, “A ‘Balanced’ Reading of the Rape of Dinah: Some Exegetical and Methodological 
Observations”, Biblical Interpretation 4 (1996): 199. 
15 Ibid., 199-203. 
16 John Van Seters, “The Silence of Dinah (Genesis 34)”, in Jacob: Commentaire à plusieures voix de 
Gen. 25-36; Mélanges offerts à Albert de Pury, ed. Jean-Daniel Macchi and Thomas Römer (Geneva: 
Labor et Fides, 2001), 247.   
17 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1999), 24, 41-42; Susanne Scholz, “‘Back Then It Was Legal’: The Epistemological 
Imbalance in Readings of Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Rape Legislation”, Journal of Religion 
and Abuse 7, (2005): 5-29. 
18 ‘Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie’.  From Blaise Pascal, Penseés: Edition de Ch.-
M des Granges, section 2, no.206 (Paris: Garnier Fréres, 1964), 131. 
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and Van Seters only serves to ensure that this silence remains unchallenged, simply 
accepted as an inevitable socio-historical feature of the culture in which this ancient 
text was written.19  I strongly believe however that, in spite of their protestations, 
both the patriarchal discourse of this narrative and its interpretive traditions can and 
should be taken to task for this perpetual silencing of Dinah.  I will now explain why 
I believe that this is so important. 
In the first place, and contrary to Sternberg’s assertions, there really is nothing to 
stop a biblical interpreter from ‘spitting out’, rather than ‘swallowing’ any 
‘unpalatable’ ideology that they encounter within the biblical material.  As literary 
theorist Wayne Booth argues, no text, however ancient or esteemed, ought to be 
elevated into, what he terms, ‘a purified and hence invulnerable kingdom’, which is 
immune from the rigors of ethical criticism.20  The literary word is, after all, never 
merely a static mirror image of the historical, social, political, and religious context 
in which it was written, nor does it ever leave the reader either untouched or 
unchanged by the reading process.21  Rather, all texts speak to their readers through 
the values and ideologies that shaped them, the author using words as a medium by 
which to encourage his audience to endorse and perpetuate the rhetoric of his writing 
within their own cultural milieu.22  However, there is no imperative on the reader 
simply to accept such rhetoric, or to use it as the only source of reference from 
which to uncover meaning.  Indeed, according to Booth, there is instead an ethical 
demand for the responsible reader to criticise and challenge ‘unpalatable’ texts, 
revealing their inherent articulation of injustices, and recognising their potential to 
                                                
19 Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Feminist Interpretation: A Method of Correlation”, in Feminist 
Interpretation of the Bible, ed. Letty M. Russell (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 112-13. 
20 Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1988), 152-53. 
21 Ibid., 91, 153; J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, and 
Benjamin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 8; Catharine Belsey and Jane Moore, 
introduction to The Feminist Reader, ed. Catharine Belsey and Jane Moore (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 1997), 2. 
22 J. Hillis Miller, 8; Belsey and Moore, 2; M.H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms (Fort Worth: 
Harcourt Brace, 1999), 88, 90; Pam Morris, Literature and Feminism: An Introduction, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), 28, 114.  Similar thoughts are expressed, with particular reference to the biblical 
texts, by Katheryn Pfisterer Darr,  Far More Precious than Jewels: Perspectives on Biblical Women 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1991), 40; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Wisdom 
Ways: Introducing Feminist Biblical Interpretation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001), 4; and 
“Feminist Hermeneutics”, in Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: 
Doubleday, 1992), 2:785; Fuchs, Sexual Politics, 12-13; Ruether, 114; Gayle Greene and Coppélia 
Kahn, “Feminist Scholarship and the Social Construction of Woman”, in Making a Difference: 




perpetuate these injustices within the reader’s own contemporary context.23  As 
Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza likewise asserts, ‘Stories are never just descriptive but 
always also prescriptive.  Hence they must be analysed not only for what they tell 
but also for what they presume to pass over in silence … We must search for the 
submerged and untold part of the story, its inscribed contradictions, silences, and 
persuasive strategy’.24 
Keen to follow Booth’s call to read responsibly has therefore led me to adopt a 
feminist25 hermeneutical approach to the Genesis 34 narrative.  Such a methodology 
recognises that the biblical narratives are by no means impartial with regards their 
representation of the sexes; rather, they are the product of patriarchal  ideologies and 
gender stereotypes, which contribute in no small way to the perpetuation of 
                                                
23 Booth, 152-53, 489.  Booth cites an anonymous quotation at the end of his book, which sums up 
this point very well: ‘It is almost impossible to think of any narrative, among those that get 
themselves attended to at all, that do not implicitly raise us up from the dirt and mould us into created 
creatures of some kind of spirit … Which is to say that we all dwell in a world in which ethical 
criticism is not only possible; it is required’ (501-2).  See also Maggie Humm, “Feminist Literary 
Theory”, in Contemporary Feminist Theories, ed. Stevi Jackson and Jackie Jones (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 194; Annette Kolodny, “Dancing in the Minefields: Some 
Observations on the Theory, Practice, and Politics of a Feminist Literary Criticism”, in Feminisms: 
An Anthology of Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 184-85. 
24 Fiorenza, Wisdom Ways, 157.  
25 The terms ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’ are so diverse that they are incredibly difficult to define in 
simple or concise terms; as David Rutledge has pointed out, we may be more accurate to talk of 
‘feminisms’, given the multiplicity of meaning that these terms can convey (Reading Marginally: 
Feminism, Deconstruction and the Bible [Leiden: Brill, 1996], 10).  However, at the risk of 
oversimplifying such a complex concept, I tend to adopt the concise definition offered by Trible, who 
states that feminism is a ‘critique of culture in light of misogyny’ (God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality 
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978], 7).  That is, it is a personal and political reaction against the 
cultural prioritisation of patriarchy and the concomitant sexism, inequality, and injustice suffered by 
women as the result of socially constructed gender differentiation.  Furthermore, feminist criticism is 
not a unified epistemology; it uses multiple methodologies, depending on what questions are being 
addressed.  However, I would adopt Kolodny’s definition of feminist criticism as a useful ‘umbrella’ 
term for what I believe is the essence of feminist biblical interpretation: ‘All the feminist is asserting, 
then, is her own equivalent right to liberate new (and perhaps different) significances from these same 
texts; and at the same time, her right to choose which features of a text she takes as relevant because 
she is, after all, asking new and different questions of it.  In the process, she claims neither 
definitiveness nor structural completeness for her different readings and reading systems, but only 
their usefulness’ (183).  For further discussion, see Heather A. McKay, “On the Future of Feminist 
Biblical Criticism”, in  A Feminist Companion to Reading the Bible: Approaches, Methods and 
Strategies, ed. Athalya Brenner and Carole Fontaine (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 62; 
Morris, 1; Fokkelein van Dijk-Hemmes, “Reading the Bible ‘as a Woman’”, in The Double Voice of 
Her Desire: Texts by Fokkelein  van Dijk-Hemmes, ed. Jonneke Bekkenkamp and Freda Dröes, trans. 
David E. Orton (Leiden: Deo, 1995), 135; Phyllis A. Bird, “What Makes a Feminist Reading 
Feminist?  A Qualified Answer”, in Escaping Eden: New Feminist Perspectives on the Bible, ed. 
Harold C. Washington, Susan Lochrie Graham, and Pamela Thimmes (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1998), 124-31; Pamela Thimmes, “What Makes a Feminist Reading Feminist?  Another 
Perspective”, in Washington, Graham, and Thimmes, 132-40.  For an excellent overview of some of 
the methodological approaches to feminist biblical interpretation, see Eryl W. Davies, The Dissenting 
Reader: Feminist Approaches to the Hebrew Bible (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), especially 17-54. 
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women’s silencing and marginalisation.26  Feminist criticism therefore encourages 
readers not to acquiesce to the authority of the text’s unpalatable androcentric and at 
times misogynist literary representations, but rather makes a moral claim on them to 
subvert this authority, and to hold up these representations for scrutiny and critical 
evaluation.27  As Davies contends: 
To accept the value statements of the text in utter passivity, without allowing oneself 
the freedom to reflect critically upon its claims and to question its assumptions is 
merely to foster a sense of complacency … The task of the reader, therefore, is to 
engage in a vigorous dialogue and debate with the Hebrew Bible, resisting statements 
that appear to be morally objectionable, and taking a critical stance against what he or 
she may regard as the excesses of the biblical text.28  
By approaching the text with such a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’,29 the reader 
therefore becomes, in the words of Judith Fetterley, a ‘resisting reader’, who can 
unpick the strands of androcentric rhetoric and expose its inherent injustices towards 
                                                
26 Humm, 194; Luise Schottroff, Silvia Schroer, and Marie-Theres Wacker, Feministische Exegese: 
Forschungserträge zur Bibel aus der Perspektive von Frauen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1995), 49; Davies, 53; Mary Jacobus, “The Difference of View”, in Belsey and 
Moore, 69. 
27 Schottroff, Schroer, and Wacker, 52; Rutledge, 13; Davies, 45, 47, 55; Alice Bach, “Reading 
Allowed: Feminist Biblical Criticism Approaching the Millennium”, Currents in Research: Biblical 
Studies 1 (1993): 196; Judith Fetterley, The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American 
Fiction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), xx, xxii; Toril Moi, “Feminist, Female, 
Feminine”, in Belsey and Moore, 105; Mary Ann Tolbert, “Defining the Problem: The Bible and 
Feminist Hermeneutics”, Semeia 28 (1983): 19-20; Adele Reinhartz, “Feminist Criticism and Biblical 
Studies on the Verge of the Twenty-First Century”, in Brenner and Fontaine, 177-8; van Dijk-
Hemmes, “Reading the Bible”, 133; Pamela J. Milne, “Towards Feminist Companionship: The Future 
of Feminist Biblical Studies and Feminism”, in Brenner and Fontaine, 58; Ruether, 116; Kolodny, 
183; Patrocinio P. Schweickart, “Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of Reading”, in 
Warhol and Herndl, 615-16; Greene and Khan, 27-28. 
28 Davies, 46-47.   
29 Reading with a hermeneutics of suspicion attempts both to uncover the implicit and often 
impalpable patriarchal agenda of the text and thus to offer a corrective to the androcentric perspective 
evident within the text, by laying bare its partialities and value systems and thus recovering women’s 
voices from the marginal positions that they inhabit.  It therefore deconstructs the ‘politics of 
otherness’ that are often ascribed to gender relations within the text in order to provide a fresh reading 
that refuses to accept the misogynist and phallocentric value systems, which the author presents as 
‘normative’ or ‘universal’.  Thus, in the words of Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, a hermeneutics of 
suspicion seeks ‘to explore the liberating or oppressive values and visions inscribed in the text by 
identifying the androcentric-patriarchal character and dynamics of the text and its interpretations’.  In 
But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), 57.  For 
further discussion on reading with a hermeneutics of suspicion, see also Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, 
Bread Not Stone: The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984), 
14, 112; and Wisdom Ways, 156, 175; and “Feminist Hermeneutics”, 785; Abrams, 127; Fuchs, 
Sexual Politics,17; Davies, 52-53, 89; Ruether, 114; Bible and Culture Collective,  The Postmodern 




women.30  For, as Mary Jacobus has pointed out, women’s voices within literary 
traditions are all too often ‘located in the gaps, the absences, the unsayable or 
unrepresentable of discourse and representation’.31  Feminist biblical criticism 
therefore attempts to redress this injustice by searching within these ‘women-
shaped’ gaps and absences and reclaiming both women’s subjectivity and their 
narrative space, so that their lost and stifled voices can at last be heard.32  In the 
words of Judith Fetterley, ‘Feminist criticism represents the discovery/recovery of a 
voice, a unique and uniquely powerful voice’.33 
Thus, with regards Genesis 34, the resisting reader treats Dinah as the subject of her 
own discourse, rather than the object of androcentric interpretive concerns.34  
Moreover, such a reader insists that her objectification and her silencing within the 
text demands an ethical response, for such silence does not merely signify an 
absence from textual consideration, but is, in its own right, a violating act of female 
repression.35  Simply reiterating the patriarchal ideologies of the author, as the 
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methodology endorsed by Sternberg, Noble, and Van Seters would necessitate, 
cannot be ethically sustained.  For, to read this narrative uncritically is essentially 
tantamount to capitulating to and thus sanctioning its cultural tolerance of women’s 
marginalisation, and its tacit acquiescence to violence against women.36  As John 
Winkler, a literary critic, asserts, ‘if our critical faculties are placed solely in the 
service of elucidating an author’s meaning, then we have already committed 
ourselves to the premises and the protocols of the past … This above all we will not 
do’.37  In other words, unless we begin to listen for the woman’s story, which is 
hidden and suppressed within the confines of the biblical narrative, we become 
nothing less than a voyeur, complicit with the narrator’s androcentric response to 
sexual violence and content to adopt and therefore implicitly endorse his stifling of 
the female voice.38  As feminist poet Adrienne Rich asserts, ‘We need to know the 
writing of the past, and know it differently than we have ever known it; not to pass 
on a tradition but to break its hold over us’.39 
This is not to say however, that attempts to fill in the gaps left by Dinah’s silence 
within this narrative is merely an exercise in ‘feminist fiction-making’, as Noble and 
Sternberg would suggest.  Nor does such a reading offer a contribution that is of any 
less value to the hermeneutical debate surrounding this narrative.  For centuries, the 
dominant approach to biblical interpretation has, under the guise of ‘studied 
neutrality’,40 simply served to reiterate and perpetuate the deeply patriarchal 
ideologies present within the biblical traditions.41  As a result, women’s experiences 
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within the biblical traditions have been consistently overlooked or underrepresented, 
their voices drowned out by the prioritising of the biblical author’s own ideological 
perspective, which simply regards women’s absence and silence as the norm.42  
Such an essentialist and empiricist epistemology, furthermore, has long been 
accorded greater authority and higher hermeneutical value than any other reading, 
claiming to offer definitive, authoritative, and disinterested readings of the biblical 
traditions, which are neither clouded nor distorted by the interpreter’s own 
subjective personal or theological beliefs.43   
However, within today’s postmodern milieu of biblical interpretation, such a 
monopoly on the ‘true meaning’ of a text has been increasingly challenged, while 
the idealisation of interpretive objectivity likewise appears to be ever more illusory.  
Rather, there is increased recognition that the meaning of a particular text for an 
individual or community is not only bound up within the words of that text or even 
within its socio-historical context, but is intricately related to and shaped by the 
values and ideologies, which fashion the reader’s own psychological and cultural 
worldview.  Thus, according to David Rutledge, ‘Meaning becomes situated in the 
contentious realm of conflicting discourses of reading communities, and the 
authority of any reading of any text becomes no more than a function of the 
persuasive ideological force with which it is held in place by the readers who 
produce it’ [original italics].44  Or, as Mieke Bal has noted, ‘Interpretation is never 
objective, never reliable, never free of biases and subjectivity”.45   
Thus, a feminist hermeneutic of interpretation cannot simply be rejected as a 
subjective, and therefore unworthy, attempt to produce ‘fictitious’  misreadings of 
the biblical texts; rather, such a method of reading embraces the contextualised 
nature of all biblical interpretation, while emphasising the central role of the reader 
in the meaning-making process.46  It does not distort texts; rather, it offers 
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innovative ways of looking at these texts, entering them from new critical directions, 
and thus raising up fresh possibilities of meaning that are no less valuable a 
contribution to the hermeneutical debate than any other reading.47  The ancient 
authors’ intentions, their didactic goals, and the ideologies that motivated them to 
record these remarkable and thought-provoking traditions are, after all, forever lost 
to us in the proverbial mists of time.  As biblical scholars and interested readers, we 
are left only to conjecture upon the underlying sense of these texts, to read them and 
to find a significance within them that is meaningful to us.  As Bal further notes, 
‘Texts trigger readings; that is what they are: the occasion of a reaction’.48  And 
what triggers a reaction in us can be, not only what is said within the text, but what 
is omitted; silence, after all, is sometimes as voluminous and as evocative as speech, 
creating within the narrative a subversive subtext, which stands in fascinating 
tension to the main authorial concerns.49  Feminist readings of Genesis 34, which 
attempt to give new value and meaning to Dinah’s silence, are therefore no more 
‘fictitious’ than those proposed by Sternberg and Noble.  Indeed, Sternberg’s and 
Noble’s claim that only certain methodological strategies can make a worthy 
contribution to the hermeneutical debate speaks only of the narrow exclusivism 
inherent within their argument and, furthermore, belies the androcentric subjectivity 
of their own discourse.50  By refusing to address the gaps and silences left by Dinah 
within the narrative of Genesis 34, and by insisting upon giving a platform only to 
the androcentric attitudes of its ancient author, they are effectively nailing their 
ideological colours to the mast, creating their own fictional world, where rape 
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victims make no ethical demands upon our conscience and where these women’s 
voices are not worthy even of our consideration.51   
Secondly, in response to Sternberg’s claim that biblical interpreters can ‘take 
comfort’ from the progress made since the biblical period with regards cultural 
attitudes towards women, I would contend, however, that there is still far too much 
progress yet to be made to excuse the level of complacency endorsed by this remark.  
As amply demonstrated in the testimonies cited at the start of this chapter, the 
stifling of women’s rape experiences and the denial of their suffering are far from 
‘ancient history’.52  Dinah has many silent sisters who, in recent history and up to 
the present day, experience rape but are subsequently denied the opportunity to 
express their pain, grief, and anger and whose status as casualties of sexual violence 
is either reinterpreted or suppressed by the dominant patriarchal discourse.  These 
women’s testimonies of suffering must therefore place an even greater imperative 
upon biblical scholars to challenge the interpretive strategies proposed by Sternberg, 
which would have us disregard the silencing of rape victims within the biblical texts.  
For, as mentioned above, any literary work, which articulates the unjust treatment of 
women, has the potential to act as an instrument of female subjugation, by 
perpetuating, validating, and legitimising patriarchal gender inequality and female 
oppression within the reader’s own contemporary milieu.53  As Patrocinio 
Schweickart has noted, ‘Literature acts on the world by acting on its readers’.54  The 
patriarchal myths and attitudes given voice within the biblical scriptures still 
resonate today within a diversity of contemporary cultures, bearing witness to the 
pervasive and insidious influence, which such ideologies have had and continue to 
have on cultural values and belief systems within patriarchal societies over time and 
space.55  Sternberg’s call to objective empiricism therefore ignores the fact that as 
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biblical interpreters, reading and interpreting these ancient traditions in a ‘global 
rape culture’,56 we have a moral obligation to highlight and confront such textual 
injustices, to raise an awareness of the insidious power that these texts may have 
within whichever community they are read, and to ensure that the narratives of 
biblical rape survivors, such as Dinah, are recognised and remembered.57   
How then, does one begin the task of giving Dinah back her voice, of respecting her 
right to an honest and gynocentric representation?  At first glance, such a task may 
seem well nigh impossible, given the totality of her silencing within this narrative.  
However, one may perhaps take heart from the tale of Philomena, the young woman 
raped by her brother-in-law Tereus in Ovid’s poetic work The Metamorphoses.58  
Philomena threatens to proclaim to heaven and earth the outrage Tereus has 
committed against her, but before she can do so, he cuts out her tongue, and 
imprisons her, silenced and alone, to ensure that no one will ever hear of his crime.  
Nevertheless, Philomena refuses either to be silent, passive, or forgotten; so, taking 
up a loom and shuttle, she weaves a tapestry depicting her rape, which eventually, 
others will see and know exactly what she has suffered.  Can we as readers empower 
Dinah to weave a tapestry for us? 
Thankfully, a number of biblical interpreters, including myself, believe that this 
question can be answered in the affirmative.  In order to begin the weaving, 
however, we have to start focalizing Dinah’s rape through the medium of her own 
silence, recognising her voicelessness, not as an inevitable rhetorical feature of a 
patriarchal narrative but as a feature within that narrative, which contributes to and is 
intrinsic to her suffering, and which therefore may be a source of insight into her 
ordeal.59  Recognising this will allow the reader to grant a deeper significance to 
Dinah’s narrative elision, understanding it, not simply as a signal for the reader to 
likewise ignore her, but as an added source of her abuse.  As Patricia Laurence, a 
feminist literary critic, explains: 
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 ‘If reality is perceived according to the established patriarchal values, then 
women’s silence, viewed from the outside, is a mark of absence and powerlessness 
… If, however, the same silence is viewed from the inside, and women’s 
experiences and disposition of mind inform the standard of what is real, then 
women’s silence can be viewed as a presence, and as a text waiting to be read’.60 
Through the creation of such a rhetoric of silence, we as readers of Gen. 34 can 
therefore generate a space in which we can, by the power of our own imaginings, 
stand in solidarity and empathy with Dinah, reflecting upon her fear, pain, and 
suffering.61  That is, by appealing to the witnesses and testimonies to the silencing of 
contemporary rape survivors, we may be granted insight into the significance of 
Dinah’s own silence and the terrible suffering that lies hidden behind her 
voicelessness.  We may thereby begin to ask and suggest answers to questions that 
have heretofore so rarely been addressed in the interpretive traditions of this 
narrative.  For example, we might ask, how would Dinah have felt about her 
imposed silence, about having no opportunity to share her story?  How would the 
fact that her brothers appeared more concerned about family honour than about her 
wellbeing have affected her?  What emotions would have enveloped her when, in 
the aftermath of her brutal assault, her rapist showered her with endearments, 
insisting that she was to become his wife?  By focalising the rape through Dinah’s 
eyes, we enable her to transcend the patriarchal ideologies of the text to become the 
subject of her own discourse.  Her suffering can thus be articulated despite, or to be 
more accurate, precisely because of her suppression within the text, as it is her very 
suppression that speaks out so clearly about the full horror of her experience.62  As 
Nehama Aschkenasy so powerfully puts it, ‘Only if we reread Dinah’s wordless 
absence as a scream can we do her justice’.63 
 
In the following chapters, I therefore plan to take a journey through ancient and 
contemporary patriarchal cultures, contemplating the commonality of rape 
survivors’ experiences across space and time and, in particular, evaluating the 
insidious and pervasive influences of patriarchy, which have long served to deny 
these women a voice with which to be heard.  In Chapter 1, I will consider some of 
the common contemporary cultural attitudes and misperceptions regarding sexual 
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violence, commonly known as ‘rape myths’, which appear to be rooted within the 
deeply entrenched gender stereotypes of patriarchal cultures the world over, and 
which survivors of sexual violence regard as lying at the very heart of their own 
voicelessness.  The following four chapters will then focus in turn upon some of 
these rape myths; I will examine the means by which they silence victims of sexual 
violence, before evaluating whether they are likewise given voice within both the 
text and interpretive traditions of Genesis 34.  If these myths do appear to be 
represented within this narrative, I will then consider the impact that they may 
likewise have had upon Dinah’s own experience of her violation and thus, upon her 
ability to share her story.  Moreover, I will evaluate the representations of Dinah in 
her ‘interpretive afterlife’,64 assessing the ways in which biblical interpreters, some 
contemporary, some ancient, may or may not appeal  to these same myths in order 
both to attend to her silence and make sense of her experience.  My intentions thus 
are twofold: I want to paint a picture of the world in which Dinah lived through her 
sexual assault, by casting light upon the attitudes and ideologies that she would have 
faced from others within her own community.  In addition, I will also consider the 
narrative world, which Dinah continues to occupy in the minds of those who read 
her story, looking at the responses she has received and continues to receive from 
within this community.  By doing so, I hope to develop a deeper insight into Dinah’s 
own experience of her ordeal, in order that we can better comprehend the 
meaningfulness and complexity of her silence and grant to it a rich and new 
meaning.   
As a final caveat, however, I must emphasise that, while I am attempting to give 
Dinah a voice through which she can express her emotions and experiences to us, I 
cannot claim that the emotions and experiences, which I attribute to her, are 
definitive or authoritative.  For, although history bears witness to the fact that 
women’s experience of coercive sexual aggression is a universal phenomenon 
within patriarchal cultures spanning both time and space, the ways in which these 
women define and make sense of their experiences has been and always will be 
affected and shaped by the particular meaning and significance accorded to rape 
within their specific culture.65  I am therefore the first to admit that, living in a 
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culture so temporally and geographically far removed from that of biblical Israel, my 
own understanding of Dinah’s experiences will by no means capture all of the 
nuances of meaning surrounding sexual violence, which she may have encountered 
within her own biblical community.       
However, such an admission does not necessarily preclude my proposed discourse 
regarding the cross-cultural relatedness of women’s rape experiences.66  While both 
biblical and contemporary conceptualisations of sexual violence are constructs of the 
historical, political, religious, and social idiosyncrasies dominant within their 
respective milieus, it is nevertheless true that the differences between these 
conceptualisations should not be overestimated.  As I hope to show in the following 
chapters, the myths, assumptions, and misperceptions, which are prevalent within so 
many contemporary patriarchal cultures, and which contribute to the silencing of 
rape survivors therein, would appear to demonstrate a terrible timelessness and 
tenacity.  Many are given ample voice within the biblical material and it is this same 
voice, which continues to echo strongly in our own societies and communities today.  
I am therefore confident that, despite utilising such a distinctly contemporary 
witness to sexual violence as a hermeneutical key, I will nonetheless be able to shed 
a little light and understanding upon Dinah’s rape experience.  For, to paraphrase 
Qoheleth, it would appear that with regard to cultural responses towards sexual 
violence, there really is nothing very new under the sun (Qoh. 1.9). 
Finally, I must also point out that, throughout this work, I have cited, on occasion, 
the testimonies of contemporary rape survivors as a means of better understanding 
Dinah’s own experiences of sexual violence.  Listening to these women’s accounts 
of their own silencing and the way that their violation becomes redefined and 
rewritten within the patriarchal discourse of their culture, brings an added clarity and 
prominence to the fact that women’s elision from their own rape narrative does 
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Rape, ed. Cheryl Brown Travis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 363-81; John J. Pilch, “Family 
Violence in Cross-Cultural Perspective: An Approach for Feminist Interpreters of the Bible”, in 
Brenner and Fontaine, 319; Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, “‘You May Enjoy the Spoil of Your 
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Consideration of Language”, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 28 (2004): 298. 
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contribute in no small way to their trauma and pain.  By appealing to the courageous 
witness of these women, I am however sensitive to the fact that words alone are 
woefully incapable of capturing the full depth of horror that they have endured.  As 
a Caucasian, European woman, who has never experienced the awfulness of sexual 
violence first-hand, I realise that rape survivors, living within patriarchal cultures the 
world over, both now and in the past, could bring their own diverse experiences to 
bear upon Dinah’s story, thus enabling her to weave many differing, but equally 
rich, vibrant, and authentic tapestries, which depict, in their eyes, her narrative of 
suffering.  Throughout this work, I have attempted to represent these women’s 
voices with sincerity and integrity; however, I accept that my own interpretation of 
their terrible discourses of suffering can never adequately express the full 
significance of their words.  My reading can therefore only ever be a partial reading, 
and the voice that I give to Dinah represents but one of many possible voices with 


















‘He sat very close to me and said no one would believe me.  I’d lose 
everything.  I was now his, no other man would want me.  It was 
impossible to force a girl.  I must have wanted it because he had 
been able to do it’.1 
‘I just wanted to block it out.  I felt ashamed because it happened.  I 
just felt dirty, violated.  I thought it was my fault.  It wasn’t like he 
did something to me, it was like I let him do something to me, so I 
felt very bad about myself … who would believe me?  He was a 
really great football player.  No one would have believed me if I 
said anything’.2 
 
Under contemporary law, determining whether a sexual deed constitutes the criminal 
act of rape is based solely upon establishing the woman’s lack of consent; the social 
context and circumstances within which the alleged assault occurred have no legal 
bearing upon this decision.3  However, in reality, a number of ubiquitous and 
pernicious extra-legal factors have, over the centuries, played a dominant role in 
shaping and informing societies’ definition, interpretation, and evaluation of sexual 
violence.4  These factors, termed by feminists as ‘rape myths’, comprise ‘prejudicial, 
stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists’,5 and are 
                                                
1 Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (London: Women’s Press, 2002), 12. 
2 Cited in Robin Warshaw, I Never Called it Rape: The Ms. Report on Recognising, Fighting, and 
Surviving Date and Acquaintance Rape (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), 30. 
3 K. L’Armand and A. Pepitone, “Judgments of Rape: A Study of Victim-Rapist Relationship and 
Victim Sexual History”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8 (1982):134; Rebecca Campbell 
and Camille R. Johnson, “Police Officers’ Perceptions of Rape: Is There a Consistency between State 
Law and Individual Beliefs?” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 12 (1997): 259; A. Daniel Yarmey, 
“Older and Younger Adults’ Attributions of Responsibility toward Rape Victims and Rapists”, 
Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 17 (1985): 328. 
4 Linda A. Fairstein, Sexual Violence: Our War Against Rape (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, 1993), 13; Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: 
Fawcett Books,1993),  312; Martha R. Burt, “Cultural Myths and Support for Rape”, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 38 (1980): 217; Colleen A. Ward, Attitudes Toward Rape: 
Feminist and Social Psychological Perspectives (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 3, 24. 
5 Burt, “Cultural Myths”, 217. 
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internalised by a great many individuals and institutions within patriarchal societies, 
including law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, medical services, the media, and, 
not least, the public – in other words, all those who constitute the services and 
networks intended to support and seek justice for victims of sexual violence.6   
What, then, are these rape myths?  Well, if we look at the two testimonies of rape 
survivors, quoted above, some of the most common myths, which shape 
contemporary attitudes towards sexual violence, are illustrated therein.  These 
include the belief that there is no such thing as rape, that rape is little more than 
normative consensual sexual intercourse, that women are to blame for their rape, 
that they make up false allegations of rape, and that they are, in their own eyes and 
in the eyes of others, devalued by their rape experience.  With regards the rapist, 
there is also a common misperception that he will be unknown to the victim and will 
inevitably present as a social misfit or a mentally-deranged psychopath.  ‘Normal’ 
men, it is maintained, do not commit rape, or at least, not without good reason; any 
woman who claims that she was sexually assaulted by an otherwise respectable 
member of the community is therefore either making a false accusation or is 
understood to have ‘driven’ this man to such an extreme form of sexual behaviour 
through the excesses of her own capricious promiscuity.  These myths therefore 
make assumptions about the victim’s character, respectability, and worthiness, while 
refuting both the seriousness of sexual violence and the rapist’s moral culpability for 
this crime.  As Liz Kelly notes,  
These ideas combine, interact and lead to stereotypes of which men commit 
sexual violence, which women/girls it occurs to, at the same time as offering a 
form of causal explanation.  They may deny the violence, normalise it or 
pathologise the offender and/or the abused woman, resulting in both the 
deflection of responsibility from men and the denial of women’s experience.7   
Thus, people who internalise rape myths, who hold them to be an accurate reflection 
of the realities of sexual violence, will inevitably redefine and re-evaluate rape, the 
rapist, and the rape victim through the particular lens of these discriminatory, 
                                                
6 Ibid.; Hubert S. Feild, “Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, Crisis 
Counsellors and Citizens”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (1978): 156, 169, 176; 
Barbara Krahé, “Victim and Observer Characteristics as Determinants of Responsibility Attributions 
to Victims of Rape”, Journal of Applied Social Psychology 18 (1988): 50; Ward, 2, 25-27; Kelly, 
Surviving Sexual Violence, 157; Susan Roth and Leslie Lebowitz, “The Experience of Sexual 
Trauma”, Journal of Traumatic Stress 1 (1988): 85; Julia R. Schwendinger and Herman 
Schwendinger, “Rape Myths: In Legal, Theoretical, and Everyday Practice”, Crime and Social Justice 
1 (1974): 18; Joan McGregor, Is it Rape?  Rape and Taking Women’s Consent Seriously (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005), 35-37. 
7 Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence, 34-6; Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: 
Routledge, 1989), 26. 
21 
 
stereotyped, and essentially false ideologies.  As a result, if a sexually aggressive 
event does not conform to these preconceived notions, they may refuse to interpret it 
as a criminal act of rape, whilst blaming the victim and exonerating the rapist of any 
wrongdoing.8  For example, although far more common than stranger rape, 
acquaintance rape and intimate partner violence are less likely to be perceived by 
others as ‘real rape’ than an incident of sexual violence by a stranger, despite the 
fact that they are equally as traumatic for the victim.9  This is in no small part due to 
the erroneous myth that rapists are usually unknown to the victim and because of the 
(equally erroneous) propensity to contextualise sexual violence between 
acquaintances strictly within a milieu of consensual and normative heterosexual 
activity.10  As Martha Burt notes, ‘Accepting or believing rape myths leads to a 
more restrictive definition of rape and is thus rape-supportive, because such beliefs 
deny the reality of many actual rapes’.11   
Thus, rape myths are far from harmless misconceptions or misunderstandings; they 
are pernicious, dangerous, and deeply influential beliefs, which undermine the 
reality of criminal violence against women, and make the community in which 
women live a far more perilous place.12  In doing so, they therefore contribute to the 
subversion of a woman’s right to her bodily integrity, peace of mind, and freedom, 
                                                
8 Ward, 79; Feild, 156; Fairstein, 99, 134; Martha R. Burt, “Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape”, in 
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Seibel, “Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: Are There Differences in the Victim’s Experience?”, 
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not to mention any adequate recourse to justice and protection from the law.13  For 
far too long, they have been allowed to affect women’s likelihood of reporting their 
rape, the processing of their complaints by law enforcement agencies and the 
criminal justice system, and the support that they are offered (or, in some cases, not 
offered) by both professional and lay groups and organisations within the 
community.14  Survivors are far less likely to break their silence about rape or report 
their assault to the authorities, because they are loath to endure the doubt, stigma, 
blame, and shame that they fear will be heaped upon them as the result of the 
ubiquity of rape myths within their community.15  Furthermore, women who do 
report their rape to the authorities have no guarantee that their accusation will be 
taken seriously or that their rapist will be convicted.  What is guaranteed however is 
that they will almost certainly face some degree of hostility, blame, and scepticism 
during every step of the reporting and trial process, as their testimonies are re-
interpreted through the influence of these rape myths.16  The consequences for these 
                                                
13 Camille E. LeGrand, “Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law”, in Forcible Rape: The 
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women can be devastating, impeding their recovery and healing, and allowing the 
effects of the original trauma to be perpetuated or intensified.17  In effect, and as will 
be highlighted in the following chapters, rape myths can make victims of sexual 
violence feel re-victimised and re-violated; indeed, such is their insidious power 
within societies that a great number of women describe the social, judicial, and 
community response that they face after their rape as a ‘second assault’ or ‘second 
rape’.18 As Joyce Williams explains, ‘victims are social creations – products not just 
of criminal action on the part of an offender, or even of the dynamics between 
offender and victim.  Victims are also created, in a secondary process, by the 
responses which community and society make to their initial experience.  Thus, 
society and community also become offenders’.19 
If, however, rape myths are not only false but also so very harmful, why then do 
they remain an intrinsic and dominant feature of cultural interpretations of sexual 
violence within a considerable number of patriarchal societies?  The answer to this 
question most likely lies in the fact that these myths are intricately connected to the 
traditional gender expectations and sex role stereotypes, which are deeply 
entrenched within the cultural consciousness and history of these societies and 
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which are therefore highly resistant to change.20  These stereotypes are essentially 
founded upon an adherence to the ‘expected’ social and behavioural roles attributed 
to both males and females within a particular society; that is, they dictate which 
sexual behaviours are deemed appropriate, normative, and acceptable for both sexes 
to engage in.21 Gendered sexuality is therefore a cultural construct, the product of 
socially learned values and attitudes within a particular culture at a particular time in 
history.22  In other words, sexual behaviour patterns considered normative for both 
males and females are defined and given meaning by the culture within which they 
are located and are dependent on the beliefs and assumptions embedded within that 
culture’s dominant ideological framework.  In this sense, they are socially scripted, 
rather than determined solely by biological or innate factors.23  As Kimmel notes, 
‘Sexual beings are made, not born’.24   
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Thus, for example, these stereotypes and gender expectations endorse the belief that, 
‘by nature’, females ought to be both sexually submissive and chaste.25  As the 
valuable sexual property of the males under whose authority they exist, women carry 
the weight of responsibility for guarding their sexual integrity and sexual worth, and 
must therefore avoid any risk of their sexuality being exploited and ‘devalued’ by 
another more sexually aggressive and dominant male.26  The ideal feminine 
sexuality is therefore both passive and resisting; it is considered inappropriate and 
unacceptable for a woman to initiate a sexual encounter or to take an active role in 
selecting a sexual partner of her choice.27  Women who eschew these feminine 
norms and opt instead to exercise the strictly male prerogative of sexual freedom 
will face social opprobrium from within the patriarchal culture to which they belong, 
not to mention their moral and  sexual reputation suffering often irreparable damage.  
For, only chaste women are of social ‘value’, according to these gender expectations 
and sex role stereotypes, whereas women who have had multiple male partners or 
who have freely engaged in sexual relationships outwith matrimony are relegated to 
the status of  ‘loose women’, ‘sluts’, or ‘whores’.28   
This cultural imperative towards feminine sexual passivity, submissiveness, and 
chastity does not however apply likewise to normative ideations about masculine 
sexual behaviour.  On the contrary, patriarchal gender stereotypes conceptualise 
male sexuality as innately dominant, aggressive, proactive, and controlling; there is 
no imperative towards male chastity, indeed, men are expected to ‘sow their wild 
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oats’ liberally and without fear of recrimination.29  Furthermore, sex role stereotypes 
suggest that males have innate and biologically driven sexual needs, which cannot 
be controlled and which ought not to be suppressed; the concomitant expectation 
that females will display a reluctance to meet these needs thereby functions as a 
natural validation of a distinctly coercive and aggressive masculine sexuality.30   
How, then, are these traditional expectations about gender and sexuality related to 
rape myths?  Well, it is now widely accepted that people who adopt these dominant 
cultural expectations about male and female sexuality also have a propensity to 
subscribe to rape myths.31  In effect, these traditional values and perceptions about 
gendered sexual behaviour, which are pervasive within the legal, religious, social, 
and political institutions of patriarchal cultures, endorse and validate rape myths, and 
together, they facilitate both the perpetuation of a rape-supportive culture and the 
concomitant subversion of a woman’s right to her social, moral, and sexual 
autonomy.32  Within a rape culture, the inherent violence of gender relatedness, that 
is, the acceptance of coercion and physical aggression within a sexual context, is 
regarded as neither immoral nor criminal but is instead tolerated as an acceptable 
form of normative heterosexuality; rape, in effect, becomes equated with sex.33  
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1994), 162; Kenneth Plummer, “The Social Uses of Sexuality: Symbolic Interaction, Power and 
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Female vulnerability and male sexual aggression are thereby represented as 
universal and natural gender ideals, rather than the cultural constructs of a 
misogynist and sexist society.  That is, women become the ‘natural’ target for rapists 
and men the ‘natural’ rapists.34  Women therefore cannot escape this culturally 
allotted role, for to be feminine is to be submissive and to be submissive is to defer 
to masculine strength and sexual aggression.35  As Carolyn Schaffer explains, ‘In a 
culture that touts violent, aggressive acts as manly and views weak, submissive 
behaviour as womanly, sexual assault is a logical extension of normal male-female 
relationships’.36   
Furthermore, the traditional conviction that it is a woman’s responsibility to protect 
her sexual chastity, coupled with the concomitant belief in the naturally aggressive 
and uncontrollable temperament of masculine sexuality, provide the essential 
underpinnings to the myth that a rape victim is often culpable for her assault.37  Any 
woman who is deemed not to have adequately protected her sexuality or rendered 
herself vulnerable to unwanted male sexual attention is liable to be held responsible 
for her own victimisation and blamed by her community.  She may be accused of 
precipitating the rape by behaving in a provocative manner that did not conform to 
the expected role of female sexual passivity and chastity, her errant promiscuity 
thereby inflaming the natural and uncontrollable sexual lust of her attacker.38  
Alternatively, she may be attributed culpability because she acted in a manner 
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deemed inappropriate and dangerous for a woman, because it rendered her 
vulnerable to unwanted male sexual attention.39  In essence, any female behaviour, 
which can be construed as either sexually provocative or socially irresponsible, may 
be regarded, within the internal logic of patriarchal gender conceptualisation, as the 
ultimate cause of a woman’s rape.  As a result, women existing within a rape culture 
are expected to ensure their own safety and security by dramatically curtailing their 
freedom to act, dress, move, and speak with the same liberty afforded to men, and, 
ironically enough, by relying on the protection of men, those very individuals who 
create the threat of sexual violence in the first place.40  Their rapists meanwhile are 
granted a licence to eschew their responsibility for this act of criminal aggression by 
appealing to the naturally uncontrollable and voracious appetite of their masculine 
sexuality.   
Finally, the origins of the particularly pernicious myth that raped women are 
‘damaged goods’ may likewise be traced back to the patriarchal sex role stereotypes 
that measure a woman’s value by her sexual chastity and regards women as male 
sexual property.41  An unchaste woman, who loses her virginity outwith marriage or 
who has had multiple extra-marital sexual partners, is deemed intrinsically less 
valuable than a woman whose sexuality remains under the absolute authority and 
ownership of one male, be it her father or husband/partner.42  It therefore follows 
that a woman who has been raped is considered to have been ‘misused’, 
‘blemished’, or ‘devalued’ by her rapist, in that he has subverted her chastity and 
undermined the exclusivity of male proprietary rights.43  That the woman’s 
‘participation’ in this sexually debasing act was totally coerced and achieved 
through violence is a moot point; her chastity has been irreparably damaged and her 
sexual ‘value’ radically undermined. 
Thus, to summarise, within rape-supportive cultures, sexual violence is commonly 
conceptualised, evaluated, and experienced within the profoundly androcentric 
definitional framework of gender stereotypes and rape myths, which, as discussed 
above, undermine the seriousness of this crime, shift the burden of blame from the 
                                                
39 Rozee, “Rape Resistance”, 267. 
40 Ward, 24-5, 88-89; Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime”, 59, 64; Winifred Woodhull, 
“Sexuality, Power, and the Question of Rape”, in Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance, 
ed. Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), 173; Youngs, 
1215; Schaffer, 463; Muehlenhard et al., “Definitions of Rape”, 40. 
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rapist onto the victim, and critically undermine women’s social and sexual 
freedom.44  Furthermore, these sex role stereotypes and the concomitant rape myths 
that they perpetuate and validate, drastically decrease the likelihood that rape will be 
either reported or adequately punished.   In essence, the presence of these deeply 
held beliefs within society fundamentally excludes women from naming or defining 
their own experiences of sexual violence.45  Instead, their voices and their ability to 
give meaning to their ordeal are silenced and suppressed by the male prerogative to 
identify and delineate women’s experiences from the strictly androcentric 
perspective of public discourse, or, as Carol Smart succinctly puts it, ‘a woman is 
not allowed to tell her own story of rape’.46  Even when a woman is enabled to speak 
of her rape, her words are all too often heard and translated through the distorting 
miasma of myths and cultural assumptions about sexual violence and sexuality.47   
Furthermore, such stifling of an intrinsically gynocentric conceptualisation of rape 
through the pervasive and pernicious influence of rape myths has a profound impact 
upon both the community’s response to sexual violence and the victim’s experience 
of it.48  Such is the power and ubiquity of these rape-supportive cultural 
constructions that survivors of sexual violence may likewise access them to make 
sense of their own stories, adopting the concomitant attitudes of self-blame, 
decreased self-worth, and a denial of their own right to sexual autonomy and 
justice.49  As Laura Hengehold notes, ‘By identifying herself as a victim of a crime 
that provokes intense and  often defensive reactions in community members, 
whether they support her or mistrust her, a woman puts herself in the midst of 
confused and conflicting discourses that can overshadow or undermine her own 
understanding of the sexual events that she tries to master through the evaluation of 
“rape”’.50  Living in a rape culture that tolerates and promotes a rape-supportive 
construction of gender can therefore make it very difficult for survivors to cope, to 
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start to feel safe again, to begin to recover autonomy and self-worth, and to heal.51  
A woman’s relationship with the world will be deeply damaged after her rape; she 
will see it as a hostile place, which is suffused with beliefs and attitudes that 
denigrate and devalue her, blame her for her own victimisation, and threaten her 
autonomy, liberty, and self-worth.52  Furthermore, her inability to engage in an 
honest discourse about her rape experience within her own community, because of 
these beliefs and attitudes, will further contribute to her suffering and will impede 
her on the path towards recovery.53  As Adrienne Rich has written:  
Where language and naming are 
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Rape or Seduction?  Shechem’s Sexual Encounter with Dinah in Gen. 34.2 
 
Distinguishing Between Sex and Sexual Violence 
It’s been 21,900 hours, 912 days, 130 Saturday nights, 30 months, 
3 years since October 16, 1988 when I was stunned awake, 
straddled by a man I did not know … Before I was raped, I’d prided 
myself on waking up an alert (sic) that didn’t need the caffeine 
props of coffee and tea.  Afterwards, it’s a daily struggle to come 
into consciousness and realise AGAIN that I didn’t nightmare (sic) 
being raped.  Now, as it did when I was actually being raped, my 
mind scrabbles for a safe place and, finding none, tries to shut off, 
but the strategy is no more effective than it was that gruesome 
night.  No idea how I’ll get out of bed, much less take the ten steps 
from the bedroom I was raped in to the bathroom I’ve become 
afraid to shower in.  Grope for eyeglasses.  Turn off the bedroom 
lamp rape has made a nighttime necessity.  Step over the telephone 
wire the newly installed burglar alarm is hooked up to.  Peer 
blinking as I did the rape night, into the living room.  Tense, heart 
racing, afraid.1 
 ‘I didn’t tell anyone.  In fact, I wouldn’t even admit to myself until 
about four months later when the guilt and fear that had been 
eating at me became too much to hide and I came very close to a 
complete breakdown … There’s no way to describe what was going 
on inside of me.  I was losing control and I’d never been so terrified 
and helpless in my life.  I felt as if my whole world had been kicked 
out from under me and I had been left to drift all alone in the 
darkness.  I had a horrible nightmare in which I relived the rape 
and others which were even worse.  I was terrified of being with 
people and terrified of being alone.  I couldn’t concentrate on 
anything and began falling asleep in classes.  Deciding what to 
                                                
1 Andrea Benton Rushing, “Surviving Rape: A Morning/Mourning Ritual”, in Odem and Clay-
Warner, 6, 14.   
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wear in the morning was enough to make me panic and cry 
uncontrollably.  I was convinced I was going crazy, and I’m still 
convinced I almost did’.2 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, dominant attitudes, stereotypes, and 
ideologies governing the construction of gender within patriarchal societies all too 
often serve to preclude any clear-cut distinction between mutually desired, 
consensual sexual intercourse and the criminal act of sexual violence.3  As Carol 
Smart has remarked, within many contemporary cultures, pressing a woman until 
she submits to having a sexual relationship has come to be regarded as ‘a natural, 
pleasurable phallocentric pastime’.4  Attitudes such as these, however, are also the 
very characteristics, which, in their extreme manifestation, promote sexual assault 
and abuse, as rape comes to be perceived as little more than the result of conformity 
or overconformity to the values and prerogatives, which define the normatively 
insistent and forceful male sex role.5  In cultures where men are taught that a 
woman’s ‘no’ means ‘yes’, women are understood as never really saying ‘no’; men 
internalise this conviction so strongly, they are able to block out a woman’s protests, 
in the belief that, underneath her token resistance, she is as keen as he is.6  Thus, one 
woman who was raped by her boyfriend reported that when she tried to stop him 
having sexual intercourse with her, ‘he acted as if this were a challenge and 
continued to do what he had been doing … When it was over, I was crying and 
hurting.  His only reply was, “You know you liked it”’.7  It is as though, amidst the 
incessant clamour of such aggressive masculine sexuality, the woman’s voice 
inevitably becomes lost, as her words and actions are re-contextualised and 
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reinterpreted according to the gendered sexual stereotypes that are dominant within 
her community.8  As Winifred Woodhull suggests, the sexual autonomy and sexual 
agency of women living within patriarchal societies are devalued to the extent that 
‘men speak their desires for them’.9 
Obviously, this cultural confusion of sexuality and sexual violence will, in turn, have 
a considerable influence upon how societies respond to and make sense of women’s 
narratives about their rape experience.10  All too often, the brutality and 
destructiveness inherent to rape and the injustice underlying its subversion of 
women’s sexual and bodily integrity are overlooked by the institutions and 
individuals, who constitute the victim’s community.11  The police and judiciary,12 
the media,13 the medical professions,14 not to mention lay members of the 
community,15 habitually contextualise rape within the bounds of accepted sexuality, 
thereby failing to recognise that coercive acts of sexual aggression are occasions of 
unlawful assault, which brutalise women on a physical, emotional, and spiritual 
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level.16  As Campbell and Johnson note, within cultures where the boundary 
between sexuality and sexual aggression is so indistinct, ‘violence becomes sexy, 
and sexiness is not criminal’.17  It is little wonder then that rape is one of the most 
underreported crimes; if women are going to be faced with the response from their 
community that rape is little more than a normative expression of sexual desire, who 
is going to take their testimony of suffering seriously?18   
In reality, however, rape has no currency within the realm of acceptable sexuality; it 
is an act of hatred and violence, the crucial objective of which is to subdue and 
subordinate the victim, terrorising her, dominating her, and humiliating her.19  As 
Madigan and Gamble note, rape drastically subverts the expression of sexuality, 
until it is ‘no longer a sacred sharing but hate and power expressed by violence and 
brutality’.20  The personal testimonies of rape survivors, such as those cited at the 
beginning of the chapter, show all too clearly that sexual violence is anything but 
sexy and is a world apart from consensual and mutually desired sexual intercourse.  
Rather, it assaults women to the very core of their physical, psychological, and 
spiritual being, throwing into confusion both their relationship with the world 
around them and their very own sense of self.21  They confront the threat of death 
directly and concretely; they experience raw terror in the realisation of their own 
powerlessness and vulnerability.22  To deny the sheer horror and brutality implicit 
within the act of rape is to undermine radically the victim’s ordeal, minimise and 
silence the reality of her suffering, and deny her status as the wounded casualty of a 
truly terrible atrocity.23      
Nevertheless, to call rape simply an act of brutality or aggression does not fully 
capture the full nature and horror of this crime.  Nor does such a radical separation 
of violence and sexuality challenge or confront the power of the cultural 
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construction of masculinity, which consistently normalises male sexual aggression.24  
To be sure, rape cannot simply be equated with consensual sexual behaviour.  Yet, 
unlike any other form of violent offence, rape has an intrinsically sexualised basis, in 
that it is realized through specifically sexual acts.25  Simply put, sexual violence is a 
sexual crime, which differentiates it from other forms of non-sexualised aggression.  
However, although rape as an embodied experience involves the sexuality of both 
the perpetrator and victim, unlike normative, consensual sexual intercourse it is not a 
mutually entered upon sexual act.26  Thus, a victim of rape will not focalize the rape 
as an act of sexual intercourse in which she participated, but as a sexually located 
act, which has been imposed upon her, in order to commit an assault upon her sexual 
and bodily integrity.27  Rape is therefore intrinsically different from consensual 
sexual intercourse in that its main raison d’être is not sexual gratification but a 
desire to harm; it is first and foremost an indisputable act of aggression and hatred, 
in which a man uses his penis as a weapon.28  As Pamela Cooper-White explains, 
rape is ‘an act of aggression and intimidation accomplished by sexual means … the 
sexual expression of aggression, rather than as the aggressive expression of 
sexuality’.29   
To summarise then, rape should always be recognised as a brutalising act of male 
violence; it cannot be confused with any form of tolerable sexual behaviour.  Yet, 
such confusion does appear to predominate within contemporary patriarchal culture, 
where the undermining of women’s sexual and bodily autonomy is all too often 
regarded as an acceptable and inevitable feature of gendered sexuality and gender 
relations.  If we fail to challenge attitudes such as these and refuse to acknowledge 
the distinction between consensual sexuality and sexual violence, we effectively re-
interpret the ordeal that rape survivors have had to endure, undermining and 
ignoring the violence, terror, and trauma intrinsic to these women’s experience of 
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Crossing, 1984), 120.  See also Scully and Marolla, “‘Riding the Bull at Gilley’s’”, 118; Groth, 13, 
60; Leslie, 4. 
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rape, and thus effectively denying them a voice with which to relate the reality of 
their ordeal and the true extent of their suffering.30    
 
Sex or Sexual Violence?  Denying Dinah’s Rape in Genesis 34 
Within the above discussion, we have highlighted the all too common proclivity, 
within contemporary patriarchal culture, to perceive coercive sexual intercourse, less 
as a brutal crime committed against a woman’s bodily and sexual autonomy than as 
a normative outplaying of the sex role stereotypes that govern masculine and 
feminine sexuality.  The question that we now ought therefore to ask is whether such 
a conceptualisation of rape is likewise reflected within the Genesis 34 narrative.  
That is, does the ancient author focalize Dinah’s encounter with Shechem as a 
predominantly sexual event, or, does he indeed grant recognition to the violence and 
brutality inherent within this act committed against Dinah by the Hivite prince? 
Well, when we turn to consider the representation of Dinah’s rape in Gen. 34.2, it is 
striking to note that the narrator by no means wasted any words furnishing his 
readers with a detailed or comprehensive depiction of this episode.  Taking up but 
one succinct verse, the event is portrayed in a terse, laconic style: Shechem, son of 
Hamor, the local ruler of the land, saw Dinah, seized her, had sexual intercourse 
with her, and thus violated her.  There are no details provided pertaining either to 
events preceding this sexual assault or to the assault itself; indeed, in the Hebrew 
text, there are as many words spent clarifying Shechem’s lineage (five) as there are 
devoted to the depiction of his sexual response on first encountering Dinah.31  We 
are granted no access to this young prince’s underlying motives for his actions here, 
nor is any time spent elucidating Dinah’s reaction to being the object of such an 
apparently precipitous sexual attack.32   
Nevertheless, over the centuries, the dominant exegetical traditions surrounding this 
verse have tended, in the main, to acknowledge that the sexual event, which took 
place when Shechem encountered Dinah in Gen. 34.2, was both violent and 
                                                
30 Dragiewicz, 209; Smart, 44; Scully and Marolla, “‘Riding the Bull at Gilley’s’”, 118. 
31 hn(yw ht) bk#$yw ht) xqyw Cr)h )y#&n ywxh rwmx-Nb Mk#$ ht) )ryw 
32 Tikva Frymer-Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible (New York: Schocken Books, 2002), 181-
82; Yael Shemesh, “Rape is Rape Is Rape: The Story of Dinah and Shechem (Genesis 34)”, 
Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 119 (2007): 2-3.  
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coercive.33  However, there are a number of scholars whose responses have been 
rather more ambivalent with regards their interpretation of the events depicted 
                                                
33 Scholars who do read Gen. 34.2 as a depiction of Dinah’s rape include Meir Sternberg, The Poetics 
of Biblical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 446; and “Biblical Poetics and 
Sexual Politics”, 463-88; Susanne Scholz, Rape Plots: A Feminist Cultural Study of Genesis 34 (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2002); and “Through Whose Eyes?  A ‘Right’ Reading of Genesis 34”, in Genesis, 
vol.1 of A Feminist Companion to the Bible (2nd Series), ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1998), 150-71; and “Was It Really Rape”, 182-98; Noble, 173-203; Robin Parry, 
“Feminist Hermeneutics and Evangelical Concerns: The Rape of Dinah as a Case Study”, Tynedale 
Bulletin 53 (2002): 1-28; and Old Testament Story and Christian Ethics: The Rape of Dinah as a Case 
Study (Milton Keynes: Paternoster Press, 2004); Susan Niditch, “Genesis”, in The Women’s Bible 
Commentary, ed. Carol A. Newsom and Sharon H. Ringe (London: SPCK, 1992), 23-24; Martin 
Kessler and Karel Deurloo, A Commentary on Genesis: The Book of Beginnings (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press, 2004), 175; Thistlethwaithe, 69-70; F.C. Fensham, “Gen. XXIV and Mari”, Journal of 
Northwest Semitic Languages 4 (1975): 88; Carolyn S. Leeb, Away from the Father’s House: The 
Social Location of na‘ar and na‘arah in Ancient Israel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 
137; Luther’s Works: Lectures on Genesis, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1970), 6:193-94; James L. Kugel, Traditions in the Bible: A Guide to the Bible As It Was at 
the Start of the Common Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 406; Alice A. Keefe, 
“Rapes of Women/ Wars of Men”, Semeia 61 (1993):79-97; Sharon P. Jeansonne, The Women of 
Genesis: From Sarah to Potiphar’s Wife (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 91-92, 138, n.14; J. 
Gerald Janzen, Abraham and All the Families of the Earth: A Commentary on the Book of Genesis 
12-50 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 136; Leon R. Kass, The Beginning of Wisdom: Reading 
Genesis (New York: Free Press, 2003), 480-82; and “Regarding Daughters and Sisters: The Rape of 
Dinah”, Commentary 93, no.4 (1992): 29-38; John E. Hartley, Genesis (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 2000), 291; Jon L. Berquist, Reclaiming Her Story: The Witness of Women in the Old 
Testament (St Louis: Chalice Press, 1992), 61; Hermann Gunkel, Genesis, trans. Mark E. Biddle 
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), 358; Gravett, 282-84; Naomi Graetz, “Dinah the 
Daughter”, in A Feminist Companion to Genesis, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1993), 306-17; Dana Nolan Fewell and David M. Gunn, “Tipping the Balance: Sternberg’s 
Reader and the Rape of Dinah”, Journal of Biblical Literature 110 (1991): 193-211; and Gender, 
Power, and Promise: The Subject of the Bible’s First Story (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993), 81; 
Davies, 55-60; Yamada, 149-65; Robert Alter, Genesis: Translation and Commentary (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1996), 189; Stephen A. Geller, “The Sack of Shechem: The Use of Typology in 
Biblical Covenant Religion”, Prooftexts 10 (1990): 1; John C.L. Gibson, Genesis (Edinburgh: Saint 
Andrew Press, 1982), 2:211; Claus Westermann, Genesis 12-36: A Commentary, trans. J.J. Scullion 
(London: SPCK, 1986), 538; Gila Ramras-Rauch, “Fathers and Daughters: Two Biblical Narratives”, 
in Tollers and Maier, 161; Athalya Brenner, The Intercourse of Knowledge: On Gendering Desire 
and Sexuality in the Hebrew Bible (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 96, n.14; Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 16-50 
(Dallas: Word Books, 1994), 311; and Story as Torah: Reading the Old Testament Ethically 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 110-19; Nahum M. Sarna, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 234; J.K. Salkin, “Dinah, The Torah’s Forgotten 
Woman”, Judaism 35 (1986): 284-89; Karen Armstrong, In the Beginning: A New Reading of the 
Book of Genesis (London: Harper Collins, 1997), 93; Laurence A. Turner, Genesis (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 149; Sheres; Eugene F. Roop, Genesis (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 
1987), 217; Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (London: SCM Press, 1972), 329, 331; 
Mishael Maswari Caspi, “The Story of the Rape of Dinah: The Narrator and the Reader”, Hebrew 
Studies 26 (1985): 25-45; Leila Leah Bronner, From Eve to Esther: Rabbinic Reconstructions of 
Biblical Women (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 118-21; Nehama Aschkenasy, 
Eve’s Journey: Feminine Images in Hebraic Literary Tradition (Philadelphia: University of 
Philadelphia Press, 1986), 125; and Woman at the Window, 45-59; D.W. Cotter, Genesis 
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2003), 254, n.56; E.A. Speiser, Genesis: Introduction, Translation, 
and Notes (New York: Doubleday, 1964), 264; Ilona N. Rashkow, Taboo or not Taboo: Sexuality and 
Family in the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 146; and “Daughters and Fathers in 
Genesis … Or, What is Wrong With This Picture?”, in A Feminist Companion to Exodus to 
Deuteronomy, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 27; and “Hebrew 
Bible Translation and the Fear of Judaization”, Sixteenth Century Journal 21 (1990): 217-33; F. 
Rachel Magdalene, “Ancient Near Eastern Treaty-Curses and the Ultimate Texts of Terror: A Study 
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within this verse.  Thus, some have described Shechem’s encounter with Dinah as a 
‘seduction’34 a ‘liaison’,35 or an act of ‘passion’36, thereby managing to imply that it 
ought to be focalised less as a brutal assault than a typical and normative display of 
sexual desire.37  Thus, for example, John Gibson proposes, with regards Shechem’s 
behaviour in v.2, that, ‘like the squire’s son in many a modern novel he had his 
pleasure of [Dinah]’ [italics added].38  In a similar vein, Michael Maher refers to the 
rape event as ‘the unfortunate consequences of a young man’s amorous folly’ 
[italics added],39 while Everett Fox talks about ‘Shechem’s desire and love’, 
concluding that ‘love once again leads to an unfortunate end’ [italics added].40  
Alternatively, using some rather impressive circumlocution, several interpreters 
simply refer to the event as an ‘act’,41 an ‘affair’,42 or even, rather confusingly, as 
both a ‘rape’ and a ‘seduction’.43  While some of these scholars do admit that 
Dinah’s participation in this sexual act was indeed coerced, their interpretive 
readings of this text nevertheless seem particularly ambivalent with regards their 
acknowledgment of any clear distinction between sexual violence and acceptable 
sexuality.  Indeed, by contextualising Shechem’s treatment of Dinah within a 
specifically sexualised, if not romantic, framework, rather than as a criminal act of 
brutality, they would appear to be reflecting the myths described above, which 
regard sexual violence as little more than a natural and inevitable manifestation of 
                                                                                                                                    
of the Language of Divine Sexual Abuse in the Prophetic Corpus”, in A Feminist Companion to the 
Latter Prophets, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1995), 336, n.1; Fuchs, 
Sexual Politics, 200-224; Joy A. Schroeder, “The Rape of Dinah: Luther’s Interpretation of a Biblical 
Narrative”, Sixteenth Century Journal 28 (1997): 775-91; Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: 
Chapters 18-50 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 354; David Noel Freedman, “Dinah and Shechem 
Tamar and Amnon”, Austin Seminary Bulletin 105 (1990): 51-63. 
34 Mary Douglas, In the Wilderness: The Doctrine of Defilement in the Book of Numbers (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 177, 205; Calum M. Carmichael, Women, Law and the Genesis 
Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), 46; and Law and Narrative in the Bible: 
The Evidence of the Deuteronomic Laws and the Decalogue (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1985), 219; Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982), 274. 
35 Brueggemann, 275. 
36 Ibid., 276; Carmichael, Women, Law and the Genesis Tradition, 36. 
37 Mary Anna Bader, Sexual Violation in the Hebrew Bible: A Multi-Methodological Study of Genesis 
34 and 2 Samuel 13 (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 10. 
38 Gibson, 213-14.  
39 Michael Maher, Genesis (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1982), 196. 
40 Everett Fox, In the Beginning: A New English Rendition of the Book of Genesis (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1983), 139. 
41 Brueggemann, 276.  
42 Helena Zlotnik, Dinah’s Daughters: Gender and Judaism from the Hebrew Bible to Late Antiquity 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 38. 
43 Ibid., 35-40.  Fretheim, rather perplexingly, describes Shechem as Dinah’s ‘rapist and lover’, 
seemingly having no qualms about juxtaposing two such diametrically opposed concepts.  See “The 
Book of Genesis: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections”, in The New Interpreter’s Bible: 
General Articles and Introduction, Commentary, and Reflection for Each Book of the Bible, including 
the Apochryphal/Deuterocanonical Books, ed. Leander E. Keck (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 
1:578.   
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the masculine search for sexual gratification or desire.  That is, while they may not 
deny the aggressive nature of Shechem’s sexual behaviour, these scholarly 
interpretations of this behaviour appear, nevertheless, to go some way towards either 
excusing it, minimising its inherent wrongfulness, or simply reinterpreting it, 
thereby undermining the misogyny, violence, and contempt underlying any act of 
rape, including the one depicted within this biblical text.   
However, in addition to these readings, the reality of Dinah’s rape has faced, more 
recently, a far more radical challenge within biblical interpretation by scholars who 
have questioned the very notion that Dinah was in fact the victim of a sexual assault.  
By appealing to the textual evidence, they propose that, from the brief description 
afforded us by this ancient author in v.2, the sexual intercourse that occurred 
between Shechem and Dinah was most likely both consensual and mutually 
desired.44  That is, Shechem did not violently seize Dinah and rape her; he 
captivated her and made love to her.  Thus, a tale of violence and violation becomes 
transformed into one of sexuality and seduction, as boy meets girl and, in a flurry of 
desire, they fall into each other’s arms.  
Such an interpretation of Gen. 34.2 certainly warrants further investigation, not least 
because my discussion to date and throughout this work is strongly grounded upon 
the presumption that Shechem did indeed rape Dinah.  Furthermore, I am concerned 
that such a reading may only serve to perpetuate the all-too common contemporary 
denial of the violence and brutality underlying acts of coercive sexual intercourse, 
which I considered at the beginning of this chapter.  If we read this event as simply a 
                                                
44 As Nicolas Wyatt suggests, ‘there is no justification as far as the vocabulary is concerned for the 
conclusion that the encounter is a violent one’.  In “The Story of Dinah and Shechem”, Ugarit-
Forschungen 22 (1990): 436.  Other scholars who question whether Dinah was indeed raped by 
Shechem in Gen. 34.2 include Lyn M. Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped?  (Genesis 34)”, Journal 
for the Study of the Old Testament 64 (1994): 19-36; and “Dinah”, in Women in Scripture: A 
Dictionary of Named and Unnamed Women in The Hebrew Bible, the Apochryphal/Deuterocanonical 
Books, and the New Testament, ed. Carol Meyers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 69-70; Lipka, 
185-89; Ellen van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape?  A Semantic Analysis of a Controversial Word”, 
Vetus Testamentum 52 (2002): 543-44; and “Love and Hatred in  Multiracial Society: The Dinah and 
Shechem Story in Genesis 34 in the Context of Genesis 28-35”, in Reading from Right to Left: Essays 
on the Hebrew Bible in Honour of David J.A. Clines, ed. J. Cheryl Exum and H.G.M. Williamson 
(London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2003), 435-49; Joseph Fleishman, “Why Did Simeon and Levi 
Rebuke Their Father in Genesis 34.31?”  Journal of Northwest Semitic Languages 26 (2000): 102-4; 
Alice Ogden Bellis, Helpmates, Harlots, Heroes: Women’s Stories in the Hebrew Bible (Westminster: 
John Knox Press, 1994), 89-90; Frymer-Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible, 181-83; and “Law 
and Philosophy: The Case of Sex in the Bible”, Semeia 45 (1989): 95; and “Virginity in the Bible”, in 
Gender and Law in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East, ed. Victor H. Matthews, Bernard M. 
Levinson, and Tikva Frymer-Kensky (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 87; and In the 
Wake of the Goddesses: Women, Culture, and the Biblical Transformation of Pagan Myth (New 
York: Fawcett Columbine, 1992), 194; Bader, 28; Van Seters, 242-43. 
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consensual affair between two lovers, we run the risk of failing to acknowledge the 
inherent violence, misogyny, and abusiveness of Dinah’s experience, thereby 
becoming complicit in her narrative silencing as a victim of sexual assault.  In order 
to explore this matter further then, let us pause to consider in more detail the 
depiction of the sexual encounter in Gen. 34.2.  In particular, I will attempt to 
determine whether the linguistic choices made by the narrator in this particularly 
succinct passage specifically reflect the coercive and aggressive nature of this 
encounter, or whether he did indeed treat the event as more of a romantic tryst than a 
violent assault.  My primary aim here is therefore to ensure that, if an act of sexual 
violence did occur within this narrative, it is recognised as such; by this means, I am 
seeking to make certain that the cruelty, misogyny, and sheer horror of Dinah’s 
experience is neither silenced nor denied.  
 
 Sexual Assault or Seduction?  Taking a Closer Look at v.2 
As mentioned above, Dinah’s sexual encounter with Shechem is depicted by the 
narrator in a decidedly succinct fashion, using only three verbs arranged in a 
tripartite waw consecutive chain (hn(yw ht) bk#$yw ht) xqyw).  It is primarily the 
semantic significance of the three verbs xql, bk#$, and hn(, upon which scholars 
have based their claims that Dinah was not the victim of a sexual assault.  In the 
following section, I will therefore test the veracity of these assertions, by taking a 
closer look at the possible meanings that each of these verbal forms may convey, 
focusing in particular on their potential connotations within contexts of both 
consensual and coercive sexual behaviour.  With regards the syntactic and stylistic 
presentation of this sexual act, I will also consider the significance of both the 
narrator’s utilisation of a tripartite consecutive verbal chain to depict the sexual 
encounter, and Dinah’s precipitate shift from being an independently acting subject 
in v.1 to her utter passivity in v.2.  I hope that by taking a more in-depth look at 
these linguistic and stylistic features, I will be able to determine more accurately 
whether the author’s concise remarks here in v.2 were intended to denote an act of 





The Semantic Significance of  bk#$ in Biblical Hebrew 
In Gen. 34.2, the act of sexual intercourse that occurred between Dinah and 
Shechem is represented by the verb bk#$.  In its most basic sense, this verb means ‘to 
lie down’, either to rest or sleep,45 or, when used metaphorically, to lie down in 
death.46  However, one of its more frequent idiomatic uses is to denote sexual 
behaviour, where it tends to be translated ‘to lie with’ or ‘to sleep with’.47  In 
particular, it appears to be employed primarily to describe acts of sexual intercourse 
that are in some sense illicit.48  Thus, bk#$ is the verb of choice for biblical 
descriptions of incestuous sexual relationships,49 adultery,50 bestiality,51 
homosexuality,52 sexual intercourse with a menstruant,53 sexual intercourse with a 
prostitute,54 and premarital sexual relations between a man and an unmarried, or 
unbetrothed, woman.55  Of particular interest here however, is whether bk#$, may be 
utilised within biblical Hebrew to connote an explicitly aggressive and coercive 
sexual act.  More specifically, I wish to establish whether the occurrence of this verb 
within the particular contextual environment of Gen. 34.2 enables the reader to 
determine that Shechem did indeed commit an act of sexual violence against Dinah.   
Within the biblical material, bk#$ is certainly used on several occasions to depict 
sexual intercourse that is unequivocally non-consensual and that ought therefore to 
                                                
45 For example, Gen. 19.4; Lev. 14.47; 2 Sam. 13.5; Ps. 3.5; Ruth 3.7, 8, 14, etc. 
46  For example, 1 Kgs 11.21, 43; 14.20; 22.40, etc. 
47 For example, Gen. 19.32, 33, 34, 35; 30.15, 16; Exod. 22.16; Lev. 15.18, 24; 1 Sam. 2.22; 2 Sam. 
12.11; Ezek. 23.6, etc.  Indeed, bk#$ is used within the Hebrew Bible to denote sexual intercourse in 
just over one quarter (54 out of 207) of its occurrences.  See W.C. Williams, “bk#$”, in New 
International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren 
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 4:101; L. Koehler, W. Baumgartner, and J.J. Stamm, The Hebrew 
and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, trans. M.E.J. Richardson (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 4:1487; 
Francis Brown, S.R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs, The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English 
Lexicon, With an Appendix Containing the Biblical Aramaic (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 
1993), 1011-12.   
48 This verb is used fifty-four times in the Hebrew biblical texts to denote sexual intercourse.  Of these 
fifty-four occurrences, only four refer to a sexual relationship that is not prohibited within the priestly 
and Deuteronomic legal codes.  Thus, in Gen. 30.15, 16, 2 Sam. 11.11, and 12.24, bk#$ is used to 
denote legitimate sexual intercourse between a husband and wife.  In Lev. 15.18,which is part of the 
priestly purity legislation dealing with the ritual impurity of genital emissions, bk#$ appears to be 
utilised to denote sexual intercourse in general, which, according to the priestly writers of this purity 
legislation, always causes a temporary ritual defilement for both the man and woman.   
49 Gen. 19.32, 33, 34, 35; 35.22; Lev. 20.11, 12, 20; Deut. 27.20, 22, 23. 
50 Gen. 26.10; 39.7, 10, 12, 14; Lev. 19.20; Num. 5.13, 19; Deut. 22.22-23; 28.30; 2 Sam. 11.4; 12.11; 
Jer. 3.2; Ezek. 23.8.     
51 Exod. 22.18; Deut. 27.21. 
52 Lev. 18.22; 20.13. 
53 Lev. 20.18; c.f. 18.19. 
54 1 Sam. 2.22.   
55 Exod. 22.15; Lev. 19.20; 2 Sam. 13.11.   
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be classified as an act of rape.56  Thus for example, the law of Deut. 22.25-7 
describes the hypothetical case of a man who comes upon a betrothed woman57 in 
the countryside, seizes her (hb-qyzxhw), and ‘lies with’ her (hm( bk#$w).  The 
aggressive and coercive nature of this sexual encounter is made plain both from the 
inclusion of a verb of seizure (qzx) in v.25 and in light of the events depicted in 
vv.26-7.  Here we are told that, after being forcefully restrained, the woman would 
have cried out for help, but, being in the rural setting of the open countryside, no one 
could hear her.  Clearly then, there is no doubt in the minds of the lawmakers that 
the woman’s participation in this act of sexual intercourse was utterly coerced.  
Likewise, vv.28-9 of this law code cites the case of a man who comes upon an 
unbethrothed virgin, seizes her (h#&ptw), and ‘lies with’ her (hm( bk#$w).  Similar to 
the inclusion of qzx in v.25, the verb #&pt (‘to capture, seize, lay hold of’) strongly 
suggests that the sexual intercourse between the pair was forcible and non-
consensual, the verb of seizure informing the reader that the woman did not enter 
into this sexual partnership willingly.58  Outwith the legal material, bk#$ is also 
utilised within 2 Sam. 13.11, 14 to denote a sexual act that is unequivocally violent.  
In v.11, we read that Amnon, son of David seizes his sister Tamar, whom he has 
sickened himself lusting after, and demands that she ‘lie with’ him (ym( ybk#$).  
Tamar refuses, and, despite her lengthy protestations in vv.12-13,59 is then 
overpowered by Amnon (hnmm qzxyw), who ‘forces her down’ (hn(yw) and ‘lies with 
                                                
56 The verb bk#$ also appears in four other texts (Deut. 28.30; Isa. 13.16; Jer. 3.2; Zech. 14.2), all of 
which denote acts of unlawful or aggressive sexual impropriety, but in these cases, it is the Qere 
tradition, which stands alongside the Ketib  reading of lg#$ (‘to sleep with, ravish, rape, violate’).  This 
verbal form is generally understood to be a rather shocking and coarse expression, guaranteed to catch 
the attention of the reader; Gravett suggests that the contemporary vernacular word “fuck” would be a 
suitable translation, connoting as it does a sense of both aggressive and illicit sexuality (289-90).  It is 
likely that the Qere tradition was a result of the Masoretic editors finding lg#$ too obscene; however, 
it is interesting that they chose bk#$ on each occasion to ‘replace’ it.  See Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 
993; Koehler, Baumgartner, and Stamm, (1999), 4:1415; William C. Williams, “lg#$”, in New 
International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren 
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 4:45; Edward Ullendorff, The Bawdy Bible, (Oxford: Oxford 
Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies, 1978), 444; Gravett, 289-90. 
57A betrothed woman (h#&r)m) was essentially a married virgin; her husband had paid a bride price to 
her father, thus rendering the woman as his wife under the law, but the marriage had not yet been 
consummated.  Though she would probably still be living in the home of her father, she was legally 
recognised as the sexual property of her husband; sexual intercourse with a betrothed woman was 
therefore, under the Deuteronomic laws of Deut. 22.13-29, treated as adultery.  See Robin Wakely, 
“#&r)”, in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. 
VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 1:526-27; Lipka, 80. 
58 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 1074.  For further discussion of the meaning of #&pt, with regards its 
function as a verb of seizure, see below. 
59 ‘But [Tamar] said to [Amnon], “No, my brother, do not abuse me!  For such a thing is not done in 
Israel!  Do not commit this serious folly!  And as for me, where will I carry my shame?  And as for 
you, you will be as one of the fools of Israel.  And now, please speak to the king, for he will not 
withhold me from you”’. 
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her’ (ht) bk#$yw).  Again, given both Tamar’s unambiguous refusal to accede to 
Amnon’s sexual demands and his subsequent use of force in order to satiate his 
desire, it is very clear that, within this text, bk#$ once again represents an act of 
coercive sexual intercourse.60  
Despite these examples, however, a quick survey of other biblical texts where bk#$ 
is employed within a sexual context will leave us in no doubt that the verb bk#$ does 
not exclusively carry an inherent sense of sexual aggression.  As mentioned earlier, 
it occurs extensively throughout the biblical corpus to connote sexual intercourse, 
the vast majority of which is not depicted, either explicitly or implicitly, as being 
forcible or coercive.61  Indeed, in Deut. 22.23-4, bk#$ is employed to describe a 
sexual event that is unambiguously consensual.  This law stresses that, if a man 
comes upon a betrothed woman in the city and ‘lies with her’ (hm( bk#$w), the 
woman is assumed to have been fully complicit in an unlawful and adulterous sexual 
union, and is thereby liable to face the death penalty, along with her sexual ‘partner’.  
Had she been raped, the lawmakers reason, she would have cried for help and 
someone would have heard her in such a busy, well-populated urban environment; 
                                                
60 Phyllis Trible, Texts of Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives (London: SCM 
Press, 1984), 46; Shimon Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989), 265; 
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(Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1978), 33.    
61 There is one other text in the Hebrew Bible, which utilise bk#$ to depict an act of sexual intercourse 
that, although not explicitly violent in nature, may, according to modern definition, be deemed as 
coercive, and therefore can be read as rape.  In 2 Sam. 11.4, we read that David ‘lies with’ Bathsheba, 
after summoning her to the royal palace.  As is now recognised, an act of rape may still be said to 
occur in such circumstances where, although force or violence is not used, the woman is unable to 
withhold her consent freely, owing to the marked disparity in social status or power between herself 
and her rapist.  In the words of F. Rachel Magdalene, ‘the fact of consent is often a false assertion 
when the power differential between the two sexes is great’ (337, n.1).  David may not have used 
physical force to subdue Bathsheba; however, it is unlikely that any woman outwith the royal 
household, who was called before the king of Israel to provide a sexual service would have felt able to 
reject his advances without fear of recrimination.  Therefore, because Bathsheba’s ability to withhold 
her consent was compromised, it is appropriate to read this depiction of a royal affair as a case of 
rape.  Nevertheless, I have not included this text in my discussion because I wish to focus here only 
on texts where bk#$ is utilised by the biblical writer to depict episodes of sexual intercourse that he 
recognised as being unambiguously coercive, so that I may evaluate the possibility that in Gen. 34.2, 
this verb likewise denotes an act of sexual intercourse that is non-consensual.  For further discussion 
of Bathsheba’s characterisation as a victim of sexual violence, see Exum, Fragmented Women, 172-6; 
Bellis, 149; Fokkelmann, King David, 52-3; Gale Yee, “Fraught With Background: Literary 
Ambiguity in II Samuel 11”, Interpretation 42 (1988): 240-53.  Ellen Rooney provides an 
enlightening discussion regarding the recognition of rape in cases where there is a marked differential 
between the social status of rapist and victim, focussing on Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles, 




as no one did hear her, she clearly could not have cried out in the first place and 
therefore had not in fact been raped.62   
Nevertheless, a number of scholars still propose that within Gen. 34.2, the verb bk#$ 
may indeed be understood to convey a specifically non-consensual and aggressive 
act of sexual intercourse.  In essence, two main arguments are proposed to support 
this theory: the relevance of the direct object marker h@tf)o, which directly follows 
bk#$, and the semantic significance of the verb xql, which immediately precedes 
this phrase.  The implications of these will now be discussed in detail below. 
 
a) The significance of h@tf)o bka@#;$yIwA in Gen. 34.2  
In the Masoretic Text of Gen. 34.2, bk#$ appears, at first glance, to be treated as a 
transitive verbal form, in that it is followed by the direct object h@tf)o, which, 
according to the pointing, represents the object marker t)e with the 3f.s. pronominal 
suffix.  This is somewhat unusual, in that this verb is normally intransitive when 
used to denote sexual intercourse, and therefore tends to be followed by the 
prepositions M(i or t)e (‘with’), which immediately precede its indirect object.63  
With the Masoretic vocalisation in Gen.34.2 however, Dinah appears to be 
introduced as the direct object of the sexual act, the phrase h@tf)o bka@#;$yIwA therefore 
suggesting a literal translation, ‘and he laid her’.  This has led a number of biblical 
interpreters to propose that this atypical syntactical presentation is a conscious 
attempt by the narrator to convey the particularly violent and coercive nature of the 
sexual intercourse denoted by the verb bk#$.  Thus, according to Scholz, the phrase 
emphasises that ‘Shechem acted without regard for Dinah.  He is the subject of the 
                                                
62 The flawed logic of making a woman’s cries the definitive criterion for delineating between 
consensual and coercive sexual behaviour ought to be obvious: just because a woman does not call for 
help during her rape does not mean that her assault never took place.  There are many practical and 
psychological reasons why a woman may remain silent during her violation – the threat or use of 
force by the rapist, terror, shock, and disbelief, to name but few (see Brownmiller, 358-59).  Women 
who are forced to confront the horror of rape simply want to survive what they rightly perceive to be a 
potentially life-threatening event; as one survivor noted, ‘The choice between dying and being f****d 
is no choice’ (Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 15).  It is therefore possible that the biblical women who 
claimed to have been raped in the city and who were subsequently stoned to death for their adulterous 
‘crime’ may well have been the victims of a sexual violation.  However, because they failed to 
conform to the lawmakers’ erroneous assumptions about sexual violence, they had to pay for this 
patriarchal ignorance with their lives.  While Lipka is correct to suggest that the law in vv.25-27 
(discussed above)  ‘gives the woman the benefit of the doubt’ with regard her innocence (91), it is 
interesting that she makes no comment about the injustice inherent in vv.23-24, where the woman is 
accorded no such benefit, but is simply disbelieved on principle.  For further comments on this verse, 
see Shemesh, 5-6. 
63 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 1012.   
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verb, and she is the object.  Dinah does not consent.  No doubt, “Shechem laid 
her”’.64  In a similar vein, Paul Noble also suggests that h@tf)o bka@#;$yIwA may have been 
used deliberately by the author of Gen. 34.2 to convey the brutal nature of the sexual 
encounter: ‘Translating this phrase by “and he raped her,” with “rape” carrying 
significant overtones of disapproval, would probably give the right sense’.65  Cotter, 
meanwhile, describes this particular grammatical construction as ‘a sort of coarse 
and vulgar Hebrew used for instances of improper or brutal sexual encounter’.66 
Such a reading is furthermore lent weight by the fact that this same construction, 
h@tf) bka@#;$yIwA, occurs in 2 Sam. 13.14, to depict an act of sexual intercourse, which, as 
discussed above, is unequivocally forceful and coercive.  Thus, Rashkow proposes 
that ‘since Tamar refuses to be lain with, she is laid’ [original italics],67 while 
Fokkelman suggests that h@tf)o bka@#;$y,IwA portrays Tamar as the ‘objectivised, 
depersonalised victim’; she is no longer a person in Amnon’s eyes, but an object 
with which he can gratify his transitory and uncontrolled lust.68  Similarly, Trible 
suggests that the apparently transitive nature of the verb bk#$ is deliberately chosen 
by the narrator here ‘to stress [Amnon’s] brutality … the direct object her 
underscores cruelty beyond the expected’.69   
Other biblical interpreters are, however, more reticent about accepting the veracity 
of these readings, not least of all because they are based solely upon the system of 
Masoretic pointing, which occurred at a date much later than when this text was 
originally composed.  Thus, for example, Lyn Bechtel and Nick Wyatt both question 
whether the ancient author actually intended the word ht) to represent the 
accusative marker with the 3f.s. pronominal suffix (h@tf)o), or whether he wished 
instead to connote h@t@f)i (preposition t)e + 3f.s. suffix), giving the perhaps less 
                                                
64 Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes”, 166; and Rape Plots, 136-37.  Similar sentiments are expressed by 
Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 446; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 306, 311; and Story as Torah, 
112, n.8; Alter, 189; Caspi, 32; Hamilton, 354. 
65 Noble, 178.   
66 Cotter, 254.  Marvin H. Pope has likewise suggested that when bk#$ appears to be used as a 
transitive verb with a direct object, in texts such as Gen. 34.2 and 2 Sam. 13.14, it may convey the 
same meaning as the naturally transitive verb lg#$, which, as noted above, is a rather obscene Hebrew 
term for unlawful and aggressive sexual intercourse.  See “Bible, Euphemism and Dysphemism”, in 
Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 1:722.   
67 Rashkow, Taboo, 145.   
68 Fokkelman, King David, 105.   
69 Trible, Texts of Terror, 46.  Other scholars to consider this vocalisation a deliberate grammatical 
construction representing forcible, illegitimate intercourse include Bar-Efrat, 265; Pamela Tamarkin 
Reis, “Cupidity and Stupidity: Woman’s Agency and the ‘Rape’ of Tamar”, in Journal of Ancient 
Near Eastern Studies 25 (1997): 52; Conroy, 32; Rashkow, “Hebrew Bible Translation”, 226; Lipka, 
184; Fokkelman, King David, 105, n.20; 
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pejorative reading, ‘he lay with her’.70  They therefore suggest that the vocalisation 
of ht) bk#$yw as a transitive verbal form to denote sexual assault in both Gen. 34.2 
and 2 Sam. 13.14 is in all likelihood the product of later interpretative traditions 
surrounding these biblical texts, rather than a deliberate grammatical construction 
used by the author to depict an act of sexual violence.71  While the verb bk#$ may, 
within texts, such as Deut. 22.25-7, 28-9, and 2 Sam. 13.14, undoubtedly denote 
sexual behaviour of a specifically forceful and coercive nature, this particular nuance 
of meaning is, they argue, made explicit only by other contextual considerations, 
such as the use of a verb of seizure to clarify that the woman was not a consenting 
partner.  In the case of Gen. 34.2, such a context is, according to Wyatt, markedly 
absent.72  
These objections certainly ought to be taken seriously, not least because the reading, 
‘he lay with her (h@t@f)i bk@a#$;y,IwA) is represented within all the ancient versions of Gen. 
34.2, with the exception of Targum Onqelos.73  Such text-critical evidence strongly 
suggests that, in Gen. 34.2, ht) bk#$yw was originally read as h@t@f)i bka@#;$y,IwAi, a phrase 
which does not inherently connote any sense of violent or non-consensual sexual 
activity.  Furthermore, the theory that the syntactic construction h@tf)o bk#$ is utilised 
specifically to denote coercive sexual behaviour is completely subverted when one 
considers the other biblical passages that employ it.  Num. 5.11-31, for example, 
deals with the case of a man who seeks to determine whether his wife is guilty of 
adultery.  In vv.13, 19, the particle t), which follows bk#$, is pointed as the suffixed 
                                                
70 Bechtel, “Dinah”, 70; and “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 23; Wyatt, 435. 
71 Wyatt, 435; Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 23; also see L. Koehler, W. Baumgartner, and 
J.J. Stamm, The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, trans. M.E.J. Richardson 
(Leiden: Brill, 1999), 4:1487; S.R. Driver, Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1890), 230. 
72 Wyatt, 435.  Likewise, Fleishman reads ht) bk#$yw here as denoting Shechem’s consummation of 
his marriage to Dinah; in his opinion, there is nothing intrinsically aggressive about the sexual act 
(103). 
73 The Aramaic Targum Onqelos translates ht) in Gen. 34.2 in keeping with the Masoretic Text as 
the accusative marker plus suffix (hty bk#$yw), ‘he laid her’.  However, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 
renders all forms of the verb bk#$ + suffixed -twO) as M(i bk#$, thereby suggesting that the verb was read 
as an intransitive form.  Furthermore, the Septuagint converts ht) bk#$yw in both Gen. 34.2 and 2 Sam 
13.14 into e)koimh&qh met’ au)th~j – ‘he lay with her’ – the latter signifying that, even in contexts, 
which unquestionably depict scenes of a sexually violent nature, the use of bk#$ as a transitive verb to 
convey such a meaning was not generally acknowledged at the time the Greek translator was working 
on these texts.  Likewise, the Biblia Sacra Vulgata translates ht) bk#$yw as et dormivit cum illa, which 
can also be rendered ‘he lay with her’.  Westermann therefore suggests pointing ht) bk#$yw in Gen. 
34.2 as h@t@f)i bka@#;$y,IwAi, in line with the Septuagint (Genesis 12-36, 534).  See also Alexander Sperber, The 
Pentateuch According to Targum Onkelos, vol.1 of The Bible in Aramaic Based on Old Manuscripts 
and Printed Texts (Leiden: Brill, 1959), 56; John William Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of 
Genesis (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 558; Harry M. Orlinsky, “The Hebrew Root S0KB”, Journal 
of Biblical Literature 63 (1944): 26-31.  
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object marker (h@tf)o in v.13; K7tf)o in v.19), despite the fact that the woman’s consent 
to this illicit sexual encounter is assumed throughout the passage.  Similarly, in Lev. 
15.18, 24 and Ezek. 23.8, bk#$ + suffixed object marker is likewise used to denote 
sexual relationships that are neither aggressive nor coercive.74  Lev. 15.24 describes 
the ritually and morally defiling act of consensual sexual intercourse with a 
menstruating woman (h@tf)o #$y)i bk@aa#$;yI), while in Ezek 23.8, we read about the 
adulterous, though consensual fornications of YHWH’s metaphorical wife Oholah 
with her Egyptian lovers (w%bk;#$f h@tfwO)).  Finally, in Lev. 15.18, the construction h@tf)o 
#$y)i bka@#;$yi appears to connote the act of sexual intercourse in general, therefore it 
obviously cannot convey any limited sense of coercive or forcible sexual assault.  
These texts therefore confirm that, even when employed as an apparently transitive 
verbal form, bk#$ does not necessarily denote an act of sexual violence. 
Furthermore, if the syntactical form bk#$ + object marker was indeed the standard 
means of describing non-consensual sexual intercourse within biblical Hebrew, it 
seems incongruous that it was not utilised in Deut. 22.25, 28, where there is an 
undeniable suggestion of sexual violence.75  Instead, the suffixed preposition M( 
follows bk#$ (hm( bk#$w), indicating once again that there can be no definite 
correlation between the presentation of bk#$ as a transitive verb and its denotation of 
sexual aggression.76  Biblical evidence would therefore appear to suggest that the 
particle used to designate the object of bk#$ is grammatically irrelevant, with regards 
any attempt to determine the consensual/coercive nature of the sexual act in 
question.77  Moreover, Orlinsky has proposed that the presence of an object marker 
alongside bk#$ does not even necessarily render it a transitive verbal form; as he 
notes, the use of the particle t) pointed as the object marker to represent the 
meaning ‘with’ is attested elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible.78  Thus, the phrase bka@#;$y,IwA 
                                                
74 Lipka, 187.  
75 Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 23, n.8.  
76 Williams, “bk#$”, 102; Parry, Old Testament Story, 139, n.60; Lipka, 187; Orlinsky, 20-21.   
77 Orlinsky, 24; Parry, Old Testament Story, 139; Bader, 20.  Orlinsky suggests that the pattern of 
usage for bk#$ t) and M( bk#$ is perhaps influenced, less by the licit/illicit or consensual/coercive 
nature of the sexual intercourse denoted by these terms, than by the biblical text in which they are 
found.  Thus, the priestly material shows a preference for t) bk#$ (i.e. Leviticus, Numbers, Ezekiel), 
while the Deuteronomist favours M( bk#$ (21-22).  With regards Genesis, Exodus and the books of 
Samuel, Orlinsky confesses that the multi-stranded interweaving of sources within these texts do not 
permit him to theorize as to the pattern of usage of these two grammatical constructions (22).   
78 Orlinsky, 26, n.14, 28; also Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 85; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16: A New 
Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 931; P. Kyle 
McCarter, II Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes and Commentary (New York: 
Doubleday, 1984), 317.  The pointing of the particle t) as an object marker, but with the meaning 
‘with’ can be seen, for example, in Josh. 10.25; 14.12; 2 Sam. 24.24, and repeatedly (though not 
exclusively) throughout the texts of 1 Kgs 20-2 Kgs 8, Ezekiel, and Jeremiah. 
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h@tf)o in Gen. 34.2 and 2 Sam. 13.14 may not even be a Masoretic tradition but rather 
a more ancient grammatical construction, which retains the intransitive nature of the 
verb bk#$  and which, furthermore, carries no inherent connotations of sexual 
violence or coercion.79   
Thus, to conclude, it would appear that the particular use of the phrase h@tf)o bka@#;$y,IwA in 
Gen. 34.2 sheds little or no light upon the precise nature of Shechem and Dinah’s 
sexual experience.  While this syntactic construction is likewise utilised in 2 Sam. 
13.14 to connote unequivocal acts of sexual violence, it is just as likely to occur in 
contexts where the consensual nature of the sexual intercourse in question is left in 
no doubt by the text’s author.  We can therefore only deduce that the presence of 
h@tf)o bka@#;$y,IwA in Gen. 34.2 is, in itself, insufficient to either confirm or deny the reality 
of Dinah’s rape. 
 
b) The significance of the verb xql in Gen. 34.2 
The conclusions reached above regarding ht) bk#$ inevitably leave us with the 
question; is there anything else to suggest that Gen. 34.2 presents a contextual 
environment, in which the verb bk#$ may be read as an act of rape?  As mentioned 
earlier, several scholars have demurred, claiming that there is nothing intrinsic to the 
language of this verse, which could justify such an interpretation.80 
However, an important feature to bear in mind, as regards the usage of bk#$ in this 
verse, is that it is directly preceded by the verb xql.  From the discussion above, it 
was noted that, when bk#$ is utilised in a context that denotes coercive and 
aggressive sexual intercourse (Deut. 22.25, 28; 2 Sam. 13.14), the woman who is the 
object of this action is said to be seized or forcibly grasped prior to the sexual act 
occurring.  Thus it would appear that, by preceding bk#$ with a verb of seizure, such 
as qzx or #&pt, the ancient writers conveyed the coercive and aggressive nature of an 
act of sexual intercourse, signalling to the reader that the woman was not entering 
into this sexual encounter willingly.  Rather, she was taken hold of by her assailant, 
controlled by his physical strength, and compelled through forceful means to be the 
object of his sexual attention.81      
                                                
79 Orlinsky, 23-25, 28.     
80 Wyatt, 435; Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 28; Lipka, 187-88. 
81 In Jdg. 19.25, the sexual assault of the Levite’s concubine is also initiated by her forceful seizure, 
only in this case, it is her own husband who ‘seizes’ her (w#$glypb #$y)h qzxyw) and sends her out to face 
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This stylistic commonality amongst biblical texts depicting sexual violence has led 
several scholars to thus surmise that in Gen. 34.2, the verb xql, which immediately 
precedes bk#$, may likewise carry nuances of forceful seizure, thereby confirming 
that Dinah’s sexual experience was indeed coerced.  Thus, according to Gravett, the 
use of xql here in v.2 ‘conveys violence on the part of Shechem’.82  Similarly, 
Gerhard von Rad likewise translates this phrase as ‘he seized her’,83 while Gunkel 
translates ht) xqyw as ‘he kidnapped, abducted her’.84  In order to test the veracity 
of these readings put forward by Gravett, von Rad, and Gunkel, among others, it will 
be helpful then to review the semantic range of the verbal root xql within the 
Hebrew biblical corpus; hopefully, this will enable us to determine whether, in Gen. 
34.2, it is employed as a verb of seizure.  
The verb xql is typically used within biblical Hebrew to convey the meaning, ‘to 
take’, ‘to appropriate (something)’ for oneself or another, ‘to take possession of’, ‘to 
carry off’, ‘to choose’, or ‘to receive’.85  In this general usage, it therefore does not 
necessarily convey any inherent sense of force or violence.  It can represent the 
legitimate taking or acquiring of something or someone that is at one’s disposal, 
without any implication that aggressive means were utilised.86  Within this 
contextual locale of non-aggressive acquisition, one very common treatment of the 
verb xql is its denotation of the act of ‘taking’ a wife in marriage.  Indeed, this 
specific use of xql accounts for around a quarter of the verb’s occurrences in the 
book of Genesis.87  Outwith Genesis, xql likewise conveys the sense of ‘to take as a 
                                                                                                                                    
the mob of Benjaminites, who then rape and abuse her the night long.  Nevertheless, the use of 
physical control to override this woman’s own wishes leaves in no doubt the coercive and abusive 
nature of this horrific act of sexual violence.  
82 Gravett, 282.   
83 von Rad, Genesis, 329. 
84  Gunkel, 358.  It is pertinent to note that the Latin translator responsible for the Biblia Sacra 
Vulgata appears to have read xql as connoting forceful seizure here in v.2.  He represents the Hebrew 
ht) xqyw with the Latin et rapuit, from the verb rapere, which conveys a sense of ‘to seize, capture 
forcibly, take away by force, steal, carry off and violate’.  See Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. P.G.W. 
Glare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 2:1573. 
85 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 542-43; Koehler, Baumgartner, and Stamm, (1995), 2:543; H.H. 
Schmid, “xql”, in Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament, ed. Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann, 
trans. Mark E. Biddle (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1997), 2:649-50; H. Seebass, “xql”, in 
Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, and 
Heinz-Josef Fabry, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 1997), 8:17; P.J.J.S. Els, 
“xql”, in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. 
VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 2:812-15.  
86 This general nuance of non-violent ‘taking’ is prevalent through the entire Hebrew biblical canon.  
For just a few of these many occasions, see for example Gen. 21.14; Exod. 16.16; Lev. 8.15; Num. 
19.2; Deut. 26.2; Jdg. 15.15; 1 Sam. 25.18; 2 Sam. 13.19; 1 Kgs. 14.3; 2 Kgs 5.15; Isa. 8.1; Jer. 36.2; 
Ezek. 43.20; Zech. 14.21; Zeph. 3.2; Prov. 7.20; Job 42.8, etc. 
87 It is used in this sense in 33 out of the 142 occurrences within the book of Genesis.  See, for 
example, Gen. 4.19; 6.2; 11.29; 12.19; 19.4; 21.21; 25.1, 20; 28.1, 2, 6, 9; 31.50; 36.2, etc.   
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wife’ in the legal material,88 the former prophets,89 the latter prophets,90 and the 
writings.91  
However, there are a significant number of passages, both in Genesis and elsewhere 
in the Hebrew Bible, where xql does appear to connote the violent or compulsory 
arrest of a person or persons, for a purpose that is intended to subdue or exert control 
over them.92  Thus, it is commonly employed to convey the capture and detainment 
of prisoners during a time of military conflict,93 or the seizure of an individual 
within any other context of hostility and aggression. 94  In these latter cases, a person 
is taken against their will and held in a situation that both compromises their 
autonomy and is of considerable detriment to their welfare and security.  This then 
begs the question, is there anything within the contextual milieu of Gen. 34.2 to 
support the proposal that one ought to read xql here in a similar sense?  That is, did 
the narrator of this text utilise this verb specifically to convey the idea that Shechem 
took hold of Dinah with the explicit purpose of overpowering and raping her?   
In response to this question, several biblical scholars have answered firmly in the 
negative, arguing that within the context of Gen. 34.2, xql carries no explicit or 
implicit inferences of hostility or aggression on Shechem’s part.  Instead, they 
propose that the verb simply denotes the meaning, mentioned above, ‘to take as a 
wife’.  That is, Shechem did not seize Dinah forcefully in order to overpower and 
sexually violate her; rather, as Nicolas Wyatt suggests, by having consensual sexual 
relations with her, he ‘took’ her in a matrimonial sense, the sexual act itself 
symbolising his desire to claim to her as a wife.95   
                                                
88 For example,  Exod. 21.10; 34.16; Lev. 18.18; 20.14; 21.14; Num. 12.1; Deut. 7.3; 20.7; 24.4-5, 
etc. 
89 For example Jdg. 14.2-3, 8; 1 Sam. 25.39, 43; 2 Sam 12.10; 1 Kgs. 3.1; 16.31 etc. 
90 For example, Jer. 16.2; 29.6; Ezek. 44.22; Hos. 1.2-3.  
91 For example, Ruth 4.13; 1 Chron. 2.19, 21; 7.15; 2 Chron. 11.18, 20; Ezra 2.61; Neh. 5.15; 6.18; 
7.63, etc. 
92 As well as denoting the violent seizure of people, xql is also commonly utilised to convey the 
unlawful or unjust acquisition of some object that does not rightly belong to the taker, be it material 
property (1 Sam. 2.16; Josh. 6.18; 7.11; Jdg. 17.2), or some more ethereal possession, such as a 
blessing or birthright (Gen. 27.35, 36; Mic. 2.9).  Continuing this sense of aggressive acquisition, the 
verb is utilised frequently within an explicitly military context to signify the capture and subjugation 
of foreign territory (e.g. Josh. 11.16, 23; 1 Sam. 7.14; 2 Sam. 8.1; 1 Kgs 20.34; 2 Kgs 13.25; Hos. 
10.6; 1 Chr. 18.1, etc), and the subsequent acquirement of war booty (e.g. Gen. 31.34; Jdg. 5.19; 1 
Sam. 14.32; 2 Sam. 7.8; 1 Kgs. 14.26; Isa. 49.24; Joel 4.5; Job 1.15, 17; 1 Chr. 7.21; 2 Chr. 12.9, etc). 
93 For example, Gen. 14.12; Josh. 8.12; 11.19; 2 Sam. 10.4; 21.8; 2 Kgs. 10.7; 23.34; 24.12; 25.18; 
Isa. 52.5; Jer. 39.5; 48.46; 52.24, 26; Ezek. 23.10, 25; 2 Chron. 36.4; Job 1.15, etc. 
94 For example, Gen 37.24; 39.20; 42.24, 36; 43.18; 44.29; 2 Sam. 18.17; Jer. 38.6, etc. 
95 Wyatt, 435. 
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Wyatt’s proposed reading of xql here in v.2 is likewise echoed by a number of 
other scholars, who all argue that there is nothing within the context of this verse to 
substantiate the claim that xql denotes violent seizure.96  As Bader insists, ‘The use 
of the verb xql does not imply that a man had taken the woman without first asking 
[her] permission to do so’.97  Instead, like Wyatt, these scholars suggest that the 
narrator has used this verb in v.2 in the same sense as in vv.4, 9, 16, and 21: to 
denote a man’s (non-aggressive) acquisition of a woman in marriage.98  Fleishman 
substantiates this interpretation of xql by appealing to cognate evidence, noting that 
the cognate Akkadian term for the Hebrew form xql is ah~a4zu, which, he proposes, 
bears the meaning ‘to take hold of for the purpose of marriage’.99  Indeed, he would 
appear to suggest that throughout this entire narrative, xql, which occurs eight times 
(vv.2, 4, 9, 16, 21, 25, 26, 28), never connotes a sense of physical constraint or 
violent coercion, but rather, always ‘refers to marriage’.100  Bechtel likewise makes a 
similar statement, proposing that, ‘elsewhere in the story lqh[ has no inherent 
connotation of physical force’.101   
However, while it is certainly true that, within the text of Genesis 34, xql is indeed 
used to denote the sense of ‘to take in marriage’ (vv.4, 9, 16, 21), the suggestion that 
this verb carries these connubial nuances here in v.2 may be called into question for 
two principal reasons; namely, the semantic diversity of xql in Genesis 34 and the 
veracity of Fleishman’s cognate evidence.  Let us now consider each briefly in turn. 
Firstly, Fleishman and Bechtel’s suggestion that, elsewhere in Gen. 34, xql is used 
primarily to denote the non-violent and mutual ‘taking’ of wives, proves, on closer 
consideration of the text, to be rather misleading.  In fact, this verb is employed 
within the narrative to convey a wider range of semantic nuances than merely ‘to 
take in marriage’.  As Bechtel herself admits,102 it appears in the explicitly violent 
context of v.25 to denote Simeon and Levi’s ‘taking up’ their swords to slay the 
                                                
96 Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 28; and “Dinah”, 70; Fleishman, 103; Lipka, 188, n.75; 
Bader, 26; Van Seters, 243; van Wolde, “Love and Hatred”, 436.  Indeed, Lipka suggests here that, 
when xql is utilised as a verb of seizure, ‘the object is always inanimate, usually a town or city and/or 
its booty … never a person’.  However, footnotes 93 and 94 above list a number of examples within 
the biblical texts that challenge her statement here.   
97 Bader, 26. 
98 Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 28; Fleishman, 103, n.5; Lipka, 188, n.75; Bader, 26; Van 
Seters, 243. 
99 Fleishman, 103, n.5. 
100 Ibid.  
101 Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 28.   
102 Ibid.  
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Hivite males.103  Furthermore, Bechtel fails to mention that later, in vv.28-9, the 
verb is again utilised within a context of aggression and hostility to connote Dinah’s 
brothers’ barbarous and comprehensive capture and pillaging of the city of Shechem 
and its inhabitants.104  All the wealth and possessions of the slain Hivite men, 
including their wives and children, are depicted within these two verses as being 
seized (xql) and looted (zzb) as war booty.   
Furthermore, and of particular importance to this argument, xql is employed in 
v.26, when, after slaying the young prince and his father Hamor, Dinah’s brothers 
‘take’ her out of Shechem’s house, where she has been residing since her encounter 
with the young prince.105  The replication of this verb here, resonating with the 
memories of Dinah’s initial experience of being ‘taken’ by Shechem in v.2, is surely 
significant.  It is possible that the narrator deliberately repeated this lexical form in 
v.26 to evoke memories of Shechem’s crime, thereby reminding the reader that, just 
as Dinah is ‘taken’ back by her brothers within a context seething with swift 
aggression, so too was she originally ‘taken’ by Shechem in circumstances that were 
likewise shocking in their precipitate brutality.106  Shechem is therefore perhaps 
reaping what he has sown here, as his initially aggressive actions are reciprocated, 
through the ferocious force of Jacobite vengeance.  The brothers ‘take up’ their 
swords to slay the Hivite males, ‘take’ Dinah back, and finally, they compound their 
bloody revenge by ‘taking’ for themselves everything of value, including women 
and children, within Hivite territory.  As Sternberg suggests, ‘It is as if one brutal 
“taking” led to the rest, and what followed Shechem’s sexual “taking” was not the 
legal “taking” for which he came to yearn but “takings” more analogous to that with 
which he launched the chain of violence’.107     
Given the above discussion, I would therefore suggest that it is inadequate to assert, 
as Fleishman does, that within Genesis 34, the verb xql ‘refers to marriage’.108  Nor 
can we concur with Bechtel, who proposed that within this narrative, xql carries no 
                                                
103 wbrx #$y) hnyd yx) ywlw Nw(m#$ bq(y-ynb-yn#$ wxqyw : v.25b 
104 whql hd#&b r#$)-t)w ry(b-r#$) t)w Mhyrmx-t)w Mrqb-t)w Mn)c-t) : v.28 
105 w)cyw Mk#$ tybm hnyd-t) wxqyw : v.26b  
106 This is not to say that Dinah’s brothers were aggressive towards her when they ‘took’ her from 
Shechem’s house in v.26.  The point I am trying to make here is that the particularly violent context in 
which xql occurs within this verse may echo the aggression implicit in this same verbal action in v.2.  
In other words, just as Dinah’s being ‘taken’ by her brothers occurs in circumstances of extreme 
violence and bloodshed, so too was the original act of her being ‘taken’ by Shechem executed within 
a context replete with the physical brutality and horror of rape.  The distinction is that in v.2, this 
aggression is perpetrated against her; in v.26, it is directed in an avenging spirit against her tormentor. 
107 Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 469. 
108 Fleishman, 103, n.5. 
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explicit connotations of physical force.109  It is clear that this Hebrew verb conveys a 
wider range of semantic nuances in this text than simply ‘to take as a wife’; rather, 
as we saw above, the narrator’s repetition of the verb in vv.25, 26, and 28 may 
suggest that its significance in v.2 speaks less of Shechem’s supposedly peaceful 
acquisition of a spouse than of his brutal seizure and assault of a young woman.  As 
Parry concludes, it may well be that ‘it was not marriage in which Dinah was 
taken’.110     
Turning now to Fleishman’s appeal to Akkadian cognate evidence, an important 
point to note at the outset is that, contrary to his claims, the Akkadian verb 
ah~a4zu does have other semantic nuances apart from ‘to take in marriage’.  It can also 
simply mean ‘to take (something or someone)’, thereby carrying the same basic 
semantic connotations as its Hebrew counterpart xql.111  In other words, this term 
does not necessarily always refer to ‘taking’ a woman as a wife, as Fleishman would 
appear to presume.  Furthermore, ah~a4zu is not the only cognate of xql occurring 
within Akkadian.  The Akkadian verb lequ= is another cognate term, which, like its 
biblical Hebrew equivalent, can mean ‘to take hold of’, ‘to receive’, ‘to carry off 
(i.e. booty, captives)’, and ‘to take away’.112  While lequ= is utilised idiomatically 
within Akkadian to convey the sense ‘to take as a wife’, its semantic range is 
likewise more diverse than this single special application.  In other words, cognate 
equivalents, such as lequ= and ah~a4zu, share more than one particular meaning of the 
Hebrew verb xql; they carry a sense of ‘taking’, which is much broader than simply 
‘to take in marriage’.  Indeed, as Els has noted, all of the cognates for xql occurring 
within the Semitic languages of the ancient Near East express ‘basically the same 
central concept of receiving/taking’ within both peaceful and aggressive contexts.113 
Thus, Fleishman’s appeal to cognate evidence to confirm his theory that the verb 
xql only denotes ‘to take as a wife’ in Gen. 34.2 is not necessarily correct.  A 
similar argument could be made for Akkadian cognate equivalents attesting to this 
verb conveying the sense ‘to take hold of’, or ‘to carry off’, both of which are within 
the semantic range of these Akkadian terms.  Such a meaning would suggest a more 
forceful and aggressive seizure of Dinah by Shechem, rather than merely inferring 
                                                
109 Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 28. 
110 Parry, Old Testament Story, 137. 
111 J. Black, A. George and N. Postgate (eds.), A Concise Dictionary of Akkadian (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2000), 7; W. von Soden, Akkadisches Handwörterbuch (Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz, 1965), 1:18-19. 
112 Seebass, 16; Schmid, 648; Els, “xql”, 812; von Soden, 544-45; Black, George, and Postgate, 180. 
113 Els, “xql”, 812; also Seebass, 16; Schmid, 648; Koehler, Baumgartner, and Stamm, (1995), 2:534. 
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connubial intentions on his part.  We simply cannot assume that the Hebrew verb 
connotes one particular nuance here, based on cognate equivalents, when the 
cognate evidence itself leaves the matter much wider open to debate than Fleishman 
would admit.  There is simply not enough evidence within the context of Gen. 34.2 
itself, which would point conclusively to xql carrying the particular idiomatic sense 
of the Akkadian cognates lequ= and ah~a4zu, ‘to take in marriage’, as opposed to one of 
their other meanings.   
Thus, given the above discussion, it is simply inadequate to claim, as Fleishman, 
Wyatt, and Bechtel do, that the function of xql in v.2 is necessarily the same as its 
meaning in vv.4, 9, 16 and 21 – ‘to take in marriage’.  Instead, it is very possible that 
the author of Gen. 34.2 sought to convey a sense of the aggressive and coercive 
nature of Shechem’s sexual intercourse with Dinah by preceding bk#$ with the verb 
xql.  As in the other biblical texts where women are depicted as the victims of 
sexual violence, Dinah is first taken hold of by Shechem and overpowered by his 
superior strength, thereby precluding her ability to reject his sexual advances.114  
Thus, as Gravett concludes, ‘The verb xql, as translated, conveys violence on the 
part of Shechem, and not simply the unlawful seizure of Dinah to be his wife’.115   
 
Shame or Sexual Violence?  The Semantic Significance of  hn@(i 
The verb hn( has probably caused the greatest amount of debate within biblical 
scholarship regarding the extent of violence used by Shechem during his sexual 
encounter with Dinah in Gen. 34.2.  As Ellen van Wolde has stated with regards this 
verb, ‘if ever words can change one’s view of a text, this word can’.116  Translations 
of the 3m.s. Piel form hfn@e(ay:wA in v.2 vary considerably; scholars have represented it 
with readings such as, ‘he debased her’,117 ‘shamed her’,118 ‘raped her’,119 
‘humiliated her’,120 ‘ravished her’,121 ‘abused her’,122 and ‘tortured’ her.123  The 
                                                
114 Gravett, 281. 
115 Ibid., 282. 
116 van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 530. 
117 Alter, 189. 
118 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 305. 
119 Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power and Promise, 81; Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes”, 165; Gravett, 
282; Zlotnik, 37. 
120 Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 24. 
121 H.C. Leupold, Exposition of Genesis (London: Evangelical Press, 1942), 897. 
122 Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 446. 
123 Aschkenasy, Eve’s Journey, 125.  Brenner also contends that hn@f(i denotes ‘to torture’ (Intercourse 
of Knowledge, 96, n.14). 
55 
 
primary point of contention here however is whether this verbal form is utilised by 
the ancient author to confirm that Dinah was the victim of an unequivocal act of 
sexual assault.     
In order to address this issue, we should perhaps begin by looking at the range of 
meanings that this verbal form can convey within the biblical material.  On 
reviewing the evidence, it quickly becomes apparent that it would be wrong to 
presume that the primary function of hnf@(i was to act as a technical term for ‘rape’.124  
The Piel stem can convey a wide range of meanings, including ‘to oppress, afflict, 
subjugate’ (e.g. Exod. 1.11-12; 22.21-22; Num. 24.24; 2 Sam. 7.10; Isa. 60.14), ‘to 
humble, humiliate, dishonour’ (e.g. 1 Sam. 11.39; Isa. 58.3, 5; Ps. 89.22), and ‘to 
abuse, mistreat, overpower, do violence to’ (e.g. Gen. 16.6; 31.50; Jdg. 16.5, 6, 
19).125  The common denominator of all these definitions is, according to 
Gerstenberger, the fact that ‘physical or psychic force is used to alter the status of 
someone for the worse’.126  In other words, the subject of this verb uses his or her 
power (either physical strength or superior authority) to treat a person or persons in a 
way that disregards their social status and causes their humiliation, subjugation, or 
physical or emotional oppression.127  There is moreover often an accompanying 
sense that the behaviour depicted by hn@f(i goes against the demands of justice, in that 
it is to the detriment and against the wishes of the verbal object.  Thus in effect, an 
element of disapproval appears to be implicit in the use of this verbal form to 
connote one person’s treatment of another; to behave towards a fellow human in 
such a way is considered, within the worldview of biblical Israel, to be abusive, 
oppressive and essentially unjust.128   
When utilised within texts denoting acts of consensual sexual intercourse, hn@F(i is 
usually understood as expressing a particular sense of social humiliation and 
debasement, wrought upon a woman as a result of her participation in a sexual 
                                                
124 Ullendorff, 436; Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 87; Harold C. Washington, “‘Lest He 
Die and Another Man Take Her’: Violence and the Construction of Gender in the Laws of 
Deuteronomy 20-22”, in Matthews, Levinson, and Frymer-Kensky, 208; Cyril S. Rodd, Glimpses of a 
Strange Land: Studies in Old Testament Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 265. 
125 Koehler, Baumgartner, and Stamm (1995), 2:853; Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 776; E. 
Gerstenberger, “hn(”, in Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, 
Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry, trans. David E. Green (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 
11:237; P. Wegner, “hn(”, in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, 
ed. Willem A. VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 3:449. 
126 Gerstenberger, “hn(”, 237.  Similarly, Lipka suggests that hn@F(i represents ‘the maltreatment of 
someone in a way that degrades or disgraces him or her’ (87). 
127 Gerstenberger, “hn(”, 237; also Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 87; van Wolde, “Does 
‘innâ Denote Rape”, 531; Lipka, 87. 
128 Keefe, 89, n.8; van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 542-43. 
56 
 
relationship, which is either deemed unlawful and morally defiling, or is, in some 
sense, a source of violation and imposition upon the woman.129  Thus, for example, 
Ezek. 22.10 refers to the men of Jerusalem who ‘debase’ (wn() a menstruating 
woman by having sexual intercourse with her, while in v.11, the offender ‘humbles’ 
(hn() his paternal sister when he engages her participation in this incestuous sexual 
relationship.  These sexual events are evaluated as serious socio-religious 
infractions, according to the Levitical legislation in Lev. 18.9, 19 and 20.17, 18, and 
are therefore recognised as the source of the woman’s dishonour. 130   
Similarly, in Deut. 22.24, hn@F(i likewise appears to denote the socially debasing 
effects upon a woman because of her apparently consensual participation in an 
adulterous act of pre-marital sexual intercourse.131  As we will discuss in more detail 
in the following chapter, female chastity was highly valued in biblical Israel and a 
betrothed woman was expected to preserve her virginity for her intended husband; 
any betrothed woman who was deflowered outwith the matrimonial covenant 
therefore suffered a serious blow to her social status, not to mention having to face 
the capital punishment meted out against perpetrators of adultery.132  Meanwhile, in 
Deut. 21.14, hn@F(i appears to convey some sense of violation imposed upon a woman 
who has become the captive war bride of an Israelite soldier.  Although the man has 
legally married her (vv.10-13), the words of v.14 suggest that, by doing so, he has in 
some sense caused her dishonour or social humiliation.  For, while he is free to 
divorce his captive bride if he ceases to desire her, he cannot however sell her into 
slavery, because, we are told, he has debased her (htyn( r#$) txt).  The source of 
this debasement is not made explicit within the text; the couple’s sexual relationship 
is legally sanctioned133 and, unlike the sexual acts denoted in Deut. 22.23-24 and 
                                                
129 Frymer-Kensky, “Law and Philosophy”, 93; and Reading the Women of the Bible, 183; Bechtel, 
“What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 24-25; Lipka, 88-89; van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 541-42; 
Van Seters, 242.  
130 Bader, 34-35; Washington, “Lest He Die”, 208; Gerstenberger, “hn(”, 237; Frymer-Kensky, “ Law 
and Philosophy”, 93, 100, n.9; and Goddesses, 192-94, 274, n.34; Lipka, 88.   
131 While I argued above that the reasoning behind the denial of the sexual violence implicit within 
this law was hopelessly flawed (see footnote 62), it is patent nevertheless from the context that the 
sexual act depicted therein is by no means intended to be read as an act of sexual violence.  I have 
therefore not included this text within my discussion, as I wish to focus only upon these texts, which 
utilise hn@F( within a context explicitly recognised by the biblical author as depicting an act of sexual 
aggression.   
132 Phyllis Trible, “Women in the Old Testament”, in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: An 
Illustrated Encyclopaedia, ed. Kenneth Crim (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976), Supplementary 
Volume, 964.  Biblical ideologies pertaining to female sexuality will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter. 
133 Of course, by modern definition, this woman is clearly a victim of sexual violence; regardless of 
the ‘legitimacy’ of her marriage and the elaborate month-long rituals of which she must partake 
before her relationship with her captor is consummated, there is no denying that the woman’s right to 
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Ezek. 22.10-11, can in no sense be understood as either unlawful or morally defiling.  
Perhaps, as Pressler has suggested, the lawmakers regarded marriage by 
cohabitation, rather than by the usual contractual arrangement with the woman’s 
father, as being a less ‘valid’ form of matrimony.134  Alternatively, the very act of 
taking this woman captive and of taking her away from her own home and installing 
her within an Israelite household may be regarded as inherently lowering her social 
status.135  Washington, meanwhile, suggests that the act of divorcing this woman or 
refusing to go through with the marriage in the first place may also be a source of 
her dishonour.136  Whatever the source of her defilement, the law therefore attempts 
to protect the woman from even further degradation than she has already suffered; as 
van Wolde asserts, ‘However low her social status may be, she is not to be 
degraded’.137 
Nevertheless, there are eight occasions (excluding Gen. 34.2) when hnf@(i appears 
within contexts, which depict sexual behaviour that is not only unlawful, but is 
unequivocally aggressive and non-consensual (Deut. 22.29; Jdg. 19.24; 20.5; 2 Sam. 
13.12, 14, 22, 32; Lam. 5.11).  Now, as noted above, this verbal form may on 
occasion be employed within non-sexual scenarios to denote a person’s physical 
subjugation and mistreatment.  Thus, in Gen. 16.6, hn@F(i appears to denote the 
                                                                                                                                    
consent to sexual intercourse is utterly subverted.  While overt physical violence may not have been 
used against the woman, her status as captive ensured that she was clearly in no position to withhold 
her consent.  As Harold Washington notes, ‘To assume the consent of the woman is to erase her 
personhood.  Only in the most masculinist of readings does the month-long waiting period give a 
satisfactory veneer of peaceful domesticity to a sequence of defeat, bereavement, and rape’ (“Lest He 
Die”, 205; also Gravett, 287).  This legislation therefore fails to acknowledge the unequivocally 
coercive nature of the sexual behaviour depicted therein, suggesting instead that such a means of 
gaining sexual access to a woman was both normative and acceptable.  Thus, although the sexual 
scenario depicted therein is, to my mind, unequivocally rape, it is not intended to be read as such 
within the context of this Deuteronomic legislation.  I have therefore chosen to discuss this text as an 
example of the use of the verb hn@F(i within an implied context of consensual sexuality, where it denotes 
some sense of the humiliation and diminished social value accorded the woman, in her status as a 
captive war bride.  For further discussion on this text, see Pamela Gordon and Harold C. Washington, 
“Rape as a Military Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible”, in Brenner, A Feminist Companion to the Latter 
Prophets, 313; Susan Niditch, “War, Women, and Defilement in Numbers 31”, Semeia 61 (1993): 50; 
Washington, “Lest He Die”, 202-7; Jeffrey H. Tigay, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 194-95; A.D.H. Mayes, Deuteronomy (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 303; Duane L. Christensen, Deuteronomy 21.10-34.12 (Nashville: Thomas 
Nelson Publishers, 2002), 472-75; Patrick D. Miller, Deuteronomy (Louisville: John Knox Press, 
1990), 159; Cheryl B. Anderson, Women, Ideology, and Violence: Critical Theory and the 
Construction of Gender in the Book of the Covenant and the Deuteronomic Law (London and New 
York: T&T Clark International, 2004), 47.   
134 Carolyn Pressler, The View of Women Found in the Deuteronomic Family Laws (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1993), 14; Frymer-Kensky, “Law and Philosophy”, 100, n.9; Brenner, Intercourse of 
Knowledge, 534. 
135 van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 535; also Pressler, View of Women, 14.   
136 Washington, “Lest He Die”, 207 
137 van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 535; also Brenner, Intercourse of Knowledge,  534. 
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physical and psychological abuse of Hagar at the hands of Sarah.  The harshness of 
this treatment is such that the woman prefers to take her chances of survival in the 
wilderness with her baby son, rather than endure the cruelty she is receiving at 
home.138  Furthermore, in Gen. 31.50, hn@F(i likewise connotes a sense degrading and 
abusive mistreatment, which may be perpetrated against a woman by her husband, 
while in Jdg. 16.5, 6, 19, it represents the act of rendering a person powerless and 
incapacitated by the employment of physical restraint.  Is it possible then that, when 
utilised within biblical portrayals of sexual violence, this verbal form may likewise 
convey such a sense of physically abusive behaviour, thereby accentuating and 
confirming the brutal and coercive nature of the sexual events depicted therein?   
In response to this question, a number of scholars have again answered 
unequivocally in the negative, proposing instead that, within texts denoting acts of 
sexual violence, hn@F(i continues to convey the same essential meaning as when it is 
employed within a context of consensual sexual impropriety.139  Thus, the 
hypothetical raped virgin in Deut. 22.28-29, Tamar’s incestuous and pre-marital 
sexual violation at the hands of her brother Amnon (2 Sam. 13), the threat and 
realisation of gang rape for the Levite’s concubine (Jdg. 19-20), and the wartime 
rapes of the women of Zion and Judah (Lam. 5.11) – in all of these texts, hn@F(i is 
believed to function, not as an explicit representation of the sexual and physical 
brutality experienced by these women, but rather, as a measure of the social shame 
and humiliation which has been wrought upon them by their, albeit unwilling, 
association with some form of illicit sexual activity. 140  According to Frymer-
Kensky therefore, hn@F(i does not always refer to rape when used within a sexual 
context, but rather to ‘illicit sex, sex with someone with whom one has no right to 
have sex’.141  Similarly, Bader argues that, whether or not hn@F(i is used in a context 
                                                
138 Lipka, 88. 
139 Pressler, Views of Women, 14; van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 538-41, 543-44; and “Love 
and Hatred”, 437; Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 87-89; and “Law and Philosophy”, 93; 
Lipka, 87-88, 188, 208, n.38; Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 24-27; Bader, 11, 16, 20, 35-
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140 Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 25-27; Lipka, 88-90, 188, 208, n.39, 253; van Wolde, 
“Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 537-40; J. Alberto Soggin, Judges: A Commentary, trans. John Bowden 
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141 Frymer-Kensky, “Law and Philosophy”, 93.  Frymer-Kensky does however admit in a footnote 
that, in some instances (such as Jdg. 19-20, 2 Sam. 13.12-13, and Lam. 5.11), hn@F(i may indeed denote 
an act of rape (“Law and Philosophy”, 100, n.9).  In the case of Deut. 22.28-29 and Gen. 34.2, 




denoting sexual violence, ‘the verb has to do with honor/shame’.142  Bechtel, 
likewise, concurs with these readings, suggesting that hn@F(i is but one means of 
denoting ‘the sense of inadequacy that an individual should feel for violation of the 
societal ideals and customs, which should produce an emotional response of 
shame’.143  While these scholars acknowledge that, within non-sexual scenarios, the 
verb may denote the physically abusive or aggressive maltreatment of one person by 
another, they nevertheless propose that such a meaning is never represented within 
texts depicting sexual violence.144   
Meanwhile, in a similar vein, Moshe Weinfeld proposes that, when employed within 
texts such as Deut. 22.28-29, 2 Sam. 13, and Jdg. 19, hn@F(i does not in fact confirm 
the coercive or aggressive nature of the sexual events depicted therein.  However, 
unlike the scholars cited above, he does not suggest that this verb necessarily 
signifies the woman’s social humiliation or debasement; rather, it simply represents 
an act of sexual intercourse, which is neither non-consensual nor violent.145  Thus, 
according to Weinfeld, these texts do not depict acts of sexual violence per se, but 
instead ‘may be interpreted more satisfactorily if we assume that they refer not 
strictly to rape … but to other instances of sexual intercourse, which are innocent but 
which involve an element of imposition upon the woman … [hn@F(i] might then still 
refer to seduction’.146   
Given these interpretations of hn@F(i outlined above, we are then left pondering their 
implications with regards our understanding of Dinah’s sexual encounter with 
Shechem in Gen. 34.2.  For, such readings of this verbal form would appear to 
suggest that the biblical narrator did not necessarily intend to portray this event as a 
violent attack upon Dinah’s bodily and sexual integrity, but rather as the occasion of 
her social debasement or, alternatively, as simply her seduction at the hands of the 
Hivite prince.  However, as I concluded in the previous discussion of the verbs bk#$ 
and xql, the language employed by the narrator within this verse does strongly 
suggest that the sexual event described here was an act of rape.  Furthermore, I 
                                                
142 Bader, 36.  Similarly, Gerstenberger notes that, when hn@F(i conveys a sense of sexual ‘violation’, as 
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would contend that, far from compromising this interpretive conclusion, the use of 
the verb hn@F(i here in Gen. 34.2 may actually serve to confirm it.  For, if we take a 
closer look at other rape texts, such as Deut. 22.28-9, Jdg. 19-20, 2 Sam. 13, and 
Lam. 5, where hn@F(i is likewise used within a context of sexual coercion and brutality, 
it would appear that this verb carries powerful nuances of the physicality of the 
abuse perpetrated against a woman during her sexual violation.  Let us therefore 
now turn to each of these texts, so that we might illuminate their particular 
employment of this verbal form. 
 
a) Deuteronomy 22.28-9 
Deut. 22.13-29 comprises a series of laws, which identify and categorise, with 
chilling efficiency, different forms of illicit sexual intercourse and the repercussions 
faced by those accused of such sexual impropriety.  In particular, they appear to 
clarify what does and does not constitute the capital offence of adultery, delineating 
under what circumstances both the man and woman involved may be held 
accountable for this sexual felony and thus face the death penalty.   
Vv.28-9, however, would appear to describe a ‘lesser’ (though still serious) 
misdemeanour, in which an unmarried and unbetrothed virgin is seized (#&pt) by a 
man and raped.  In this case, neither party faces the death penalty, but instead, the 
rapist must pay the woman’s father fifty shekels as compensation147 and, 
furthermore, has to marry the woman without later recourse to divorce.  The 
lawmaker explains this ‘punishment’ in v.29 with the explanatory clause, r#$) txt 
hn(.  A number of scholars have contended that the rationale underlying this legal 
requirement is based upon the woman being socially dishonoured after her loss of 
virginity outwith marriage.  As mentioned above, women were expected to remain 
                                                
147 Most commentators assume that the fifty shekels is paid to the woman’s father as compensation for 
the fact that, given his daughter is no longer a virgin, he will be unable to collect a lucrative bride 
price for her.  Perhaps the fixed sum of fifty shekels was the customary bride price at the time this law 
was composed, and by stipulating it, the lawmakers ensured that the woman’s father would not suffer 
financially by being a weakened position to negotiate for himself a decent sum.  Alternatively, as 
Tigay and Washington propose, the fifty shekels may have incorporated both a bride price and 
punitive damages.  As Tigay points out, according to Lev. 27.4-5, the ‘price’ for a woman is ten to 
thirty shekels, depending on her age, and it would be likely, as rape is a more grave offence than a 
seduction, that the perpetrator would have to pay some punitive damages as well as the standard bride 
price (Tigay, 208; Washington, “Lest He Die”, 211).  For further discussion of this issue, see also 
Pressler, View of Women, 40; Lipka, 176-77; Phillips, Essays, 84-85; and Ancient Israel’s Criminal 
Law: A New Approach to the Decalogue (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 115; Robert J.V. Hiebert, 




virgins until they were married; therefore such an act of pre-marital deflowerment 
would have led to a loss of the woman’s social status and would have seriously 
compromised her father’s chances of arranging a decent and lucrative marriage for 
her.148  With this in mind, these scholars therefore appear to suggest that the phrase 
hn( r#$) txt be translated ‘because he shamed her’.149   
Furthermore, several biblical interpreters have suggested that this law is not in fact 
dealing with a case of rape, but rather with an act of consensual, though illicit, pre-
marital seduction.  Thus, both Phillips and Weinfeld propose that the root #&pt in 
Deut. 22.28 does not convey the forceful seizure of a young woman by her rapist; 
rather, it denotes a sense of ‘to hold’ or ‘to embrace’ within the context of a non-
aggressive sexual encounter.150  Likewise, Bechtel translates #&pt as ‘to touch the 
heart’, thereby implying that the man wooed the young woman, rather than seizing 
her aggressively,151 while Frymer-Kensky suggests that, rather than denoting violent 
capture and rape, #&pt alludes to the man’s illicit, though consensual, ‘seizure’ of a 
woman’s sexuality, without respecting the ownership rights of her male guardian 
and first seeking his approval.152   
However, on reviewing the linguistic evidence presented within vv.28-9, I would 
contend that both of these above readings of hn( r#$) txt may be challenged.  In 
the first place, and contrary to Weinfeld, Phillips, Frymer-Kensky, and Bechtel, the 
use of #&pt as a verb of seizure in v.28 clearly indicates that the sexual event 
depicted within this legislation was undoubtedly coercive and aggressive.  As 
Carolyn Pressler has rightly pointed out, when used to connote the actions of one 
person towards another, this verbal form never depicts a mutually desired or sensual 
embrace; rather, it generally conveys the harmful and aggressive arrest or seizure of 
someone against their wishes, which threatens the recipient’s bodily integrity, their 
                                                
148 Pressler, View of Women, 40; and “Sexual Violence and Deuteronomic Law”, in Brenner, A 
Feminist Companion to Exodus to Deuteronomy, 104-5; Lipka, 177-78; Phillips, Essays, 84-85; 
Tigay, 208-9; Frymer-Kensky, “Law and Philosophy”, 92-93; and “Virginity in the Bible”, 79; and 
Goddesses, 191-92; Christensen, 514, 522; Koala Jones-Warsaw, “Toward a Womanist Hermeneutic: 
A Reading of Judges 19-21”, in A Feminist Companion to Judges, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 173. 
149 Pressler, View of Women, 37-38, n.48; Mayes, 313; Lipka, 253.  
150 Weinfeld, 286; Phillips, Essays, 85; and “Another Look at Adultery”, Journal for the Study of the 
Old Testament 20 (1981), 13; also Mayes, 313.   
151 Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 25. 
152 Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 89.  According to Frymer-Kensky, the man had ‘grabbed 
what he wanted without showing respect for the family’s honour and the protocols of propriety’ 
(“Virginity in the Bible”, 92). 
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safety, and at times, their life.153  While Weinfeld and Phillips are both correct to 
note that this verb can at times denote a sense of non-aggressive ‘holding’, such a 
meaning tends to occur primarily when the accusative is an inanimate object, such as 
a musical instrument (Gen. 4.21), a shield or sword (Jer. 46.9; Ezek. 21.11; 30.21), 
or the oars of a ship (Ezek. 27.29).   
Furthermore, Frymer-Kensky’s assertion that, in Deut. 22.28, the man ‘seizes’ the 
woman’s sexuality, rather than the woman herself belies the fact that the text plainly 
states that it is the woman, not her virginity or sexuality, which the man seizes and 
misuses.  Similarly, while it is true that #&pt is employed in Ezek. 14.5 to denote 
God’s ‘capturing’ the heart of his sinful people, Bechtel’s suggestion that the verb is 
likewise used in Deut. 22.28 in a metaphorical sense to denote an emotional 
connection between the man and woman again ignores the fact that the text does not 
tell us that the man seizes this woman’s heart; it plainly states that he seizes her.  
Within the context of Deut. 22.28-29, #&pt can therefore by no means be read as the 
prelude to an act of seduction.  Rather, as with qzx in v.25, it confirms the physical 
brutality used by the rapist to achieve his violent goal; the woman here was captured 
and controlled for a purpose that was explicitly and physically violent.154    
Moreover, the utilisation of the verbal form #&pt here may also suggest that the 
crime in question is focalised, not only as a source of social shame or dishonour for 
the woman but also as an aggressive act, that is, her forcible compulsion to 
participate in an unlawful act of sexual intercourse.  As Lipka notes, there is a strong 
similarity in the language of vv.25 and 28; in both cases, a man ‘comes upon’ a 
woman, seizes her, and proceeds to have sexual intercourse with her.155  Such 
linguistic resonance between these two verses suggests that, not only is the sexual 
                                                
153 Pressler, “Sexual Violence”, 104, n.5; and View of Women, 37-38.  Pressler notes that #&pt takes a 
human object 32 times in the Hebrew Bible; only in Ezek. 29.7, is the verb utilised to denote a sense 
of supportively holding on to someone.  In all other cases, it refers to actions such as entrapment, 
seizure, or forcible arrest (View of Women, 38, n.49).  The verb occurs frequently within the context 
of warfare to depict the capture of prisoners of war (e.g. Josh. 8.23; I Sam. 15.8; 23.26; 1 Kgs 20.18; 
2 Kgs. 7.12; 10.14; 14.13; 25.6; Jer. 34.3; Ezek. 12.13; 17.20; 19.4, 8; 2 Chron. 25.23, etc.), or in 
other situations where people are seized by hostile forces, to the detriment of their freedom and 
autonomy (e.g. Deut. 21.19; 1 Sam. 23.26; 1 Kgs 13.4; 18.40; 2 Kgs 10.14; Ps. 71.11; Jer. 26.8; 
37.13, 14; 38.23; 50.24; 52.9; Ezek. 29.7, etc.).   
154 Pressler, “Sexual Violence”, 104, n.5; and View of Women, 37-38; Anderson, 86-87; Judith 
Hauptman, “Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture”, in Brenner and Fontaine, 537; A.H. Konkel, “#&pt”, 
in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. 
VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 4:326; Eckhart Otto, “False Weights in the Scales of 
Biblical Justice?  Different Views of Women from Patriarchal Hierarchy to Religious Equality in the 
Book of Deuteronomy”, in Matthews, Levinson, and Frymer-Kensky, 133; Bader, 17-19. 
155 Lipka, 176, n.28. 
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act in v.28 an unequivocal case of rape, but also that the coercive nature of this act is 
an important point of consideration for the authors of this legislation.  These 
lawmakers are fully cognisant of the fact that, by so forcing her, the woman’s rapist 
has irreparably compromised her marriageability and ‘value’ in the bridal market; he 
must therefore face the consequences of his actions and right the wrong he has done 
her, by marrying her in perpetuity.   
Thus, I would suggest that a recognition of the coercion utilised by the rapist is 
fundamental to this law; it is because the rapist forced this woman to participate in 
an unlawful sexual act that she will suffer the indignity of being an unmarried virgin, 
and it is this very act of coercion, which therefore seals his responsibility for her 
future wellbeing.156  The words hn( r#$) txt in v.29 may then be understood to 
convey this sense of forcible violation, which is intrinsic to the sexual act that was 
described in the previous verse, and so justify the reading ‘because he forced her’, 
rather than ‘because he shamed her’ or, as Weinfeld appears to suggest, ‘because he 
seduced her’.  While it is true that hn@F(i is utilised within v.24 apparently to denote 
the shame and social debasement suffered by a woman caught in an act of 
consensual adultery, I nevertheless believe that, in v.29, this verbal form conveys 
instead a sense of sexual and physical violation, occurring as it does within a context 
of explicitly forceful and coercive sexual behaviour.   
 
b) Judges 19-20 
The book of Judges relates a turbulent period in Israel’s history when, prior to the 
institution of the monarchy, the tribal amphictyony was led by a series of judges, 
who guided the people through their oft-repeated cycles of sin and repentance.  
Within this tradition, the events that are depicted in Jdg. 19-20 are surely some of 
the most terrible.157  The story relates that a Levite and his concubine are making 
their long journey home from Bethlehem to Ephraim, when they are compelled to 
stop for the night in the Benjaminite town of Gibeah (19.11-14).  They are offered 
hospitality by an elderly resident of this town; however, no sooner have they settled 
                                                
156 The ethical implications of a law, which insists a rape victim marry her rapist, will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3.   
157 Terrible too are the events of Chapter 21, which relates the horrendous outcome of civil war, and 
which culminates in the mass abduction and rape of countless women at Jabesh-Gilead and Shiloh.  
Unfortunately, pressure of space does not permit me to discuss this text here, particularly as it has no 




in for a night of companionable revelry, when a violent mob of local townsmen 
surround the house, threatening to gang rape the Levite (v.22).158  In v.23, the 
elderly host pleads with the mob not to commit such an outrage against his male 
guest, and, in v.24, attempts to distract them and thus further protect his guest by 
offering to bring out to them in his place both his own virgin daughter and the 
Levite’s concubine, offering them the opportunity to bw+h Mhl w#&(w Mtw) wn(w 
Mkyny(b.  A number of interpreters have suggested that this proposal was, first and 
foremost, a desperate attempt by the host to uphold his duty of hospitality towards 
the Levite, by shielding him from the grave dishonour that such a sexual assault 
would have caused him, both as a man and as a Levitical priest.159  In other words, 
                                                
158 Daniel Block refers to the actions of the Benjaminite mob as a homosexual expression of 
‘unrestrained animal lust’ (542), describing these men as ‘uncontrollably aroused’ (539).  Similarly, 
Stuart Lasine also appears to view the violence in a (homo)sexualised light, speaking of ‘the perverted 
sexual desires of the mob’ and describing the Levite as ‘the object of such desires’ (57, n.38) [italics 
added].  However, it is important to clarify that the action threatened by the men of Gibeah was less 
the consummation of homosexual lust than the violating act of male gang rape.  Their actions were 
not fuelled by sexual arousal and desire; rather, as Block himself admits, they were threatening the 
Levite with an unequivocal act of violence, the goal of which was to treat him as an object of 
contempt, domination, and physical abuse (539, n.259).  Thus, according to Deryn Guest, ‘This 
narrative has very little, if anything to do with homosexuality’ (183).  As with sexual violence 
directed against women, male rape should never be treated primarily as a sexual act, but rather as a 
misanthropic, violent, and hate-fuelled assault, the goal of which is to cause physical and emotional 
harm to the victim.  See Daniel I. Block, Judges Ruth (Nashville: Broadman, and Holman, 1999), 
539; Stuart Lasine, “Guest and Host in Judges 19: Lot’s Hospitality in an Inverted World”, Journal 
for the Study of the Old Testament 29 (1984): 57, n.38; Deryn Guest, “Judges”, in The Queer Bible 
Commentary, ed. Deryn Guest et al., (London ACM Press, 2006), 182-85.  For further discussion on 
the theme of homosexual violence in Jdg. 19, see Stone, Sex, Honour, and Power, 79-82; Ilse 
Müllner, “Lethal Differences: Sexual Violence Against Others in Judges 19”, in Judges: A Feminist 
Companion to the Bible (2nd Series), ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1999), 140; John L. Thompson, Writing the Wrongs: Women of the Old Testament among Biblical 
Commentators from Philo through the Reformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 183; 
Mieke Bal, “The Rape of Narrative and the Narrative of Rape: Speech Acts and Body Language in 
Judges”, in Literature and the Body: Essays on Populations and Persons, ed. Elaine Scarry 
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1988), 20; and Death and Dissymmetry, 157-
59; Anne Michele Tapp, “An Ideology of Expendability: Virgin Daughter Sacrifice in Genesis 19.1-
11, Judges 11.30-39 and 19.22-26”, in Bal, Anti-Covenant, 162; Gale A. Yee, “Ideological Criticism: 
Judges 17-21 and the Dismembered Body”, in Yee, Judges and Method, 164; Simon B. Parker, “The 
Hebrew Bible and Homosexuality”, Quarterly Review 11, no.3 (1991): 4-19; Brenner, Intercourse of 
Knowledge, 142; Exum, Fragmented Women, 182; Susan Niditch, “The ‘Sodomite’ Theme in Judges 
19-20: Family, Community, and Social Disintegration”, Catholic Biblical Quarterly 44 (1982): 367-
69. 
159 Block, 537-38; Tapp, 164; Soggin, 288; Lasine, 39-40; Victor H. Matthews, Judges and Ruth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 185-87; and “Hospitality and Hostility in Genesis 
19 and Judges 19”, Biblical Theology Bulletin 22 (1992), 3-11; Niditch, “‘Sodomite’ Theme”, 367-69; 
Guest, 183-84; Stone, Sex, Honour, and Power, 79-82; and “Gender and Homosexuality in Judges 19: 
Subject-Honour, Object-Shame?”, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 67 (1995): 99-101.  As 
a priest who had been elected for divine service, the Levite was expected to remain holy before the 
Lord (Lev. 21.8); however, had he been the victim of the sexual violence intended for him by the 
Benjaminites, he would have been forced to commit an unlawful and defiling sexual act (Lev. 18.22; 
20.13).  Furthermore, according to Stone, he would also have suffered the shame of being forced into 
the position of sexual object by the Gibeite mob; he would thus have been ‘demasculinised’ or 
‘feminised’, by being treated like a woman, that is, a person not entitled to the masculine prerogative 
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they are suggesting that the phrase Mtw) wn(w essentially constitutes an invitation to 
the mob to shame and dishonour these two women rather than the Levite.  
Weinfeld, meanwhile, proposes that the elderly host is instead intent on protecting 
his guest by inviting the men of Gibeah simply to seduce these women in his 
place.160   
It is my contention, however, that the elderly host would have no doubt been acutely 
aware that, given their ugly mood and their insatiable intent upon gang rape, the 
threat that these hostile Benjaminites posed both to the Levite and to these women 
was also truly corporeal.  As Stone has noted, such a threat incorporated ‘both 
violence against and power over the object of the rape’.161  The men who had 
surrounded the house were clearly intent on utilising sex as a weapon, their fervour 
for intercourse being driven less by a harmless lust than a lethal desire to dominate, 
denigrate, and do violence to the object of their attentions.162  The host was therefore 
desperate to uphold his obligation of hospitality to his male guest by protecting not 
only this man’s honour but also his physical wellbeing and bodily integrity.163  To 
do so, he proffered to the crowd the two women as replacement objects of sexual 
abuse, or as Bal puts it, he presented them with ‘rapeable’ women.164  This offer 
(Mtw) wn(w) was therefore by no means simply an invitation for these men to 
‘seduce’ the two unfortunate women, nor did it refer only to the social shame that 
they would both face through their participation in an illicit orgy of extra-marital 
sexual intercourse.  Rather, the host’s use of the verb hn@F(i here denotes the tendering 
of a shockingly heartless licence to overpower, abuse, and physically violate them in 
                                                                                                                                    
to sexual subjectivity.  As Stone explains, ‘Because the man who allows himself to be acted upon 
sexually shows himself to be the object of another man, he is “feminised” … If the sexual role 
allocated by convention to a woman is forced upon a man by another male, as is the case in 
homosexual rape, then the effect is both a challenge to the object’s masculinity and a challenge to his 
honour’ (“Gender and Homosexuality”, 96-97).  Similar observations are made by Brenner, 
Intercourse of Knowledge, 138; also, Yee, “Ideological Criticism”, 164.   
160 Weinfeld, 286. 
161 Stone, “Gender and Homosexuality”, 92; also Bal, “Rape of Narrative”, 20.  Likewise, Exum notes 
that, while the theme of hospitality is central to this story, biblical interpreters may give scant 
attention to questions of the relationship between gendered violence and sexuality (Fragmented 
Women, 182-83).   
162 Müllner, 133-34.  Likewise, Gale Yee notes that, within this narrative, ‘the phallus serves as a 
weapon of aggression that establishes a relation of dominance and submission’ (“Ideological 
Criticism”, 164).  See also Karla G. Bohmbach, “Conventions/Contraventions: The Meaning of 
Public and Private for the Judges 19 Concubine”, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 83 
(1999): 87; Victor H. Matthews, Judges and Ruth, 186-87. 
163 Block, 537; Victor H. Matthews, Judges and Ruth, 186. 
164 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, 93.  As Block notes, such is the seriousness by which the host takes 
his role as provider of hospitality that the concubine ‘has significance only as a potential sacrifice in 
defence of his own reputation’ (538).   
66 
 
place of the Levite.165  These men were to do to the women whatever was ‘good’ in 
their eyes (that is, gang rape), but, as the host stressed, ‘to this man, do not do this 
dreadful thing’.166  The emphatic construction of the Hebrew here at the end of v.24 
thus serves to confirm that, while the Levite must be spared the outrageous violence 
of gang rape, the women, on the other hand, will be obliged to face this terrible 
horror in his place.167  Such a proposition should cause us to catch our breath at the 
sheer cruelty and misogyny of the old man’s words, for he appeared to be all too 
aware of the dreadful fate that would await these women outside the house were the 
crowd to accept his offer.  Nevertheless, in his (misguided) loyalty towards his male 
guest, the host appeared to be willing to tolerate this potential outrage, believing 
perhaps that it was the lesser of the two evils, which were destined to cast a shadow 
over them all that night. 
This sense of physical violation implicit within the use of hn@F(i in Jdg. 19.24 is 
furthermore replicated in Jdg. 20.5, where the Levite describes the events that 
unfolded at Gibeah to his Israelite brethren, after they had gathered together in 
Mizpah at his instigation.  In his speech to the assembled tribes, he presents a 
scenario that is unmistakable in its depiction of deadly violence.  The Benjaminite 
mob, he testifies, rose up against him and intended to kill him; thus, in his eyes at 
least, it was not his honour that was at stake, but his life.   The Levite’s recognition 
of the lethally violent nature of the abuse threatened by these men is further 
confirmed by his report that, after making an attempt on his life, they then turned 
their murderous aggression against his concubine with tragic results: as he tells his 
countrymen, tmtw wn( y#$glyp t)w.  The Levite’s suggestion that the Benjaminite’s 
treatment of the woman, represented by hn@F(i, was the ultimate cause of her death can 
leave us in no doubt that the verb is being utilised here to convey an act of deadly 
brutality.168  The concubine’s broken and dismembered body, which he subsequently 
                                                
165 Block, 536; Trible, Texts of Terror, 74.  However, van Wolde refutes such a reading, suggesting 
instead that within this context, hn@F(i denotes the women’s debasement, bringing them ‘into the lowest 
position possible: handed over as an object in another man’s hand’ (“Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 538).  
However, given that women within biblical Israel were regarded as the sole property of their male 
guardian, the very basis of their existence was structured around being treated as such an object, to be 
handed over from father to husband at the time of their marriage like a piece of chattel.  There does 
not appear to have been any biblical conception that woman as ‘object’ was in itself a particularly 
negative conceptualisation.  It is therefore unlikely that van Wolde’s proposal is an accurate reflection 
of the significance of this verb here. 
166 t)zh hlbnh rbd w#&(t )l hzh #$y)lw 
167 Block, 537, n.247.   
168 The precise cause of death of the Levite’s concubine is left rather ambiguous by the narrator of 
Jdg. 19.28; was she dead when her husband found her outside on the threshold, or did she in fact die 
at his hands, as the result of her dismemberment (v.29)?  The Levite’s words in 20.5, ‘And they 
committed violence against my concubine, and she died’, offer the reader a less specific 
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scattered throughout Israel (19.29), serves as a potent symbol of the terrible violence 
acted out upon this woman by the men of Gibeah.169  As Bal notes, such 
symbolisation conveys ‘the most truthful language’ about the concubine’s ordeal, 
representing ‘the body-language of rape, a language that bespeaks her death’.170  The 
suggestion made by scholars such as van Wolde, that this woman was simply 
‘debased until annihilation’ [italics added] by her gang rape,171 utterly ignores the 
physicality of the violence intrinsic to this event, denying its fatal degree of 
corporeal aggression and abuse, whilst at the same time silencing the emotional and 
physical suffering she endured at the hands of her rapists.172  As the Levite himself 
insists, loss of social status did not kill her, violence did.   
                                                                                                                                    
pronouncement of causality than were he to have said, ‘and they killed her’.  The Septuagint clarifies 
this matter for the reader, by adding the explanatory clause ‘for she was dead’ in 19.28 (a)ll 0 
e9teqnh/kei), after stating that the woman did not answer her husband.  Robert G. Boling has suggested 
that this Greek addition preserves an original Hebrew clause htm yk, which was lost from the 
Masoretic Text as a result of haplography or homoioteleuton ( Judges [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1975], 276).  The important point to remember here, however, is that in 20.5-6, the reader hears the 
Levite’s own account of events, an account, which, it must be admitted, is not in strict accordance 
with the circumstances depicted in 19.22-5; as Bader notes, the Levite puts his own ‘spin’ on the 
events at Gibeah, probably in a self-serving attempt to ensure that his deplorable act of throwing his 
concubine out to the baying mob is not made public knowledge (21).  In a similar vein, Victor H. 
Matthews suggests that the Levite’s story ‘is shaded to disguise his own cowardly act’ (Judges, Ruth, 
193), while Lilian R. Klein describes it as ‘sham, egotistical and mendacious’ (The Triumph of Irony 
in the Book of Judges [Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989], 170).  Certainly, his speech to the assembled 
tribe would appear rather egocentric, as he presents himself, rather than his concubine, as the one 
wronged by the men of Gibeah (Stone “Gender and Homosexuality”, 93).  Nevertheless, his words do 
make explicit the fact that, in his mind at least, the concubine’s death is equated with an event 
depicted by hn@F(i; he therefore clearly utilises this verbal form to denote some sense of violent, indeed 
lethal, behaviour.  Perhaps he did focalize the sexual threat made against him by the Benjaminites 
primarily in terms of its lethal violence, rather than perceiving it primarily as a threat to his honour or 
status; if so, then he is not necessarily being deliberately economical with the truth when he claims 
these men tried to kill him (20.5).  For further discussion of the Levite’s speech to the gathered tribes 
of Israel, see also Tammi J. Schneider, Judges (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 266-68; 
Susan Ackerman, Warrior, Dancer, Seductress, Queen: Women in Judges and Biblical Israel (New 
York: Doubleday, 1998), 238-39; Soggin, 288; Block, 541; Trible, Texts of Terror, 82; Exum, 
Fragmented Women, 180; Klein, 170; Robert Polzin, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, vol.1 of Moses 
and the Deuteronomist: A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History (New York: Seabury, 1980), 
201; Thompson, 184; Lasine, 48-50; Bal, “The Rape of Narrative”, 20.  
169 I therefore disagree strongly with Lasine, who suggests that the reader ‘is forced to view’ the scene 
of the concubine’s broken body lying at the door of the house with ‘detachment’, rather than horror or 
pity (45).  Lasine appears keen to read this whole narrative as a black comedy, which is ‘pathetic and 
ludicrous’, and laced with ‘irony and absurd humour’ (38, 45); yet, I would dispute the fact that a 
woman’s brutal and nightlong rape and her subsequent dismemberment contains any moments of 
humour, however bleak.  Sexual violence is no laughing matter, whenever and wherever it occurs 
within the history of humanity, and I furthermore do not believe that the author of this narrative 
intended it to be read as anything but a horrific and shocking depiction of the depravity and complete 
subversion of justice and morality, which had gripped Israel during this period of its history. 
170 Bal, “A Body of Writing: Judges 19”, in Brenner, A Feminist Companion to Judges, 223-24; and 
Death and Dissymmetry, 124. 
171 van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 539. 
172 As Trible notes, the story recounts with graphic honesty ‘the horror of male power, brutality, and 
triumphalism; of female helplessness, abuse, and annihilation’ (Texts of Terror, 65).  See also Bal, “A 
Body of Writing”, 223; Exum, Fragmented Women, 196; Bohmbach, 97; Yani Yoo, “Han-Laden 
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c) 2 Samuel 13 
As mentioned earlier, 2 Samuel 13 relates a sordid tale of serious family dysfunction 
within the royal Davidic household, in which David’s son Amnon, who has sickened 
himself lusting after his sister Tamar, nefariously conspires to get her alone in his 
company before seizing her in v.11 and commanding her to ‘lie with’ him (ytwx) 
ym( ybk#$).  Caught utterly unawares, Tamar responds in v.12 with the truly shocking 
words ynn(t-l) yx)-l).  Given the context within which these words are spoken, it 
surely makes sense to translate this phrase, ‘No, my brother, do not force me’, for is 
that indeed not what Amnon, through his words and actions, is threatening to do?173  
He is physically restraining Tamar and demanding to have sexual intercourse with 
her; the violent and coercive nature of his words and actions would have left her in 
no doubt that her brother intended to use his superior physical strength to overpower 
and rape her, were she to resist his demands.  As Bar-Efrat notes, the narrator’s use 
of hn@F(i therefore emphasises the inherent aggression in Amnon’s behaviour:  
Amnon will have to use force to achieve his end [but] Tamar intends to resist him 
…Tamar realises that her refusal in not in itself sufficient to prevent the deed (for 
in addition to making a verbal request, Amnon has also seized hold of her), and 
therefore does everything that she can by pleas, arguments and an alternative 
proposal, to dissuade him from fulfilling his intentions’.174   
Thus, through Tamar’s words here in v.12, the reader receives forewarning of the 
terrible violence that is to come; as Gray notes, her plea, ‘No, my brother, do not 
force me’ suggests that she is trying to ‘talk herself to safety’, as she suddenly 
grasps the full extent of the ‘unmitigated brutality’ that her brother intends to inflict 
upon her.175  Contrary to van Wolde’s reading of this verse,176 Tamar’s immediate 
fear is not only the threat of social shame and humiliation that would befall her were 
she to submit to her brother’s demands; rather, she is also responding to the very real 
and imminent danger of sexual violence, which Amnon’s behaviour has left her in 
no doubt.177  Nor is she simply demurring to her brother’s attempts at seduction, as 
                                                                                                                                    
Women: Korean ‘Comfort Women’ and Women in Judges 19-21”, Semeia 78 (1997): 40; Victor H. 
Matthews, Judges and Ruth, 189; Keefe, 86; Ackerman, 256. 
173 McCarter, 314; Robert Polzin, Second Samuel, vol.3 of David and the Deuteronomist: A Literary 
Study of the Deuteronomic History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 138; Bar-Efrat, 
259-62; Fokkelein van Dijk-Hemmes, “Tamar and the Limits of Patriarchy: Between Rape and 
Seduction (2 Samuel 13 and Genesis 38)”, in Bal, Anti-Covenant, 142; Bader, 145.  
174 Bar-Efrat, 261-62. 
175 Mark Gray, “Amnon: A Chip Off the Old Block?  Rhetorical Strategy in 2 Samuel 13.7-15: The 
Rape of Tamar and the Humiliation of the Poor”, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 77 
(1998): 48-49. 
176 van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 539; also Lipka, 208. 
177 This is not to say that Tamar is not aware of the socially shameful effects such a sexual act would 
have on her honour.  As she says to her brother in v.13, ‘where would I carry my shame?’  I am 
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Weinfeld’s reading of this verse would suggest.  For, Amnon is clearly not intending 
to woo his sister here; rather, his attempt to physically overpower her speaks all too 
clearly of his sexually abusive intent.  Within this context then, the verb hn@F(i would 
appear to encapsulate the abusive violence and horror of rape, which now confronts 
Tamar with terrifying imminence.  
Similarly, in v.14, hn@F(i again appears to confirm the physicality of the violence 
implicit in Amnon’s sexual behaviour, rather than simply evaluating this act as 
either a seduction or the source of Tamar’s dishonour.  Refusing to heed her 
attempts to dissuade him from his aggressive intentions, Amnon once more 
aggressively seizes his sister before sexually assaulting her: bk#$yw hn(yw hnmm qzxyw 
ht).  The repetition of qzx, bk#$, and hn@F(i in both vv.11-12 and v.14 may be a 
deliberate strategy by the narrator here to emphasise the continuity of meaning 
conveyed by these verbal forms, from their initial intimation of Amnon’s sexually 
abusive ambitions to their final execution. 178  Thus, Amnon confronts Tamar with 
the threat of sexual violence in v.11 and then, in v.14, after ignoring her pleas, 
proceeds to enact this threat, overpowering her, forcing her down, and raping her, 
thereby inflicting upon her the very trauma that, in v.12, she had beseeched him to 
refrain from.179  Such a confirmation of the brutal physicality of Amnon’s actions 
within this scene surely emphasises to the reader that the young prince did not 
simply seduce or shame Tamar here; he perverted her right to her bodily integrity, 
terrorised her, and, using brute force, subjected her to a vicious sexual attack.180  
Within such an explicit context of raw physical, sexual, and emotional aggression, 
hn@F(i is therefore best understood as conveying, both in vv.11 and 14, a sense of the 




                                                                                                                                    
however arguing here that her immediate response is to try to prevent the physical act of brutality that 
would cause such shame and it is this physical violation that is represented by the verb hn@F(i.  By 
Amnon’s very act of seizing her, Tamar is aware of the force he is willing to use and therefore realises 
that he is going to penetrate her whether she consents or not.  Her words ynn(t-l) yx)-l) therefore 
clearly signify her attempts to dissuade him from raping her.   
178 Bar-Efrat, 265; Bader, 147; Fokkelmann, King David, 106-7.     
179 Gray, 50; Trible, Texts of Terror, 46; Fokkelmann, King David, 107. 
180 Stone, Sex, Honour, and Power, 115; Bar-Efrat, 265.   
181 As Fokkelmann asserts, the use of hn@F(i following the verb bk#$ ‘defines and qualifies the essence of 
this “repose” as a pure rape’ (King David, 106-7). 
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d) Lamentations 5 
The heartrending community lament found in the book of Lamentations depicts, 
with harrowing detail, the physical and emotional abuses that have become part of 
daily life for the people of Zion, in the wake of the Babylonian destruction of 
Jerusalem.  Through the medium of Israel’s enemies, YHWH appeared to be 
punishing his people for their iniquities, allowing these enemies free rein to indulge 
in acts of graphic cruelty and brutality.182  Within these laments, the author appears 
at pains to convey the horror of the Israelite’s experiences; the destruction of their 
temple and city (2.1-9; 16-17), the slaughter of both the young and old (2.21; 4.9), 
the torment of disease, hunger, and imprisonment (3.1-15; 4.4-14), and the ceaseless 
agony of being hounded and abused by their Babylonian overlords (3.52-3).183  Such 
pain and horror endured by Jerusalem at this time is, we are told, ‘as vast as the sea’ 
(2.13); it is an ‘unremitting torture’ that is boundless, immeasurable, and 
insurmountable.184   
Within this context of life-destroying violence, Lamentations 5 appears to make one 
final cry of lament and despair, listing with a shocking candour the atrocities faced 
by the people of Zion.185  Of particular relevance to this discussion is the physicality 
of these atrocities.  Continuing this same emphasis from the other chapters, the 
author appears to be at pains within Chapter 5 to reflect the reality and literality of 
the people’s suffering; they have been made homeless (vv.2-3), forced into hard 
labour (vv.5, 13), treated harshly by their overlords (v.8), deprived of basic 
sustenance (v.6), surrounded by the threat and execution of pervasive torture and 
violence (vv.9, 12), and inflicted with both hunger and disease (vv.9-10).  Within 
this context of unremitting oppression, subjugation, and physical abuse, it surely 
makes sense to read the phrase wn( Nwycb My#$n in v.11 as likewise stressing the 
corporeality of the sexual violence endured by women at the hands of the enemy 
troops, rather than simply reflecting their social dishonour.186  These women suffer 
                                                
182 Robert Davidson, Jeremiah with Lamentations (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1985), 2:210; 
Norman K. Gottwald, Studies in the Book of Lamentations (London: SCM Press, 1962), 88; Michael 
L. Brown, “Lamentations: Theology of”, in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology 
and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 4:887-90. 
183 Alan Mintz, “The Rhetoric of Lamentations and the Representation of Catastrophe”, Prooftexts 2 
(1982): 6. 
184 Mintz, 6, 10. 
185 Ibid., 6, 13; Davidson, 210; Jannie Hunter, Faces of a Lamenting City: The Development and 
Coherence of the Book of Lamentations (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996), 142. 
186 I therefore disagree with Iain W. Provan, who suggests that here, hn@F(i denotes a woman’s 
humiliation and social shame as a result of being raped.  See Lamentations (Grand Rapids: William B. 
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far more than a sense of shame or humiliation here; like their fellow inhabitants of 
Zion, they endure a violence that was both emotionally and physically destructive.  
Thus, these joint contextual themes of sexual violation and physical oppression 
evident within Lamentations 5 would strongly suggest that we translate wn( Nwycb 
My#$n as ‘women are raped in Zion’.187   
   
Thus to summarise the above discussion, the use of hn@F(i in the texts of Deut. 22.28-
9, Jdg. 19-20, 2 Sam. 13, and Lam. 5, would suggest that, within contexts of explicit 
sexual aggression, this verbal form is consistently employed to represent the abusive 
and at times life-threatening acts of corporeal violence perpetrated against women, 
which are intrinsic to their experience of sexual assault.188  I would therefore suggest 
that, within such contexts, this verb may be translated as ‘to commit violence 
against’, ‘to force’, or simply, ‘to rape’.  As Alice Keefe has stated with regards this 
verb form, ‘the violence implicit or explicit in the narrative justifies the translation 
of rape’.189  Scholars who refute such a reading of hn@F(i have, I believe, failed to 
recognise the physicality of the abusiveness implicit within these women’s rape 
experiences.  Instead, they have focalized the assault primarily as a sexual act, 
regarding it from a socio-religious and judicial perspective as an occasion of 
unlawful and socially shaming sexual behaviour, as opposed to a brutalising assault 
upon a woman’s body.190  By doing so, they, albeit unwittingly, serve only to 
perpetuate the contemporary denial of the physical cruelty of rape, and the 
concomitant contextualisation of sexual violence as little more than an expression of 
sexual desire.  To be sure, rape can cause women to be subjected to an inordinate 
sense of shame and social debasement, whether they are living in biblical Israel or in 
a contemporary patriarchal culture.  However, primarily, these women experience 
                                                                                                                                    
Eerdmans, 1991), 131.  Nor, by any stretch of the imagination, could this verb form allude to the 
‘seduction’ of these women, as Weinfeld’s reading of hn@F(i would suggest. 
187 Bader, 24; Delbert R. Hillers, Lamentations: Introduction, Translation, and Notes (New York: 
Doubleday, 1972), 95; Claus Westermann, Lamentations: Issues and Interpretation, trans. Charles 
Muenchow (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 209; Frymer-Kensky, “Law and Philosophy”, 100, n.9; 
Magdalene, 336, n.1.  
188 Gordon and Washington, 313.  Similar sentiments are expressed by Magdalene, 336, n.1; 
Shemesh, 5-6.  Furthermore, Gesenius translates hn@F(i as ‘to weaken a woman, through rape’ (‘ein 
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336, n.1; Scholz, Rape Plots, 137-38; Shemesh, 5-6; Gordon and Washington, 314. 
190 Gordon and Washington, 314. 
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this crime as a corporeal and life threatening act of aggression, a dehumanising 
assault upon their bodily integrity, and a source of seemingly endless pain, terror, 
and trauma.191   
Furthermore, Weinfeld’s suggestion that hn@F(i refers to a woman’s ‘seduction’ 
appears to go even further in denying both the reality of the rape event within these 
texts and the violating aggression intrinsic to the sexual acts depicted therein.  
Indeed, his assertion that episodes of sexual behaviour ‘which are innocent but 
which involve an element of imposition upon the woman’ are ‘not strictly’ rape192 is 
nothing short of reprehensible.  Any sexual act, which imposes upon or compromises 
a woman’s right to consent is ‘strictly’ rape and therefore cannot be considered 
either ‘innocent’ or merely a ‘seduction’ by any stretch of the imagination.193  To 
suggest otherwise is a sad reflection of the influence of contemporary societal 
values, which would appear to pay scant regard to a woman’s right to determine her 
sexual boundaries whist confusing sexual violence with consensual heterosexual 
behaviour.  The texts of Deut. 22.28-29, Jdg. 19-20, 2 Sam. 13, and Lam. 5 have 
informed us all too clearly that the verbal action represented by the form hn@F(i cannot 
be read merely as an evaluation of a rape victim’s social dishonour or as a report of 
her seduction.  Instead, it should be recognised as one means by which the biblical 
authors conveyed the abusive and overtly aggressive violent treatment suffered by 
women at the hands of their rapists.194  Tamar, the unnamed concubine, and the 
countless women of Zion and Judah – these women were not simply shamed or 
seduced; they were overpowered, brutalised, and violated by the men who raped 
them and it is this experience that I believe is clearly represented within these texts 
by the verbal form hn@F(i.  
Taking the above conclusions into account, what then is the likely semantic 
significance of hn@F(i as it is utilised within the contextual environment of Gen. 34.2?  
Does it convey the same meaning as in Deut. 22.28-9, 2 Sam. 13, Jdg. 19-20, and 
Lam. 5, thus informing the reader of the intrinsic violence suffered by Dinah during 
                                                
191 Fortune, Sexual Violence, 24-25; Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 9-30.  This was also confirmed to me 
by Kristen Leslie, a pastoral theologian and rape victim advocate, in a personal communication. 
192 Weinfeld, 286, n.5. 
193 William B. Sanders, Rape and Women’s Identity (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), 26, 158. 
194 This is, of course, not to claim that hn@F(i is the only means by which the act of rape was represented 
within biblical Hebrew, as its absence from Deut. 22.25-27, which describes an unequivocal scenario 
of violent, coercive sexual intercourse, amply demonstrates.  However, it may be regarded as one of 
several means used by the biblical authors to convey such abusive and harmful acts of sexual 
violation; in other situations, the use of a verb of seizure or the evidence of  woman’s cry for help 
appear likewise to highlight the reader to the fact that the sexual event was indeed aggressive and 
non-consensual (Gravett, 285).   
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her sexual assault?  Alternatively, does this verb simply describe the sexual act of 
seduction, or perhaps allude to Dinah’s social-juridical humiliation following her 
participation in a consensual, though illicit, sexual encounter?  In other words, 
should hfn@E(ay:wA be translated here as ‘he seduced her’, ‘he shamed her’, or ‘he 
committed violence against her’? 
In response to this question, scholarly opinion remains much divided.  For example, 
some biblical interpreters have argued that within the context of Gen. 34.2, hn@F(i 
refers to Dinah’s shame, after she fails to live up to the societal ideals expected of 
unmarried virgins within the culture of biblical Israel.195  They therefore argue that 
this verb does not convey a sense of the physical brutality of Shechem’s sexual 
assault upon Dinah; rather it denotes her dishonour and loss of social status, 
following her involvement in an unlawful act of consensual sexual intercourse.196  
Thus, according to van Wolde, ‘the verb ‘innâ in Gen. xxxiv 2 does not describe 
Shechem’s rape or sexual abuse of Dinah, but evaluates Shechem’s previously 
described actions (“take” and “sleep with”) as a debasement of Dinah from a social-
juridical point of view’.197  Weinfeld, meanwhile, contends that, within this 
particular verse, hn@F(i simply informs the reader that Shechem had sexual intercourse 
with Dinah.198 
Nevertheless, taking into account the utilisation of hn@F(i within the texts discussed 
above, I would again contend that scholars who argue that, within Gen. 34.2, hfn@E(ay:wA 
denotes either Dinah’s sexual shame or her seduction may have failed to recognise 
fully the violent nuances that this verb may convey, whenever it is employed within 
a context of explicit sexual aggression.199  For, it is highly likely that, within this 
particular text, the verb hn@F(i does emphasise the particularly abusive and forceful 
                                                
195 Bechtel, “Dinah”, 70; van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape”, 543-44; Lipka, 188; Frymer-
Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible, 183; Fleishman, 103.  Lipka substantiates her argument by 
noting that the two verbal forms (hn@F(i and bk#$) are utilised in Deut. 22.23-24, where the sexual 
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will be discussed in the next chapter. 
197 van Wolde, “Does ‘innâ Denote Rape” 543-44; also Bader, 25. 
198 Weinfeld, 286. 
199 Yamada, 151, n.9; Scholz, Rape Plots, 137-38. 
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nature of Shechem’s sexual interaction with Dinah rather than simply alluding to 
either Dinah’s seduction or her dishonour.200  Shechem, we are told, took hold of 
Dinah before proceeding to sexually penetrate her; thus, just as Amnon seized 
Tamar (hnmm qzxyw) prior to having aggressive sexual intercourse with her (hn(yw 
ht) bk#$yw), so too did this Hivite prince likewise use force to restrain Dinah (xqyw 
ht)) before violating her (hn(yw ht) bk#$yw).  The fact that both bk#$ and hn@F(i occur 
in 2 Sam. 13.14 to denote an unequivocal act of sexual violence strongly suggests to 
me that these same two verbs are employed in Gen. 34.2 to convey likewise the 
aggressive and coercive nature of Shechem’s sexual response to Dinah.201  
Moreover, as a number of scholars have pointed out, the related themes of coercion 
and sexuality denoted by the phrase ht) bk#$yw ht) xqyw do provide adequate 
contextual support for reading hfn@E(ay:wA as ‘he raped her’ or ‘he committed violence 
against her’.202  Thus, Karen Armstrong notes, ‘we are told that Shechem “lay with 
her by force” (34.2) rather than the usual phrase “lay with her”’.203  Similarly, 
Westermann likewise contends that Gen. 34.2 ‘is not narrating a seduction but a 
forceful violation, as the word hfn@E(ay:wa underscores’.204  The aggression implicit within 
Shechem’s treatment of Dinah prior to her rape is thus perpetuated by his use of 
violence towards her during this event.  Through his choice of the verb hn@F(i within 
                                                
200 Jeansonne, 91.  While acknowledging that hn@F(i may also carry the meaning ‘to humble’ within 
other contexts, Jeansonne nevertheless concludes that, within this verse, such a translation ‘does not 
fully capture the meaning of the cruel act’.   
201 I therefore disagree with Frymer-Kensky’s supposition that the different order in which the verbs 
hn@F(i and bk#$ are employed in 2 Sam. 13.14 and Gen. 34.2 is significant.  She suggests that the use of 
hn@F(i after bk#$ in Gen. 34.2, as compared to its placement before bk#$ in 2 Sam. 13.14, implies that 
here, hn@F(i denotes only a sense of Dinah’s debasement as a result of her consensual participation in an 
act of illicit premarital sexual intercourse: ‘In rape, abuse starts the moment the rapist begins to use 
force, long before penetration.  In other illicit sexual encounters, the act of intercourse may not be 
abusive.  The sex may be sweet and romantic.  But the fact that the man has intercourse with her 
degrades her, and so the word ‘innah comes after the words “lay with”’ [original italics].  In other 
words, Frymer-Kensky is proposing that it would not make sense to say that Shechem abused Dinah 
after we have been told that he sexually penetrated her, as the abusiveness of rape begins prior to the 
act of penetration.  I personally fail to see the significance of the different word order within these two 
texts.  While Frymer-Kensky is correct to point out that a woman’s violation at the hands of her rapist 
does indeed begin before the act of coerced sexual intercourse occurs, such violation and abuse does 
nevertheless continue throughout the entire rape event.  Shechem seized Dinah, sexually penetrated 
her, and abused or violated her; coming at the end of the description of this event, the verb hn@F(i may 
very well evaluate Shechem’s aggressive treatment of Dinah, both in terms of his taking hold of her 
and his coercive act of sexual assault.  In my mind, therefore, to say that Shechem ‘lay with’ Dinah 
and ‘abused’ her makes just as much sense as to say that he ‘abused’ her and ‘lay with’ her. 
202 Ibid.; Gravett, 283, 285; Keefe, 81; Westermann, Genesis, 538; Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes”, 
166-67; Davies, 56; Ullendorff, 436.   
203 Armstrong, 95.  See also Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes”, 165, 167; Gravett, 282; Speiser, 262, 
264.   
204 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 538.  Likewise, Gravett suggests that Shechem did not make love to 
Dinah here, he ‘grabbed her and forcefully lay with her’ (282), while Speiser similarly proposes the 
reading, ‘he seized her, and slept with her by force’ (262, 264).  
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such a context of coerced and aggressive sexuality, the narrator thereby confirms to 
the reader that this was no act of consensual seduction but a shocking display of 
sexualised brutality. 
 
The  narrator’s syntactical strategies in v.2: do they confirm a reading of rape? 
Thus far, I have argued that, when read together, the three verbal forms employed by 
the narrator in v.2 to depict the sexual act that occurred between Dinah and Shechem 
do strongly suggest that this act was indeed a violent and coercive act of sexual 
assault.  To substantiate this reading, a number of scholars have proposed that the 
ancient author’s organisation of these three verbs into an unbroken sequence of 
consecutive verb forms (hn(yw ht) bk#$yw ht) xqyw) would further suggest that he 
did indeed intend to depict here a scene of rapidly executed and increasingly violent 
sexual assault.  Thus, for example, Sternberg posits that by utilising three verbs 
rather than one to convey Shechem’s response to seeing Dinah, the narrator 
effectively impels the reader to dwell upon this increasingly explicit and 
condemnatory depiction of the young prince’s behaviour.205  The apparent 
redundancy and ‘rhetorical overkill’ of the threefold repetition emphasises the 
abusive and non-consensual nature of the sexual encounter and thus ‘quashes the 
idea of seduction’, whilst projecting a ‘sharp judgement’ on Shechem, categorising 
him less as an amorous or love-struck youth than as a violent rapist.206   
Likewise, Cotter argues that this chain of verbs in v.2 is utilised by the narrator to 
denote a potent image of Shechem’s escalating aggression.207  These consecutive 
forms, he suggests, occurring in rapid succession, only serve to heighten the reader’s 
awareness of both the celerity and the brutality of his assault upon Dinah.208  He thus 
concludes, ‘To call this something other than rape, as some commentaries do, seems 
incomprehensible to me’.209  In a similar vein, Rashkow asserts that the three ‘verbs 
of force’ chosen by the narrator here ‘negate any possibility of seduction or mutual 
consent, and imprints the act of violence on the reader’s mind’.210   
                                                
205 Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 446.  
206 Ibid.; also “Biblical Poetics and Sexual Politics” 475. 
207 Cotter, 254.   
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid., n.56.  
210 Rashkow, “Hebrew Bible Translation”, 226.  Other scholars to understand the significance of this 
verbal chain in a similar manner include Yamada, 151; Scholz, Rape Plots, 136, 138; and “Through 
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Taking into account the above discussion, these scholars certainly do appear to be 
making a valid point.  This ‘overloading’ of the text with lexical forms connoting the 
nature of this sexual encounter suggests that the narrator did intend to convey to the 
reader something of the speed and escalating violence with which Shechem initiated 
and executed his assault upon Dinah.  By preceding two verbal forms, which 
together are utilised elsewhere to depict explicitly violent sexual intercourse, with a 
verb that can denote aggressive seizure, the ancient author managed to portray this 
sexual experience as an essentially forceful and coercive one.  While these three 
verbs, when utilised on their own, may not inherently convey explicitly aggressive 
or sexually abusive behaviour, they do however appear to convey a strong image of 
violent sexual assault when employed together in this consecutive verbal chain.  
Shechem ‘takes’ Dinah aggressively and has sex with her employing physical 
brutality and abuse.  It would therefore seem to me that hn(yw ht) bk#$yw ht) xqyw 
may indeed be translated ‘and he seized her, and lay with her, and abused her’. 
 
Dinah’s passivity  
In the Introduction, I highlighted that one of the central concerns with regards 
Dinah’s representation within Genesis 34 is her apparent passivity during both her 
rape and throughout the events that revolve around her in its aftermath.  Considering 
Gen. 34.2 in particular, such passivity on Dinah’s part is made acutely apparent by 
the fact that, within the previous verse, she is presented for the first and only time as 
an autonomous actor within this narrative; she ‘goes out’, we are told, to make the 
acquaintance of the local indigenous women of Shechem (v.1).  In stark contrast, v.2 
highlights instead her precipitate loss of self-determination and her abrupt 
consignment to the role of one more acted upon than acting.211  As a number of 
scholars have suggested, this unexpected and shocking relegation of Dinah from the 
status of active subject to that of passive object within this verse may in fact function 
as confirmation that the sexual intercourse depicted in this verse was violent and 
non-consensual.212  Without either explanation or warning, she is no longer a woman 
going out on her own volition to seek female company, but is instead the object of a 
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211 Gravett, 283; Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes”, 165; Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 46; Leeb, 
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Translation”, 226; Gravett, 283; Shemesh, 18. 
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series of increasingly aggressive verbal actions, all carried out by a man who 
appears to have neither sought her consent nor given much thought to her wishes or 
welfare.213  There is no record of their meeting, no amorous preamble, no verbal 
foreplay.  Given that her motives for going out were so clearly non-sexual, coupled 
with this apparent absence of any interaction between herself and Shechem to 
suggest that the sexual event was mutually desired, it would be reasonable to infer 
that the young prince’s apparently immediate sexual response on seeing Dinah’s 
was, in her mind, both unforeseen and unwelcome.  As Shemesh notes, Dinah’s 
syntactic status of passivity in v.2 ‘accurately reflects her personal status and 
experience as a rape victim’.214 
Furthermore, Dinah is not even referred to by name in this verse, but is instead 
merely represented by a series of pronominal suffixes, which depersonalise and 
objectify her to the point that, as Aschkenasy suggests, the reader has no choice but 
to view her ‘in her diminished status as a sedentary, immobile object of rape’.215  In 
Shechem’s eyes, she was not a subject of consciousness, but an object to be 
(ab)used, solely in order to gratify his need to dominate, control, and sexually 
possess.  Thus, according to Gravett, ‘Shechem’s actions objectify Dinah as he 
assumes the position of primary actor and she never again re-establishes her status as 
a subject in the text.  This abrupt change in power, when seen alongside words that 
can be read as violent, create contextual support for a reading of rape’.216  Dinah 
may be utterly silent and passive here in v.2, but such silence and passivity 
nevertheless speak volubly about the coercive and aggressive nature of her sexual 
ordeal; without a word of warning, she is seized and violated, her initial objective of 
seeing the women of the land totally forgotten.  Thus, like so many victims of rape, 
her subjectivity is denied her, her autonomy is utterly subverted, and her cries of 
protest go unheeded. 
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At the start of this chapter, we discussed the fact that cultural concepts of normative 
heterosexual behaviour consistently lead to a denial of the misogynistic brutality 
implicit within the rape event, because sexualised aggression is contextualised, first 
and foremost, as a sexual (and therefore mutually pleasurable and mutually desired) 
act.217  As a result, there is a propensity, within contemporary patriarchal cultures, to 
ignore or refute women’s experience of rape as a violent, damaging, and life-
destroying act of male cruelty, which threatens their physical, emotional, and 
spiritual wellbeing, and subverts their right to bodily and sexual integrity.  Rape, 
however, is sexual only in the sense that it uses the sexualities of both the victim and 
the perpetrator as a means to commit violence; it has no currency with consensual 
and mutually desired sexual intimacy.  As Anne Cahill notes, ‘To say that [rape] is 
sexual is only to recognise the experiential relevance of the means of the violence 
committed and not to undermine in any way the recognition of the crime as a 
horrifically violent one’.218   
Turning to Genesis 34, I then raised the possibility that interpretations of this 
narrative, which appear to undermine or cast doubt upon the violent and coercive 
nature of Dinah’s sexual encounter with Shechem, may, albeit unwittingly, serve 
only to perpetuate this cultural normalisation of sexual violence and the concomitant 
confusion between abusive and acceptable sexuality.  In other words, such 
interpretations would appear to focalize Shechem’s treatment of Dinah primarily as 
a sexual event, thereby failing to recognize the violence inherent within this terrible 
crime.  Through a close analysis of the language and syntax employed by the 
narrator to depict this event, it becomes evident, however, that a reading of rape, 
rather than seduction, is more likely.  The ancient author’s apparent overloading of 
the text with a tripartite chain of consecutive verbal forms, which together, denote 
aggressive sexuality, allowed him to depict with great clarity Shechem’s violent, 
abusive, and unjust behaviour.  Furthermore, Dinah’s shocking and precipitate 
relegation to passive recipient of these brutal actions only serves to underscore the 
cruel and coercive nature of her sexual experience at Shechem’s hands.   
Thus, biblical interpreters, who insist upon reading this verse as a depiction of a 
seduction, rather than a rape, may have failed to acknowledge the sense of brutality 
                                                
217 Smart, 44. 
218 Cahill, 120. 
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expressed within the linguistic and stylistic choices employed by this author to 
denote the sexual event that occurred between Dinah and Shechem.  Their 
interpretation of Gen. 34.2 therefore ought to be challenged, not only because the 
textual evidence does not rule out an alternative reading of rape, but moreover 
because such an interpretation serves only to perpetuate Dinah’s narrative silencing.  
By denying her status as the victim of sexual violence, these scholars thereby 
undermine the viciousness of this woman’s violation and the pain and terror that she 
would have endured at the hands of her rapist.  Rape is a life-subverting abuse of a 
woman’s right to her sexual and physical autonomy, an assault upon her body, her 
emotions, and her sense of safety.  In the words of Deena Metzger, herself a rape 
survivor, rape is a means by which ‘woman is brutally stripped of her humanity and 
confronted with her definition as a nonperson, a function … [rape] asserts only 
combat, brutalising the communal aspect of sexuality, destroying meaning, 
relationship, and person, creating a universe of ontological terror’.219  By 
recognising this, and thus by endorsing an honest and gynocentric representation of 
sexual violence, we thus commit ourselves to providing an environment in which 
Dinah is enabled to enter into the narrative discourse and speak freely to us about the 
physical and emotional pain, the dread, and the spiritual torment intrinsic to her rape 
experience.  As Andrea Rechtin, a rape victim advocate, notes, ‘As long as we view 
rape as seduction, and at worst unwanted sex, we will never understand rape.  If we 
push ourselves to see the violence in rape for what it is, perhaps then we can begin 
to understand the degradation of rape victims.’220   
Nevertheless, before ending this chapter, a final caveat should perhaps be added.  By 
accepting that the author of Genesis 34 does acknowledge the violence intrinsic to 
the sexual encounter between Dinah and Shechem, we should not be too hasty to 
conclude that he necessarily lends a voice to Dinah’s suffering, focalising the rape 
through her eyes, or dwelling upon the horror that she faced during her ordeal.  For, 
no sooner does he report this aggressive event (briefly) in v.2 than it appears to be 
forgotten, lost among the other pressing narrative concerns – male concerns – of 
family honour, the threat of assimilation, and intertribal conflict.  Following v.2, 
Shechem’s act of rape is never again referred to as an abusive ordeal for Dinah per 
se, but, as we will see in the following chapters, it is instead reinterpreted and given 
                                                
219 Metzger, 405; also Scully and Marolla, “Rape and Vocabularies of Motive”, 298; Griffin, Rape: 
The Politics of Consciousness, 66; Joanna Carlson Brown, “Because of the Angels: Sexual Violence 
and Abuse”, in Fiorenza and Copeland, 5; Lebowitz and Roth, 366; Roth and Lebowitz, 103. 
220 Andrea Rechtin, quoted in Beneke, 168. 
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new meaning by the narrative’s multiple male characters.221  They and they alone are 
depicted by the author as the ones affected in one sense or another by this assault; it 
is their voices we hear, not Dinah’s.  Let us therefore turn to consider the reaction of 
these male characters to the rape event, contemplating how their focalisation of 
Dinah’s violation would have affected her experience of sexual violence and how 
their own re-construal of this crime continued to ensure her narrative silencing.  
 
                                                




The Marginality of Dinah’s Suffering: Exactly Who Is the ‘Real’ Victim in 
Genesis 34? 
 
The Rape Victim as ‘Damaged Goods’: Masculinist Concerns Regarding 
Victims of Sexual Violence 
‘I wanted to die.  I could not stop crying.  I thought everybody was 
looking at me and could see what I was feeling inside.  I felt dirty, 
bathing all the time as I needed to be clean … I could smell [the rapist] 
all the time.  I kept scratching myself to get him out of my body.  I 
smashed all the mirrors in my bedroom and cut up the clothes I had 
been wearing’.1   
‘[The rape] destroyed our marriage because of [my husband’s] 
inability to accept it.  He has always seen me as his possession, not as a 
person.  And you don’t take his possessions and do anything to them.  
You don’t hurt his car.  You don’t do anything to his wife’.2   
 ‘On returning to their communities the women experienced shame and 
humiliation; some were taunted by men who said they were “used 
products that have lost their taste’.3 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the attitude commonly held within 
contemporary patriarchal cultures, which regards rape as an essentially sexual event, 
and which denies, or at least ignores, the violence and brutality inflicted upon the 
victim during the act of rape.  In this chapter, I will move onto another pervasive and 
particularly insidious myth, which appears to have its origins within this same 
equation of rape and sexuality: that is, the myth that rape survivors are ‘damaged 
goods’.   
                                                
1 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 19.  
2 Diana E.H. Russell, 226.   
3 Meredith Turshen, speaking of rape victims from Uganda, in “The Political Economy of Violence 
Against Women During Armed Conflict in Uganda”, Social Research 67 (2000): 815. 
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One of the most damaging and destructive effects of rape experienced by the victim 
is that this crime may often leave her with an overwhelming sense of having been 
‘defiled’ or ‘dirtied’.  Many survivors report feelings of humiliation and degradation, 
which overwhelm them after their assault; it is as though the rapist’s abusive 
attentions have left a dirty and indelible mark upon their body and mind, rendering 
them devalued and sullied.4  As one victim noted, this sense of defilement and 
debasement was something she believed would forever be ‘stamped’ on her forehead 
for all to see, rendering her terrifyingly exposed to social ostracism and instilling in 
her a sense of personal self-worthlessness.5   
Why does sexual violence have the power to inflict such a destructive and damaging 
sense of degradation upon the victim?  I would suggest that the answer to this 
question ultimately lies within the very ontological nature of this crime and the 
implicit message that it imparts to its survivors.  As Lebowitz and Roth observe, rape 
is ‘a powerful interpersonal communication’, which speaks volubly to the victim 
about her own insignificance; she is treated by the rapist, not as an equal moral agent 
worthy of respect, but  merely as an object of contempt, upon which he can pour out 
his scorn and disdain.6  Through this most intimate act of personal violation, the 
woman internalises the rapist’s own attitude that she is not deserving of care, 
consideration, or respect; she is merely a ‘thing’ or commodity to be damaged, 
mistreated, and then discarded as worthless.7  Thus, according Dr Muradif Kulenovic8, 
a psychiatrist and expert on post-traumatic stress disorder: 
Victims never experience rape only as a physical aggression, physical force or an 
attack on physical integrity.  For a victim it is the aggression against her emotions 
and her mental system.  It is the attack on her person, her own dignity, her intimate 
self.  Rape is aggression against her own identity.  A victim knows that her (or his) 
person has been reduced to an object or thing used by the rapist to vent his anger, 
rage, and hatred.  And this is the reason why the majority of victims feel worthless, 
“dirty”, and “infected”.8 
                                                
4 Ward, 28; Pellauer, “A Theological Perspective on Sexual Assault”, 84; Kelly, Surviving Sexual 
Violence, 171; Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 18-19; Dianne Herman, 58. 
5 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 19. 
6 Lebowitz and Roth, 366; also McGregor, 108-9, 227. 
7 Leslie, 111-16; Metzger, 407; Griffin, “Rape: The All American Crime”, 59; Pellauer, “A 
Theological Perspective on Sexual Assault”, 87-88; Lebowitz and Roth, 370, 372; Judith Lewis 
Herman, 571; Diana E.H. Russell, 168; Fairstein, 173.  
8 Cited in Seada Vranic8, Breaking the Wall of Silence: The Voices of Raped Bosnia (Zagreb: Izdanja 
Antibarbarus, 1996), 191.  
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Or, in the words of one rape survivor, ‘To feel that you have no other function other 
than as an object to be used and thrown away completely destroys your confidence 
and makes you feel powerless, worthless, ashamed and guilty’.9  
However, while the act of rape may perpetuate the victim’s belief in her own 
worthlessness and devaluation, the response she is shown by others may likewise 
confirm her own negative self-appraisal.10  Within contemporary patriarchal culture, 
there is a pervasive and insidious preponderance for the rape victim’s community, 
and even, at times, her family, to regard her as in some sense ‘damaged’, defiled, and 
devalued by her rape experience.11  Nevertheless, although this cultural response to 
rape may echo in many ways the feelings experienced by the rape survivor herself, 
the rationales underlying both of these responses would appear to be dependant upon 
very different presuppositions.  While the victim’s sense of self-worthlessness is 
informed by her own experience of violation, objectification, and bodily intrusion, 
social attitudes tend instead to conceptualise her degradation in terms of the effect 
that the rape has had upon her ‘value’ or status within the community.  In other 
words, the social response, which regards a rape victim as ‘damaged goods’, is not 
shaped by an empathetic understanding of the woman’s personal experience of 
physical and psychic degradation, but rather evaluates the rape event in terms of its 
repercussions for the woman’s ‘value’ according to patriarchal social value systems.  
In effect, such systems are founded upon two distinct but related ideologies, both of 
which are millennia-old, yet which continue to shape contemporary social and 
judicial attitudes pertaining to sexual violence.12  Let us consider these now in more 
detail. 
In the first place, it has been a common historical feature within patriarchal cultures 
dating at least as far back as the biblical period for women to be regarded as the 
exclusive ‘sexual property’ of the men under whose social protection and authority 
they existed, typically first their father, then their husband.13  A woman’s father 
traditionally had authority to control his unmarried daughter’s sexuality, while a 
husband was understood to enjoy sole sexual access to his wife.  In essence, then, 
                                                
9 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 22 (see also 18-19). 
10 Lebowitz and Roth, 366. 
11 Diana E.H. Russell, 62; Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 1, 4; Gerdi Weidner and William Griffitt, “Rape: 
A Sexual Stigma?”  Journal of Personality 51 (1983): 151-66. 
12 Brownmiller, 376; Ward, 28; Dianne Herman, 45; Metzger, 406; Bohmer, “Acquaintance Rape and 
the Law”, 318; Williams and Holmes, 24; Manazan, 46-47. 
13 Cahill, 168; Brownmiller, 16-30, 376; McGregor, 3, 29. 
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women’s bodies have traditionally been identified, not as active, autonomous subjects 
but as objects of appropriation.    
Furthermore, this male prerogative to female sexual ownership has influenced 
cultural conceptions of sexual violence, with the result that rape has often been 
treated, and continues to be treated, not as a personal attack against a woman and an 
assault upon her bodily integrity, but rather as a violation by one man of another 
man’s proprietary rights.14  Survivors of sexual violence continue to report that their 
families, especially their father or male partner, react to their rape as though they are 
the ‘real’ victims of this crime, because their right to control the sexual boundaries of 
their wife, partner, or daughter and their claims to exclusive ownership of this 
woman’s sexuality have been seriously compromised by the rapist’s actions.15  Thus, 
for example, one woman reported that her husband was angry with her when he heard 
about her rape because she had had sexual intercourse with another man.16  The fact 
that the sexual encounter had been non-consensual appeared to be a moot point for 
him; his right to sole sexual access to his wife had been violated and, as a result, she 
was no longer the ‘valued property’ that she had once been.17  Another man whose 
wife had been raped stated, ‘I wanted to kill that bastard [the rapist].  I wanted to 
destroy him for what he’d done to me’ [italics added].18  Inevitably, such a 
‘hijacking’ of the rape experience by the victim’s partner or family only leads to  the 
woman’s own interpretation and experience of the rape event being invalidated and 
suppressed. 
However, this stifling of women’s rape experiences also derives from a second,  
concomitant ideology, which shapes patriarchal value systems and which likewise 
influences cultural conceptions of sexual violence; that is, the belief that a woman’s 
status within her community and the ‘value’ that she has to her male ‘owner’ ought to 
be measured according to her sexual status, in particular, her chastity.  If a woman’s 
sexuality is laid claim to by any man other than its rightful ‘owner’, then the 
woman’s social worth and status suffer as a result; her chastity had been irredeemably 
                                                
14 Cahill, 168; Brownmiller, 376; Magdalene, 338; McGregor, 3, 29. 
15 Silverman, 142, 145; Madigan and Gamble, 6; Dianne Herman, 45; Lebowitz and Roth, 375; Diana 
E.H. Russell, 67, 194. 
16 Diana E.H. Russell, 226 
17 Ibid.  This woman’s husband had actually insisted upon reasserting his sexual ownership over her 
as soon as she returned home from hospital.  When she refused, being traumatised and in pain, he 
raped her, telling her ‘as long as you’re my wife, it’s my conjugal right.  So don’t fight me’ (227). 
18 Horos, 93; also Metzger, 406.  
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compromised and she is effectively considered devalued or degraded.19  Thus, a 
virgin or a monogamous wife is granted a much higher social value than a woman 
who has had multiple sexual partners, or for that matter, any sexual partners outwith 
marriage.  Female sexuality appears to be dichotomised into chaste/unchaste, 
valuable/worthless, clean/unclean, and worthy/unworthy of protection; once a woman 
crosses over from one category to the other, her community may often regard her as 
sullied, devalued, and defiled.20   
These negative attitudes towards female sexuality are, furthermore, often expressed 
even when the woman is the non-consenting participant in a coercive sexual assault.  
The effects of sexual violence upon the victim are all too often evaluated primarily in 
terms of the injury done to her sexual status not to her self.  It is as though her 
intimate encounter with forbidden sexuality leads others to regard her as ‘damaged’ 
or ‘used’ goods, polluted with the immorality of promiscuity, and, furthermore, as 
someone who can ‘dirty’ or defile those she comes into contact with.21  Thus, for 
example, the mother of a ten-year-old rape survivor recalled that some of her own 
family members spurned her daughter after the rape incident: ‘Instead of 
understanding, they treated her as if she was a criminal, whose very presence could 
only taint them’.22  Similarly, another rape survivor reported that her mother told her, 
‘“Now this has happened to you and you are going to have it the rest of your life” … 
I was soiled … [and] now that I’m soiled I’m going to start living a loose life.  I’m 
going to start whoring around … I really think that she thinks I am whoring around.  
That I really am a no-good person … that I really am unclean’.23   
In a very real way then, the rape survivor is objectified and degraded, not only by 
her rapist but also by those around her.  Her own sense of humiliation and 
defilement in the wake of her sexual assault is effectively confirmed and thus 
reinforced by the responses she receives from her family and community, responses 
that render her a marginalised, ostracised source of distaste or even contempt.  It is 
little wonder then that rape is one of the most unreported crimes.  Women’s fear of 
being wrapped in a miasma of defilement and dishonour is another major factor in 
                                                
19 Bohmer, “Acquaintance Rape and the Law”, 318; Cuklanz, 17; Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 132-33, 
147; and Ruling Passions, 17-37; LeGrand, 69; Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime”, 58; 
Brownmiller, 376, 385-86; Ward, 28; Millett, 44; Cahill, 168; Leslie, 114-15. 
20 Lebowitz and Roth, 374; Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 147; and Ruling Passions, 18-19. 
21 Lebowitz and Roth, 372. 
22 Ward, 3.  Ward also cites a rape survivor who reported that her husband ‘doesn’t want me around 
his family.  He told his mother on Sunday and said he was ashamed of me’ (3). 
23 Lebowitz and Roth, 374. 
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their reluctance to report rape; they simply do not want to face the ‘theatre of shame’ 
that they know they will encounter from others within their own family and 
community,24 not to mention from within the institutions that constitute the judicial 
system.25  For many women, the act of telling their story, of breaking silence about 
their abuse, is simply to be reminded, time and again, of their marginalised and 
socially dishonoured status.  Hence, they remain hidden behind ‘the silent shield of 
guilt and embarrassment’, which social stigma and humiliation ensures will be their 
legacy.26 
The insidious and damaging influence of this myth of the ‘defiled’ rape victim is, 
furthermore, demonstrated nowhere more devastatingly than in the horror of mass 
sexual violence, which, for millennia, has all too often been endemic during times of 
military conflict and remains equally as common in more recent history.  One need 
only think of the sexual abuse of hundreds of thousands of Asian Pacific women and 
girls by Japanese troops during the 1930s and 40s,27 the women of Russia, Poland 
                                                
24 For some women, the incentive to remain silent about their rape could not be greater, for their very 
lives depend upon it.  In some Mediterranean and Arab Muslim states, such as Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, 
Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan, the murder, usually by family members, of women who are suspected 
of having been sexually unchaste is either sanctioned under state law or, at the very least, is dealt with 
leniently by the courts.  Underlying these murders, or ‘honour killings’, appears to be the deeply-held 
belief that every woman embodies the honour (namu =s) of her father, husband, and patrilineal group.  
Thus, an unchaste woman destroys not only her own reputation but also the name and honour of both 
her family and community; the only way to cleanse this honour is through the woman’s death.  Even 
in cases of rape, where the sexual experience was coerced and violent, the woman’s kin may still feel 
duty bound to murder her in order to ‘cleanse’ the family’s honour and restore their status within the 
community.  Other rape survivors may be encouraged to commit suicide to expiate the shame wrought 
upon the family by their behaviour.  See Suzanne Ruggi, “Commodifying Honour in Female 
Sexuality: Honour Killings in Palestine”, in Women and Islam: Critical Concepts in Sociology, ed. 
Haideh Moghissi (London: Routledge, 2005), 2:125-30; Åsa Elde8n, “‘The Killing Seemed to be 
Necessary’: Arab Cultural Affiliation as an Extenuating Circumstance in a Swedish Verdict”, in 
Moghissi, 2:131-41; Karen Thomas, ‘Jordan’s women fight to repeal law’, guardian.co.uk, September 
7, 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,271103,00.html (accessed January 2, 2008); 
Shahrzad Mojab, “No ‘Safe Haven’: Violence Against Women in Iraqi Kuridstan”, in Sites of 
Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones, ed. Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004), 108-33; Fadia Faqir, “Intrafamily Femicide in Defence of Honour: The 
Case of Jordan”, in Moghissi, 2:104-24; Beena Sarwar, “ … On Suspicion of Illicit Relations”, in 
Women and Violence: Realities and Responses World Wide, ed. Miranda Davies (London: Zed 
Books, 2004), 220-22;. 
25 Judith Lewis Herman, 573; Williams and Holmes, 3; Mary P. Koss and Sarah L. Cook, “Facing the 
Facts: Date and Acquaintance Rape Are Significant Problems for Women”, in Issues in Intimate 
Violence, ed. Raquel Kennedy Bergen (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998), 149; 
Schwendinger and Schwendinger, “Rape Myths”, 18; Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 129-55. 
26 Williams and Holmes, 3; also Judith Lewis Herman, 574; Fairstein, 92; Diana E.H. Russell, 62, 91. 
27 Japanese troops entered Nanking in December 1937; what followed can only be described as a 
‘rampage’ of sexual violence, sexual torture, and murderous atrocity against countless Chinese 
women and girls, some younger than ten years of age.  During the period of 1937-45, the years 
spanning the war in Manchuria, the Sino-Japanese War, and World War II, the Japanese government, 
in conjunction with the Japanese Imperial Army, ran ‘comfort stations’ for use by its combatants and 
military personnel.  Over 200,000 women from Korea, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Sumatra, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Netherlands were ‘recruited’ for sexual service to these stations, by use 
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and Germany, who were the victims of sexual brutality throughout the horror of 
World War II and its aftermath,28 the countless women and girls (predominantly 
Tutsi), raped during the bloody civil war in Rwanda,29 and those women and girls in 
former Yugoslavia (primarily, though not exclusively Bosnian Muslims), who were 
systematically raped during the Balkan war as part of a deliberate Serbian military 
strategy of ethnic cleansing and genocide.30  This list is, of course, by no means 
                                                                                                                                    
of deceit, threat, or force.  Commonly known as ‘comfort women’ (jugun ianfu), these females were 
repeatedly raped by Japanese troops on a daily basis; moreover, they lived from day to day under the 
threat of torture, murder, physical abuse, disease, and unwanted pregnancy.  Most were between the 
ages of fifteen and nineteen years old and the majority of them died either during their time of 
‘service’ in the ‘comfort station’ or shortly after the war, as a result of the physical and psychological 
abuse, injury and disease that they had sustained through their repeated rapes.  A significant number 
of these women took their own lives after their release.  For further information on the scandal of the 
‘comfort women’, see Yukin Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution 
during World War II and the United States Occupation (London: Routledge, 2002); Norma Field, 
“War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After”, Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 5 
(1997): 1-49; Hyunah Yang, “Revisiting the Issue of Korean ‘Military Comfort Women’: The 
Question of Truth and Positionality”, Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 5 (1997): 51-71; Hyun 
Sook Kim, “History and Memory: The ‘Comfort Women’ Controversy”, Positions: East Asia 
Cultures Critique 5 (1997): 73-106; Yuki Terazawa, “The Transnational Campaign for Redress for 
Wartime Rape by the Japanese Military: Cases for Survivors in Shanxi Province”, NWSA Journal 18, 
no.3 (2006): 133-45; Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II 
(New York: Basic Books, 1997); Elisabeth Vikman, “Modern Combat: Sexual Violence in Warfare, 
Part II”, Anthropology and Medicine 12 (2005): 33-36; Helen Durham and Bebe Loff, “Japan’s 
‘Comfort Women’”, The Lancet 357 (2001): 302; Brownmiller, 56-63; Nelia Sancho, “The ‘Comfort 
Women’ System during World War II: Asian Women as Targets of Mass Rape and Sexual Slavery by 
Japan”, in Gender and Catastrophe, ed. Ronit Lentin (London: Zed Books, 1997), 144-54;  
28 James W. Messerschmidt, “The Forgotten Victims of World War II: Masculinities and Rape in 
Berlin, 1945”, Violence Against Women 12 (2006): 706-12; Brownmiller, 48-56, 65-78; Anita 
Grossmann, “A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Soviet Occupation Soldiers”, in 
Women and War in the Twentieth Century: Enlisted With or Without Consent, ed. Nicole Ann 
Dombrowski (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), 162-83; Akbar S. Ahmed, “‘Ethnic Cleansing’: 
A Metaphor for Our Time?”, in Genocide: An Anthropological Reader, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 211-30; Joan Ringelheim, “Genocide and Gender: A Split 
Memory”, in Lentin, 18-33.  
29 During the Rwandan civil war of 1994, it is estimated the that as many as half a million Tutsi 
women were raped by the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and Hutu militia (the Interahamwe), tens of 
thousands of whom subsequently contracted the HIV virus.  It is generally believed that both the rapes 
and the spread of the virus were deliberately deployed as weapons of war ploys by the Hutus in order 
to destroy Tutsi communities.  Tutsi women suffered multiple rapes, gang rapes, torture, and physical 
abuse.  Many survivors were left with horrific and at times fatal physical injuries, psychological 
trauma, and disease, the effects of which were often exacerbated by the ordeal of losing their homes 
and families to the conflict.  See Mardge H. Cohen, Anne-Christine d’Adesky, and Kathryn Anastos, 
“Women in Rwanda: Another World is Possible”, Journal of the American Medical Association 294 
(2005): 613-15; African Rights, Rwanda: Broken Bodies, Torn Spirits;  Living with Genocide, Rape 
and HIV/AIDS (Kigali, Rwanda: African Rights, 2004); and Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance 
(London: African Rights, 1995), 748-97; Paula Donovan, “Rape and HIV/ AIDS in Rwanda”, The 
Lancet Supplement 360 (2002): 17-18; Paul B. Spiegel et al., “Prevalence of HIV Infection in 
Conflict-Affected and Displaced People in Seven Sub-Saharan African Countries: A Systematic 
Review”, The Lancet 369 (2007): 2187-95; Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence 
During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996); Catharine 
Newbury and Hannah Baldwin, “Profile: Rwanda”, in Women and Civil War: Impact, Organisations, 
and Action, ed. Krishna Kumar (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 27-38.  
30 At least 120,000 women and girls (primarily Bosnian Muslims), some as young as seven years old, 
were the victim of multiple rapes and gang rapes by Serbian troops and civilians during the Bosnian 
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exhaustive;31 furthermore, even as I write, countless women and girls are enduring 
unimaginable sexual brutality in the interethnic civil conflict which remains 
                                                                                                                                    
war in former Yugoslavia (1992-95).  Within this civil conflict, rape was employed systematically as 
a means of ethnic cleansing and genocide by Serbian troops; their aim was to destroy families and 
communities, and to terrorise the ‘enemy’ into abandoning their homes and their land.  Furthermore, 
many Bosnian Muslim women were detained in camps and repeatedly raped until they became 
pregnant by their Serbian captors, who sought to strike a blow to their enemy by impregnating ‘their’ 
women with the seed of the enemy and forcing them to bear what they perceived would be pure 
Serbian children.  See Euan Hague, “Rape, Power and Masculinity: The Construction of Gender and 
National Identities in the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, in Lentin, 50-63; Vesna Kesic8, “Establishing 
Rape as a War Crime”, in Buchwald, Fletcher, and Roth, 269-89; Cindy S. Snyder et al., “On the 
Battleground of Women’s Bodies: Mass Rape in Bosnia-Herzogovina”, Affilia: Journal of Women 
and Social Work 21, no.2 (2006), 184-95; Vesna Nicolic8-Ristanovic8, “War and Post-War 
Victimisation of Women”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 10, no.2-
3 (2002): 138-45; and “Living Without Democracy and Peace: Violence Against Women in the 
Former Yugoslavia”, Violence Against Women 5 (1999): 63-80; Tom Post and Alexandra Stiglmayer, 
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unabated in Darfur,32 while reports of sexual atrocities being carried out by Allied 
troops in Iraq continue to appear in the media.33  It would appear then that wartime 
rape is far more than ‘the ignoble act of the occasional soldier’, as some military 
historians and political commentators have previously suggested.34  As Paula 
Donovan notes, ‘Rape is not incidental to armed conflict; it is a distinct and 
insupportable war crime’.35 
Why, then, is rape during armed conflict such a pervasive event?  From whence does 
it attain its potency as an apparently effective weapon of war?  I would suggest that 
we can find some degree of understanding if we refer back to the two interrelated 
ideologies, which, as discussed above, give meaning to the myth that a raped woman 
is ‘damaged goods’: that is, women’s designation as male sexual property and their 
valuation according to their chastity.  These cultural gender ideologies and 
assumptions, already prevalent during peacetime, are reinforced and exacerbated in 
times of war until they are transformed into a vehicle by which sexual atrocities 
become a viable and effectual war strategy.36  As Turshen notes, ‘Behind the cultural 
significance of raping ‘enemy’ women lies the institutionalisation of attitudes and 
practices that regard and treat women as property’.37  Wartime rapists recognise the 
deeply damaging effects that rape can have, not only upon the woman against whom 
the violation is perpetrated but also upon her family and her ethnic or religious 
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community.38  Women are regarded, not as persons valued or worthy in their own 
right, or as persons possessing their own right to bodily and sexual autonomy, but 
rather as objects belonging to men, which can be misappropriated by the enemy to 
become ‘receptacles for intergroup hatred’, in order to advance the enemy’s military 
cause.39  Thus, according to Nicolic8-Ristanovic8, ‘For the rapist, rape of a woman in 
war may be as much an act against her husband, father, or brother, as it is an act 
against a woman’s body’.40  By ‘invading’ and abusing the bodies of women who 
‘belong’ to the enemy, the conquerors terrorise and humiliate the conquered, 
exposing them as weak, inferior, and hopelessly incapable of protecting both the 
bodies and chastity of ‘their’ women.41  It is as though, in the words of Patricia 
Albanese, ‘one man’s sexual potency became proof of another’s impotence … [the 
woman’s] rape signifies her ethnic group’s ability to protect her, a sign of her 
nation’s and her men’s impotence against their rivals’.42  Or, as Höglund asserts, 
‘The rape becomes a symbolic expression of humiliation of the male opponents, 
telling them they have failed to protect ‘their’ women.  They are thereby 
emasculated, wounded in their masculinity and marked as incompetent males’.43   
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16, 18, 89, 211, 315; Brownmiller, 38-49; Baker, 293; Amowitz et al., 520; Ward and Vann, 13; 
Snyder et al., 190-91; Swiss and Giller, 612-15; Draculic8, 8119; Copelon, 204; Julian Pitt-Rivers, The 
Fate of Shechem, or the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 166; Sancho, 153. 
42 Albanese, 1013. 
43 Höglund, 354.  Speaking in particular with regards Korean former ‘comfort women’, Kim notes 
that these women ‘are living symbols that remind the nation of its patriarchal weakness and paternal 
failure, namely, the inability of Korean men to protect the lives and bodies of their own wives, 
daughters, and sisters … More damaging to the collective psyche of postwar Korea than the bodies of 
the women survivors themselves is, therefore, what those bodies continue to represent: the symbolic 
emasculation of Korean national, state, and patriarchal elites’ (94). 
91 
 
Furthermore, in patriarchal cultures where female purity and chastity are central to 
family honour, women who are raped and sexually exploited during military conflict 
are consequently regarded, both by their rapists and by their family and group 
members, as defiled, tainted with immorality, and a great source of communal 
shame.44  Thus, for example, in Uganda, the cultural insistence on female chastity 
has led many wartime rape survivors being treated as little more than prostitutes, 
rejected by their families because they are deemed dirty, diseased, and a source of 
immense shame.45  Similarly, within the Confucian patriarchal culture of 
postcolonial South Korea, where a woman’s value is likewise measured in terms of 
her chastity and purity, former ‘comfort women’ who were raped by Japanese troops 
were deemed by their own communities as ‘damaged, disgraceful, and unchaste 
female bodies that lack the “feminine essence”’.46  By thus debasing and degrading a 
woman’s body, the wartime rapist devastates the stability of her community, 
symbolically dishonouring all of its members and reinforcing their sense of 
humiliation and subordination.47  And thus is the deadly efficiency of wartime rape; 
as a piece of male chattel, whose chastity determines the honour and authority of her 
family and community, a woman’s degradation and objectification becomes a 
powerful communicator of one group’s contempt for and superiority over their 
enemy.  Wars are fought by men, but women are all too often the casualties, their 
bodies used to inscribe a potent and wordless message of inter-group hatred and 
ethnic intolerance.48 
Thus, to summarise the discussion so far within this chapter, it would appear that 
socio-cultural conceptualisations of sexual violence often fail to recognise that rape 
                                                
44 Snyder et al., 190; Milillio, 199; Kim, 92-93; Copelon, 201; Vikman, 41; Musse, 75, 80; Turshen, 
815-16; Clarkson, 17.   
45 Turshen, 815-16.   
46 Kim, 93; also Yang, 64; Terazawa, 133-36.     
47 Kelly, “Wars Against Women”, 53; Aafjes, 19; Milillio, 200; Snyder et al., 190-91; Ann Tierney 
Goldstein, 1-4; Amowitz et al., 520; Rozario, 264-65.  
48 I am not denying, of course, that men may likewise be the victims of sexual violence during times 
of war, nor that women themselves may be capable of perpetrating unspeakable acts of sexual torture 
and degradation against men within a conflict situation.  In 2004, for example, two female members 
of the US military, Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman, were both found guilty of the mistreatment 
and abuse of Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison; the pictures, which appeared in the international 
press, of England standing grinning in front of a group of naked  male prisoners who had been forced 
to form a human ‘pyramid’ on the floor, serve to remind us all too well that both men and women can 
be the victims and the perpetrators of sexual abuse and sexual torture during times of  warfare.  The 
point I am making above, however, is that more often than not, wars are started and fought by men, 
and, within these times of conflict, sexual violence is all too often utilised as an effective weapon of 
war primarily against civilian women and girls, in order to subvert and destroy the honour and 
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is a violent display of contempt and deeply felt misogyny directed against the female 
victim.  Rather, this crime is reinvented and re-contextualised within a framework of 
patriarchal and androcentric concerns of male honour, male property rights, and the 
valuation of a woman according to her chastity.49  As a result, rape survivors’ 
victimhood and suffering are all too frequently ignored or eclipsed, while the ‘real’ 
victim is instead identified as the survivors’ male kin or even her entire community.  
Furthermore, women’s own sense of defilement and degradation, which they suffer 
as the result of their violation, may often be confirmed and exacerbated by the 
responses that they receive from others.  Many rape survivors face an 
insurmountable wall of stigma, hostility, and rejection by both members of their 
family and their community, who believe that that their rape has effectively rendered 
them damaged, defiled, and sullied by their encounter.  We should not be surprised 
then that so many of these women never report their rapes; with the choice of stigma 
or silence, they often prefer to suffer within such a silence, rather than endure the 
contempt or hostility they may face from those who should be the source of their 
support and healing.  
 
Who Was the ‘Real’ Victim in Genesis 34? 
 
So far within this chapter, we have been considering in some depth the pervasive 
and potentially dangerous myth that regards rape victims as ‘damaged goods’, which 
appears to be founded upon the two age-old ideologies that a woman is the sexual 
property of her male kin and that her social value is determined by her sexual 
chastity.  The question that I wish to address now is whether such ideologies are 
likewise given voice by the narrator of Genesis 34.  As I noted in the Introduction, 
one of the most striking features of the narrative is, for me, Dinah’s silence.  This 
woman’s experience as a victim of sexual violence is in essence an empty space 
within the narrative, while the occasion of her rape is given meaning solely through 
the androcentric voices of the narrator and his multiple male characters.50  
Nevertheless, how do these male characters conceptualise Dinah’s rape?  Do they 
perhaps speak on her behalf, providing an empathic voice for her anguish or a 
platform from which the reader can better grasp the horror of her experience?  Are 
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they concerned about the terrible effects that such a brutal and life-altering assault 
would have had upon her?  Or, do they instead focalise the rape event as a violation 
of their property rights, regarding Dinah less as a victim of a brutal assault than as a 
woman sullied, soiled, and damaged as a result of the premature and premarital loss 
of her virginity?  In order to answer these questions, let us look a little closer at the 
ways in which Dinah’s father and brothers responded to her rape, so that we might 
gain some insight into their own understandings of this terrible event.  
 
The Significance of Jacob’s (In)action in Genesis 34 
Throughout the majority of the Genesis 34 narrative, Dinah’s father Jacob is, for the 
most part, a silent and impassive figure.  He is granted no words with which to 
express his grief and shock after first hearing about Dinah’s rape (v.5), nor does the 
reader hear his voice either during his family’s negotiations with Hamor and 
Shechem (vv.8-17), which, as head of the household, are addressed to him, or during 
the subsequent violent events that take place in the city of Shechem (vv.25-29).51  
Indeed, it is only in the penultimate verse of this text that we learn his response to 
the events that have played out around him.  Moreover, Jacob appears, to all intents 
and purposes, essentially inactive for the majority of this narrative.  On first getting 
word about Dinah’s ordeal in v.5, we are told that he did nothing, but rather ‘held his 
peace’ (#&rxh) until his sons arrived back from their duties in the field.  However, 
even after their return, Jacob continues to appear reluctant to take a proactive stance.  
In stark contrast to his sons, whose emotional reaction to the shocking news is 
intense and immediate (v.7) and who, without delay, adopt their role as chief 
protagonists for all subsequent action (vv.13ff.), Jacob instead appears to melt away 
into the narrative background, a passive bystander who lets the events instigated by 
his sons spiral towards an explosively violent conclusion.52 
How then do we make sense of Jacob’s apparent reluctance either to react to or 
voice an opinion about his daughter’s rape and abduction?  Well, one possibility is 
to suggest that the patriarch viewed Shechem’s act of sexual abuse, not as a serious 
assault perpetrated against his daughter, but rather as a violation, committed against 
him, which, most importantly, had landed him in some politically treacherous 
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Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 54.   
94 
 
territory.  For, as mentioned earlier, during the biblical period, a woman’s sexuality 
was deemed to be under the exclusive control and ownership of her male guardian, 
while she herself had little if any authority to determine her own sexual 
boundaries.53  Thus, issues such as whom she married and, by implication, with 
whom she could have sexual intercourse, were decided solely by her male kin, 
usually her father; the woman herself had no legally cognisable right of consent.54  
Any woman who lost her virginity outwith the marriage covenant subsequently 
caused her father grave dishonour, because she had disrupted his right to control her 
sexuality and, moreover, had seriously subverted community expectations of 
daughterly chastity.55  Furthermore, her premature deflowerment caused her family 
to incur a significant financial loss, as her virginity was regarded as a prerequisite 
for her father’s ability both to arrange a politically propitious marriage for her and to 
receive from her husband a decent bride price.56  As Brownmiller notes,  
What a father sold to a prospective bridegroom or his family was title to his daughter’s 
unruptured hymen, a piece of property he wholly owned and controlled.  With a clearly 
marked price tag attached to her hymen, a daughter of Israel was kept under watch to 
                                                
53 See, for example, Num. 5.11-31; Deut. 22.13-29; 24.1-4; Jdg. 19.24-25; 21.20-24; 2 Sam. 13.13.  
As Phyllis Trible states, ‘From childhood to old age, the Hebrew woman belonged to the men of her 
family … their bodies were not their own’ (“Women in the Old Testament”, 964).  For further 
discussion regarding male ownership of female sexuality in the Hebrew Bible, see Frymer-Kensky, 
Goddesses, 119-20; and ‘Sex and Sexuality’, in Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman 
(New York: Doubleday, 1992), 5:1145; Thistlethwaite, 62; Pressler, View of Women, 43, 90-92; 
Davies, 2-3; Aschkenasy, Eve’s Journey, 109, 123-24; David M. Carr, The Erotic Word: Sexuality, 
Spirituality, and the Bible (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 51; Phyllis A. Bird, “‘To Play 
the Harlot’: An Enquiry into an Old Testament Metaphor”, in Gender and Difference in Ancient 
Israel, ed. Peggy L. Day (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 77; and Missing Persons and Mistaken 
Identities: Women and Gender in Ancient Israel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press), 222; and “Women 
(Old Testament)”, in Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 
1992), 6:955-56; Rashkow, “Daughters and Fathers”, 27; Grace I. Emmerson, “Women in Ancient 
Israel”, in The World of Ancient Israel: Sociological, Anthropological and Political Perspectives, ed. 
R.E. Clements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 380-85; Victor H. Matthews, 
“Honour and Shame in Gender-Related Legal Situations in the Hebrew Bible”, in Matthews, 
Levinson. and Frymer-Kensky, 104; Helena Zlotnik Sivan, “The Rape of Cozbi (Numbers XXV)”, 
Vetus Testamentum 51 (2001): 74; Bader, 75-79; Anderson, 67, 69; Gerda Lerner, The Creation of 
Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 168-69; Brenner, Intercourse of Knowledge, 
123; Brownmiller, 18-19; T. Drorah Setel,  “Prophets and Pornography: Female Sexual Imagery in 
Hosea”, in Letty M. Russell, 87.  
54 Frymer-Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible, 183; and “Virginity in the Bible”, 91; Anderson, 
42-43; Pressler, View of Women, 31; Anthony Phillips, Deuteronomy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), 152; Magdalene, 338.   
55 Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 94; Graetz, 306; Anderson, 42-43; Pressler, View of 
Women, 30-31; Bader, 76-77.  See, for example, Deut. 22.13-21, a law dealing with the case of the 
woman accused by her husband of not being a virgin when she married him. 
56 Lerner, 170; Lipka, 100, 122; Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 79; and “Law and 
Philosophy”, 92; and Reading the Women of the Bible, 186; Brownmiller, 19-20; Victor H. Matthews, 
“Honour and Shame”, 108; Pressler, “Sexual Violence”, 105.   
95 
 
make sure she remained in a pristine state, for a piece of damaged goods could hardly 
command an advantageous match.57 
Consequently, when a man sexually assaulted an unmarried woman, this crime was 
likewise regarded, first and foremost, as a property violation against her father, the 
rapist having effectively ‘stolen’ the woman’s potentially valuable virginity from its 
rightful owner (Deut. 22.28-9; 2 Sam. 13.13).58  Thus, according to the law of Deut. 
22.28-9, a rapist had to pay the woman’s father a sum of fifty shekels, possibly the 
average bride price a father would expect to receive for a virgin daughter.59  In effect 
then, the rape victim’s virginity was treated as though it were an ‘exchangeable 
commodity’, or ‘fungible object’, which belonged to her male kin, and which could 
be replaced by some form of restitution, financial or otherwise, in the event of its 
‘theft’ or ‘damage’ as a result of her violation.60  Moreover, the rape event was 
likewise regarded as a source of great dishonour to the women’s male kin, for it 
undermined their authority and masculinity, by exposing them as inadequately 
prepared to protect and control the women under their charge.61  The fact that rape 
was a serious violation of the woman’s bodily and sexual integrity therefore appears 
to have been of little concern within the worldview of biblical Israel; women, after 
all, had no legal claim to sexual self-determination and consequently no right to 
consent or withhold consent to sexual intercourse.62  Instead, the biblical rape victim 
                                                
57 Brownmiller, 20-21.  Similarly, Alice Bach comments that, ‘under the dictates of a phallic economy 
the father or husband can demand reparation for the damaging of the woman’s body.  Female 
sexuality uncontained deflates the phallic economy in which all gains accrue to the master’.  In “Good 
to the Last Drop: Viewing the Sotah (Numbers 5.11-31) as the Glass Half Empty and Wondering 
How to View It as Half Full”, in Women in the Hebrew Bible: A Reader, ed. Alice Bach (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 506. 
58 Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 91; and Reading the Women of the Bible, 183; Lipka, 
173-84; Fuchs, Sexual Politics, 204; Elaine Adler Goodfriend, “Adultery”, in The Anchor Bible 
Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 1:83; Pressler, View of Women, 
91;  Van Seters, 243; Brownmiller, 18; Tigay, 208; Phillips, Essays, 84; William H. Propp, “Kinship 
in 2 Samuel 13”, Catholic Bible Quarterly 55 (1993): 41; Washington, “Lest He Die”, 210; 
Thistlethwaite, 63-64; Magdalene, 338; Cooper-White, 82; Manazan, 44-52; Bach, “Re-Reading the 
Body Politic”, 151; Fuchs, Sexual Politics, 214; Davies, 56; Ilona N. Rashkow, The Phallacy of 
Genesis: A Feminist Psychoanalytic Approach (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993), 
70.  
59 Phillips, Essays, 84-5; Graetz, “Dinah the Daughter”, 308; Washington, “Violence”, 354; and “Lest 
He Die”, 210-11; Thistlethwaite, 64; Pressler, “Sexual Violence”, 104; Magdalene, 338; Rashkow, 
Phallacy, 70; van Dijk-Hemmes, “Reading the Bible”, 132; Carr, 51.  See Chapter 2, n.147 above for 
a more detailed discussion of the significance of the fifty shekels. 
60 Washington, “Lest He Die”, 211; also Brenner, Intercourse of Knowledge, 137.  
61 Frymer-Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible, 183-84; and “Virginity in the Bible”, 84; Graetz, 
“Dinah the Daughter”, 308; Pressler, “Sexual Violence”, 105; and View of Women, 42; Brenner, 
Intercourse of Knowledge, 138; Fuchs, Sexual Politics, 214.   
62 While, as we discovered in the previous chapter, biblical authors do appear to have recognised that 
rape involved a physical assault against a woman’s body, such recognition was granted little 
significance in the overall conceptualisation of this crime.  Instead, they appear to have identified rape 
as, first and foremost, a dishonourable act of larceny committed against the woman’s male guardian, 
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was objectified, her violation treated as an event carried out against her but 
experienced primarily by the men who were the sanctioned owners of her sexuality.  
As Anderson suggests, according to the biblical worldview, ‘even if intercourse is 
forced upon the female, the sexual assault, for all intents and purposes, is against the 
man whose rights have been violated rather than the female’.63   
Thus, it is likely that, by sleeping with Dinah without seeking her family’s consent, 
Shechem had, in Jacob’s mind, effectively ‘stolen’ his daughter’s virginity from its 
rightful owner and, in the process, had damaged and devalued Dinah by deflowering 
her outwith the formal covenant of marriage.64  Furthermore, Jacob would have felt 
seriously dishonoured by the rape event, as Shechem had effectively demonstrated 
his apparent inability to safeguard the sexuality of the women under his authority.  
The patriarch was therefore entitled to some form of restitution from Shechem, in 
order both to recompense him for his economic losses and as a way of restoring his 
honour. 
However, and crucial to our understanding of Jacob’s inaction here, we must bear in 
mind that Dinah’s sexual encounter with Shechem would furthermore have 
constituted something of a diplomatic nightmare for him.65  His daughter had been 
raped and abducted by the son of Hamor, the local Hivite leader, upon whose land 
he had settled peacefully some years back (Gen. 33.18-20).  However, were he to 
retaliate against Shechem’s crime, such a move may well have soured his as yet 
peaceable relationship with the surrounding people, thereby endangering the welfare 
and future survival of his family in this region.  This was no minor matter, for, as 
Gila Ramras-Rauch notes, Jacob had already made a vow before YHWH to return to 
Bethel and settle there (Gen. 28.11-22), and would therefore have been extremely 
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unwilling to do anything that might compromise this plan.66  His eschewal of a more 
aggressive approach to the situation may thus have arisen from pragmatism and 
caution, rather than indecision, as he strove to ensure that his family could remain 
safely within this land.67   
But how, then, did Jacob plan to resolve the crisis faced by his daughter Dinah, who, 
lest we forget, had been abducted and raped by Shechem?  Well, it would appear 
that Jacob’s strategy regarding this matter involved the tacit approval of his sons’ 
conditional acceptance of the offer made by Hamor during the negotiation process, 
which involved not only Shechem’s marriage to Dinah, but also the total 
assimilation of the Jacobite and Hivite groups through a programme of intermarriage 
and peaceful co-existence (vv.8-12). 68  This reading makes sense particularly if we 
accept that Jacob had focalized his daughter’s rape, not as a brutal assault upon her 
body or a violation of her sexual integrity, but rather as a property violation against 
himself.  Hamor’s seemingly respectful proposition, along with Shechem’s generous 
offer of an unlimited bride price, would have appealed to Jacob as an ideal solution 
to his predicament, compensating him for the theft of his daughter’s virginity and 
thus restoring his honour without resorting to enmity or violence.69  Moreover, 
Shechem’s marriage to Dinah would have resolved Jacob’s additional problem of 
having to support a daughter rendered virtually unmarriageable by her premarital 
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deflowerment.70  Although the narrator does not explicitly state that Jacob’s silence 
during the negotiations indicated his implicit endorsement of this strategy of co-
operation between the Hivite and Jacobite groups, such a reading does appear 
probable, given that there is nothing in the text to suggest that Jacob believed his 
sons’ conditional acceptance of Hamor’s proposal to be anything but sincere.71  He 
offered no objection to it during the negotiation proceedings at which he was present 
and indeed, reacted furiously when he realised that his sons’ seemingly collaborative 
approach towards the Hivites was nothing but a deceitful sham (v.30).72  Indeed, in 
the eyes of the patriarch, their reneging on this agreement was a deeply foolish and 
reprehensible act, which had seriously damaged his honour and reputation in the 
region and, furthermore, had ruined his diplomatic efforts to resolve this political 
dilemma without compromising both the safety of his family and the preservation of 
their settlement on this land.73  
What are we to make of Jacob’s inaction here?  How ought we to evaluate this 
apparently conciliatory approach to his daughter’s sexual assault?  Well, according 
to some scholars, such a tactic by the patriarch to the rape event could be regarded as 
diplomatically strategic, given that it would have prevented hostilities between his 
family and the Hivites, who were a much larger and stronger group.  Indeed, a 
number of these scholars positively laud the patriarch for the apparent sagacity and 
diplomatic acumen he displays throughout this narrative.74  Thus according to 
Fewell and Gunn, Jacob’s unwillingness to engage combatively with the Hivites and 
his apparent willingness to allow Shechem to marry Dinah shows ‘wisdom in the 
face of a potentially explosive situation for his family as a whole’. 75  His sons’ 
impetuous behaviour had left both him and his family to face a potentially 
treacherous confrontation with the surrounding peoples, whereas Jacob’s apparently 
pacifying strategy was at least intended to avert such hostilities and ensure the 
continued safety of his family in the region.76  Sharing these views, Calum 
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Carmichael likewise suggests that Jacob demonstrates a cool-headed and expedient 
restraint within this narrative, as he responded to a difficult political crisis ‘in light 
of the total situation’.77   
Yet, amidst all of these political concerns and diplomatic dilemmas, which appear to 
have preoccupied Jacob throughout this narrative, and amidst these laudatory 
commendations of his sagacity heaped upon him by those commentators above, we 
are left asking, where is Dinah?  How much space does she inhabit within her 
father’s troubled thoughts?  Well, going by our recent discussion, probably very 
little.  At no point throughout this narrative does Jacob express any compassion, 
anxiety, or concern for her welfare, neither acknowledging to himself the terrible 
ordeal that she has just endured, nor even attempting to talk to her after her return 
home.78  Instead, he maintains both a silence and an emotional distance between 
himself and his daughter that is absolute.79  In the words of Ita Sheres, the entire 
relationship between father and daughter is presented within this narrative as one of 
‘alienation and noncommunication’.80  Furthermore, his biting rebuke directed 
against his sons in v.30 make no mention of his concern for Dinah; instead, this 
rather egocentric speech, which contains no less than eight uses of the first person 
personal pronoun and pronominal suffix, would suggest that his relationship with the 
neighbouring Hivite people was a far more pressing concern than the safety of his 
sexually abused and abducted daughter.81  It is as though Jacob has completely 
failed to conceptualise Dinah’s rape as an assault upon her bodily integrity and a 
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source of her personal pain and suffering, but rather, has viewed this event from his 
own perspective, as a potential threat to his diplomatic relations with the surrounding 
peoples and the future existence of his family within this land.82  As Frank Yamada 
notes, throughout this narrative, Jacob consistently appears as ‘a father who neglects 
the fact that his daughter has been raped, while obsessing over his own reputation’.83  
Moreover, the patriarch’s apparent willingness to see his daughter married off to her 
rapist and abductor only serves to draw attention to his obvious indifference to the 
pain and terror that Dinah must have endured during her sexual assault.  Like 
Abraham, Lot, and Isaac before him, Jacob appeared all too willing to use a woman 
under his authority as a bargaining chip in order to protect his own interests in a 
diplomatically precarious situation, regardless of the harm and pain that such a move 
may cause to that woman.84  Thus, just as Abraham and Isaac passed off their wives 
as their sisters to secure their own safety when living in a foreign land,85 and just as 
Lot offered his virgin daughters up to the Sodomite mob, so that he might prevent 
the gang rape of his distinguished male guests,86 so too does Jacob appear prepared 
to use his daughter as a means of ensuring that his relationship with the Hivites 
would not be compromised.87  In other words, Jacob treats Dinah as little more than 
a piece of chattel, which he can exchange for material gain and political security.  
By sanctioning this marriage, he effectively silences his daughter’s suffering, denies 
her experience of personal violation, and thus essentially perpetuates her 
objectification and denigration, which had already been initiated with such terrible 
effectiveness by her rapist.  As Sheres notes, ‘Jacob’s indifference to Dinah’s fate 
and his concern for his own reputation are examples of women’s dehumanisation by 
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men who are heavily concerned with their own egos, status and possessions’.88  It is 
as though Jacob would rather lose a daughter than lose his reputation and his 
foothold in this land.  
Thus, remarks by scholars such as Zlotnik, Ramras-Rauch, and Carmichael, among 
others, who laud Jacob’s diplomatic sagacity and sympathise with his anguish, 
would appear to ignore the fact that such ‘sagacity’ illustrates instead the patriarch’s 
utter disregard for his daughter Dinah’s welfare.  They fail to note that this woman’s 
suffering and trauma is consistently eclipsed and ignored by her father amidst the 
more urgent clamour of political concerns and intergroup tensions.  Indeed, 
Carmichael’s comment, that Jacob’s behaviour reflects his careful handling of 
events ‘in light of the total situation’ exposes his failure to appreciate that part of this 
‘situation’ was surely the rape and abduction of a young woman.  While Jacob’s 
concerns for the safety of his family may be understandable, is not Dinah likewise 
part of the family, deserving also of consideration?89  It would appear not, for 
Jacob’s response to his daughter’s plight suggests instead that her sexual assault is, 
for him, nothing but a thorny diplomatic crisis, which required some tactical 
manoeuvring around the issues in order to avoid stepping on any Hivite toes, 
including the toes of the rapist himself.  As Jacob’s words in v.30 demonstrate, his 
reputation in particular, as well the safety of his family within the region, are 
paramount to him, while, in comparison, the interests and safety of his daughter 
appear low on his list of priorities, commanding, in his mind perhaps, too high a 
price to be granted any serious consideration.90  Commentators who laud Jacob’s 
inaction therefore only reiterate a deeply patriarchal ideology, which insists upon 
treating women as male chattel and which denies a voice to women’s experience of 
rape.  While we can admit that Jacob was placed in a difficult situation within this 
narrative, this should in no way blind us to the fact that he displays a terrible and 
ethically reprehensible lack of concern for his daughter.  Furthermore, his silence 
about his daughter’s rape only serves to silence her experience of suffering, terror, 
and pain, and for this, we have to take him to task. 
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Anger and Outrage: The Response of Dinah’s Brothers to her Rape 
In the discussion above, we noted that Jacob appears to conceptualise Dinah’s rape, 
not as a serious assault upon his daughter’s physical and sexual integrity, but rather 
as an event, which had serious political repercussions for him.  However, Jacob is 
not the only character within this narrative who seems to focalize Dinah’s sexual 
assault from a perspective other than her own.  Unlike their father, however, Dinah’s 
brothers appear to be deeply moved when they hear the news of her violation – they 
are ‘grieved and deeply angry’,91 we are told in v.7, and, as demonstrated by their 
subsequent bloody act of vengeance carried out against the Hivites, clearly view the 
rape event as a serious offence deserving of the most extreme retribution.  What, 
however, was the source of this powerful emotional reaction?  Were they deeply 
moved by the fact that their sister has been subjected to such a violent and life-
threatening assault?  Were they perhaps overcome by anxiety for her safety and 
wellbeing?   
Well, probably not, given that, in v.7, we are told that Dinah’s brothers are grieved 
and angry because Shechem ‘had committed a heinous outrage in Israel by lying 
with the daughter of Jacob, and such a thing ought not to be done’.92  There is no 
explicit mention made of Dinah’s rape here; as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Hebrew verb bk#$ does not convey any intrinsic sense of aggressive or coercive 
sexual behaviour.93  Rather, this verb is used most frequently to describe acts of 
sexual intercourse, either consensual or coercive, which are generally regarded as 
unlawful and illicit within the biblical traditions.  Furthermore, the verbal form hnF%(i, 
which, as discussed in Chapter Two, conveys the physically abusive nature of the 
sexual event that occurred between Shechem and Dinah, is not used here, suggesting 
again that the brothers’ emotionally intense reaction here in v.7 was not in response 
to Dinah’s physical violation per se.94  As Fewell and Gunn suggest, ‘The fact that 
[Dinah] had been forced seems immaterial’.95 
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What, then, was the source of the brothers’ great grief and anger?  If they were not 
incensed by the fact that their sister had been the victim of an aggressive sexual 
assault, what did inspire them to carry out such a bloody act of genocidal vengeance 
against both Shechem and his people?  In response to this question, a number of 
commentators have suggested that at the heart of the brothers’ indignation lay their 
utter eschewal of intermarriage and interethnic sexual intercourse.96  Thus, for 
example, Lyn Bechtel proposes that the brothers’ response to Dinah’s sexual 
encounter with the Hivite prince reflects their strongly held separatist convictions 
and their desire to preserve the ethnic boundaries of the Jacobite group by avoiding 
any exposure to the polluting influence of ‘outside stuff’.97  For the ‘group-oriented’ 
brothers, Dinah’s potential marriage to an uncircumcised Hivite would have 
breached these boundaries, so essential for group cohesion and individual members’ 
identity, and would therefore have posed a serious threat to the ethnic purity and 
continued existence of their community.98   
In a similar vein, Sternberg argues that both the biblical laws of Deut. 7.1-4 and 
Exod. 34.11-16, which explicitly forbid exogamy, and the generally negative 
appraisal of interethnic marriage found elsewhere in the patriarchal narratives of 
Genesis (Gen. 24.1-9; 26.35; 27.46; 28.1-2), strongly suggest that Dinah’s brothers 
were indeed reacting to the serious threat that an exogamous union between Dinah 
and Shechem would pose to the group.99  Like Bechtel, Sternberg believes that the 
brothers’ insistence that a Jacobite woman’s marriage to an uncircumcised man 
would be a ‘disgrace’ (hprx) to them (v.14) is a genuine feature of their religio-
cultural belief system.100  While their speech here in vv.14-17 is, we are told by the 
narrator, laced with deceit (v.13),101 such dishonesty, Sternberg asserts, was not 
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attached to this credo eschewing uncircumcised marriages, but only referred to the 
‘specific proposal’ of mass circumcision offered up by the brothers as a condition 
for intermarriage and assimilation with the Jacobites.102  He therefore insists that the 
‘horror of neighbourly exogamy’ never loses its power within the Genesis traditions, 
but remains forever focused on the subsequent biblical laws, which stamped such an 
eschewal of intermarriage with the seal of divine authority.103  The brothers, avers 
Sternberg, would never have entertained Hamor’s proposed programme of Jacobite-
Hivite assimilation, ‘for assimilation would amount to national suicide on earth, 
quite apart from supplying a proof of unworthiness in the eyes of heaven’.104   
Thus, according to scholars, such as Bechtel and Sternberg, among others, the 
brothers’ vehement and murderous anger in response to Dinah’s deflowerment stems 
from their utter rejection of intermarriage and interethnic sexual relations.  However, 
their argument may run into some difficulty, especially when we consider the 
attitudes towards such relations encountered elsewhere within the book of Genesis.  
For, while it is true that Israelite-Canaanite exogamy is prohibited on pain of death 
in the law codes of Deuteronomy and the Book of the Covenant, such a divinely 
ordained distaste for interethnic sexual unions is not consistently given voice within 
the patriarchal traditions of the book of Genesis.  To be sure, as Sternberg has noted, 
Abraham took pains to arrange an endogamous marriage for his son Isaac (Gen. 
24.1-9), while Isaac subsequently charged his son Jacob not to take a Canaanite 
woman for a wife (Gen. 28.1-2).  However, these patriarchs’ apparent antithesis 
towards exogamy did not appear to be shared by other members of the family.  Esau, 
Jacob’s brother, married endogamously, taking Ishmael’s daughter Mahalath as a 
wife (Gen. 28.8), but he also married two Hittite women, Judith and Adah (Gen. 
26.34), and Oholibamah, a Hivite woman (Gen. 36.2), both of these ethnic groups 
being among the seven peoples mentioned in the divine ban on intermarriage in 
Exod. 34.11 and Deut. 7.3.  While his marriages were not viewed propitiously by 
either his father or mother (Gen. 26.35; 27.46), as a result of Esau’s foreign wives 
making his parents’ lives ‘bitter’ (26.35),105 these unions were not deemed a 
sufficiently serious problem to inspire any murderous inclination within his family 
to end them.  Certainly, a desire to avoid further exacerbation of the problems 
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evoked by Esau’s marriages may have driven Isaac to demand that his other son 
Jacob did not likewise marry a ‘woman of the land’ (27.46-28.2).  However, it is 
impossible to gain a sense from these accounts of familial tensions that marriage 
between a member of the patriarchal family and a person of Canaanite origin was an 
event that would arouse intense passions or religious zeal, let alone be regarded as ‘a 
matter of life and death’, as Sternberg suggests.106   
Furthermore, this seeming ambivalence with regards the treatment of exogamy 
within the patriarchal traditions is likewise suggested by the fact that, within the 
same generation as the events at Shechem, Dinah’s brothers Judah (Gen. 38.1-2) and 
Simeon (Gen. 46.10) themselves marry Canaanite women.  Such an occurrence 
would be very strange indeed if, such a short time beforehand, Judah and Simeon 
had conspired with their brothers to commit an act of genocide against the Hivite 
people in response to Shechem’s own exogamous designs.  While Sternberg argues 
that Judah’s life following his marriage ‘lands him in a vicious circle of 
transgression and catastrophe’, suggesting that Dinah’s brother is the recipient of 
divine retribution as a result of his interethnic union,107 he ignores the fact that Judah 
must at least have believed that an Israelite-Canaanite marriage was an acceptable 
step for him to take.108  Moreover, it is near inconceivable that Simeon, chief 
protagonist of the Hivite massacre along with his brother Levi, would bear a child by 
a Canaanite woman if, such a short time previously, he had been impelled to commit 
ethnic genocide because of a hatred of interethnic sexual unions.  It surely makes 
little sense, therefore, to suggest, as Sternberg does, that the brothers’ murderous 
revenge against the Hivite people was fuelled primarily by their ethical and religious 
abhorrence of exogamy.  For some of them at least, interethnic sexual intercourse 
was not an issue that raised either strong religious or social objections. 
Finally, and most significantly, any understanding of the brothers’ vengeance as a 
response to the interethnic nature of Shechem’s sexual encounter with Dinah must 
surely be challenged in light of their subsequent actions in v.29, where they capture 
all the Hivite women as war booty, presumably to take as sexual slaves or wives.109  
Were the eschewal of intermarriage a significant religio-cultural concern within the 
Jacobite community, the detainment of these women would make no sense at all.  
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While, in Gen. 34.14, the brothers claim that the eschewal of interethnic sexual 
congress was a significant religio-cultural creed within the Jacobite community, it is 
more likely that this claim was simply an intrinsic part of their deceitful speech, used 
to lure the Hivites into agreeing to be circumcised.  As Van Seters has rightly 
pointed out, the narrator gives the reader no clues as to which parts of the speech are 
true and which are deceitful; we simply cannot assume, as Sternberg does, that the 
brothers’ distaste for interethnic sexual unions was sincere.110  Indeed, it could well 
be that everything these men say here to Hamor and Shechem is disingenuous, 
including their profession of a religio-cultural intolerance of exogamy.111  This 
seems all the more likely when it becomes apparent that their insistence on mass 
Hivite circumcision is in fact the centre point of a deliberate ruse used to 
incapacitate the Hivite males during the Jacobites’ subsequent assault upon the city 
(vv.25-9).112  As Noble asserts, ‘because [the brothers’] statement is motivated by 
political expedience, nothing can be inferred about their true beliefs’ [original 
italics]’.113   
Thus, contrary to scholars such as Sternberg and Bechtel, the attitudes held by the 
brothers towards exogamy within the traditions of Genesis 34 are not necessarily as 
unequivocal in their condemnation of interethnic sexual unions as those expressed 
within the biblical law codes of Exod. 34.11-16 and Deut. 7.1-4.  It therefore makes 
little sense to suggest that the catalyst fuelling these men’s act of murderous 
vengeance against the Hivite people was rooted within a deep sensitivity on their 
part to the divine imperative against Canaanite-Israelite exogamy, given voice 
within the law codes of the Torah.  
This is not to say, however, that in order to understand fully the driving force behind 
the brothers’ deadly reaction to Dinah’s rape, we should completely ignore the 
significance of Shechem’s ethnicity.  Rather, I suggest that the import of his ethnic 
‘otherness’ to the Jacobites is not necessarily rooted in any passionate eschewal on 
their part of exogamy per se, but instead, may perhaps be contextualised better 
within a broader dynamic of interethnic relations, in particular, the relations between 
the Jacobite people and their Canaanite neighbours.  The real significance of 
Shechem’s ethnicity for Dinah’s brothers, I would propose, lies in their focalization 
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of his behaviour as an aggressive Hivite assault, perpetrated, not simply against 
Dinah, but against the entire Jacobite group.  That is, Shechem’s forceful abduction 
and rape of Jacob’s daughter was conceptualised by her brothers as a pre-emptive, 
combative attack directed by the Hivite prince against their community, which was 
intended to intimidate and oppress them, while demonstrating to them the 
superiority of their much larger, more powerful Hivite neighbours.  In other words, 
Dinah’s brothers perceived her rape as nothing less than an act of war.   
In order to substantiate this reading, it will be helpful to revisit our earlier discussion 
of the ideologies underlying the utilisation of rape as a military strategy during 
warfare.  For, I believe that it is within the context of these ideologies, which grant 
to wartime rape its insidious power, that we can best understand the reactions of 
Dinah’s brothers to her sexual assault.  As I discussed above, the potency of rape 
during times of military combat would appear to arise from the conceptualisation of 
sexual violence, not primarily as an act of aggression against the female victim, but 
as an attack upon the honour and authority of her community, in particular its male 
members.  The rape of an enemy woman by invading armies is a powerful 
communicator of the deeply humiliating incapacity and impotence of this woman’s 
male kin and community members to protect her; their valued sexual property has 
been seized aggressively from them, thereby displaying their utter vulnerability to 
the superior strength of the opposition.  Moreover, wartime rape, like rape during 
times of peace, denigrates and objectifies women, sending out a potent message to 
their community that they are objects worthy only of abuse and contempt.  Such a 
message has a deeply destabilising and damaging effect upon communities affected 
by wartime rape, especially within those where, according to their own cultural 
value systems, women’s social worth is measured according to their sexual status.   
With this in mind, let us now consider in more detail the reactions of Dinah’s 
brothers to her rape, looking at their focalisation of this event in light of these 
ideologies discussed above, which would appear to grant meaning and power to the 
conceptualisation of rape as a weapon of war.   
 
Dinah’s rape as an offence against the Jacobite community 
In Gen. 34.7, when the brothers first hear of Dinah’s rape and abduction, the narrator 
tells us that they were ‘deeply grieved and burning with rage’ because Shechem had 
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lain with ‘the daughter of Jacob’.  What is of particular interest to us here is the fact 
that, elsewhere within the narrative, Dinah is similarly referred to by the narrator in 
terms of her specific kinship and ethnic ties; she is always ‘their sister’, ‘our sister’, 
‘our daughter’, and ‘Jacob’s daughter’ – she is never simply ‘Dinah’.114   
What does this apparent emphasis on Dinah’s familial and ethnic identification tell 
us about her brothers’ conceptualisation of the rape event?  Well, we could perhaps 
suggest that, by laying such stress upon Dinah’s kinship ties, the brothers, like their 
father, viewed their sister’s rape primarily as a violation of her family’s proprietary 
rights, that is, their exclusive ownership of her virginity and their right to control her 
sexuality.115  Before laying claim to Dinah’s virginity, this Hivite prince had sought 
neither her father’s or brothers’ permission, thereby seriously subverting the 
family’s political standing within the region, by demonstrating their inability to 
safeguard their domestic interests and control sexual access to ‘their’ women.116   
Furthermore, the emphasis on Dinah’s ethnicity, through her designation as the 
‘daughter of Jacob’ in v.7 may also encourage us to focalize her rape through the 
significance of Shechem’s ethnic otherness.  Dinah’s virginity had not only been 
misappropriated, it had been misappropriated by a member of a neighbouring group, 
a group who, moreover, were much greater in number and strength than the 
Jacobites, and who could therefore pose a potentially serious threat to their safety 
and survival in the region.  As we noted above, men’s successful defence of the 
women within their own group has long been perceived as the hallmark of group 
honour and authority; the rape of ‘their women’ by the ethnic ‘Other’ is therefore 
regarded as nothing less than a demonstration of their own vulnerability and 
impotence to outside attack.117  As Brownmiller notes, ‘The body of a raped woman 
becomes a ceremonial battlefield, a parade ground for the victor’s trooping of the 
colours.  The act that is played out upon her is a message passed between men – 
vivid proof of victory for one and loss and defeat for the other’.118   
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This use of sexual violence as a means of demonstrating the superiority of one group 
over another during warfare appears likewise to be given voice within the Hebrew 
Bible.119  Certainly, the rape and abduction of women as war spoil by the victors 
after a successful military conquest is well attested in texts such as Num. 31.9-17, 
Jdg. 5.30; 21.8-12, and Lam. 5.11, and is even legislated for in the law codes of 
Deut. 20.10-17 and 21.10-14.  It is therefore very possible that by emphasising 
Dinah’s ethnicity in relation to Shechem’s offence (v.7), the narrator may be 
suggesting that her brothers evaluated her rape, less as a personal attack against her, 
than as a deliberate and combative attack  perpetrated by Shechem against their 
group, which demonstrated the inferiority of their strength and authority vis-à-vis 
their Hivite neighbours and which caused them maximum humiliation and 
dishonour.120  As Aschkenasy suggests, Dinah’s brothers ‘are not motivated by 
compassion for her but by their concern for the tribal honour, as well as for their 
geopolitical survival and the preservation of their own seed on the land’.121 
This reading of the brothers’ focalisation of Dinah’s rape as an offence against her 
family likewise appears to be confirmed when we turn to v.31, where Simeon and 
Levi defend to their father their act of vengeance, by arguing that Shechem had 
treated their sister ‘like a harlot’ (hnwzk).  Within the biblical traditions, a prostitute 
or harlot was essentially regarded as a woman whose sexuality was not under the 
authority or control of her male kin.122  Men who had sexual relations with such a 
woman therefore did not firstly seek permission from the woman’s guardian, but 
simply claimed access to her sexuality after negotiations with the woman herself.  
Comparing their sexually abused sister to a prostitute does not suggest to me that 
Dinah’s brothers were regarding her here compassionately as the victim of a violent 
assault.  Rather, they utterly ignore the fact that Shechem had violated Dinah’s right 
to determine her sexual boundaries and instead, focus only on his violation of their 
right to control these boundaries.  In other words, according to the brothers, 
Shechem had treated Dinah like a prostitute because he had acted as though she was 
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a woman whose family had no command or authority over her sexuality.123  By 
doing so, however, the Hivite prince had seriously dishonoured the Jacobites, 
demonstrating their incapacity to protect and defend ‘their women’, and thereby 
destroying any notions they may have entertained about their authority and power 
vis-à-vis their Hivite neighbours.  While Shechem did subsequently seek the consent 
of Dinah’s family to marry her, it would appear that her brothers’ deep anger 
prevented them from seeing past his original violating act.124  By sleeping with her 
without first seeking the consent of her family, he had treated their sister like a 
prostitute, and nothing he did subsequently could repair the serious dishonour that 
his earlier crime had caused the Jacobite group. 
Finally, the brothers’ focalisation of Dinah’s rape as a dishonourable and hostile 
violation committed by Shechem against the entire Jacobite community is likewise 
emphasised in v.7, where we are told that the brothers are burning with grief and 
anger because Shechem had committed a ‘heinous outrage’ (hlbn) by his lying with 
the daughter of Jacob.  The use of the abstract noun hlbn (nebalah)125 here 
highlights the fact that the brothers regarded Shechem’s sexual violation as a crime, 
which adversely affected neither Dinah alone nor even themselves as individuals, 
but the entire community to which they belonged.  For, the term nebalah is never 
used with reference to the wrongful behaviour of one individual against another; 
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rather, it connotes a dangerously disruptive act, which struck at the heart of Israelite 
community stability, violated its socio-ethical codes and value systems, and was 
therefore capable of bringing chaos and unruliness to the established bonds of social 
relationships.126  As Keefe notes, within the worldview of biblical Israel, any 
behaviour, which was evaluated as a nebalah was understood to be ‘inherently 
generative of disorder, chaos, and the disintegration of shalom within a 
community’.127    
This semantic definition of the term nebalah is further emphasised by the fact that 
on seven128 out of its thirteen occurrences, including Gen. 34.7, the event to which it 
refers is specifically said to have occurred ‘in Israel’, as though this setting in which 
the offence occurred was of especial significance, perhaps adding to its heinous and 
objectionable nature.  To commit such a deed ‘in Israel’ was to act against Israel, 
because by doing so, the perpetrator was understood to be bringing ‘evil’ into the 
midst of the people (e.g. Deut. 22.21; Jdg. 20.13), thereby threatening their social 
and ethical value systems, which held together the order and right relations 
understood to be essential for community survival.129  Thus, according to Marböck, 
the common element of all acts designated as a nebalah ‘consists not just in the 
transgression of fundamental social or religious principles but in the consequent 
violation of the Israelite community’.130  Or, as Lipka explains, ‘An act that was 
considered an outrage [nebalah] poses a threat to the community because the 
repercussions of such behaviour go beyond the immediate actors to reverberate 
within the entire community, ultimately threatening to tear apart the fabric of 
society’.131 
Moreover, and of particular relevance to this inquiry, the formula ‘to commit a 
nebalah in Israel’ is used, in slightly varied forms, to evaluate the rape of a woman, 
not only in Gen. 34.7, but also in Jdg. 20.6, 10 and 2 Sam. 13.12.  In Jdg. 20.6, the 
Levite describes to the assembled tribes of Israel both the threat against his life by 
the Benjaminite mob and their gang rape of his concubine as a nebalah.132  It is 
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patently clear, within this context, that the Levite did not focalize the events at 
Gibeah simply as an offence against his concubine, or even as an act that he alone 
was affected by.  Instead, his very act of assembling all the Israelites from Dan to 
Beer-sheba (20.1) and insisting on their participation in responding to this heinous 
Benjaminite offence strongly suggests that at stake was not simply a desire to 
avenge the honour of one man or his wife, but rather a resolve to avenge a violation 
that struck at the very heart of the tribal confederacy.133  In the eyes of the Levite, 
these Benjaminites had committed a multilayered crime, their behaviour seriously 
disrupting communal codes of conduct, which were deemed essential for Israelite 
community stability and survival.  For, not only had they threatened him with rape 
and enacted horrendous violence against his concubine, they had also seriously 
subverted the strict societal protocols governing both traditional hospitality and male 
sexual ownership, the latter of which held as sacrosanct a man’s right to sole sexual 
access to his wife.  The dangerous threat that such an act of nebalah was deemed to 
pose for the community of Israel is likewise emphasised by the response of the tribes 
gathered at Mizpah (20.10).134  Immediately after hearing the Levite’s account, they 
agree to gather against Gibeah of Benjamin as a united force, to ensure that the men 
who committed this nebalah are put to death, so that the evil, which they represent, 
can be ‘purged’ from the midst of Israel (20.13).   
Meanwhile, the text of 2 Samuel 13 likewise appears to emphasise the enormously 
deleterious repercussions that a violating act of nebalah was believed to have upon 
the community of Israel.  In v.13, Tamar pleads with Amnon, ‘No, my brother, do 
not force me, for such a thing is not done in Israel; do not commit this nebalah’.  
She further warns him that were he to do so, he would be reckoned as ‘one of the 
fools in Israel (l)r#&yb Mylbnh dx)k)’ and would, moreover, cause her to suffer 
serious humiliation (v.13).135  Yet, Amnon’s threatened assault upon his sister will 
be, as Tamar’s words in the remainder of v.13 suggest, not only a source of her own 
shame and her brother’s dishonour, but will also constitute a violation of the highly 
regarded sexual etiquette upheld within the community of Israel, which defended her 
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father’s exclusive prerogative to determine to whom her virginity should be given.136  
In order to prevent this crisis, she therefore insists that her brother seek their father’s 
permission before satisfying his violent sexual hunger.137  However, Amnon fails to 
heed her words and, as becomes apparent further on in this narrative, his act of 
nebalah has serious repercussions, which spread far beyond either himself or Tamar.  
By having sexual intercourse with his sister without first seeking their father’s 
consent, he appears effectively to destroy the stability and order of their entire 
family, and subsequently, the community of Israel.138  At the end of this narrative, 
brother is pitched against brother, and eventually son against father, until the 
Davidic household and indeed the Davidic kingdom lie in turmoil, irrevocably 
damaged by family disloyalty, betrayal, and revenge (2 Sam. 13-20).   
Thus, it would appear that the utilisation of nebalah to describe an act of sexual 
violence strongly suggests that, within the biblical traditions, rape was not perceived 
primarily as a crime that had a deleterious and damaging effect upon the female 
victim.  Rather, it was evaluated as an event, which caused terrible and lasting 
effects upon her family or community, subverting the principles of accepted social 
and sexual relations, and threatening the very foundations of community stability.139  
As Keefe suggests, the application of the term nebalah to rape ‘points to an 
understanding in which the gravity of the crime is measured not primarily in terms 
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of the consequences for the individuals involved, either victim or rapist, but as an 
(sic) disruption of and a violation against the order of community life’.140  
Turning now to Genesis 34, we could propose that by designating Shechem’s sexual 
violation of Dinah as a l)r#$yb hlbn, the narrator may be again suggesting that, for 
the brothers, this event was not a personal assault against Dinah or even a personal 
affront to them; rather, it was a violating act of outrage committed against their 
entire community, that is, the house of Jacob.141  While the term ‘Israel’ here may 
appear anachronistic, given that there was no identifiable nation or community of 
Israel at this point, the significance of its usage within this patriarchal context may 
nevertheless emphasise the relevance of Shechem’s crime, both for the Jacobite 
family and for the later community of Israel.  As a number of scholars have 
proposed, the term l)r#$yb may well connote a dual meaning here.142  In the first 
instance, it could refer to Jacob, who, in Gen. 33.27-8, was renamed Israel by the 
angel with whom he had wrestled the nightlong.  Thus, the term l)r#$yb could be 
translated ‘against Israel’ or ‘upon Israel’, the brothers perceiving Shechem’s act of 
lying with Dinah as an affront against Jacob and his family.143  It may also, however, 
convey a second, mutually inclusive meaning, which could be translated ‘in Israel’ 
or ‘against Israel’, if we assume that the narrator is also encouraging later audiences, 
who are reading the text at a time when the community of Israel was extant, to 
consider the effects that Shechem’s actions would have had upon this wider 
community.144   
In other words, through this duality of meaning, the narrator emphasises that 
Shechem’s behaviour was viewed with great seriousness both within the patriarchal 
context of the Jacobite community and subsequently, within the wider context of 
national life.145  That is, whatever meaning we ascribe to l)r#$yb, it is clear that 
Dinah’s rape was perceived in terms of its effects upon her community, be it the 
Jacobite community or the later community of Israel, not upon herself.  As Esther 
Fuchs has suggested, ‘The dignity of the family and of the Israelite nation are here at 
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stake, not the physical and emotional aggression suffered by the girl herself’.146  By 
sleeping with the daughter of Jacob and thus committing a l)r#$yb hlbn, the Hivite 
prince had subverted the ethical and social mores lying at the very heart of Jacobite 
community identity, which treated as sacrosanct the rights of a woman’s male kin to 
have exclusive control over her sexuality, and, in so doing, had threatened to destroy 
the fabric of societal order.147  Moreover, as a Hivite, Shechem’s defiant disavowal 
of Jacobite social and sexual values may have emphasised to the brothers the 
particular threat that his actions posed to their group.  By aggressively seizing one 
of their women and laying sexual claim to her, he had in effect demonstrated their 
weakness and vulnerability to outside hostility, thereby seriously undermining their 
political standing within the region.148   
Thus, it would appear that, like their father, Dinah’s brothers did not focalize her 
rape as a terrible and traumatising event for her; rather, they re-conceptualised and 
re-interpreted the rape event as an act that had serious political consequences for the 
entire ethnic entity that was the Jacobite community.  However, unlike their father, 
the brothers also believed that such a dishonouring violation of community order 
was not something that could be resolved by Hamor and Shechem’s seemingly 
generous offer of economic and political recompense.149  In the brothers’ eyes, 
Shechem’s ethnic identity as a member of their larger, more powerful neighbours 
may have intensified the sinister significance of his actions, essentially serving to 
accentuate the Jacobites’ vulnerability to being subjugated and absorbed by other 
peoples.150  By abducting a young Jacobite woman and having sexual intercourse 
with her without first seeking her family’s consent, the Hivite prince would have 
sent a potent message of hostility and disrespect to her community.  Whether or not 
this was his intention will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter; 
however, it is sufficient to say now that his actions appear to have at least been 
interpreted by Dinah’s brothers as a deliberate challenge to Jacobite authority, 
honour, and social status in relation to their Hivite neighbours, which effectively 
struck a blow to their political strength and prominence, if not their very survival, in 
this region.  Jacob’s inaction and his ostensibly conciliatory approach towards the 
Hivites must therefore have seriously perplexed his sons, impelling them to take it 
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upon themselves to avenge the family’s dishonour and the damage done to their 
authority.151  Furthermore, their abduction of the Hivite women (v.29) may likewise 
have been driven by their desire to demonstrate to the surrounding peoples that the 
Jacobites were indeed as strong, if not stronger, than their aggressors and that they 
too were able to seize with impunity the women belonging to their enemy.152  By 
reacting to Dinah’s rape and abduction with such a murderous act of vengeance, the 
brothers are therefore making a political statement to the neighbouring tribes, 
demonstrating to them that they are more than capable of retaliating against any 
form of external threat to their community.153 
 
Dinah’s defilement 
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the fact that women who are raped, both in times 
of war and peace, are all too often regarded by their family and members of their 
community as degraded, devalued, and damaged by their encounter with sexual 
violence.  Such a response to rape victims arises from the ideology, often pervasive 
in patriarchal cultures, which insists that a woman’s social worth and value, 
particularly to her male kin, ought to be measured according to her sexual status, in 
particular, her chastity.  Furthermore, this ideology plays an intrinsic role in the 
potency of rape as a weapon of war.  As discussed above, the denigration, 
devaluation, and objectification of women through rape by conquering troops sends 
a powerful message to these women’s communities that, as a people, they are 
worthless, contemptible, and not deserving of the basic human right to bodily and 
sexual self-determination.  Thus, the victim’s own personal experience of abuse, 
denigration, and contempt at the hands of her rapist is once again eclipsed and 
ignored, reinterpreted and recontextualised in terms of the patriarchal concerns and 
gender expectations of her community and culture. 
Turning now to Genesis 34, it is therefore of interest to note that the narrator tells us 
that both Dinah’s father and brothers likewise regarded her as having been ‘defiled’ 
()m+) by her sexual encounter with Shechem (vv.5, 13, 27).  The verbal form, used 
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here in the Piel stem, usually occurs within the biblical priestly material, often in a 
ritual or cultic context, to denote the ritual defilement, which temporarily affects 
people as the result of their direct or indirect contact with a number of naturally 
occurring substances, which are regarded as unclean.154  It is also used by the 
priestly writers to refer to the permanent moral defilement of a person as a result of 
their participation in sinful acts, such as idolatry,155 murder,156 and sexual sins, 
including adultery, homosexuality, bestiality, and incest.157  Furthermore, and of 
central importance to the overall rationale of this priestly purity system, these 
sources of impurity were understood to pose a serious threat to the people’s 
continued relationship with YHWH and their very existence on this land.158  For, as 
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the priestly material makes clear, the people of Israel were expected to live their 
lives in a state of purity and holiness; because YHWH their God was holy, then the 
people too had to be holy (Exod. 19.6; Lev. 19.2; 20.7-8, 26; Num. 15.40; 16.3).159  
However, impurity, like sin, damaged this sought-after state of holiness, thereby 
rendering the people unfit for such a close affiliation with their God.160  Moreover, 
the people’s impurity was believed to defile both the sanctuary and the land of 
Israel’s inheritance, the spaces in which YHWH was understood to dwell (Lev. 
15.31; 18.24-30; Num. 35.34; Ezek. 5.11; 43.7-9).161  By bringing impurity into the 
midst of YHWH’s dwelling place was to profane YHWH, causing the deity to turn 
away from the covenant community and thus depriving them of their God’s saving 
presence (Ezek. 5.11;  39.24; Lev. 15.31; 20.3).162     
However, within the patriarchal context of Genesis 34, where there was no official 
cult or priesthood and no land or sanctuary to be guarded against ritual or moral 
defilement, I would suggest that the verb )m+ conveys somewhat different nuances 
of meaning to those it bears when employed within a specifically cultic or priestly 
milieu.163  Rather, this term may carry a similar sense of defilement as is used within 
contemporary cultures to describe the apparent effects of rape upon its female 
victims.  Thus, it may be that, for her father and brothers, Dinah’s (albeit unwilling) 
involvement in an act of premarital sexual intercourse, which destroyed her chastity 
and subverted their exclusive right to control her sexuality, had effectively caused 
her to suffer a serious and permanent degradation of her social worth and status.164  
In other words, in the eyes of her family, Shechem had defiled Dinah because by 
deflowering her, he had wrested her sexuality out of her family’s control and, in the 
process, had irreparably damaged her sexual purity.165  As an unmarried non-virgin 
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living within a culture where a woman’s virginity was a highly prized sexual asset 
and most likely a prerequisite to finding a desirable husband, Dinah would have 
been deemed virtually unmarriageable, for very few if any potential suitors would 
wish to marry a woman whose hymen was no longer intact.166  That the offending 
sexual event was aggressive and utterly coerced may therefore have had little or no 
bearing on the family’s evaluation of its wrongfulness.167  Rather, their primary 
concern appears to have been that Dinah’s social status and social value had been 
seriously tarnished, rendering her sullied, spoiled, and defiled within her own 
community, whilst at the same time, visiting great dishonour upon them.168  For, as I 
have already noted, within the worldview of biblical Israel, the preservation of a 
woman’s sexual purity was a potent symbol of a man’s capability and authority to 
protect and control the women under his charge. 
This conceptualisation of Dinah’s rape as the source of her defilement and social 
degradation appears likewise to be echoed nowhere more painfully than in 2 Samuel 
13.  While the verb )m+ is not used within this narrative, the author nevertheless 
manages to express this same sense of debasement and social devaluation 
experienced by Dinah in the aftermath of her rape.  In v.13, prior to her assault, 
Tamar attempts to reason with her would-be rapist, reminding him of the terrible 
shame that she would have to suffer, were he to violate her.  Her words here take on 
near-prophetic significance when we learn of her fate in the aftermath of her sexual 
assault.  There is to be no prestigious royal wedding for Tamar, no experience of 
motherhood, no ‘happily-ever-after’ ending to her story.  Instead, we learn in v.20 
that this former virgin princess spends the remainder of her days living in her 
brother Absalom’s house, a desolate and broken woman.169  Her royal robes, 
symbols of her sexual purity and esteemed social status, lie in tatters, rent by her 
own hand whilst mourning her lost virginity and subsequent social devaluation 
(v.19).170  It is one of the bitter ironies of the story that this woman of many words 
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has no voice with which to express the terror, pain, and sheer horror of her rape 
experience.  Instead, her voice is permitted to speak of the assault only in terms of 
its detrimental effects upon her chastity, honour, and social worth.171  Like Dinah, 
she is presented less as a woman traumatised by the effects of a life-shattering and 
life-threatening physical violation of her body, than one who faces a social ‘death’, 
irreparably damaged and sullied by her (albeit unwilling) encounter with forbidden 
sexuality.172  Like Dinah too, despite the fact that a terrible wrong had been 
committed against her, it is nevertheless she, not her rapist, who carries the burden 
of shame and desolation, wrought upon her by her assault.173 
Such an evaluation of Dinah’s defilement as both a potent symbol of her social 
devaluation and the source of deep dishonour for her family likewise makes sense 
when we come to consider the very different responses of Jacob and his sons to her 
rape.  For Jacob, this event had not only landed him in a very tricky political and 
diplomatic quagmire, it would also have had deleterious economic repercussions for 
him.  Dinah’s premarital deflowerment at the hands of Shechem had seriously 
compromised her social value, for Jacob was unlikely to receive a decent bride price 
for a daughter whose valuable virginity had already been laid claim to by another 
man.  Thus, by agreeing to Shechem’s proposal of marriage and his generous offer 
of an unlimited bride price, Jacob must have thought that both his financial and 
political troubles would be resolved.  He could keep relations with his host Hamor 
on a positive footing, by letting his son have what he so desperately desired, and in 
the process, would ensure that he was more than adequately recompensed by 
Shechem for the loss of his daughter’s valuable virginity.   
However, in the eyes of Jacob’s sons, Dinah’s defilement was far more than a 
financial or political inconvenience, which could be resolved by acquiescing to 
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Hivite demands; rather, the social degradation and devaluation of their sister 
represented for them nothing less than a hostile display of animosity and aggression 
against the entire Jacobite group that they simply could not ignore.  As discussed 
above, the denigration, defilement, and objectification of women through rape by the 
enemy during conflict situations is often perceived, not as a personal crime against 
the woman per se, but as means by which the rapist can demonstrate his superior 
strength over the enemy, uncovering their inadequacies, and, moreover, by which he 
can communicate his contempt both for his victim and for the group to which she 
belongs, particularly its male members.  The sexual violation of a woman sends a 
powerful message to her community that, as a people or ethnic group, they are 
worthless, contemptible, and not deserving of the basic human rights to bodily and 
sexual self-determination.  It may well be that this is the message, which Dinah’s 
brothers heard when they learnt of her rape; the Hivite prince had laid claim to their 
sister’s sexuality without first seeking their consent and, in so doing, had rendered 
their sister ‘damaged goods’.  In their minds, he had therefore struck at the very 
heart of Jacobite self-worth, authority, and honour.174   
This particular evaluation of Dinah’s defilement by her brothers is further lent 
weight by the fact that they did not seem to regard Shechem’s actions as simply a 
personal attack perpetrated by this one man against Dinah and her family.  Instead, 
while acknowledging that he was the individual who carried out the atrocity that 
defiled their sister, they nevertheless appear to have focalized his behaviour, through 
the medium of his ethnic otherness, as representative of a much wider and more 
dangerous threat of Hivite aggression directed against their community.175  This 
comes to light particularly in v.27, where the brothers appear to allocate the blame 
for Dinah’s defilement to all the Hivite males.176  Just as victims of wartime rape 
today are often regarded as having been raped and defiled by ‘the enemy’, rather 
than by an individual who happens to belong to the enemy side,177 so too does this 
sense of collective responsibility appear to influence the perceptions of Dinah’s 
brothers to the rape event.  It is almost as though both Shechem and Dinah become 
living symbols of the ethnic groups to which they each belong, while the rape event 
itself is seen as representative, not of one woman’s violation, but as the violation, or 
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nebalah, perpetrated by one of these groups against the other.178  The fact that 
Shechem, as an individual, had hurt their sister, had subjected her to a terrifying 
assault, and had caused her untold suffering appears to have escaped their notice.  
Rather, they conceptualise her most personal experience of sexual violence as a 
Hivite attack against her family and community, as a threat to their security and 
authority, and as a violation of their honour.  Amidst these very masculine concerns 
of inter-group animosity, political status, and family honour, Dinah’s voice is 
therefore inevitably lost and, as readers, we are never invited, by either the narrator 
or his male characters, to seek it out.  
 
Listening for Dinah’s Voice 
Throughout this chapter, we have looked at the various conceptualisations of 
Dinah’s rape that are given voice within the Genesis 34 narrative.  On reviewing the 
evidence, it would appear that scant attention is paid to the fact that Shechem’s act 
of sexual assault was a forcible violation of Dinah’s bodily integrity and that it 
would have been a source of immense physical, emotional, and spiritual distress for 
her.  Instead, through the voices and actions of his male characters, the narrator 
focalizes this woman’s rape in such a manner that it is transformed discursively into 
another quite different event.179  For Jacob, Dinah’s rape constituted something of a 
diplomatic nightmare, while for her brothers, her abusive sexual violation and 
subsequent defilement were nothing less than a hostile display of Hivite aggression 
and superiority perpetrated against their community.180  Dinah’s violent and abusive 
treatment at the hands of her rapist is thus consistently overshadowed and her 
victimhood eclipsed by both her brothers’ and her father’s concerns over male 
ownership rights, damaged honour, and inter-ethnic tensions.181  She is little more 
than a pawn – a silent pawn – fought over by men in a competition that is violently 
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played out upon the woman’s body.182  In the words of Aschkenasy, ‘Dinah’s verbal 
absence may be best understood as a cultural comment, a message to women that 
rape will not be considered as a woman’s ordeal, but as an event significant to men, 
and that its repercussions are economic and political rather than emotional’.183   
Furthermore, the reader is encouraged to regard Dinah, less as the victim of a violent 
crime than a woman sullied and stained by an encounter with illicit sexuality.184  Her 
tainted body becomes a symbol of outsiders’ aggression towards the Jacobite 
community and serves only as a reminder to her family of the terrible wrong 
perpetrated against them.  As Yamada notes, ‘The reader stands appalled at this 
narratively constructed world, where the rape of one of Israel’s daughters is turned 
into excessive violence, family dissention and, in the final account, the woman’s 
desolation and isolation.  The world becomes a strange place when a woman’s 
defilement turns into the wars of men’.185    
Thus, amidst the clamour of these wholly masculine concerns of property violation, 
intertribal conflict and family dishonour, Dinah’s voice is subsequently lost; like the 
many victims of sexual violence today, her story is silenced by a dominant and at 
times deafening androcentric discourse, which all too often grants no audience to the 
woman’s testimony of suffering.186  As a literary rape victim, she is refused the right 
to participate in her own discourse, but is rather relegated to status of a ‘voiceless 
creation’, left standing within the shadows of the narrative tradition, the object, 
never the subject, of androcentric words, thoughts, and actions.187  We hear nothing 
of the pain and terror Dinah must have endured during her rape, we learn nothing 
about her own sense of shame or degradation, which, as mentioned at the start of this 
chapter, many rape survivors experience in the aftermath of their assault.  All of the 
other emotions one would expect her to feel after her rape, such as a strong sense of 
grief, anger, and a desire for justice, are denied her and are instead ascribed to her 
brothers.188  Moreover, she has no part to play in punishing her rapist, nor is she 
granted any say in what form this punishment ought to take.  As Aschkenasy further 
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notes, it is as though ‘within the patriarchal trajectory there is no female perspective 
to rape; only men should handle rape in all its aspects, dealing with the rapist as well 
as with the victim.  Women should not be involved since they have nothing to 
offer’.189  Even in the patriarchal traditions, which follow Genesis 34, we are told 
next to nothing about Dinah’s fate, her resettlement into the community, or her 
process of healing.190  Instead, all we are confronted with is absolute silence – 
Dinah’s silence.   
It is not, however, only the narrator of this biblical text who may be called to 
account for the systematic erasure of Dinah’s voice and the silencing of her 
suffering.  Within the interpretive traditions surrounding Gen. 34, there is a common 
proclivity among some biblical scholars to ignore, or pass over in a silence of their 
own, the circumscription of Dinah’s personal rape experience.  These scholars 
appear to overlook the fact that Dinah is denied the role of focalizer for her own 
rape; certainly, many make no mention of the fact that her encounter with sexual 
violence is perceived through all eyes except her own.  Instead, they choose to focus, 
as the narrator does, on the reactions of the male characters to this rape event, while 
suppressing any consideration of Dinah’s personal experience of her assault.  
Thus, as we have already noted above, a number of scholars, including Carmichael 
and Fewell and Gunn, appear to view Dinah’s rape, less as a terrible violation of her 
bodily integrity than as a difficult political dilemma for her father.  Sharing this 
propensity to focalize the rape event from the perspective of Dinah’s male kin, 
Gerhard von Rad makes note of ‘the burning shame done to the brothers in the rape 
of Dinah’ [italics added],191 while Robin Parry describes the ‘Dinah episode’ as ‘a 
sin’ committed by Shechem ‘against the family’ [italics added].192   
Meanwhile, showing a similar disinterest in the effects that Dinah’s rape may have 
had upon her, Helena Zlotnik defines the repercussions of the rape event solely in 
terms of the effect that it had upon the socio-political dynamics of the geopolitical 
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region.  Shechem’s violation of the young Jacobite woman had, she claims, 
‘undermined not only patriarchal strategies of prearranged marriages but, more 
seriously, he also caused a disruption of the delicate set of male relationships that 
supported a socioeconomic structure carefully calculated to retain a balance of 
power between nomads and sedentary populations’ [italics added].193  Some scholars 
even endow Dinah with these same distinctly androcentric attitudes towards her own 
rape; Bruce Vawter, for example, shows a rather disturbing degree of insensitivity to 
Dinah’s personal rape experience when he suggests that she would have been 
‘expecting her family to sustain her honour by naming a respectable [bride] price’ 
from Shechem.194  It is as though he simply assumes that she would have evaluated 
her rape, like her father and brothers, as a dishonourable property violation, which 
reduced her social ‘worth’ and thus caused them to incur damage both to their 
finances and their honour.  The possibility that she would have identified herself, 
above all, as the victim of a brutal and life-threatening assault is not even 
considered.    
Interpretive traditions of Gen. 34, such as those mentioned above, however, ought to 
be taken to task , for they only serve to perpetuate Dinah’s suppression within the 
narrative discourse, by re-inscribing the tradition of her silence, and reinforcing the 
author’s androcentric portrayal of rape as nothing more than the occasion of a male 
reaction.195  By insisting that Dinah’s rape is an offence against her father, her 
brothers, and her community, biblical scholars surely draw our attention away from 
any adequate conception of the very real pain and terror that Dinah would have 
experienced.  Furthermore, they ensure that this woman remains forever excluded 
from interpretive consideration, unnoticed or ignored among the dark corners of this 
narrative.  As a result, her silence becomes nothing less than a form of oppression, 
the mark of her exclusion from honest representation within the text.196 
Given such a silence, it therefore falls to us, the readers, to consider for ourselves 
some of the emotions and thoughts that Dinah may have experienced following her 
ordeal and thus to give her, in some sense, a voice with which to tell her story.  For, 
if we fail to do so, choosing instead to focalize Dinah’s rape only through the eyes of 
the narrator and his male characters, we surely then become complicit in her 
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narrative silencing, abandoning her experience in favour of masculine concerns and 
patriarchal priorities.197  Thus, in order to imagine, as sensitively and as honestly as 
possible, what she might say to us, we can look nowhere else but to the testimonies 
of rape survivors who have found the strength and courage to share their experiences 
with us.  We can let their voices guide us, asking them to speak on Dinah’s behalf, 
so that they may grant us a new awareness of the terrible and painful space, which 
Dinah, as a rape survivor, may have inhabited.   
Through these women’s witness, we can suggest, for example, that, like so many 
rape survivors, Dinah may have felt sullied and defiled by her sexual assault.  
Perhaps, like the rape survivor quoted at the start of this chapter, she experienced a 
sense of feeling ‘dirty’ with the smell of Shechem upon her skin, and may have 
longed to wash away the stain of sexual violation, which permeated her entire body. 
198  She may also have suffered feelings of self-worthlessness and degradation, 
having been objectified by her rapist and treated as a person not worthy of respect or 
consideration.  It is conceivable that her thoughts would have been much like those 
expressed within the following testimony:  ‘[When] it really hit me what had 
happened then I felt very, very dirty.  I remember taking a bath but it was like you 
were internally dirty.  You couldn’t get clean no matter how you tried … and after 
that I didn’t care what happened to my body … Like what did it matter any more … 
At that point, you know, it’s like you’ve been violated so so so bad that it didn’t 
matter’.199  These powerful and terrible words can only remind us of the insidious 
power of rape to damage a woman’s sense of self-worth within her own community; 
we therefore cannot ignore the fact that Dinah too may have experienced such a 
crippling sense of internal defilement.  Like the rape survivor who reported a 
perpetual feeling of ‘carrying some kind of visible stamp, of being dirty, physically 
dirty, and guilty’,200 Dinah may likewise have internalised this powerful message of 
insignificance and contempt, conveyed to her by her rapist through his abuse, until it 
soaked into her very soul and became, for her, a reality.201  
Such feelings of worthlessness and personal defilement would also have been 
reinforced for Dinah by the seemingly unfeeling response of her family in the wake 
of the rape event.  On returning to the family home, it would appear from the text 
                                                
197 Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 52; Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise, 11. 
198 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 19. 
199 Lebowitz and Roth, 374. 
200 Draculic8, 119. 
201 Freedman, 129. 
127 
 
that neither her father nor her brothers even attempted to speak to her, either to 
reassure her, voice concern for her wellbeing, or simply ask her to relate her account 
of the terrifying and traumatic events that she had endured.  In their eyes, she was 
less a casualty of a violent crime than a misappropriated piece of their property and a 
woman tainted and defiled by illicit sexual intercourse.  Facing attitudes such as 
these must have been devastating for Dinah, reminding her of her objectification at 
the hands of her rapist and reinforcing her own sense of self-worthlessness and 
social degradation.  Like the woman cited above, whose mother believed that she 
was permanently ‘soiled’ after her rape and would subsequently start ‘whoring 
around’,202 Dinah too may have felt that such a response from her family only served 
to confirm what she already believed; that, as an unmarried virgin, she was 
devalued, despoiled, and morally sullied.  Perhaps, like the victims of wartime rape 
in Uganda, who are taunted by their communities because they are ‘used products 
that have lost their taste’,203  Dinah may have experienced terrible social stigma, 
shame, and humiliation, being treated as a piece of damaged property, which had 
been misused and devalued.  Perhaps, like the woman whose husband treated her 
rape as a property violation perpetrated against him,204 Dinah simply felt that, for her 
family, her suffering and her pain were less important than their own sense of 
violation and victimhood.  Indeed, if she were able to recount to us her experiences, 
she may speak with the same terrible knowledge as the Rwandan rape survivor, who 
commented that ‘after rape, you don’t have value in the community’.205 
Finally, when contemplating the effects that Dinah’s rape may have had upon her, 
we must not forget that an intrinsic part of her ordeal would have been the very act 
of silencing that was imposed upon her by the narrator and his multiple male 
characters.206  Dinah was given no opportunity to share her story, her feelings, or her 
fears.  Instead, her voice was stifled and her very victimhood laid claim to by her 
father and brothers, who appeared to show little or no concern for her own wellbeing 
or welfare, but rather, were concerned only with masculinist concerns of property 
violation, political threat, and family dishonour.207  Yet, such a silencing of the rape 
survivor only serves to deepen and prolong her wounds, extending the physical and 
psychological trauma inflicted upon her by her rapist, and delaying her beginning 
                                                
202 Lebowitz and Roth, 374. 
203 Turshen, 815. 
204 Diana E.H. Russell, 226-7 (see nn.2 and 17 above). 
205 Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives, 25.  
206 Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 52; and Eve’s Journey, 128.  
207 Aschkenasy, Eve’s Journey, 126; Fuchs, Sexual Politics, 206. 
128 
 
the journey along the long path towards healing.208  For, as many rape survivors 
note, the space and safety to speak about their ordeal, which is offered to them by 
their community, is an essential element of their recovery.209  Women who are not 
granted this space within which to tell their stories, but who instead are stigmatised, 
degraded, and silenced by those they live with, bear living testament to the 
continued suffering, loneliness, and pain of their existence as a rape survivor.  As 
Deena Metzger explains, ‘My experience [of rape] and that of the women I know 
tells me there is no treatment for rape other than community … The social 
community is the appropriate centre for the restoration of spirit, but the rape victim 
is usually shamed into silence and or self-imposed isolation’.210  Dinah, we must 
admit, is one of these victims of sexual violence who has, for millennia, been 
‘shamed into silence’ by both the author of the Genesis 34 narrative and by all those 
who read this narrative and likewise ignore her presence within it.  By being denied 
the opportunity to share her experiences with her family and community, by being 
faced only with social disgrace, devaluation, and shame, Dinah suffers perpetually 
the fate of the silenced rape victim, isolated, stigmatised, and deprived of a 
supportive audience, who could at least begin her upon the path to healing and 
restoration.  We should therefore read the painful and honest words, spoken by Ruth 
Schmidt, with Dinah in mind, for, to me, they embody with an all too painful clarity, 
the experience of rape survivors who, like Dinah, have been left by her community 
to suffer in silence:  ‘It is difficult for many to imagine how one’s life changes after 
living through an experience of terror … even while clothed I am naked, even in a 
family I am alone, even speaking I am silenced and even living I am dying’.211 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion then, the patriarchal ideologies, which reduce rape to a male property 
violation and which insist upon measuring a woman’s social worth according to her 
chastity appear to be given ample voice within the narrative of Genesis 34.  
Moreover, these ideologies still resonate today within a diversity of contemporary 
cultures, bearing witness to the pervasive and insidious influence, which they have 
had and continue to have on cultural values and belief systems within patriarchal 
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societies over time and space.212  Dinah has many silent sisters who, in recent 
history and up to the present day, experience rape but are subsequently denied the 
opportunity to express their pain, grief, and anger and whose status as casualties of 
sexual violence is either reinterpreted or suppressed by the dominant patriarchal 
discourse.  Within today’s global community, where rape occurs on a pandemic 
scale in countries both active within and desisting from military conflict, where the 
sexual violation of female refugees in Darfur and political detainees in Iraq 
continues both unabated and ignored within the international political arena, and 
where we continue to read about the decades-old unrelenting saga of resistance, 
denial, and resentful silence faced by former ‘comfort women’ in their search for 
justice, the imperative to end these women’s suffering must surely make its moral 
demand upon us all.  Such a demand may seem near nigh insurmountable, yet it can 
only begin when we start to challenge and demythologise these attitudes and 
ideologies, so pervasive within both the biblical texts and patriarchal societies the 
world over, which continue to regard women as male property, and which measure a 
woman’s worth primarily in terms of her chastity.213  For it is only by achieving 
such a deconstructive act upon these lethally dangerous ideologies, which grant to 
rape its insidious power, that we can even begin to destroy their deadly potential to 
denigrate, devalue, and dehumanise victims of sexual violence.  Only then will the 
twisted, masculinist ‘logic’ underlying the use of rape as a weapon, both in 
peacetime and during conflict, cease to have either power or meaning, and only then, 
will the voices of women like Dinah cease to be lost within the more dominant 
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Redeemed by His Love?  The Characterisation of Shechem in Genesis 34 
 
‘Not Your Typical Rapist’: Myths about Men Who Rape 
‘As soon as he had ejaculated he got off me, put himself straight, 
told me not to phone the police, because I wouldn’t be believed, 
and he also asked if he could phone me and take me out the next 
day’.1 
‘He said he had chosen me as a victim because he could control me 
with violence’.2 
‘I mean we’re men.  We’re wired to see a woman, smash her on the 
head with a bone, drag her unconscious body back to our 
apartment by the hair and f*** her.  I think you all should give us a 
break and, in fact, a little credit’.3 
In the previous two chapters, we have discussed two rape myths, which are both 
pervasive within contemporary patriarchal cultures the world over: the myth that 
rape is primarily a sexual act and the myth that the rape victim is ‘damaged goods’.  
In this chapter, I wish to discuss some other, equally common and equally insidious 
beliefs, which likewise ultimately serve to silence the voices of rape victims whilst 
undermining the seriousness of sexual violence.  These myths and misperceptions, 
upon which I will now elaborate, are centred on men who rape. 
In essence, there are two interrelated beliefs, which, when taken together, influence 
people’s perceptions about rapists and make it far more likely that men accused of 
committing acts of sexual violence will receive public sympathy, rather than 
censure.  In the first place, there is a common misperception that ‘typical’ rapists are 
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psychopathic deviants or socially inept and mentally unstable individuals, unknown 
to their victims, who lurk in dark alleyways and leap out at unsuspecting women.4  
When a man who is accused of rape does not fit this profile – for example, if he is 
regarded as a respectable, well-adjusted male, who is perhaps in a long-term 
relationship, or has a steady job, or is a devoted ‘family man’ – it is far less likely 
that such an accusation will be taken seriously, either by members of his community 
or within a judicial context.5  Research has shown that both jurors and the judiciary 
are often swayed by the lifestyle and appearance of the defendant; when he fails to 
fit the stereotyped ‘portrait’ of a rapist, he is far more likely to be acquitted, in the 
event that his case ever goes to trial in the first place.6  As Linda Fairstein, assistant 
district attorney and director of the Manhattan Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit, recalls, 
‘My colleagues and I have now heard hundreds of times – especially when middle-
class, professional defendants stand up in the courtroom – the murmurs of 
prospective jurors or public onlookers saying, “I can’t believe it – he doesn’t look 
like a rapist” or “He doesn’t look like he’d have to force someone to have sex with 
him”’.7   
However, although this stereotyped profile of the ‘typical rapist’ is extremely 
common within many contemporary cultures, it is nonetheless not only erroneous, 
but also a very dangerous and highly influential misperception.  In the first place, 
this insistence upon sourcing the cause of sexual violence within the 
psychopathology of the rapist utterly ignores the cultural and social factors, 
discussed in Chapter 2, which many feminists believe may contribute to men’s 
propensity to rape.  By attributing blame to some psychological peculiarity buried 
within the offender, the urgent need to investigate or address the attitudes and 
gender stereotypes within a society, which may precipitate male sexually aggressive 
behaviour, are thus overlooked.  As Diana Scully has noted, ‘The consequence of 
defining responsibility this way is that men never have to confront rape as their 
problem … [it] is a prime example of reductionist thinking in which androcentric 
blinders diminish a complex social problem to a singular simplistic cause’.8 
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Moreover, research into sexual offenders has shown repeatedly that the majority of 
rapists are not psychologically deranged, sexually deviant, or socially inept.  They 
come from all strata of society, from every ethnic, religious, and economic group, 
and live a variety of lifestyles, some even ensconced within conventional, stable, and 
non-abusive heterosexual relationships.9  The ‘normality’ of the rapist is sometimes 
even confirmed by his victim; survivors of sexual violence may report that the men 
who treated them with such brutality and contempt during the rape event appeared to 
be pleasant, friendly, and socially adept in their behaviour and approach prior to the 
assault.10  Yet such signs of the rapist’s mental and social adjustment may, all too 
often, be used as ‘evidence’ of his innocence, both during his court appearance and 
within the community in which the rape occurred.11   
Thus, the myth of the sexually and socially deviant rapist can have a deeply 
damaging and insidious effect upon the communities in which it operates, leading to 
fewer rapists being convicted and more rape survivors facing attitudes of disbelief, 
cynicism, and even outright hostility both from their communities and from within 
the judicial system.12  As Sue Lees argues, ‘If women are to be protected from 
dangerous rapists, society and the law must recognise that most of the men who 
commit these horrifically violent crimes do not jump out from behind bushes or 
break into women’s homes.  While the present myths and stereotypes about rapists 
are perpetuated, the vast majority of men who rape will continue to go free to rape 
again and again’.13 
Furthermore, even in cases where there is incontrovertible evidence that a rape did 
indeed occur, if the man involved does not fit the stereotyped profile of the ‘typical’ 
rapist, a second concomitant misperception rises up to ensure, once again, that 
victims of sexual assault will receive neither justice nor support.  For, in such cases, 
rape is simply explained away as the result of a man’s inability to ‘control’ his 
sexual ardour, once it has been inflamed by a seductive and sexually provocative 
female.14  A man, it is argued, ‘just can’t help himself’ when he is confronted by a 
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woman whose behaviour or appearance seems designed to arouse his ardour and yet 
who remains unwilling to grant him access to her sexuality.  His ‘natural’ biological 
need for sexual gratification renders him incapable of controlling his actions, 
compelling him to satisfy this physical urge by aggressive means if necessary.15  As 
Henderson states, social gender expectations insist that ‘men are entitled to act on 
their sexual passions, which are viewed as difficult and sometimes impossible to 
control’.16  In turn, these erroneous social expectations of male physiology and 
sexuality alter people’s perceptions of sexual violence, with the result that rape 
ceases to be regarded as an abhorrent act of violence and is instead perceived as little 
more than the necessary gratification of a man’s natural sexual response to a 
woman’s capricious promiscuity.17     
This belief in a man’s incapacity to control his sexual drives when provoked by 
feminine desirability is not only a social presupposition commonly held by lay 
members of a cultural group, it is also often reflected within responses to rape 
voiced by members of the legal system, who, ironically, are responsible for ensuring 
that rapists and their victims receive adequate recourse to justice.  All too often, the 
defendant in a rape trial is presented as an unwilling victim of his own innate sexual 
drive, which has been provoked by a woman’s promiscuous or provocative 
behaviour.  Thus, for example, Sue Lees cites one defence counsel, who, in his 
summing up, asked the jury, ‘Did [the complainant] lead [the defendant] on, 
prostitute herself, or consent and then change her mind at the last minute when the 
man was unable to control himself?’18  Similarly, in 1986, members of the Dublin 
Rape Crisis Centre  were outraged when a defence counsel appealed to the judge for 
leniency in sentencing a convicted rapist by arguing that his client had ‘given way to 
a human sexual urge’ and if he were a practising Catholic ‘it would mean 23 minutes 
in confession to wipe the slate clean’.19  Within many rape trials, it is as though male 
sexuality, with its concomitant motifs of aggressive acquisition, natural predation, 
and the uncontrollable need for gratification, is not so much condemned as defended 
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and prioritised.20  Male sexuality in effect becomes a more than adequate 
justification for rape, giving men ‘an unauthorised permission’ to violate women, 
while women in turn are attributed with full responsibility for such a violation.21  As 
a result, jurors and the judiciary are reluctant to either convict or punish men for 
simply doing what they believe is natural for a man to do.22  In the words of Carol 
Smart, ‘the rape trial may not celebrate random rape, but it does celebrate the deep-
seated notions of natural male sexual need and female sexual capriciousness’.23 
Thus, it would appear that the social insistence on regarding the rapist as simply a 
man held captive by a natural biological response appears to reflect the common 
misperception, discussed in Chapter 2, which insists upon evaluating rape as a 
primarily sexual event, rather than a violent and abusive display of power, contempt, 
and domination.24  Men grow up learning the social expectations, which inform 
them of their biological need for sexual gratification and their inability to control 
their sexuality when faced with female sexual stimuli.  In addition, as we noted 
earlier in Chapter Two, men are likewise taught that male sexuality is naturally 
aggressive; social gender expectations require that they take a proactive and 
controlling role in their sexual relationships, while women, in turn, are expected to 
be passive objects of male sexual attention, who may put up a token resistance but 
who nonetheless are always willing participants.25  Taken together, these cultural 
values, which are upheld as ‘natural’ or biological facts, create a social milieu in 
which the forceful acquisition of a woman’s body is regarded as little more than an 
accepted, if not laudable, outplaying of normative masculine sexuality.26  Rape, 
however, has little if anything to do with physical sexual desire; the rapist is not 
satisfying a need for sexual gratification, but is instead fulfilling other needs, such as 
the desire to terrorise, dominate, or express hatred and contempt for the object of his 
abuse.27  Moreover, and as we will discuss in more detail in the following chapter, a 
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Bohmer, “Acquaintance Rape and the Law”, 321; Scully and Marolla, “‘Riding the Bull at Gilley’s”’, 
112; Kimmell, 264-67; McGregor, 7-8. 
26 Kimmel, 274; Lisak, 247; Diana E.H. Russell, 260; Groth, 28; Scully and Marolla, “Rape and 
Vocabularies of Motive”, 306-7; and “‘Riding the Bull at Gilley’s’”, 124; White and Humphrey, 43-
56; Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime”, 50; Lebowitz and Roth, 377; Beneke, 8-9. 
27 Fairstein, 136, 173; Ward, 29; Beneke, 9, 11; Scully and Marolla, “Rape and Vocabularies of 
Motive”, 298; Groth, 2, 5, 12-15, 25-28; Dianne Herman, 45. 
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woman is not raped because her provocative appearance or desirability somehow 
incited a man to uncontrollable sexual ardour; rather, rape is a form of gender-based 
violence, which is directed against women because they are women.28  As Diana 
Russell notes, rape is ‘the ultimate sexist act.  It is an act of physical and psychic 
oppression.  It is an act in which a woman is used against her will sometimes 
because she is seen as just another piece of ass, and sometimes because the act of 
dominating her provides a sense of power’.29   
This is not to say, however, that all rapists will acknowledge these deep-seated 
feelings of hatred and derision, which underlie and motivate their act of sexual 
assault. 30  Instead, some may rationalise and justify their behaviour by appealing to 
the same cultural attitudes, discussed above, which misidentify rape with normative 
masculine heterosexuality and which refuse to acknowledge the violence and 
misogyny inherent within this crime.  Indeed, some rapists may show affection to 
their victim after the assault, offering to walk her home, asking her out for a further 
date, or attempting to see her again.31  Victims of acquaintance rape or intimate 
partner violence often report that the rapist acted as though nothing had happened, 
and sought to continue the relationship on the same terms as those prior to the 
rape.32  Whether this is a genuine misperception of events by the rapist or a 
deliberate strategy on his part to downplay the seriousness of his crime, we do not 
know.  What we do know, however, is that it is an added source of great distress for 
his victim.  Nevertheless, such behaviour by the rapist may often be regarded by 
others as a praiseworthy gesture on his part, demonstrating, in their minds, that he is 
not a violent criminal but a man who was simply acting in response to natural sexual 
desire and whose previously abusive behaviour towards the woman can therefore all 
too easily be overlooked.33  Yet for women there is no affection or desire intrinsic to 
the act of rape; for how could ardour or mutual gratification ever be borne from such 
an intrinsically brutal, misogynistic, and dehumanising act?  Whether a rapist admits 
                                                
28 James Luginbuhl and Courtney Mullin, “Rape and Responsibility: How and How Much is the 
Victim Blamed?”  Sex Roles 7 (1981): 557; Bevacqua, 60-61; Stenzel, 91; Cahill, 123-24; Medea and 
Thompson, 31, 45. 
29 Diana E.H. Russell, 265. 
30 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 213; Bechhofer and Parrot, 11; D. Grubin and J. Gunn, The Imprisoned 
Rapist and Rape (London: Home Office Research Unit, 1990). 
31 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 232-34; Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime”, 50; Bechhofer and 
Parrot, 11; Groth, 30. 
32 Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime”, 50; McGregor, 7; Luoluo Hong, “Breaking the Silence: 
Making Laughter: Testimony of an Asian-American Sister”, in Gold and Villari, 59-73. 
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it, all rape is fuelled by a deep-seated contempt for women and a total dismissal of 
their rights to bodily integrity and sexual autonomy.  
In the midst of these myths concerning rapists, which deny the culpability of these 
men for such a terrible crime, the voices of victims of sexual violence are thus once 
again consistently silenced.  If a man accused of rape does not fit the stereotyped 
profile of a socially deviant, sexual psychopath, the woman whom he raped is far 
less likely to have her story believed either by her community or by members of the 
judiciary.  Furthermore, even when there is acknowledgement that a rape did occur, 
the woman’s experience is again re-interpreted and re-contextualised within a 
framework of cultural gender expectations, until it ceases to be regarded as a violent 
assault against her bodily and sexual integrity, and is instead viewed as little more 
than a normative outplaying of aggressive masculine sexuality, for which the woman 
must shoulder some, if not all, of the blame.34  Women’s voices are therefore denied 
permission to enter into the patriarchal discourse concerning their own rape 
experience; instead, they must stand in silence, while the individuals and institutions 
that constitute their community pay scant regard to their experience of suffering and 
violation. 
 
Valorised or Vilified?  The Narrator’s Representation of Shechem 
So far, within this chapter, we have discussed some of the cultural myths regarding 
men who commit acts of sexual violence.  These myths, as we have noted, often 
serve to justify the rapist’s behaviour, by contextualising rape within a framework of 
normative masculine sexuality.  Furthermore, they encourage the ideation that 
rapists are not responsible for their actions, but are instead at the mercy of both their 
own biological drives and the power of capricious feminine sexuality.  However, 
such beliefs only serve to minimise the sheer horror of sexual violence for its 
victims, by downplaying the aggression implicit within this crime and re-evaluating 
the rapist as little more than a man overcome with natural, and thus harmless, sexual 
desire.  
Turning now to Genesis 34, it would appear, on first reading, that the narrator of this 
text has similarly allowed these ideologies to colour his portrayal of Dinah’s rapist, 
                                                




Shechem.  For, as many commentators have noted, the Hivite prince’s exposé seems 
to consist of a bewildering juxtaposition of hero and villain.  Following his depiction 
as a brutal perpetrator of sexual violence in v.2, there is a seemingly precipitate 
transformation in his representation during the remainder of the narrative, when he 
appears to be described, somewhat perplexingly, in a positively laudatory manner.  
From v.3 onwards, his initially aggressive response to Dinah is replaced with 
apparent feelings of love and affection; he cleaves to her, we are told (v.3), and will 
do anything that is asked of him in order to make her his wife (vv.4, 8, 11-12, 19).  It 
is as though the ancient author is at pains to convince his readers that this man is not 
the violent and despicable criminal we may have first thought he was, but rather, is a 
man overcome by passion, whose impetuous behaviour was motivated less by anger, 
hatred, or contempt than by genuine and heartfelt sexual desire. 
Given this ostensibly confounding shift in narrative opinion towards Shechem, the 
majority of biblical scholars have tended to conclude that the aim of the ancient 
author of Gen. 34 was essentially to rehabilitate the character and reputation of the 
Hivite prince, that is, to present him in a more positive, less ethically reprehensible 
light.  That a rapist would in any sense be redeemed or validated within this biblical 
text is very disturbing, given that it would serve only to undermine and essentially 
dismiss the horror and brutality of his crime.  More disturbing, therefore, is the fact 
that some scholars also appear to consider Shechem’s supposed rehabilitation as 
perfectly justifiable, in light of the circumstances presented in the text.  Their 
interpretations contain no outright condemnation of this man who had sexually 
abused Dinah, but rather provide a validation of the narrator’s apparent call for 
leniency and understanding, with intolerance being vetoed in favour of tolerance and 
mitigation replacing denunciation.  Shechem may be a rapist, it is averred, but his 
subsequent love for Dinah and his willingness to ‘do the right thing’ by marrying her 
surely redeems his somewhat tarnished character.  In the eyes of these interpreters, 
the young prince is thus transformed from rapist to hero, and rightly so. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I therefore seek to address two distinct but related 
issues.  In the first place, I will review the narrator’s portrayal of Shechem, in order 
to ascertain whether he does indeed give voice to these myths, discussed above, 
which confuse sexual violence with sexual desire, undermine the violence inherent 
in a rapist’s behaviour, and thus excuse him all too easily of any wrongdoing.  That 
is, I wish to determine if he sought to redeem the character of Dinah’s rapist, by 
presenting him less as a violent sexual predator than as a man overcome by natural 
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sexual desire.  Furthermore, and intrinsic to this inquiry, I will consider the scholarly 
evaluations of Shechem’s behaviour in light of those ideologies discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter; in particular, I wish to evaluate and critique the 
suppositions and assumptions used by those scholars who confirm and justify the 
narrator’s supposedly redemptive portrayal of the Hivite prince.  Are they simply 
reiterating the androcentric and sexist ideologies, presented by the narrator himself, 
or have they perhaps allowed their interpretations of this narrative to be shaped and 
coloured by the myths and attitudes concerning sexual violence, which are prevalent 
within their own cultural milieu?  In either case, do these biblical scholars present a 
responsible and ethical reading of this text or does their show of sympathy for the 
rapist only serve (whether intentionally or unintentionally) to undermine Dinah’s 
terrible experience of sexual violence and thus silence her narrative of suffering?  
 
Genesis 34.3: The Beginning of Shechem’s Redemption? 
Within the interpretative traditions surrounding Gen. 34.3, there is a propensity 
among scholars to read this verse as the narrator’s initial attempt to rehabilitate 
Shechem’s character, following his very negative depiction as a brutal rapist in v.2.  
The words r(nh bl l( rbdyw r(nh t) bh)yw bq(y tb hnydb w#$pn qbdtw are thus 
read as evidence of the strong and sincere emotional attachment, which Shechem has 
formed towards Dinah.  The Hivite prince, it is argued, is making a genuine attempt 
to right the wrong he has done to the woman he has violated; he therefore expresses 
his heartfelt attempts to make amends, by seeking to establish her future security and 
wellbeing as his wife (v.4).  Thus, according to Wenham, Shechem is portrayed as 
‘doing the right thing’ by Dinah, and for this, he deserves a compassionate response 
from the reader:  
So, having unequivocally condemned Shechem for assaulting Dinah, the narrator now 
reveals other facets of his behaviour that evoke much more sympathy for him […] 
Shechem was not your callous, anonymous rapist, so dreaded in modern society, but 
an affectionate young man, who “loved the girl and spoke reassuringly to her”.35 
Wenham is far from alone in his reading of v.3.  A number of other biblical 
interpreters likewise argue that this passage reflects the narrator’s attempt to redeem 
Shechem and to elicit a heightened degree of sympathy for him from the reader.  
Through his choice of language, they contend, the ancient author provides a 
                                                
35 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 317.  Similar sentiments are expressed by Carmichael, Women, Law, and 
the Genesis Tradition, 36, 45; Fretheim, Genesis, 577. 
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penetrating insight into Shechem’s inner emotional world.  What is revealed in the 
process is a man who has replaced aggressive brutality with powerful feelings of 
‘wild consuming love’ for the object of his initially abusive attentions.36  The 
protracted and repetitive syntactical style of this verse, which echoes the tripartite 
structure of v.2, is understood to be an invitation for the reader to linger upon 
Shechem’s deep seated sentiments towards Dinah.37  Thus, according to Fewell and 
Gunn, the three consecutive verbal forms used by the ancient author ‘form a 
powerful sequence in language that is strongly affective and with almost uniformly 
positive overtones.  All of the verbal expressions in this verse are terms of affection 
at home in contexts where a commitment to another person is being made’.38  In 
their minds, this glimpse into Shechem’s psychological worldview ought to soften 
our negative appraisal of his character following v.2, as we come to realise that he is 
a man with profound and genuine emotions of affection and compassion for the 
object of his desire, who not only regrets his past crime, but also wants to make real 
restitution for it.39  They therefore conclude that the reader must surely warm to the 
young Hivite prince, given the depths of his blossoming love for Dinah: ‘If 
sympathy is being accumulated’, they contend, ‘it seems to be sympathy for 
Shechem’.40   
Thus, in the eyes of these biblical scholars, the representation of Shechem in Gen. 
34.3 ought to be read as a deliberate attempt by the narrator to portray the Hivite 
prince, less as a violent and impulsive sexual predator than a Romeo-type figure, 
who, upon finding his ‘Juliet’, seeks to offer her ‘the amende honourable’ after his 
less than chivalrous conduct on their first encounter.41  In order to consider these 
                                                
36 Caspi, 33; also Salkin, 287; Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 28; and “Dinah”, 70; Alter, 
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Is Not Raped”, 28; Alter, 190.  
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40 Fewell and Gunn, “Tipping the Balance”, 197.  Similarly, David Noel Freedman suggests that ‘the 
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Parry, Old Testament Story, 160. 
41 Vawter, 358. 
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readings further, let us now take a closer look at Gen. 34.3, so that we attempt to 
ascertain the narrator’s intentions vis-à-vis his depiction of Shechem.  We will stop 
to consider in turn each of the three phrases within this verse, in the hope that we 
can shed a little more light on the semantic nuances that each one appears to convey 
within the particular context of this narrative.  
 
1. hnydb w#$pn qbdtw 
This initial phrase within the tripartite structure of Gen. 34.3 tends to be translated, 
‘and his very being clung to Dinah’ (literally, ‘and his soul clung to Dinah’).42  In its 
general usage, the verb qbd carries the meaning ‘to cling, cleave, keep close’, and 
may refer to the close physical proximity of two or more separate objects or 
entities.43  However, it is also commonly employed in a figurative sense to express 
the notion of loyalty, affection, and intimacy between individuals, with the 
implication of physical closeness being retained at times too.44  These positive 
emotions may be erotic in nature, signifying sexual intimacy (e.g. Gen. 2.24; 1 Kgs 
11.2), or may refer to a close, yet platonic friendship between two members of the 
same sex (e.g. Ruth 1.14; Prov. 18.24).   
When we come to consider Gen. 34.3, qbd is generally understood by most scholars 
to carry this figurative usage, thereby denoting the emotional closeness and affection  
felt by Shechem towards Dinah.45  That is, Shechem is not simply near to Dinah in a 
spatial sense; he has become attached to her on an emotional level too, his feelings 
of fondness and desire having been awoken following their violent sexual encounter.  
Thus, according to Frymer-Kensky, ‘Shechem is not fickle and his love is not 
transitory’; rather, in her mind, hnydb w#$pn qbdtw connotes a sense of his permanent 
and heartfelt commitment towards Dinah.46  Furthermore, both she and a number of 
other scholars specifically equate the semantic nuance of the verb qbd here in Gen. 
34.3 with its particular connotations in Gen. 2.24, where it would appear to convey 
                                                
42 This translation assumes that in both this verse and again in v.8, #$pn is used as an intensifying 
synonym of the personal pronoun.  See Alter, 190; Brown, Driver and Briggs, 660. 
43 For example, see Jer. 13.11; 42.16; Ezek. 3.26; 29.4; Ps. 119.25; Job 19.20; 29.10. 
44 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 179; G.J. Brooke, “qbd”, in New International Dictionary of Old 
Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 
1:911; 
45 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 179; G. Wallis, “qbd”, in Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, 
ed. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren, trans. John T. Willis, Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and 
David E. Green (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 3:81. 
46 Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 89; also van Wolde, “Love and Hatred”, 437-38. 
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the perfect encapsulation of marital love and fidelity as intended by God: ‘Therefore, 
a man leaves his father and mother and cleaves (qbdw) to his wife, that they become 
one flesh’.47  Thus, according to Wenham, the narrator’s use of the phrase qbdtw 
hnydb w#$pn emphasises that the emotional interaction between Dinah and Shechem 
ought to be understood as ‘precisely the right bond between a married couple’.48   
However, Suzanne Scholz has countered this reading, by suggesting that the phrase 
hnydb w#$pn qbdtw need not necessarily represent the emotional closeness and 
affection felt by Shechem for Dinah here; rather, it may simply refer to their spatial 
proximity, and as such, may express the ‘sexually objectifying dimension’ of the 
young Hivite’s behaviour towards his rape victim.49  In other words, Shechem is 
intent on remaining physically near to the object of his lustful aggression, reluctant 
perhaps, to let her out of his sight.50  Therefore, according to Scholz, the young 
prince is not forming a loving and intimate bond with Dinah here but is essentially 
keeping her captive, until such a time that he can gain permanent control over her 
sexuality through the covenant of marriage.  
Scholz’s interpretation of this phrase in Gen. 34.3 certainly offers an interesting 
alternative reading.  As she rightly points out, the verb qbd can be utilised within 
biblical Hebrew to connote a literal sense of physical proximity between people, 
which in no way indicates any sense of affection, emotional attachment or 
involvement between the verbal subject and object.51  Nevertheless, intertextual 
comparisons between Gen. 34.3 and the two other passages where qbd is used to 
describe the relationship between a man and a woman would suggest that Scholz’s 
reading of this phrase might not be entirely appropriate.  In both Gen. 2.24 and 1 
Kgs 11.2, qbd unequivocally denotes an emotional rather than physical closeness 
between sexual partners, signifying as it does the erotic love and loyalty that bonds a 
man to a woman.52  As mentioned above, Gen. 2.24 relates the etiological myth 
regarding the origin of a man’s drive to form a passionate and permanent union with 
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a woman, through the divinely ordained institution of marriage.53  Likewise, 1 Kgs 
11.2 shows the realisation of this connubial relationship in its description of the 
strong erotic and emotional bond that existed between Solomon and his many 
foreign wives.  Given the similarities in context between these two passages and 
Gen. 34.3 – that is, the particularly sexual nature of the relationship between a man 
and a woman – it would therefore appear probable that, here in Genesis 34, the 
phrase hnydb w#$pn qbdtw gives voice to Shechem’s passionate love and desire for 
the woman he seeks to marry, rather than simply his physical proximity to her.54 
Does such a reading then suggest, as several scholars themselves believe, that the 
narrator of Gen. 34.3 sought to portray Shechem in a more positive light, by 
depicting his relationship with Dinah as that of the perfect encapsulation of marital 
love and fidelity?  Well, as mentioned above, qbd is used in Gen. 2.24 to denote the 
natural and divinely ordained relationship between a man and a woman united by the 
covenant of marriage.  Within the particular context of this etiological myth, such a 
bond of erotic love is regarded positively, originating as it did from YHWH’s initial 
works of cosmic creativity. 
However, this very favourable sense of qbd, captured in Gen. 2.24, is not 
necessarily inherent to the verb form itself, when it depicts the emotive connection 
between sexual partners.  Other contextual considerations, primarily the aptness or 
legitimacy of the union, do appear to play a vital part in determining whether such 
emotional commitment is viewed auspiciously within the biblical material.  Thus, in 
I Kgs 11.2, Solomon’s passionate attachment to his foreign wives (hml#$ qbd Mhb 
hbh)l) is ultimately understood to be the cause of both his apostasy and the 
resultant division of the united kingdom of Israel immediately after his death (vv.3-
13).  While the King’s love and fidelity towards these women was genuine enough, 
the reader was therefore by no means expected to applaud him for this depth of 
commitment.   
Turning now to Gen. 34.3, if one compares Shechem’s connubial desire for Dinah 
with the scenario depicted in Gen. 2.24, there is one striking difference, which may 
suggest that, as in 1 Kgs 11.2, the verb qbd does not carry the same positive 
connotations as Wenham and Frymer-Kensky would appear to suggest.  For, in the 
                                                
53 Gunkel, 13; Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15 (Waco, TA: Word Books, 1987), 71; Umberto 
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aetiological tradition of Gen. 2.24, a man ‘cleaves’ to his wife within the divinely 
mandated covenant of matrimony; the sexual intimacy and fidelity denoted by qbd 
is therefore approved as part of the right relationship between husband and wife, 
inside the specific bounds of legitimate wedlock.   
However, in Gen. 34.3, Shechem’s desire for Dinah occurs outwith these bounds; it 
is a direct consequence of his coercive and aggressive extramarital sexual encounter 
with Jacob’s virgin daughter.  His emotional response was therefore both 
inappropriate and unlawful, for, as we discussed in the previous chapter, within the 
worldview of biblical Israel, female sexuality was considered the rightful and 
exclusive possession of the man under whose authority a woman existed.  By having 
sexual intercourse with Dinah without consulting her male kin, Shechem was thus 
acting without regard for the highly valued socio-religious protocol of biblical Israel, 
which demanded that he seek their consent before engaging in a sexual relationship 
with her. 
Thus, while the phrase hnydb w#$pn qbdtw may very well witness to Shechem’s 
genuine depth of feeling for Jacob’s daughter, it may not necessarily have been 
intended as a narratorial exhortation of high praise for the young prince.  That is, 
even though the author has depicted Shechem as a man deeply committed to the 
object of his affections, he may not have intended the reader to view such depth of 
commitment with any sense of approval.  After all, Shechem’s desire for Dinah was 
utterly illegitimate, having sprung from the illicit and aggressive sexual acquisition 
of a woman outwith wedlock.  It therefore in no sense epitomised ‘precisely the right 
bond between a married couple’, as Wenham has suggested.55  Rather, such a 
heartfelt attachment on Shechem’s part was instead a distortion of the proper 
marriage covenant and therefore, in all likelihood, would have been looked upon by 
the narrator with great disapproval.   
 
2. r(nh t) bh)w 
Within biblical scholarship, the verb bh) is usually translated in Gen. 34.3 to give 
the positive sense of ‘to love’, thereby alluding to the genuine depth of Shechem’s 
feelings for the young woman that he had just raped.56  Thus, for example, Alter 
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asserts that the narrator paints a scenario in v.3, where ‘the fulfilment of the impulse 
of unrestrained desire is followed by love, which complicates the moral balance of 
the story’.57  Likewise, Westermann understands the function of this clause as one of 
intensifying the semantic nuances implicit in the previous expression; in other 
words, the narrator seeks to stress that Shechem is not only drawn emotionally to 
Dinah, he also ‘comes to love’ her.58  Meanwhile, Frymer-Kensky speaks of the 
Hivite prince’s ‘free exercise of erotic love’ towards Dinah, as though love were a 
natural outcome of the violent sexual assault, which had just occurred in v.2.59 
These readings of r(nh t) bh)w are certainly compatible with the usage of the verb 
bh) elsewhere in Genesis and in the other texts the Hebrew Bible, where it conveys 
the love felt between a man and a woman, often a husband and wife.60  However, it 
is also worth noting that, within particular scenarios, it may likewise denote a more 
pejorative sense of uncontrolled passion or illicit erotic desire, which transgresses 
biblical Israel’s strict laws regarding marital fidelity and sexual integrity.61  Thus, 
for example, in Prov. 7.18, it occurs in its nominal form to describe the clandestine 
sexual partners of immoral women, who lure men onto the path of ruin with their 
sweet words and amorous promises: ‘Let us drink our fill of love until morning; let 
us delight in lovers (Mybh))’.  Similarly, in Hos. 8.9, the noun Mybh) represents 
Ephraim’s figurative illicit ‘amours’ courted among the foreign nations.  In both 
these texts, the root bh) does not convey a positive sense of laudable love or 
commitment; rather, it carries unequivocally pejorative connotations of lawless or 
excessive eroticism, ‘the intention of which is not active mutual affection but self-
gratification’ and which inevitably causes chaotic and lawless behaviour that is 
utterly rejected by Israelite socio-religious standards.62   
Moreover, and of particular significance to this enquiry is the fact that bh) is 
utilised in 2 Samuel 13 in a similarly pejorative sense to depict the rapist’s 
ephemeral and uncontrolled desire for his victim prior to her assault.63  Amnon’s 
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‘love’ for his sister Tamar (v.1)64 actualises itself in an unlawful act of sexual 
brutality, which not only devastated his sister, but also seriously disrupted the highly 
valued sexual protocol of biblical Israel, occurring as it did outwith the formal 
covenant of marriage and without the express permission of Tamar’s father.  Thus, 
within such a context of illicit and aggressive sexuality, bh) does not appear to 
express any positive semantic nuances of acceptable or praiseworthy loving affection 
for a sexual partner.  Instead, this verb describes a sense of erotic excess, which, 
when left unchecked, leads only to lawless sexual behaviour that was utterly 
condemned within the ancient milieu of biblical Israel.   
Turning now to Gen. 34.3, it may make more sense to conclude that, given the 
shared contextual theme of unlawful premarital sexual aggression, the verb bh) 
signifies here this same derogatory sense of uncontrolled and illicit desire for sexual 
gratification.65  For, while it is true that Amnon’s passion for Tamar grew cold after 
he had raped her, while Shechem’s only transpired for Dinah following the sexual 
assault, this difference in time scale does not detract from the fact that the emotional 
involvement of the rapist for his victim is, in both cases, expressed by bh).66  Such 
‘love’ is far from laudable, in that it neither bears any ethical concerns for the object 
of affection nor stops to consider its consequences; instead, it ‘strives only to enjoy 
life without any self-restraint’.67  I would therefore suggest that, through his use of 
this verb within such a context of illegitimate and unrestrained sexual activity, the 
narrator of Genesis 34 is by no means seeking to rehabilitate Shechem here.  Rather, 
he is reminding the reader once more, as in v.2, that this is a man who allows his 
passions to run awry, causing destructive and lawless violence in the process, as he 
endeavours to take possession of that which he has no right to claim as his own.  
 
                                                
64 dwd-Nb Nwnm) hbh)yw rmt hm#$w hpy twx) dwd-Nb Mwl#$b)lw Nk-yrx) yhyw (‘Now, Absalom, David’s 
son, had a beautiful sister whose name was Tamar, and Amnon, David’s son, was in love with her’). 
65 Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes”, 169. 
66 I therefore disagree with Sternberg, whose comments would appear to suggest that a rapist who 
loves his victim before he rapes her is in some sense more commendable than one whose love only 
develops after the violation (Poetics of Biblical Narrative, 447).  Nor can I concur with these scholars, 
whose opinion, contra Sternberg, is that we view Shechem in a more positive light than Amnon 
because the Hivite prince at least loved Dinah after he had raped her (see, for example, Wenham, 
Genesis 12-50, 311; Parry, Old Testament Story, 151; Fewell and Gunn, “Tipping the Balance”, 197).  
Love may breed aggression, or aggression may beget lust; the fact remains that both of these men had 
committed a serious act of physical brutality against a woman and their feelings towards her, both 
before and after the assault, can in no way be equated with any sense of commendable or atoning 
love. 
67 Wallis, “bh)”, 108; also Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes” 169. 
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3. r(nh bl l( rbdyw 
The Hebrew idiom bl l) rbd (literally, ‘to speak to the heart’) occurs nine times in 
the biblical corpus and is generally used to convey a sense of speaking words of 
benevolence, consolation or reassurance, in order to inspire the ‘heart’ of the 
addressee.68  Within the context of Gen. 34.3, most commentators believe that this 
idiom is another attempt by the narrator to redeem Shechem; the Hivite prince is 
understood to be treating Dinah with compassionate tenderness and comforting 
affection here, as he strives to quell her fears and reassure her that his loyalty and 
love for her are genuine and heartfelt.69  Indeed, Fewell and Gunn even suggest that 
this phrase is a perlocutionary expression, that is, one that describes a speech act that 
succeeds in producing the speaker’s desired effect upon his or her audience.70  They 
thus conclude that r(nh bl l( rbdyw ‘indicates both Shechem’s action and Dinah’s 
positive response’.71 
However, in contrast to this particularly positive reading of r(nh bl l( rbdyw,  
Scholz has argued instead that this phrase does not in fact depict Shechem’s 
honourable and compassionate attempt to reassure Dinah and win her affections.  
Rather, she suggests, it is best read as little more than an egotistical and self-serving 
attempt by this rapist to placate and mollify the woman who has been a casualty of 
his violent sexual assault; as she suggests, ‘He has to calm her down because she did 
not consent’.72  That is, for Scholz, Shechem is not so much ‘comforting’ or 
‘speaking tenderly’ to Dinah out of any regard for her welfare, as simply trying to 
appease her and perhaps, out of a sense of self-preservation and self-interest, present 
his aggressive behaviour towards her in a far less serious and threatening light.73 
                                                
68 Gen. 34.3; 50.21; Jdg. 19.3; Ruth 2.13; 2 Sam. 19.8; 2 Chron. 30.22; 32.6; Isa. 40.2; Hos. 2.16.  See  
Sternberg, “Biblical Poetics and Sexual Politics”, 474, 477; Heinz-Josef Fabry, “bl”, in Theological 
Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren and Heinz-Josef 
Fabry, trans. David E. Green (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 7:417. 
69 See, for example, Trible, Texts of Terror, 67; Jeansonne, 138, n.7; Davies, 57; Ullendorff, 2:436; 
Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 311; Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise, 81; and “Tipping the 
Balance”, 196; Leupold, 898; Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 90; Westermann, Genesis 12-
36, 534; Cotter, 254; Rashkow, “Hebrew Bible Translation”, 227, n.31. 
70 Fewell and Gunn, “Tipping the Balance”, 196.  Other examples of perlocutionary expressions 
include, for example, ‘compel’, ‘persuade’, and ‘convince’.  Fretheim likewise suggests that 
Shechem’s words here may have initiated a positive response from her (“Genesis”, 577).   
71 Ibid.  
72 Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes”, 170.  Similar sentiments are expressed by Kass, Beginning of 
Wisdom, 482; and “Regarding Daughters and Sisters”, 32. 
73 In a similar vein, Speiser comments that Shechem’s words to Dinah here were ‘not so much to 
comfort her as to persuade her’ (264, n.3). 
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This is a fascinating reading of the phrase r(nh bl l( rbdyw and certainly 
challenges the belief that rapists can feel anything approaching genuine affection and 
concern for their victims.  However, Scholz’s interpretation does nevertheless run 
into difficulty when one considers the other eight uses of this idiom in the Hebrew 
Bible.  For it would appear at first glance that the phrase does not carry any 
inherently negative connotations about the speaker.  Instead, it seems to denote a 
sense that the subject is indeed offering his audience positive reassurance, comfort, 
or gentle persuasion, by attempting to allay their fears or placate their insecurities.    
On saying that, however, the phrase bl l) rbd is used within Judges 19, another 
narrative depicting sexual violence, where, it may be argued, the subject’s need to 
‘speak to the heart’ of a woman is motivated by primarily self-seeking considerations 
and is aimed as much at benefiting the speaker as reassuring the woman whom he 
addresses.  In Jdg. 19.2, we are told that the Levite, who is living in the hill country 
of Ephraim, makes the journey to Bethlehem in pursuit of his concubine who, having 
‘played the harlot’ against him,74 has left him and returned to her father’s house.  
The reader is informed that the Levite’s intention is to ‘speak to the heart’ of his 
concubine (hbl-l( rbdl) and thereby persuade her to return home with him (v.3).  
While this opening context does initially appear to suggest that this phrase is once 
again used in a very positive manner, indicating as it does the Levite’s willingness to 
comfort and reassure his ‘errant’ concubine, shadows of doubt are cast upon this 
reading as the story progresses.  For, once he arrives in Bethlehem, the Levite makes 
no explicit attempt to speak any placatory words to the woman who had left him; 
indeed, for the duration of his visit, he all but ignores her, preferring instead to enjoy 
the companionship and hospitality offered to him by his host, the concubine’s father 
(Jdg. 19.4-9).75  His first explicit (yet still wordless) acknowledgement of this 
                                                
74 w#$glyp wyl( hnztw.  It is not clear from the text what the nature of the concubine’s ‘harlotry’ has 
been.  If she had committed adultery or had been behaving like a prostitute, it seems very strange that 
her husband would make such a long journey in order to win back her affections.  Phyllis Trible and J. 
Cheryl Exum, among others, have suggested that the text makes more sense if we understand the 
woman’s sexual offence as simply that of leaving her husband.  As Trible notes, divorce was strictly a 
male prerogative in biblical Israel; it was unheard of for a woman to initiate a separation between 
herself and her spouse (Texts of Terror, 67).  Similarly, Exum suggests that, ‘a woman who asserts 
her sexual autonomy by leaving her husband – and whether or not she remains with him is a sexual 
issue – is guilty of sexual misconduct’ (Fragmented Women, 178-79).  Some interpreters, for example 
Boling and Soggin, prefer the reading in LXXA to that of the Masoretic Text, which renders wyl( hnztw 
with the Greek w)rgi/sqh au)tw – ‘she became angry with him’.  See Boling, 273-74; Soggin, 284; also 
Schneider, 250-51; Hans-Winfried Jüngling, Richter 19: Ein Plädoyer für das Königtum (Rome: 
Biblical Institute Press, 1981), 187-90; Block, 522-23; Klein, 163. 
75 Trible, Texts of Terror, 68, 73.  The Levite’s apparent failure to speak with his concubine continues 
after the couple leave Bethlehem to make their way home.  Thus, in Jdg. 19.11-14, the decision to 
spend the night in Gibeah is made by the Levite after consultation with his servant; once again, he 
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woman is, in fact, in v.25, where, in a scandalous act of self-preservation, he seizes 
her and casts her out of the house in Gibeah, to be gang raped by the mob of 
Benjaminite townsmen.  This is surely not the action of a man who sought genuine 
reconciliation with his unconventional wife, or who wished to convey his loyalty and 
love to her by ‘speaking to her heart’.  One is therefore left wondering if, within this 
particular context, the phrase bl l( rbd represents rather a sense of egocentric self-
interest and expediency on behalf of the speaker.  The Levite did not wish to 
persuade his concubine to come back to Ephraim with him because he had deep 
feelings of love and affection for her; the facts of the matter are that she was ‘useful’ 
to him, as a source of sexual service perhaps, or provider of domestic comfort.  
Unfortunately, for the concubine, her usefulness took on new meaning when her 
husband’s own sexual integrity was threatened in Gibeah, and he was quick to traffic 
her sexuality in an act rendered all the more shocking by the extent of its deplorable 
cowardice.  As Susan Ackerman notes, the concubine is little more than ‘a pawn in 
the hands of men, and, like a pawn on a chess board, she is valuable only up to a 
point.  If it becomes necessary, the man in control of her movements is willing to 
sacrifice her in the interest of protecting his more important pieces, in this case, 
himself’.76 
Turning back to Gen. 34.3, it could therefore be argued that, like the Levite’s 
intentions to ‘speak to the heart’ of his concubine, Shechem’s act of speaking 
tenderly to Dinah may have been motivated more by a sense of self-interest than by 
any feelings of genuine compassion or concern on his part towards the young woman 
he had just raped.  Both men had laid claim to a ‘sexual asset’, which they were 
unwilling to relinquish; furthermore, in both narratives, the object of their attentions 
was a woman, who, given the circumstances, would have been less than enthusiastic 
to receive this male attention.  The Levite’s concubine, after all, had taken the 
unprecedented move of leaving the marital home to make the long and dangerous 
journey back to her father, where she had remained for four months, apparently 
content to be away from her husband.  Can we really suppose that she would have 
been pleased to see him turn up in Bethlehem, intent on having her return with him?  
Similarly, we can surely presume that, having just been raped, Dinah would have 
been terrified of her attacker’s presence, seeking only to escape from him and return 
to the safety of her family; it is therefore unlikely that she would have been receptive 
                                                                                                                                    
does not address his concubine, despite this being the apparently primary motivation underlying his 
journey to Bethlehem. 
76 Ackerman, 238. 
149 
 
to his attempts to win her affections and keep her near to him.  As Scholz has 
suggested, Shechem’s speech need not necessarily therefore be looked upon 
auspiciously, occurring as it does immediately in the wake of his act of sexual 
assault.77  Perhaps, like rapists today who appear to conceptualise their violent 
behaviour as little more than an act inspired by natural male desire,78 or who try to 
win over the affections of their victims with compliments and promises of future 
commitment,  Shechem too may have been attempting to re-contextualise his assault 
(consciously or unconsciously) within a ‘romantic’ framework, in order to convince 
Dinah (and her family) that he had, in essence, done nothing wrong.   
Finally, the suggestion made by Fewell and Gunn, that r(nh bl l( rbdyw ought to 
be read as a perlocutionary phrase indicating Dinah’s positive response to Shechem’s 
words ought to be challenged.  For, as Sternberg has rightly pointed out, this idiom 
refers only to the speaking of words designed to move the heart of the listener; 
within the biblical texts where it occurs, there are no obvious assumptions that such a 
speech will achieve its desired goal.79  We therefore cannot know from the narrator’s 
utilisation of this phrase how successful Shechem was in his attempts to calm Dinah, 
for the narrator’s focus is entirely upon Shechem’s behaviour, rather than Dinah’s 
response; as Parry notes, ‘The term only describes what Shechem tried to achieve (to 
soothe her) but it tells us nothing about what he actually achieved’ [original 
italics].80  Furthermore, Fewell and Gunn’s proposition that a woman would gain any 
sense of comfort from words spoken by the man who had just subjected her to such a 
brutal and coercive violation would suggest that they have seriously underestimated 
both the horror of rape and the terrible message of contempt and hatred that it 
imparts to its victims.   
 
To summarise then, the above discussion of Gen. 34.3 certainly opens up the 
possibility that, contrary to the opinion of many scholars, the narrator’s portrayal of 
Shechem in this verse may not have been intended to ‘rehabilitate’ his tarnished 
character.  Instead, the language utilised by the author allows us to look upon the 
Hivite prince as essentially a man who has formed an intense emotional attachment 
                                                
77  Scholz, “Through Whose Eyes”, 170. 
78 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 232-34; Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime”, 50; Bechhofer and 
Parrot, 11; Groth, 30. 
79 Sternberg, “Biblical Poetics and Sexual Politics”, 476-78.  Sternberg’s conclusions are likewise 
echoed by Noble, 179; Parry, Old Testament Story, 151-52. 
80 Parry, Old Testament Story, 152. 
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to Dinah, which, though genuine enough, is nonetheless self-seeking, uncontrolled 
and utterly at odds with the sexual protocol upheld within biblical Israel.81  We are 
not necessarily therefore  expected to applaud the young prince for his emotional 
response here; rather, this glimpse into Shechem’s emotional inner world may have 
been intended to make us stand appalled at his selfish and self-interested attempts to 
retain possession of a woman who had so recently been the object of his aggression.   
However, this less than positive portrayal of Shechem does not necessarily mean that 
the narrator likewise acknowledged the misogyny, contempt, and hatred, which lay 
at the very heart of this act of sexual violence.  By lingering on the young prince’s 
emotional attachment to Dinah in the wake of the rape event, he offers the 
impression that the actions of this man were not driven by hatred or derision, but 
were rather the result of unrestrained sexual desire.  Thus, while the ancient author 
may not have approved of such desire, he nevertheless appears to focalize the rape 
event through a specifically sexual, rather than an aggressive and misogynistic, locus 
of meaning, thereby endorsing the common misperceptions, discussed earlier in this 
chapter, which suggest rapists are essentially motivated by their exclusively erotic 
needs.  This is reiterated, in not only the tripartite structure of v.3, but also in vv.8 
and 19, where, once again, the narrator contextualises Shechem’s relationship with 
Dinah within a framework of sexual yearning, rather than one of violence.  In v.8, 
Hamor begins his negotiations with Dinah’s family by emphasising that his son 
‘longs for’ their daughter, and therefore seeks their permission to marry her.82  Later, 
in v.19, the narrator reports that Shechem did not delay in accepting circumcision as 
a condition of his marriage to Dinah, because he had ‘set his passion towards’ her.83  
                                                
81 Ibid., 159. 
82 h#$)l wl ht) )n wnt Mctbb w#$pn hq#$x ynb Mk#$ rm)l Mt) rwmx rbdyw.  The verb q#$x is a relatively 
rare form in biblical Hebrew, occurring only 11 times within the scriptural corpus (Gen. 34.8; Exod. 
27.17; 38.17; 38.28; Deut. 7.7; 10.15; 21.11; 1 Kgs 9.19; Isa. 38.17; Ps.91.14; 2 Chron. 8.6).  Its basic 
meaning appears to designate a sense of ‘to adhere to, be joined, united’, but it is most commonly 
utilised in a metaphorical sense to suggest an emotional bond or unconditional desire for passionate 
involvement with someone or something, thereby carrying similar nuances of meaning as the verb qbd.  
On two occasions, (Gen. 34.8; Deut. 21.11), it conveys the close bond of affection and desire felt by a 
man for a woman.  See D. Talley, “q#$x”, in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology 
and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 2:318-19; G. Wallis, 
“q#$x”, in Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer 
Ringgren, trans. David E. Green (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 5:261-62. 
83 bq(y-tbb Cpx yk rbdh tw#&(l r(nh rx)-)lw.  The verb Cpx occurs 73 times in the Hebrew Bible, 
always in the Qal stem.  Its semantic value is very similar to that of q#$x when used within a sexual 
context, expressing the sense of ‘delight’ that a man may take in a woman with whom he seeks to 
enter into a sexual, connubial relationship (Est. 2.14; Deut. 21.14, 25.7-8).  This likewise appears to 
be the meaning given voice in Gen. 34.19; Shechem has set his heart towards marrying Dinah and, 
such is his ardour, he ‘does not delay’ in accepting even the most painful condition of circumcision, 
insisted upon by her brothers.  See D. Talley, “Cpx”, in New International Dictionary of Old 
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Focalised through Shechem’s eyes, we are therefore invited to view the rape not as a 
coercive and aggressive event but as a sexual event, with the result that Dinah’s 
violation becomes a little more than an illicit seduction, a natural actualisation of 
male sexuality, while her experience of the violence inherent within Shechem’s 
behaviour is again eclipsed and ignored.84   
Nevertheless, it is not only the biblical narrator that we should call to account for his 
apparent endorsement of the still-prevalent rape myths that contextualise rape within 
a framework of normative masculine sexuality.  As I illustrated above, a number of 
biblical critics, such as Wenham, Frymer-Kensky, and Fewell and Gunn, among 
others, likewise give voice to these myths within their interpretations of Gen. 34.3.  
Indeed, I would suggest that by insisting upon reading this verse as a laudably 
redemptive portrayal of Shechem, they go even further than the narrator does.  For, 
not only do they reiterate the narrator’s own patriarchal attitudes about rape, they 
also appear to attempt to validate other myths, contemporary to their own cultural 
milieu, which justify and excuse the behaviour of men who rape.85  While the ancient 
author of Gen. 34.3 may have disapproved of Shechem’s sexual impetuosity, these 
biblical scholars appear instead to rationalize it, thereby endorsing Shechem’s own 
focalisation of the rape event as little more than a romantic interlude.  By doing so, 
however, they only serve to encourage the ideation that rapists are simply acting out 
their natural, and thus harmless, sexual desire, thereby minimising the aggression 
implicit within his crime, seriously downplaying his culpability, and completely 
disregarding the terrible effects that the rape event would have had upon Dinah.   
Thus, for example, Wenham’s declaration that Shechem ‘was not your callous, 
anonymous rapist, so dreaded in modern society, but an affectionate young man’,86 
seems only to ignore the fact that, in the previous verse, the Hivite prince had 
committed an act of sexual violence and therefore would have been, in Dinah’s eyes, 
a ‘callous, anonymous rapist’, who had subjected her to the most terrible and 
terrifying ordeal.  It would appear that, for Wenham, the brutality of the rape event 
may be all too easily forgotten, eclipsed by the subsequent awakening of Shechem’s 
ardour and commitment.  Perhaps he is relying on the myth that ‘real’ rapists are 
                                                                                                                                    
Testament Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 
2:231; G. Johannes Botterweck, “Cpx”, in Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, ed. G. 
Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren, trans. David E. Green (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 
5:93.   
84 Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 57. 
85 Scholz, “Was It Really Rape”, 195; Washington, “Violence”, 359. 
86 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 317.   
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socially deviant, mentally disturbed psychopaths, whose behaviour is utterly unlike 
that of a ‘normal’ heterosexual male.  Perhaps, as a result, he simply views Shechem 
as a man overcome by unbridled desire and longing at the sight of this young 
Jacobite maiden.  However, in so doing, Wenham ignores the fact that the majority 
of men who commit rape are not mentally unstable sociopaths; they have simply 
grown up in a culture where the aggressive acquisition of women is regarded as a 
normative feature of masculine sexuality.  He therefore fails to consider that the 
‘affectionate young man’ in Genesis 34 is nevertheless a violent sexual predator who 
hurt, violated, and terrified the woman whom he now so desperately desires.87   
Furthermore, commentators, such as Vawter, who insist upon viewing Shechem 
simply as a man overcome by passion, or even a Romeo to Dinah’s Juliet,88 likewise 
appear to be relying upon these myths and misperceptions, which reduce the act of 
rape to little more than an act of seduction.  In doing so, however, they utterly fail to 
grant recognition to the fact that sexual violence is, first and foremost, a serious and 
life-altering violation of a woman’s bodily and sexual integrity, which strikes at the 
very core of her sense of self and inalterably damages her relationship with the 
world.  It therefore has naught to do with seduction or romance; it cannot be 
confused with mutual love, lust, or desire.  They similarly forget that rapists are 
driven, not by sexual desire, but by contempt, hatred, and a need to dominate the 
object of their abuse.  Even rapists who, as I mentioned above, endeavour to form a 
relationship with the woman whom they have raped, are by no means attempting to 
create with her a bond based on mutual love and respect.  Rather, like Shechem, 
these men do not recognise that sexual violence is the very antithesis of sexual desire 
but is instead an outpouring of misogyny and detestation, the aim of which is to 
denigrate, dominate, and objectify its victim.  Their treatment of women can 
therefore never be confused with an act that inspires love or desire, for it is nothing 
less than a terrible act of violation and abuse. 
Thus, contrary to scholars discussed above, Shechem’s apparent feelings of desire 
and attachment for Dinah are by no means laudable, nor should they elicit our 
sympathy for him.  If anything, they should heighten our sense of disdain and 
loathing for this man, who despite subjecting a woman to the most terrible of 
ordeals, appears to have little or no insight into the wrongfulness of his actions.  He 
                                                
87 As Yamada notes, ‘The reader must ponder the appropriateness of Shechem’s affection, especially 
since the relationship between Dinah and Shechem began with sexual violation’ (151-52). 




may believe that he loves this woman, but his behaviour only serves to show us that 
he has no real concern for her wellbeing; rather, his priorities lie in satisfying his 
own sexual and emotional ‘needs’, while Dinah’s needs – safety, sexual and bodily 
integrity, physical wellbeing – appear to be of secondary concern to him.  We should 
therefore not be lulled into falling into a trap, laid by the pervasive rape myths within 
our own culture, which would have us extol a rapist for his apparent emotional 
commitment to his victim.  For, such commitment is merely a smokescreen, which 
attempts to hide from our view the hatred and misogyny that truly occupies each 
rapist’s heart and mind. 
 
Was marriage to Shechem the best option for Dinah? 
In the previous section of this chapter, we discussed the ideologies and attitudes 
pertaining to sexual violence, which appear to have influenced interpretive traditions 
surrounding the narrator’s portrayal of Shechem in Gen. 34.3.  I wish to continue 
this discussion by looking at another passage within this narrative that is likewise 
often cited as further ‘evidence’ of Shechem’s admirable character.  In Gen. 34.11-
12, the Hivite prince gives voice to his apparently heartfelt longing to wed Dinah, by 
promising her family that he is willing to pay whatever price they ask of him, in 
return for her hand in marriage.  Such a generous and seemingly genuine offer has 
led a number of scholars to propose that the narrator appears at pains to emphasise 
both Shechem’s desire to make recompense for his wrongdoing and his heart-
warming willingness to go to any lengths to secure the hand of the woman he 
loves.89  Thus, Fewell and Gunn assert that, in wishing to marry Dinah, Shechem is 
‘seeking to make restitution for the wrong he has done her’; the reader therefore 
ought to feel reassured about Dinah’s future, safe as it is in the hands of a man who 
is offering her genuine love and commitment on a permanent basis.90  While they 
concede that marriage to a rapist was by no means an ideal solution for any victim of 
sexual violence, Fewell and Gunn nonetheless believe that there were simply no 
                                                
89 Fewell and Gunn, “Tipping the Balance”, 197.  Meanwhile, Gunkel states, ‘The narrator wants to 
represent Shechem’s love in his many words’ (364).  See also Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 540; 
Ramras-Rauch, 162-3; Fretheim, Genesis, 577. 
90 Fewell and Gunn, “Tipping the Balance”, 197.  As they suggest, ‘Our concern for Dinah is lessened 
as we view Shechem’s resolve to take care of her’.  Sharing a similar attitude with regards the 
marriage of a rapist to his victim, Zlotnik likewise suggests with reference to 2 Samuel 13 that such a 
union would resolve the problems caused to the victim by her rape; as she notes, ‘Even the tale of 
Amnon and Tamar could have ended happily but for Amnon’s change of heart from love to hatred’ 
(41).  See also Kessler and Deurloo, 177.   
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‘liberating alternatives’ in the androcentric culture to which Shechem and Dinah 
belonged.91  As an unmarried woman, the victim of (albeit forceful) pre-marital 
sexual intercourse, her opportunities for achieving security and social acceptance 
through a decent marriage had been severely compromised.  Shechem was therefore 
surely ‘making the best out of a flawed world’ when, in vv.11-12, he shows genuine 
commitment to ‘do the right thing’ by marrying the woman he had violated and 
thereby saving her from a life of social isolation and humiliation.92  Furthermore, 
according to Zlotnik and Aschkenasy, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Dinah 
herself may well have approved of such a marriage proposal; as the daughter of her 
father’s unloved wife, the prospect of a ‘potentially loving spouse’ may have 
appealed to her, for at least it ‘carried a promise of peace’.93 
However, I would contend that such a reading of Gen. 34.11-12 ought to be 
challenged for a number of significant reasons.  Firstly, if one sought evidence that 
Shechem’s ‘generous’ offer to Dinah’s family in vv.11-12 does nothing to redeem 
him, one only need consider his words here in light of the events that preceded them.  
The Hivite prince approaches Jacob, directly after raping and abducting his 
daughter.  Yet, despite this, he offers no apology, no explanation, and no outright 
admission of his violent and immoral actions.94  Several scholars have attempted to 
soften this condemnatory ‘omission’ of Shechem’s here in vv.11-12, by reading into 
his words an implicitly remorseful and apologetic tone.  Thus, Westermann argues 
that ‘Shechem’s plea […] is completely coloured by the deed that has preceded; 
consequently he is ready to pay any price the brothers of Dinah demand of him so as 
to atone for his crime’.95  Likewise, Fewell and Gunn claim that, in vv.11-12, ‘We 
see the son, acutely aware of his offence and desperately anxious not to alienate 
further Dinah’s brothers’.96  Furthermore, Fewell and Gunn even go so far as to laud 
                                                
91 Fewell and Gunn, “Tipping the Balance”, 211. 
92 Ibid.; and Gender, Power, and Promise, 84-85.  Sharing this view, Ramras-Rauch suggests that, as 
an unmarried non-virgin, Dinah would have been ‘doomed to a life of disgrace if she is returned home 
unmarried, while as the wife of the converted Shechem she would have some status’ (162).  See also 
Frymer-Kensky, Goddesses, 194; Parry, Old Testament Story, 152; Fretheim, 577; Shemesh, 11, n.46. 
93 Zlotnik, 38; Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 61; and Eve’s Journey, 129.  Likewise, with 
reference to Tamar’s apparent insistence that Amnon marry her after he had raped her, Stone suggests 
that ‘where marriage is the primary avenue through which female prestige can be secured, and the 
loss of one’s sexual purity can become an obstacle to marriage, it is not inconceivable that a woman 
would prefer to take advantage of the androcentric rationale which expresses itself in the 
Deuteronomic law [of Deut. 22.28-29] and choose marriage over non-marriage’ (Sex, Honour, and 
Power, 115-16). 
94 Sarna, 235; Kass, Beginning of Wisdom, 487; Cotter, 255; Parry, Old Testament Story, 160; Noble, 
192. 
95 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, 540. 
96 Fewell and Gunn, “Tipping the Balance”, 201, n.13. 
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Shechem for the seemingly ‘conciliatory’ and ‘diplomatic’ nature of his proposal to 
Dinah’s family, contending that any ‘open declaration’ of guilt to Dinah’s family on 
his part would have proved ‘diplomatically inept’, leading inevitably to 
confrontation and ruining all hope of peaceful intercession between the two groups.  
Far better, they posit, that he kept quiet about his crime, thereby allowing the 
emphasis of his negotiations to fall upon ‘restitution rather than recrimination’.97     
Such a reading is, however, not without its difficulties.  For, while Shechem’s words 
in vv.11-12 may be courteous and respectful, and his financial generosity impressive, 
there is really nothing to suggest from the language used in these verses to support 
the supposition that he shows any regret for his previous assault on Dinah.98  To be 
sure, the young prince’s largesse speaks volubly of his desire for Dinah.  To propose, 
however, that this is in itself an indicator of his remorse for this violent crime is 
surely to read into these words a meaning that simply was not there in the first place.  
Furthermore, Fewell and Gunn’s contention that the reader ought to applaud 
Shechem’s skills of ‘diplomacy’ and his ‘prudent’ avoidance of the truth is surely a 
perverse way to evaluate an acceptable response to any crime.  In effect, they would 
appear to be arguing that economy with the truth is justifiable if it avoids further 
conflict between the wrongdoer and the wronged, even when such economy would 
seem to preclude justice itself.  Ultimately, their reading of this text, using an ‘ethic 
of responsibility’,99 does nothing less than instil this example of unequivocal 
dishonesty with a flavour of moral relativism, which is in effect neither judicious nor 
ethical.  It is clear that the young Hivite’s own needs are paramount here; he wants 
Dinah as his wife and will go to any lengths to attain this goal.  That she was 
previously the victim of his sexual assault appears to be of little or no importance to 
him.  By omitting any words of contrition or sorrow for Shechem’s prior misdeeds, 
the narrator may be couching this young man’s speech to Dinah’s family with 
pejorative overtones, which should appal the reader with their seemingly unfeeling 
and impenitent tenor.   
                                                
97 Ibid., 199. 
98 Jeansonne, 93; Fleishman, 104; Leupold, 902; Cotter, 255; Luther, 198; Noble, 181.  Cotter even 
suggests that Shechem’s generous offer may indeed have been nothing more than ‘a crass offer to buy 
silence’ (255). 
99 An ‘ethic of responsibility’ addresses moral problems in terms of ‘conflicting responsibilities’ and 
sensitivity to the contextual reality of a given situation.  In comparison, an ‘ethic of rights’ is more 
concerned to seek justice and uphold individual rights, regardless of the context.  See Fewell and 
Gunn, “Tipping the Balance”, 209.   
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Lastly, the suggestion made by Fewell and Gunn, among others, that the reader 
ought to consider Shechem’s offer of marriage to Dinah as an optimal solution to her 
future wellbeing surely raises difficult questions with regard to the fate of any rape 
victim.  As Sternberg rightly points out, such an evaluation of this marriage proposal 
‘consults nothing but the logic of patriarchy’,100 by conveying the message that ‘one 
may rape and rape and rape with impunity, then cling and cling and cling to the 
victim amidst cheers’.101  Like Wenham, who suggested that the perfect connubial 
‘bond’ can arise out of such a hostile and dehumanising act as rape,102 Fewell and 
Gunn appear oblivious to the fact that such a union would sentence Dinah to a 
lifelong nightmare of having to share her life, and her bed, with her abuser. 103  To 
suggest, as they and a number of other scholars do, that marriage to Shechem would 
relieve our concerns for Dinah is therefore an incredible statement, one that seriously 
downplays the long-term physical and psychological damage wrought by sexual 
violence.104  Likewise, remarks made by Zlotnik and Aschkenasy, which suggest that 
Dinah herself would have been content to marry Shechem, simply fail to 
acknowledge the fact that no victim of sexual violence would ever wish to enter into 
any form of long-term sexual relationship with the man who had abused her, hurt 
her, and violated her.105  While it is doubtlessly true that there were a distinct lack of 
                                                
100 Sternberg, “Biblical Poetics and Sexual Politics”, 482. 
101 Ibid., 474. 
102 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 311. 
103 Sternberg, “Biblical Poetics and Sexual Politics”, 479. 
104 I likewise disagree with those scholars who argue that the biblical insistence on the marriage of a 
woman to her rapist in Deut. 22.28-29 would have constituted a significant improvement in the 
treatment of victims of sexual violence by ensuring that they would be able to achieve a decent 
marriage even in their deflowered status (Pressler, “Sexual Violence”, 105; Otto, 133; Tigay, 208).  
Their readings of this law utterly ignore the terrible trauma that the woman would undoubtedly suffer 
by having to spend the rest of her life in a connubial relationship with the man who had abused her.  
Furthermore, such a positive evaluation of Deut. 22.28-29 fails to note that its primary beneficiary 
would not be the woman, but her father, who is more than amply recompensed for the ‘loss’ of his 
daughter’s virginity and who is able to resolve the problem of having to support indefinitely a 
virtually unmarriageable daughter.  This law is based on a distinctly patriarchal view of rape, which 
prefers to view the woman in terms of her deflowered status and her loss of marriageability, rather 
than as the victim of a horrific act of physical brutality.  It would therefore not improve life for a rape 
victim; rather, it would be more likely to make her life an unbearable and endless torture.   
105 While Aschkenasy rightly notes that Tamar beseeched her rapist Amnon to let her remain with 
him, her remarks that ‘in biblical society a woman would prefer to stay with her hated violator, rather 
than return home to a life of isolation as a “tainted” woman’ (Woman at the Window, 164, n.20) 
ignores the fact that the tradition of 2 Samuel 13 presents a distinctly gendered focalization of sexual 
violence.  As Fuchs points out, Tamar’s words are authored by men and, as such, represent less the 
genuine feelings of a rape victim than the feelings that a rape victim was expected to have, given that 
she lived within a culture where her loss of chastity and subsequent loss of social worth as the result 
of her sexual assault were deemed far greater problems than her sense of physical and psychic 
violation (Sexual Politics, 216).  I am therefore not so certain that any woman within the society of 
biblical Israel would necessarily have wanted to stay with her rapist; rather, texts such as 2 Samuel 13 
present only androcentric attitudes about rape, which fail to grant recognition to the female 
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‘liberating alternatives’ for unmarried rape survivors in biblical Israel, their 
proposals nonetheless appear to me an unacceptable compromise, serving only to 
reiterate and validate those biblical ideologies, which appear oblivious to the needs 
and welfare of victims of sexual violence.106  Furthermore, they appear content to 
carry out their evaluation of Dinah’s ‘best options’ solely within the patriarchal 
confines of the biblical world; by doing so, however, they eschew the opportunity to 
critique these very confines and to challenge the horrendous injustice that would 
insist upon a rape survivor marrying her abuser.107  
 
Conclusions 
In the previous chapter, we considered the ways in which Dinah’s voice is silenced 
by her family’s re-contextualisation of her rape as an event, which violated their 
property rights and caused them serious dishonour.  Within this chapter, I have been 
considering the way in which Dinah’s narrative of suffering is likewise stifled by the 
                                                                                                                                    
experience of sexual violence.  Scholars who voice similar opinions as Aschkenasy with regards 
Tamar include Parry, Old Testament Story, 152; Stone, Sex, Honour, and Power, 115-16; Shemesh, 
11, n.46. 
106 What perplexes me in particular about Fewell and Gunn’s suggestions here is the fact that they 
admit themselves that a reader’s interpretation of a text will inevitably be coloured by their own 
ideologies.  Indeed, they actively encourage ‘more self-consciously ideological readings of biblical 
narrative … [which] can help to block the monopolization of biblical meaning and to facilitate the life 
of the text in contemporary society’ (“Tipping the Balance”, 194).  However, their own insistence on 
reading Dinah’s prospective marriage to Shechem as a positive experience for her is little more than a 
reiteration of the deeply patriarchal attitudes regarding sexual violence found within biblical texts, 
such as 2 Samuel 13 and Deut. 22.28-29, suggesting that they themselves allow their interpretation to 
be monopolised by the biblical evaluation of this woman’s rape.  I would therefore suggest that their 
critique of Sternberg’s reading of Genesis 34 as being ‘in significant respects a reflex of values that 
many would characterise as androcentric’ (ibid., 195) could equally apply to their reading of this 
same text.  If they were sincere about facilitating the life of this narrative within a contemporary 
context, they may have been better served contemplating Dinah’s predicament in light of current 
feminist thought, which treats with revulsion any notion of rapist-victim marriage regardless of the 
circumstances, rather than simply reiterating the androcentric and sexist values of the biblical world.   
107 I therefore take to task the comments made by Shemesh (11, n.46) and Rodd (270), which caution 
us against evaluating biblical practices, such as rapist-victim marriage, in light of contemporary 
ethical values.  While I agree that ‘the Israelite culture differed massively from ours in respect of 
hierarchy, patriarchy, and the way women were perceived and valued’ (Rodd, 270), this ought not 
prevent us from a comparative critique of these differences, in light of our own contemporary ethical 
values.  Their proposal, that such objectionable ideologies and practices, such as rapist-victim 
marriage, ought to remain beyond our criticism, is, to my mind, unnecessary; no culture, however far 
removed from our own by time or space, need be immune from the rigours of ethical criticism (Booth, 
413).  Such an appeal to cultural relativism only serves to ignore or obscure the fact that real 
injustices and ethically abhorrent practices occurred within these groups, and furthermore, it 
undermines, and thereby implicitly grants approval of the oppression and marginalisation of women 
within these distant social settings.  As Martha C. Nussbaum has rightly contended, what is so 
laudable about respecting ideologies and attitudes that would have caused real pain to real people?  In 
Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 35-37. 
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narrator’s characterisation of her rapist.  Though closer than any other male character 
within this narrative to the actual violating event, Shechem, more than anyone, re-
encodes its meaning in the most radical manner.  From the moment it occurred, the 
rape no longer constituted in his eyes Dinah’s unlawful or aggressive violation.  
Instead, through the haze of his own desire, he focalized it simply as the source of 
his love.108  In the course of the narrator’s portrayal of this Hivite prince, the reader 
is therefore guided towards the inevitable conclusion that sexual violence is 
primarily a sexual act, driven by desire, which can culminate in the rapist’s 
emotional commitment to his victim.  While this ancient author may not have fully 
approved of Shechem’s newly awakened attachment to Dinah, he nevertheless 
appears comfortable with the notion that this young man’s powerful longing for the 
Jacobite maiden could result from such a violent and hate-filled act as rape.   
Yet, in the midst of all this talk of love and desire, Dinah is again granted no words 
with which to express how she felt about either her rape or her rapist.  We can only 
imagine the dread and revulsion she would have experienced in the presence of this 
man who had so brutally violated her.  For a rapist inspires only an all-encompassing 
terror in his victim; she is confronted by his ferocious hatred and rage, she 
experiences the immanence and intensity of his contempt.  Victims of sexual 
violence repeatedly report that their central and most pressing concern immediately 
after their assault is to escape their attacker; the propensity of some rapists to insist 
on remaining with the woman for a period of time after their assault only adds to her 
sense of terror and trauma.  As one rape survivor noted, ‘My heart was racing.  My 
brain was spinning.  I felt I must escape … I talked continually to him about 
anything … anything to get a chance to escape’.109  Even if the rapist behaved in a 
‘friendly’ or ‘affectionate’ manner after the assault, even at times apologising to the 
woman or asking to see her again, such a precipitate change in his behaviour grants 
his victim no sense of comfort.  In the words of another rape survivor, ‘I was 
petrified.  It was the way he kept changing.  He’d be so nice.  Then all of a sudden 
he’d be totally different’.110  It is as though the rapist’s attempts to normalise this 
dreadful situation serves only to terrorise and traumatise the victim further, for the 
very presence of this man only keeps alive her principal fear that he could hurt her 
again.111   
                                                
108 Bader, 92. 
109 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 176. 
110 Ibid., 230. 
111 Ibid., 232-35. 
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Bearing this in mind, we can perhaps suggest that Dinah likewise received no sense 
of comfort either from Shechem’s continued presence in her life or his apparent 
emotional attachment towards her.  Rather, she would have been utterly confused by 
his behaviour, unable to comprehend that this man could behave with such anger and 
contempt towards her and yet claim to have such strong feelings of desire and 
affection for her.  Like the rape survivor cited above, she too may have attempted to 
talk to Shechem, to persuade him to let her go; alternatively, she may have been too 
terrified and traumatized by events to utter even a word.  The shock of the attack, 
this unexpected and most intimate violation, would have left her feeling little more 
than a receptacle upon which Shechem had poured out his predatory aggression and 
scorn.  She would therefore have been aghast by his endearments and his promises of 
commitment in the wake of her assault, seeking only to distance herself from him 
and escape back to the safety of her family.  The space that Dinah occupied during 
the rape and in its aftermath would therefore not have been rendered more bearable 
by Shechem’s words of devotion and reassurance; if anything, she would have 
perceived this space as even more awful, more unbearable, and more terrifying by 
the continued presence of the man who had subjected her to such a horrific ordeal.   
Furthermore, were Dinah to hear biblical interpreters’ evaluations of Shechem as a 
man fuelled more by lust and desire than by predatory aggression and anger, she 
would surely be left bewildered by such a misconception of her rape experience.  
These scholars’ reinterpretation of her assault within a specifically sexualised 
framework and their apparent indifference to the terrible violence and the trauma that 
she had endured, would, in her mind, serve only to deny her experience of sexual 
assault and further silence her narrative of suffering.  For, sexual violence is a crime 
that has no currency with mutual and consensual sexual desire, but is rather a violent 
and degrading act of brutality, inspired by misogyny, anger and the need to control 
and intimidate.  Scholars, who propose that Dinah may have welcomed Shechem’s 
endearments or who laud the young man for the apparent depth of his love and 
commitment to Dinah, must surely therefore be called to account for their terrible 
failure to recognise both the horror and brutality of rape and the terror that victims 
endure when they live through such a violation.  Any man who violates a woman’s 
right to her sexual integrity can thus never be regarded merely as this woman’s 
‘Romeo’;  no, he is her rapist, the source of her suffering and torment, the face 




“She Asked For It”: Attributing Blame to Victims of Rape in Genesis 34 and its 
Interpretive Traditions 
 
The Myth of Victim Precipitation 
 ‘I think that the problem with most women, including myself, is that we 
feel it is our fault that this has happened.  Because I had nobody to talk 
to about it, I continued to blame myself.  It also did a lot of damage to 
my self-esteem, as I already had a low opinion of myself.  I think that 
things have to change drastically so that women no longer feel they are 
to blame and men start feeling responsible for what they have done’.1 
‘Right from the very beginning I think [the police] thought I was a little 
slut – I even told them “I’m not a little slut”, because I was a virgin … 
But I always thought they thought I was a young stupid girl who had got 
drunk and had sex’.2 
‘It is the height of imprudence for any girl to hitch-hike at night.  That is 
plain.  It isn’t really worth stating.  She is in the true sense asking for 
it’.3     
 
In this final chapter, we will be considering a rape myth that is extremely pervasive 
within patriarchal cultures and that has a particularly pernicious influence on the 
treatment of rape victims.  Consider, if you will, the following statements: 
‘Are you sure you didn’t lead him on?’ 
‘You were out drinking – could you not put it down to experience?’ 
‘Why could you not fight them [two rapists] off?  You’re a big girl.’ 
                                                
1 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 22. 
2 Jordan, 695 




Surprising as it may seem, these questions were some of the responses given 
recently by police officers to rape victims, after they had come forward to report 
their assault.4  On the other hand, perhaps it is not so surprising, if one bears in mind 
that in 2006, a senior police officer in a Scottish constabulary stated publicly that ‘a 
lot’ of rapes could be avoided by women ‘not allowing themselves to be in a 
vulnerable position’.5  Implicit in this remark is the assumption that the 
responsibility for avoiding sexual violence, and thus by implication, the 
responsibility for falling prey to sexual violence, rests in the main upon the victims, 
rather than the perpetrators, of this crime.  Often referred to as ‘victim precipitation’, 
this propensity to hold a woman responsible for her rape is based on the erroneous, 
yet commonly held, supposition that, through her behaviour or appearance, she in 
some sense ‘encouraged’ or provoked her rapist to sexually assault her.6  Rape is 
therefore unique, being the only violent felony in which a victim is often attributed 
in this way with some, if not all, culpability for her ‘participation’ in a criminal act 
committed by forcible compulsion.7  
However, the idea that a woman might provoke her own rape may, to some readers, 
appear perverse; what would a woman have to do to unleash the propensity within a 
man to perpetrate such a brutal and hate-filled crime?  Well, as discussed in Chapter 
One, the concept of victim precipitation appears to be heavily dependant upon an 
adherence to the traditional gender stereotypes, which dictate how women ‘ought’ to 
act within their particular patriarchal culture.  Women who do not conform to these 
stereotypes are regarded as essentially ‘asking for trouble’, as such behaviour is 
repeatedly contextualised, at worst, in a sexually provocative light and at best, as 
reckless and irresponsible.8   
Thus, for example, if a woman is judged to have acted, prior to her rape, in an 
aggressively sexual or promiscuous manner (wearing provocative or revealing 
                                                
4 These responses were reported to Rape Crisis Scotland, whom the women had contacted for support.  
See Kate Foster, “True extent of unreported rapes revealed”, scotsman.com, November 26, 2006, 
http://news.scotsman.com/topics,cfm?tid=53&id=1752272006 (accessed March 18, 2007). 
5 Kate Foster, “Women told ‘drink less’ to avoid rape”, in scotsman.com, June 11, 2006, 
http://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=53&id=860222006 (accessed March 18, 2007). 
6 Menachim Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1971), 259; Steve Nelson and Menachim Amir, “The Hitchhike Victim of Rape: A Research Report”, 
in Chappell, Geis, and Geis, 272-90. 
7 Fairstein, 13; Rozee, “Rape Resistance”, 267; Tetreaut, 246; White and Sorensen, 187; Brownmiller, 
383-84; Henderson, 146; LeGrand, 81; Bohmer, “Acquaintance Rape and the Law”, 320; and “Rape 
and the Law”, 251; Yarmey, 327; Coller and Resick, 115; Burt, “Rape Myths and Acquaintance 
Rape”, 32. 
8 Krahé, 51; Burt, “Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape”, 31-32; and “Rape Myths”, 135; also, 
Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime”, 66; Bohmer, “Rape and the Law”, 250. 
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clothing, or acting ‘flirtatiously’), or if she has a sexual history or reputation that is 
deemed ‘unacceptable’ according to cultural gender expectations (having had 
multiple sexual partners, sexual relationships outwith marriage, or working in the 
sex industry), she may stand accused of having encouraged or precipitated the sexual 
advances of her attacker.9  Such behaviours are considered a blatant breach of 
patriarchal social protocol, which demands female chastity and sexual passivity; by 
‘breaking the rules’, women therefore risk having their behaviour misconstrued as 
sexually motivated and their bodies regarded as sexually available.10   
In addition, women who are deemed to have eschewed their culturally-imposed 
responsibility to safeguard their sexual integrity, by going out alone late at night, 
walking in an insalubrious part of town, or simply forgetting to lock the door of their 
car or home, may likewise be blamed for their rape, having exposed themselves to 
the danger of encountering or attracting unsolicited male sexual attention.11  A 
woman’s vulnerability to sexual violence within such a situation is thus reinterpreted 
as culpability;12 as a result, she is regarded less an innocent casualty of a brutal 
                                                
9 There is a significant body of work discussing public attitudes towards rape victim precipitation.  
See, for example, LeGrand, 67-86; Krahé, 56-57; Jenkins and Dambrot, 875-95; Calhoun and 
Townsley, 57-69; Brownmiller, 385-86; Henderson, 151; D.J. West, “The Victim’s Contribution to 
Sexual Offences”, in Hopkins, 1-14; Tetreault, 247-48, 254; Bevacqua, 60-61, 157-60; Yarmey, 327-
38; Williams and Holmes, 125-45; Suresh Kanekar and Laura Vaz, “Attribution of Causal and Moral 
Responsibility to a Victim of Rape”, Applied Psychology: An International Review 37 (1988): 35-49; 
Alan C. Acock and Nancy K. Ireland, “Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: The Impact of Norm 
Violation, Gender, and Sex-Role Attitude”, Sex Roles 9 (1983): 179-93; Koss, 1335; Ward, 33-34, 75-
77; Georgina S. Hammock and Deborah R. Richardson, “Perceptions of Rape: The Influence of 
Closeness of Relationship, Intoxication and Sex of Participant”, Violence and Victims 12 (1997): 237-
46; Bridges and McGrail, 273-86; Bohmer, “Rape and the Law”, 250-52; and “Acquaintance Rape 
and the Law”, 320, 324; Weidner and Griffit, 151-66; Andrew Karmen, Crime Victims: An 
Introduction to Victimology (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1990), 131-41; Cahill, 175; Spencer, 
57; Burt, “Rape Myths”, 129-44; and “Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape”, 30-31; Coller and 
Resick, 115-25; Sarah L. Cook, “Acceptance and Expectation of Sexual Aggression in College 
Students”, Psychology of Women Quarterly 19 (1995): 188; Rozee, “Stranger Rape”, 98-99; Calhoun 
and Townsley, 62-65; Scully and Marolla, “‘Riding the Bull at Gilley’s’”, 118; Diana E.H. Russell, 
242; Deborah G. Schult and Lawrence J. Schneider, “The Role of Sexual Provocativeness, Rape 
History, and Observer Gender in Perceptions of Blame in Sexual Assault”, Journal of International 
Violence 6 (1991): 94-101; McCaul et al., 1-26. 
10 As Susan Brownmiller states, it is a common cultural myth that ‘a virtuous woman either cannot get 
raped or does not get into situations that leave her open to assault’ (386).  The behaviour of a woman 
who is raped is therefore consistently contextualised from a sexualised perspective, her every action 
reinterpreted as an indication of her sexual receptivity.  Similar remarks are noted by L’Armand and 
Pepitone, 134, 136; Martha R. Burt and Rochelle Semmel Albin, “Rape Myths, Rape Definitions, and 
Probability of Conviction”, Journal of Applied Psychology 11 (1981): 214; Scully and Marolla, “Rape 
and Vocabularies of Motive”, 305; Giacopassi, and Dull, 64. 
11 Rozee, “Rape Resistance”, 267; Shirley Petchel Damrosch, “How Perceived Carelessness and Time 
of Attack Affect Nursing Students’ Attributions About Rape Victims”, Psychological Reports 56 
91985): 531-36; Beneke, 111-12; Burt, “Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape”, 32.   
12 The difference between responsibility and vulnerability is not always appreciated by adherents to 
the myth of victim precipitation.  If, for example, I do not lock my car doors when I am out driving 
alone, I admittedly leave myself vulnerable to being car-jacked.  Nevertheless, if I am car-jacked, I do 
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violation than an individual who, to some degree at least, ought to be held legally 
and morally accountable for the assault perpetrated against her.13   
Thus, by shunning societal regulations concerning appropriate female behaviour, 
women stand accused of acting in ways, which encourage men to regard them as 
either sexually promiscuous or sexually irresponsible and therefore ‘deserving’ of 
their rape.14  In other words, women who claim the same independence and 
autonomy as men, who enter freely into the public sphere without male protection, 
and who take control of their own bodies, behaviour, and sexuality, are considered 
legitimate sexual prey, because their behaviour is contextualised solely from a 
sexualised perspective.  As Helen Benedict asserts, ‘rape is sex, rape is attraction, 
rape is the woman’s fault’.15   
However, this concept of victim precipitation is far more than a harmless or 
inconsequential misapprehension; it is a dangerous falsehood, which, unfortunately, 
has a pervasive and malignant influence upon cultural perceptions of sexual 
violence, essentially serving to rationalise and justify rape, while shifting the 
perpetrator’s own culpability for the crime onto his victim.16  Such an influence can 
be detected within a wide range of social groups, including those organisations and 
                                                                                                                                    
not incur any responsibility or blame for this crime, nor is there any doubt that a crime has occurred or 
that the car-jacker is the responsible agent for committing it.  No one will ask me suspiciously, ‘But 
why did you not lock your car doors?  Were you encouraging the car-jacker?  Did you want to be car-
jacked?’  Applying the theory of victim precipitation to this scenario would however lead to the 
conclusions that I was to blame for the car-jacking, that no actual crime had occurred, and that the 
car-jacker ought to be acquitted of any charges because, by not locking my car doors, I had been 
‘asking’ to be car-jacked.  These suppositions are, of course, ludicrous; why then should rape be 
treated any differently to other crimes in this respect?  I thank Professor Kristen Leslie for clarifying 
this to me in a personal conversation. 
13 Recent surveys carried out by both Amnesty International and the Scottish Executive found that 
between one fifth to one quarter of people who took part believed that a woman was to some extent 
responsible for her rape if she was wearing sexy or revealing clothes, had been ‘flirtatious’ prior to 
her rape, had been walking alone in a dangerous or deserted area, or if she had had multiple sexual 
partners prior to the assault.  See Amnesty International, Sexual Assault Research Summary Report, 
amnesty.org.uk, http://amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=16618 (accessed March 15, 2007); 
The Scottish Executive, Domestic Abuse 2006/7: Post Campaign Evaluation, scotland.gov.uk, 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/194212/0052140.pdf (accessed August 8, 2007).   
14 Woodhull, 172; Lebowitz and Roth, 383; Krahé, 51; Bohmer, “Rape and the Law”, 250-55; Burt, 
“Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape”, 30-32; Ward, 75-77; Dianne Herman, 41-42; Schwendinger 
and Schwendinger, “Rape Myths”, 21-24; and Rape and Inequality (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 
1983), 66; Tetreault, 247-48, 254; Calhoun and Townsley, 62-63; Griffin, “Rape: The All-American 
Crime”, 66; Joyce E. Williams, 76; Linda Brookover Bourque, Defining Rape (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1989), 16; Sharon Lamb, The Trouble With Blame: Victims, Perpetrators, and 
Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 96 
15 Helen Benedict, “The Language of Rape”, in Buchwald, Fletcher, and Roth, 125. 
16 Scully and Marolla, “Rape and the Vocabularies of Motive”, 305; Bohmer, “Acquaintance Rape 
and the Law”, 324; Kimberly A. Lonsway and Louise F. Fitzgerald, “Rape Myths in Review”, 
Psychology of Women Quarterly 18 (1994): 136-37; Schwendinger and Schwendinger, “Rape 
Myths”, 22; Bevacqua, 61. 
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institutions that are responsible both for the support of the rape victim and for the 
dispensation of justice against the perpetrator on her behalf.  Members of law 
enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system, including the police, the 
judiciary, and members of the public who serve as jurors,17 as well as the media,18 
the medical professions,19 not to mention the victim’s own family and friends,20 may 
all endorse the belief that a woman who behaves in a certain manner prior to her 
rape ought to shoulder a significant part, if not all, of the blame for her own 
victimisation.   
It should come as little surprise then to learn that many survivors of sexual violence 
tell no one about their assault.  Victim precipitation thus becomes yet another 
dominant patriarchal ideology, which all but ensures the silencing of women who 
                                                
17 Hubert S. Feild’s research into rape myths led to the troubling conclusion that the police officers in 
his study shared similar conceptions and attitudes about victim precipitation as those held by 
convicted rapists (156-79), while Patricia Tetreault discovered in the course of her research that jurors 
who accept the concept of victim precipitation are more likely to acquit an accused rapist or, if found 
guilty, recommend a more lenient sentence, than a juror who does not hold a rape victim in any way 
responsible for her assault (248).  There is a plethora of research and discussion investigating the 
acceptance of the victim precipitation myth among the police, judiciary, and jurors; see, for example, 
Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett, and Linda Regan, A Gap or a Chasm?  Attrition in Reported Rape Cases 
(London: Home Office, 2005); Rozee, “Stranger Rape”, 98-99; Ward, 33-34, 56, 75-77; Brownmiller, 
364-74; Shirley Feldman-Summers and Clark D. Ashworth, “Factors Related to Intentions to Report a 
Rape”, Journal of Social Issues 37, no.4 (1981): 53-70; Ullman, 143-57; Campbell and Johnson,  255-
74; Eugene Borgida and Nancy Brekke, “Psychological Research on Rape Trials”, in Burgess, 321; 
Madigan and Gamble, 71-81, 91-107; Julie Bindel, “Why is rape so easy to get away with?” 
guardian.co.uk, February 1, 2007,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/crime/article/0,,2003229,00.html 
(accessed 28 March, 2007); Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 129-58; Henderson, 145-53; Luginbuhl and 
Mullin, 554, 556-57; Carol Bohmer, “Judicial Attitudes Towards Rape Victims”, in Chappell, Geis, 
and Geis, 161-69; and “Acquaintance Rape and the Law”, 320, 324; Diana E.H. Russell, 112, 224-25; 
LeGrand, 72-73, 77-79; Estrich, 8-79; Barbara Toner, “Inside a rape trial”, guardian.co.uk, June 22, 
2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/columnists/column/0,,1803084,00.html (accessed 28 March, 2007); 
Nancy E. Snow, “Evaluating Rape Shield Laws: Why the Law Continues to Fail Rape Victims”, in A 
Most Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays on Rape, ed. Keith Burgess-Jackson (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 245-66; Emine Saner, “Taking a beating”, guardian.co.uk, March 9, 
2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/crime/article/0,,2029923,00.html (accessed 28 March, 
2007);L’Armand and Pepitone, 134-39; Fairstein, 132, 122-24, 258, 272-73; Goldberg-Ambrose, 173-
85; Shirley Feldman-Summers and K. Lindner, “Perceptions of Victims and Defendants in Criminal 
Assault Cases”, Criminal Justice and Behaviour 3 (1976): 135-50; Griffin, Rape: The Politics of 
Consciousness, 122-24; Feldman-Summers and Norris, 570-71; Jody Clay-Warner and Callie Harbin 
Burt, “Rape Reporting After Reforms: Have Times Really Changed?” Violence Against Women 11 
(2005): 154, 172; Lonsway and Fitzgerald, 154; Kennedy, 106-139.   
18 Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 75, 80-81, 85-88; and “Media Reporting”, 111-14; Korn and Efrat, 1056-
75. 
19 Madigan and Gamble, 82-90; Campbell and Raja, 261-75; Rebecca Campbell and D. Bybee, 
“Emergency Medical Services for Rape Victims: Detecting the Cracks in Service Delivery”, Women’s 
Health: Research on Gender, Behaviour and Policy 3 (1997): 75-101; Diana E.H. Russell, 225.   
20 Silverman, 141; Schwendinger and Schwendinger, “Rape Myths”, 22; Diana E.H. Russell, 226; 
Julie Campbell-Ruggard and Jami Van Ryswick, “Rape on Campus: Numbers Tell Less than Half the 
Story”, in Sex without Consent: Rape and Sexual Coercion in America, ed. Merril D. Smith (New 
York: New York University Press, 2001), 291; Griffin, Rape: The Politics of Consciousness, 97-98; 
Hong, 61.  
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have endured, through no fault of their own, the horror of rape.21  Furthermore, 
women who do speak out may quickly learn that breaking their silence about sexual 
violence comes at an enormous cost.  All too often, they risk facing the emotionally 
crippling and life-altering effects of social stigma, suspicion, and recrimination that 
may be heaped upon them by members of their community,22 not to mention the 
psychological trauma of self-blame,23 while their status as the victim of a violent 
criminal assault is all but overlooked.  Survivors’ narratives of suffering, their pain, 
terror, and humiliation endured both during the assault and in its aftermath, are 
therefore suppressed and denied an audience, both when these women attempt to 
share their rape experience and by virtue of their own fear of such sharing.  
The myth of victim precipitation and its concomitant subversion of women’s liberty 
are therefore nothing less than a scandalous reality, deeply engrained within 
patriarchal societies, which effectively silences the voices of rape survivors, subverts 
their status as victims of a horrifyingly brutal and life-destroying crime, and 
seriously compromises their access to any tangible form of justice.  In essence, it 
undermines the belief that women ought to have the same guaranteed self-
determination and freedom of expression that men enjoy within these societies, by 
essentially insisting on the curtailment of female behaviour within a set of seriously 
debilitating limitations and boundaries.24  
                                                
21 As Susan Estrich notes, victim precipitation is ‘precisely the sort of judgment that leads [rape 
victims] to remain silent’ (21). 
22 Diana E.H. Russell, 187; Burt, “Rape Myths”, 135; and “Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape”, 37; 
Scully and Marolla, “Rape and Vocabularies of Motive”, 305.  It is estimated that between 75-95% of 
women who have been raped never report their assault to the police, and one of the primary reasons 
for them not doing so is that they fear being held culpable for their assault by the criminal justice 
agencies (Kelly, Lovett, and Regan, 30-32).  
23 Thus, one survivor noted, ‘For years afterward I felt it was my fault.  I tried to figure out what had 
made him follow me.  Was it the clothes I was wearing or was it my walk?  It had to be my fault, you 
see?’  [original italics] (Brownmiller, 361-2).  As Andrea Medea and Kathleen Thompson assert, ‘To 
be raped is to be guilty, in one’s own eyes as well as in everyone else’s’ (25).  Similar sentiments are 
expressed by Lebowitz and Roth, 365-66, 375-76, 385-86; also Calhoun and Townsley, 66; Ward, 
126-27; Koss, 1335; Diana E.H. Russell, 184, 273; Bevacqua, 61; Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 
“Rape Myths”, 32; Leslie, 108-9; Cahill, 121: Burt, “Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape”, 37; 
Williams and Holmes, 3; hooks, 89; Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 94; Madigan and Gamble, 107; Susan 
McKay, 108.  Research shows that a woman’s degree of self-blame for her rape is consistently 
associated with poor post-rape recovery, greater risk of depression, and lowered self-esteem.  See for 
example, C. Buf Meyer and Shelley E. Taylor, “Adjustment to Rape”, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 50 (1986): 1226-34; Ellen Dye and Susan Roth, “Psychotherapist’s Knowledge 
About and Attitudes toward Sexual Assault Victim Clients”, Psychology of Women Quarterly 14 
(1990):193. 
24 As Brownmiller stresses, ‘to accept a special burden of self-protection is to reinforce the concept 
that women must live and move about in fear and can never expect to achieve the personal freedom, 
independence and self-assurance of men’ (400).  See also Woodhull, 172; Rozee, “Rape Resistance”, 
268; Beatrix Schiele, “Violence and Justice”, in Fiorenza and Copeland, 31; Cahill, 121, 125; Lees, 
Carnal Knowledge, 113-14; Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime”, 55; Calhoun and Townsley, 
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Furthermore, this myth enables members of the rape victim’s community, such as 
the police officer quoted at the start of this chapter, to stigmatise and blame her for 
hostilities that she could neither have prevented nor foreseen, while allowing her 
rapist to retreat into the shadows, unscathed by recrimination or culpability and 
seldom having to bear the full weight of justice for his crime.25  Rather than 
suggesting that some rapes may be avoidable if women did not place themselves in a 
‘vulnerable position’, it surely makes more sense to suggest that all rapes could be 
prevented if men did not prey on these vulnerable women in the first place.  In other 
words, we have to begin challenging this myth of victim precipitation and stressing 
that it is men, rather than women, who ought to be made to face up to their 
responsibility to prevent sexual violence.  As Beneke stresses, ‘It is men who rape 
and men who collectively have the power to end rape … This will only begin to 
happen when men cease blaming women for rape’.26  Or, in the words of Nell 
McCafferty, a feminist campaigner, ‘Women are raped, not because they walk on 
certain streets at certain times, but because men walk on those streets’.27 
 
Victim Precipitation in Genesis 34: Exactly Who Blames Dinah for her Rape? 
Thus far, in this chapter, we have been discussing the insidious myth of victim 
precipitation, which insists upon holding victims of sexual violence, to some degree 
at least, culpable for their own assault.  When we turn now to consider Genesis 34, it 
would appear that this myth has had, and continues to have, a profound and 
enveloping influence upon the interpretive traditions surrounding the text.  Over the 
centuries, a great deal of exegetical ink has been spilled discussing ‘the peculiar 
initiative of Dinah sallying forth into foreign terrain’ at the very outset of the 
narrative.28  From the early exegetical elucidations of the rabbinic midrashim and the 
Christian Church fathers, right down to the present day, there are countless readings 
of Gen. 34.1, which appear to regard this opening statement as a deliberate 
                                                                                                                                    
57-58; Manazan, 47; Emilie Buchwald, “Raising Girls in the Twenty-First Century”, in Buchwald, 
Fletcher, and Roth, 219-20.   
25 Carine M. Mardrossian, “Toward a New Feminist Theory of Rape”, Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society 27 (2002): 758; Naomi Wolf, “Take the shame out of rape”, guardian.co.uk, 
November 25, 2005,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/crime/article/0,,1650583.html (accessed 28 March 
2007); Calhoun and Townsley, 67; Rozee, “Stranger Rape”, 98; Bohmer, “Rape and the Law”, 251, 
255; Gavey, 22; Lees, Carnal Knowledge, 199-200. 
26 Beneke, 169-70. 
27 Susan McKay, 5.  Similar sentiments are expressed by Spencer, 58; Mardrossian, 758. 
28 Carmichael, Women, Law and the Genesis Traditions, 36. 
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disclosure by the narrator that, in ‘going out’ ()cy) to look upon the indigenous 
women of Shechem, Dinah became the ‘architect of her own misfortune’.29  Time 
and again, her solo excursion has been overlaid with pejorative overtones of sexual 
and social impropriety, while Dinah herself stands accused of playing a precipitating 
role in Shechem’s act of sexual violence.   
In light of this dominant reading of Dinah’s behaviour in Gen. 34.1, a number of 
feminist biblical scholars have understandably wasted no time in taking the biblical 
narrator to task for his apparent endorsement of this patriarchal myth of victim 
precipitation.30  I would however contend that there are a number of features of this 
opening verse, which cause me to hesitate before joining in such a chorus of 
disapproval directed towards its ancient author.  As several interpreters have indeed 
noted, Dinah’s desire to seek female company among the Canaanite women does, on 
first reading, seem to be somewhat innocuous and free from authorial censure; any 
explicitly condemnatory narratorial judgments of her behaviour are decidedly absent 
from the text.31  Her actions are not described as rebellious or improper, nor do the 
other characters in the story rebuke her or even pass comment upon the 
appropriateness of her outing.  If anything, her departure, the first and last 
autonomous action she takes within this narrative, has the appearance of a distinctly 
harmless act, devoid of any pejorative content (sexual or otherwise), and is 
furthermore contextualised within the strictly gendered space of female 
companionship.  The daughter of Leah and Jacob, it is stressed, went out to make the 
acquaintance of the daughters of the land (Cr)h twnbb tw)rl).  Why then do the 
dominant interpretive traditions of this opening verse repeatedly read this statement 
as a deliberate declaration by the narrator that this young woman’s behaviour was 
the precipitating factor underlying her sexual assault?  
In order to answer this question, it will be helpful to take a closer look at the 
interpretive traditions surrounding Genesis 34, which insist upon attributing to 
Dinah at least some of the responsibility for the rape event.  These interpretations 
will then be tested against the textual evidence of both the Genesis 34 narrative and, 
                                                
29 Davies, 56.  Joy Schroeder provides an in-depth historical review of early interpretation of Gen. 
34.1, from the writings of Josephus and the church fathers through to Martin Luther and John Calvin 
(775-91).   
30 Brenner, Intercourse of Knowledge, 170; Davies, 56-57; Fuchs, Sexual Politics, 207, 210; 
Rashkow, “Daughters and Fathers”, 23; Thistlethwaite, 70; Graetz, “Dinah the Daughter”, 312. 
31 Thus, for example, H.C. Leupold states, ‘It is useless to speculate whether mere idle curiosity 
prompted [Dinah], or whether she went out without consulting her parents, or whether she even went 
forth contrary to their wishes.  We are unable to determine to what extent she was at fault, if at all’ 
[emphasis added] (897-98).  Similar sentiments are expressed by Cotter, 254.   
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where appropriate, the wider context of the Hebrew biblical canon.  I am keen to 
find out where this dominant convention of blaming Dinah for her rape is rooted; is 
it from within the narrative itself, is it perhaps based upon other textual 
considerations outwith Genesis, or does it originate solely from within some other 
extra-biblical source, a source that is generally unacknowledged or unrecognised by 
these interpreters?  More specifically, are biblical exegetes, who insist upon 
contextualising this verse within a framework of victim precipitation, perhaps 
influenced less by the textual evidence than by the sexual stereotypes and rape 
myths prevalent within their own culture?  Have they perhaps read an implicit 
authorial criticism of Dinah in Gen. 34.1, not because the author himself alluded to 
this in his writing, but because they have allowed, wittingly or unwittingly, 
contemporary rhetoric regarding rape, which pervades their socio-cultural milieus 
and cognitive schemata, to colour their perceptions of the text?  
 
‘She Asked For It’: Interpretations of Dinah’s Behaviour in Gen. 34.1  
When we first cast our eye over the interpretive traditions surrounding Gen. 34.1, it 
becomes apparent that biblical interpreters who read the opening verse of this 
narrative as a deliberate imputation of blame upon Dinah for her rape tend to 
rationalise both the source and the extent of this woman’s accountability in two 
subtly different ways, both of which reflect a rationale rooted in the myth of victim 
precipitation.  While some contend that she was raped because she behaved in a 
manner that was overtly promiscuous, others argue instead that she ought to bear 
responsibility for her sexual assault by virtue of her eschewal of social protocol and 
reckless lack of judgement.  Both of these singularly unfavourable evaluations of 
Dinah’s character and behaviour will now be discussed in more detail. 
 
‘The lady is a tramp’: was Dinah behaving promiscuously? 
For many biblical interpreters, ancient and contemporary, Dinah’s presentation 
within the text of Genesis 34 is that of a woman who has contravened the traditional 
cultural expectations of female chastity and sexual passivity, by acting in an 
explicitly wanton and sexually provocative manner.  She ‘went out’, they argue, less 
to meet her female Canaanite peers than with the express purpose of seeking a 
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sexual encounter with a local male.  These interpreters therefore propose that 
Dinah’s rape is intended to be read as a fitting and inevitable conclusion to her 
promiscuous and sexually motivated actions.  Just as women within contemporary 
patriarchal societies are commonly judged by others to have ‘deserved’ their rape if, 
prior to the attack, they are deemed to have behaved in a promiscuous manner, so 
too is Dinah’s behaviour contextualised as overtly wanton in its orientation, thereby 
inevitably provoking Shechem’s aggressively sexual reaction.  Such a reading does 
not necessarily preclude the belief that Dinah was raped; however, it does infer that 
she ‘led him on’, by acting in a manner, which would have sent Shechem an 
unambiguous signal that she was receptive to his sexual advances, even if she had no 
intention of submitting to her sexual desires at that particular moment in time.32 
This interpretation of Dinah’s behaviour, for example, is voiced uncompromisingly 
throughout the c. 4th Century CE rabbinical text Genesis Rabbah 80.  This midrash 
on Genesis 34 holds Dinah culpable, not simply of an unconventional and imprudent 
need to venture out alone, but of wanton promiscuity and a desire to be seen, less by 
the ‘daughters of the land’ than by the local Hivite men.  Thus, Genesis Rabbah 80.1 
reads:  
Behold everyone that useth proverbs shall use this proverb against thee, saying: As 
the mother, so her daughter (Ezek. XVI.44) … a cow does not gore unless her calf 
kicks; a woman is not immoral unless her daughter is immoral …  because it says, 
‘And Leah went out to meet him’ (Gen. XXX.16), which means that she went out to 
meet him adorned like a harlot; therefore and Dinah the daughter of Leah went out 
[original italics].33 
Clearly, the implication within these midrashic traditions is that, like Leah, who 
went out ()cy) to meet Jacob for the express purpose of having sexual intercourse 
with him (Gen. 30.16), so too does Dinah follow her mother’s footsteps by going out 
()cy), not to visit the local indigenous women, but rather to initiate contact with a 
potential sexual partner.34  This is likewise emphasised elsewhere in Genesis 
Rabbah, where Dinah is repeatedly referred to as a ‘gadabout’ (tyn)cwy), who 
compromised her sexual integrity by provocatively exposing herself to the dangers 
lurking in the outside world and who should therefore be held culpable for her own 
                                                
32 To use common parlance, the undeniable inference from this line of reasoning is that Dinah was 
behaving in the manner of a ‘prick-tease’.  
33 All translations of Genesis Rabbah are from H. Freedman and Maurice Simon, Midrash Rabbah: 
Genesis II (London; Soncino Press, 1939), 735-36. 
34 Bronner, From Eve to Esther, 120. 
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rape.35  The message here is obvious; a woman who defied the traditional regime of 
modesty expected of her within her culture by ‘going out’ alone and displaying 
herself before sexually rapacious young men clearly ‘got what she asked for’.36  
Dinah’s sexual assault at Shechem’s hands is thus considered less a crime against 
her, than a punishment for her promiscuous and inappropriate behaviour.37 
In a similar vein, Midrash Tanhuma, the collection of Pentateuchal halakhot and 
haggadot, believed to predate Genesis Rabbah, equates Dinah’s excursion into 
foreign territory with her explicit desire to have a clandestine sexual adventure; she 
did not go out so much ‘to see’ the women of the land than ‘to be seen’ by the young 
male Hivites: 
If [a woman] walks about a lot and goes out into the market place, she finally 
comes to a state of corruption, to a state of harlotry.  And so you find in the case of 
Jacob’s daughter Dinah.  All the time that she was sitting at home, she was not 
corrupted by transgression, but, as soon as she went out into the market place, she 
caused herself to come to the point of corruption … in every place the female child 
is accompanied by males, but here she is accompanied by her mother.  Thus the 
corruption began with her mother … ‘To see’ [implies] ‘to be seen’.  To what is 
this matter comparable?  To one who was walking in the market place with a piece 
[of meat] in his hand.  A dog, having seen it, went after it, and snatched it from 
him.  Thus did Dinah go out ‘to see’ when Shechem saw her and seized her’.38 
                                                
35 Genesis Rabbah 18.2; 45.5; 80.5.  Furthermore, in 80.12, the accusation of Dinah’s brothers, that 
Shechem treated their sister like a harlot (Gen. 34.31), is again attributed to her ‘going out’.  See 
Bronner, From Eve to Esther, 119-20, 138, n.28. 
36 Bronner, From Eve to Esther, 119-20, 138, n.28; Salkin, 285; Jacob Neusner, Genesis Rabbah.  The 
Judaic Commentary to the Book of Genesis: A New American Translation (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1985), 2:146. 
37 These particularly condemnatory remarks made against Dinah in Genesis Rabbah 80.1, 
interestingly enough, are tempered somewhat elsewhere in the rabbinic midrashim.  For example, in 
Genesis Rabbah 79.8, 80.4, and Leviticus Rabbah 37.1, the rabbinic authors ascribe some of the 
blame for Dinah’s rape to Jacob, suggesting that it was, at least in part, the indirect result of various 
wrongdoings of his own.  Elsewhere in the midrashim, rabbinic opinion of Jacob’s daughter similarly 
appears to soften, as various destinies for her are suggested, to compensate, perhaps, for her 
precipitate disappearance from the Genesis narrative after chapter 34.  Thus, in Genesis Rabbah 80.4, 
it is suggested that she married Job; in 80.11, it is her brother Simeon who weds his defiled, 
unmarriageable sister.  Furthermore, she is attributed with bearing children – fourteen sons and six 
daughters by Job, according to Targum Job (2.9) and, in Genesis Rabbah, a son Saul, by her brother 
Simeon (Genesis Rabbah 57.4; 80.11).  However, none of these midrashic additions to the text 
detracts from the fact that, within these traditions, Dinah’s journey out into Hivite territory is 
repeatedly cited as the cause of her sexual assault.  As Leila Leah Bronner notes, ‘despite some 
aggadic efforts to sweeten her life, Dinah bears most of the midrashic blame for her violation.  Very 
often when her name came up, it would elicit a sneering “because Dinah went out”’ (From Eve to 
Esther, 121).  See also Cotter, 253. 
38 Translation by John T. Townsend, Genesis, vol.1 of Midrash Tanhuma: Translation into English 
with Introduction, Indices, and Brief Notes (S. Buber Recension) (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing 
House, 1989), 216-19.  Similar sentiments are expressed in Genesis Rabbah 80.5: ‘And Dinah the 
daughter of Leah went out … This may be compared to one who was holding a pound of meat in his 
hand, and as soon as he exposed it a bird swooped down and snatched it away.  Similarly, and Dinah 
the daughter of Leah went out, and forthwith, and Shechem the son of Hamor saw her’. 
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Thus again, as in Genesis Rabbah, Dinah’s actions are construed as having been 
driven by her desire to meet local men; her subsequent rape is thereby regarded as 
the ‘inevitable’ result of her ‘displaying’ herself in a sexually provocative manner.  
Just as someone who is carrying a piece of meat in his hand cannot be surprised if a 
passing dog sees it and snatches it from him, so Dinah, and likewise the reader, 
should not have been taken aback when her promiscuous flaunting led her into an 
aggressive sexual situation.  This censorious attitude towards Dinah’s behaviour is 
similarly echoed in Ecclesiastes Rabbah 10.8: ‘And whoso breaketh through a fence, 
a serpent shall bite him: i.e. Dinah.  While her father and brothers were sitting in the 
House of Study, She went out to see the daughters of the land (Gen. XXXIV, 1).  She 
brought upon herself the violation by Shechem the son of Hamor the Hivite’ 
[original italics].39  Like the person with the proverbial piece of meat in his hand, a 
woman who acts in a manner that eschews the traditional expectations for female 
sexuality can expect to get ‘bitten’ by some unpleasant consequences.  
However, these early Jewish midrashim are by no means a lone voice within biblical 
scholarship, as regards this particular reading of Gen. 34.1.  Continuing the tradition 
of attributing liability to Dinah for her own rape, some contemporary scholars have 
likewise joined in this centuries-old chorus of disapproval against Jacob’s daughter.  
Thus, Nehama Aschkenasy echoes the sentiments put forward in Genesis Rabbah, 
suggesting that, like her mother Leah, Dinah’s act of ‘going out’ betrayed her 
predilection towards predatory sexual behaviour and promiscuity.40  Leah ‘went 
out’, after taking the unusual step for an Israelite woman of initiating a night of 
sexual intercourse with her husband; the reader, argues Ashkenasy, ought therefore 
take it for granted that her daughter Dinah likewise ventured forth ‘with the sexual 
intention of luring a man’.41  While conceding that the biblical text offers no clues as 
to Dinah’s actual motives for going out, she concludes that ‘if we apply the simple 
laws of nature and, in this particular case, the genetic factors as well, then we may 
safely propose that natural sexual curiosity did play a role in Dinah’s action’.42   
In a similar vein to Aschkenasy, Ita Sheres likewise imbues Dinah’s behaviour with 
a distinctly sexual flavour, suggesting that her sojourn was motivated primarily by 
                                                
39 Translation from H. Freedman and Maurice Simon, eds. Midrash Rabbah: Ecclesiastes (London: 
Soncino Press, 1939), 268-69. 





her desire to find a mate.43  According to Sheres, Dinah, who ought to have 
consulted her male kin before making her journey, went out ‘explicitly or implicitly, 
in order to be seduced’.44  To substantiate her argument, she compares Dinah with 
Rebekah and Rachel, whose own marriages were arranged after they had been seen 
outside the family home while performing a domestic duty, in Rachel’s case, by her 
prospective husband Jacob (Gen. 29), and in Rebekah’s case, by Abraham’s servant, 
who was scouting for a wife for Isaac (Gen. 24).45  Referring to Gen. 24, 29, and 34 
as ‘courtship narratives’, Sheres thus surmises that Dinah could conceivably have 
been inspired by the, albeit unintentional, connubial success that her female relatives 
had enjoyed and had thus gone out herself ‘in search of a future husband’.46  
However, in comparison to Rebekah and Rachel, Dinah’s journey would have 
inevitably been frowned upon by the narrator, for unlike her two relatives, Dinah did 
not go out initially to perform a household task or duty, but rather, she left the family 
home with a specifically sexual agenda, thereby flouting the strict social protocol 
that demanded an unmarried woman safeguard her virginity until she was wed.47   
Thus, according to Sheres, Dinah’s behaviour in this narrative is, from the outset, 
tainted with the suggestion of sexual impropriety and moral wrongdoing.  
Furthermore, she argues that the author’s apparent ‘reticence’ in v.1 about Dinah’s 
actual motivations for going out likewise implies that they ought to be understood as 
wrong and shameful in their inception, and therefore only serving to accentuate her 
guilt.  She thus concludes, ‘the very fact that vague phrases with almost cryptic 
significance are used leads to suspicion and a speculation that the very activity the 
woman was involved in was probably wrong’.48  In effect then, Dinah is, in Sheres’ 
eyes, presented by the narrator as a woman whose sinful rebellion against the 
patriarchal authority of her father’s household is swiftly and brutally punished 
through the medium of sexual violence.49  Her sexually flavoured motives for 
venturing out mark her as a ‘worthless woman’ within this text, and furthermore, 
according to Sheres, as a woman who is essentially ‘looking to be raped’.50  Sheres’ 
                                                
43 Sheres, 50, 83.  Similar sentiments are expressed by Wenham, who suggests that the author’s use of 
)cy within this particular context ‘may suggest Dinah’s imprudence, if not impropriety’; he thus 
concludes that, even if her actions appeared innocuous, ‘her motives may have been suspect’ 
(Genesis 16-50, 310). 
44 Sheres, 50. 
45 Ibid., 59.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 72. 
49 Ibid., 48. 
50 Ibid., 87.  
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conclusions are likewise echoed by G.C. Aalders, who writes, ‘It was disturbing that 
Dinah would so flippantly expose herself to the men of this pagan city …[she] was 
far more at fault for what happened than anyone else in the city of Shechem’.51  In 
other words, by going out, Dinah was deliberately defying cultural expectations of 
female chastity by soliciting male sexual attention and thus, when she received this 
attention, albeit in a particularly brutal form, she effectively got what she deserved. 
 
 ‘She ought to have known better’: was Dinah’s poor judgement her downfall? 
In comparison to the readings of Gen. 34.1 proposed above, not all interpreters are 
as completely convinced that Dinah’s solo journey was sexually motivated.  Instead, 
they are willing to concede that her reasons for going out may have been fuelled less 
by an explicit desire to search for a sexual companion than simply a need to make 
friends, seek out female company, or satisfy her curiosity about the Canaanite 
women living nearby.  Nevertheless, this is not to say that these scholars exonerate 
Dinah of all sense of blame or responsibility for her sexual assault.  Rather, they 
propose that, while Dinah’s excursion was not motivated by sexual desire, her 
behaviour was nevertheless inappropriate and imprudent because it contravened 
another cultural sex-role stereotype, which, they aver, governed appropriate female 
behaviour in the patriarchal culture of biblical Israel.  As a young unmarried woman, 
Dinah would not have been expected to go out by herself, particularly without a 
specific domestic duty to perform, because the ‘outside world’ was replete with 
sexual dangers for women, and to venture into this world would inevitably render 
them hopelessly exposed to the unwanted attentions of the local male population.52  
By travelling forth alone, even for a purpose that was entirely innocent and chaste in 
its inception, Dinah was therefore acting with undue caution, endangering her sexual 
integrity by exposing herself, albeit unwittingly, to the threat of sexual assault.  
Thus, any sympathy the reader may feel inclined to bestow upon Dinah becomes 
quickly tempered by the realisation and recognition of her own blameworthiness.  
Just as women within contemporary cultures are almost certain to face accusations 
of irresponsibility and carelessness if they are raped after walking home late at night 
by themselves, or after venturing into an unsavoury part of town, so too is Dinah 
                                                
51 G.C. Aalders, Genesis, trans. J. Vriend (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981), 2:154, 159. 
52 Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 46-48; Rashkow, “Daughters and Fathers”, 23-24; Wenham, 
Genesis 16-50, 310; Frymer-Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible, 181; Victor H. Matthews, 
Judges and Ruth, 71; Pitt-Rivers, 156. 
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charged with showing an inappropriate and untraditional carelessness towards her 
own sexual safety.  To put it bluntly, these interpreters claim that she ought to have 
known better.     
Thus, appearing to appeal to the logic of this argument, Nehama Aschkenasy reads 
Gen. 34.1 as an implicit indictment of Dinah’s unconventional actions.  For it is 
these actions, she posits, which almost inevitably led to her sexual assault, not to 
mention the subsequent disastrous repercussions that this event had for the entire 
Jacobite group: 
[I]f a woman leaves the protection of the patriarchal roof, she can expect to 
be molested.  Therefore, venturing out of the family protection is tantamount 
to “asking for it”; the woman should not be surprised at the violent 
consequences of her irresponsibility … If she dares expose herself to danger 
she will bring disaster not only on herself and her violator, but also on the 
entire community.53 
Continuing this line of thought, a number of scholars have likewise suggested that 
Dinah’s unexpected outing was, within the patriarchal cultural milieu of biblical 
Israel, both inappropriate and unconventional.  Thus, according to Naomi Graetz, 
‘One can read into Dinah’s behaviour a desire for freedom or self-fulfilment that is 
alien to the time and threatening to the patriarchal structure of biblical society’.54  
Acting on her own initiative, Jacob’s daughter appears to have been reaching out to 
beyond the confines of her family, eschewing a secluded existence within her own 
community and attempting to exert her autonomy and self-will.55  Such a naïve 
desire for freedom, however, had dangerous implications; as Leon Kass notes, 
Dinah, wandering alone into the city – ‘never – not even today – a safe place for an 
innocent, attractive, unprotected, and vulnerable young woman’56 – was bound to be 
                                                
53 Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 57.  As mentioned above, Aschkenasy also attributes a more 
deliberate sense of promiscuity to Dinah’s behaviour, suggesting that, like her mother, Dinah went out 
looking for a specifically sexual adventure (ibid., 51).  However, she also raises the point here that 
Dinah’s very act of leaving the family home was, regardless of her intentions, both unorthodox and 
imprudent by virtue of the fact that it rendered her vulnerable to sexual assault.  Thus, however one 
might construe Dinah’s actual motivations for ‘going out’, Aschkenasy appears to advocate laying a 
significant degree of culpability for the rape event firmly upon her shoulders.   
54 Graetz, “Dinah the Daughter”, 312.  In a similar fashion, Ilona Rashkow proposes that Genesis 34 
is a narrative detailing ‘a daughter’s transgression against and departure from the closure of her 
father’s house.  The text in effect becomes a code for what is subliminally the father’s story of the 
sins of the daughter’ (“Daughters and Fathers”, 23-24). 
55 Frymer-Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible, 180; Graetz, “Dinah the Daughter”, 312.  In a 
similar light, Gerhard von Rad notes that by going out, Dinah ‘stepped outside the small circle 
allotted to the life of the ancient Israelite woman’, and in so doing, ‘she thus loosened the stone which 
became a landslide’ (Genesis, 331). 
56 Kass appears here to be relying on the popular cultural myth that only young, sexually attractive 
women are victims of rape.  Such a belief, however, rests on the misidentification of rape as a natural 
outcome of sexual desire, rather than an act fuelled by anger, misogyny and contempt.  Rapists do not 
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the recipient of unwanted sexual dangers lurking in the outside world.57  For these 
scholars therefore, Dinah may not have deliberately set out in search of a clandestine 
sexual encounter, nor was she necessarily aware of the nature of the risk that she 
was taking.  Nonetheless, her naïve eschewal of social protocol led her into a very 
dangerous and foolhardy venture, for which she paid dearly.58  As Parry notes, ‘The 
only action for which she is responsible is her own ‘going out’ and the only blame is 
any that may attach to her lack of wisdom’.59  In other words, while Dinah’s actions 
are regarded as in no way sexually motivated, there is, however, still the suggestion 
that the cause of the rape event is sourced within a particular aspect of this young 
woman’s own character and behaviour.  Such a conceptualisation of Dinah’s 




                                                                                                                                    
only target young, sexually attractive women; females of any age, from infants to nonagenarians, alas, 
can become victims of sexual violence.  It is the victim’s gender, not her physical appearance, which 
renders her especially vulnerable to this crime.  See Rozee, “Rape Resistance”, 267; Dianne Herman, 
45, 51; Diana E.H. Russell, 265; Fairstein, 136, 173; Ward, 29; Beneke, 9, 11; Scully and Marolla, 
“Rape and Vocabularies of Motive”, 298; Groth, 12-15, 25-28; Luginbuhl and Mullin, 557; 
Bevacqua, 60-61; Stenzel, 91; Cahill, 123-24; Medea and Thompson, 31, 45. 
57 Kass, Beginning of Wisdom, 479; Parry, Old Testament Story, 231-32; Frymer-Kensky, Reading the 
Women of the Bible, 180; Graetz, “Dinah the Daughter”, 306-12.  In a similar vein, Nahum Sarna 
suggests that the narrator of Gen. 34 ‘casts a critical eye upon Dinah’s unconventional behaviour’, 
because ‘girls of a marriageable age would not normally leave a rural encampment to go 
unchaperoned into an alien city’ (233).  This contemporary approach to Dinah’s outing is likewise 
reflected in the works of earlier interpreters.  Thus, for example, John Calvin notes that ‘Dinah is 
ravished, because, having left her father’s house, she wandered about more freely than was proper’.  
For Calvin, Dinah’s rape is therefore nothing less than a punishment for her eschewal of societal 
protocol, which expected her to maintain her virtue by remaining ‘under her mother’s eyes in the 
tent’.  In Commentaries on the First Book of Moses Called Genesis, trans. John King (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1948), 2:218.  Similar sentiments are also expressed in the writings of some 19th Century 
female biblical scholars.  Thus, for example, Sarah Trimmer (1741-1810) wrote, “The shocking thing 
related in this chapter shows that it is dangerous for young women to go about by themselves, and 
make acquaintances with strangers’, while Mary Cornwallis (1758-1836) noted that ‘[Dinah’s] 
misfortune is not without instruction, and teaches young women the necessity of circumspection in 
the choice of companion, as well as the danger of giving way to indiscreet curiosity’.  See Sarah 
Trimmer, A Help to the Unlearned in the Study of the Holy Scriptures (London: F.C. & J. Rivington, 
1805), 35; Mary Cornwallis, Observations, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical on the Canonical 
Scriptures (London: Baldwin, Craddock and Joy, 1820), 80-81.  Both texts are cited in Let Her Speak 
for Herself: Nineteenth-Century Women Writing on the Women of Genesis, ed. Marion Ann Taylor 
and Heather E. Weir (Waco, TA: Baylor University Press, 2006), 425-26. 
58 Kass claims not to blame Dinah for her assault, yet, at the same time, he likens Dinah to Eve, 
another woman who ‘is curious and who finds “outside” matters attractive’ (Beginning of Wisdom, 
478).  Given that Eve’s curiosity led to a fateful act of disobedience against YHWH, I find this 
comparison suggestive that Kass’s insistence on Dinah’s innocence is perhaps more double-edged or 
ambiguous than he would care to admit.   
59 Parry, Old Testament Story, 231-32.   
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The sexual significance of )cy: cognate evidence 
One feature that appears central to all of the above readings of Gen. 34.1, which 
impute some degree of blame upon Dinah for her sexual violation, is the supposition 
that the verb )cy used here to depict Dinah’s journeying forth, may carry implicit 
connotations of sexual impropriety in biblical Hebrew when it takes a feminine 
subject.60  Thus, many interpreters believe that, by deliberately choosing this verb to 
denote Dinah’s movements, the narrator is indeed inferring that she acted, either 
wittingly or unwittingly, in an inappropriate manner.61  Whether they accuse her of 
intentionally seductive behaviour or simply imprudent incaution, these interpreters 
consider that her act of going out presented her, in Shechem’s eyes at least, as a 
woman who was sexually available.  To substantiate this claim, a number of scholars 
have appealed to Akkadian and Aramaic cognate evidence, which they argue 
demonstrates that the specific use of )cy with a feminine subject may at times imbue 
the woman’s actions with a strong sense of social or sexual impropriety.   
Thus, for example, both Wenham and Frymer-Kensky note that the term wa4s[iat 
(‘gadabout’) from the cognate Akkadian verb was[u4, a cognate of the Hebrew )cy, is 
used in the legal text, the Laws of Hammurabi 141, to describe a wife who behaves 
inappropriately towards her husband.62  When a woman goes to a local court seeking 
a divorce from her husband, if the court decides that she has been a chaste and loyal 
wife to a good-for-nothing husband, they will grant her a divorce and order her 
husband to giver her back her dowry.  On the other hand, if it is discovered that she 
has been a wa4s[iat, or ‘gadabout’, she is denied her divorce and is instead thrown in 
the river.63  Furthermore, Frymer-Kensky points out that the Akkadian noun 
wa4s[itum (literally, ‘one who goes out’), which is also derived from the root was[u4, is 
used in an Old Babylonian word list to designate a h}arimtu, a ‘wayward woman’ or 
prostitute.64   
Continuing his appeal to cognate evidence, Wenham also turns to the equivalent 
forms of )cy in Aramaic, citing the Targums, which at times translate the Hebrew 
for ‘prostitute’ (hnwz) using the root qpn  to give the literal sense of ‘one who goes 
                                                
60 Davies, 78, n.2. 
61 Graetz, “Dinah the Daughter”, 312; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 310; Davies, 78, n.2; Frymer-Kensky, 
“Virginity in the Bible”, 86; Aschkenasy, Eve’s Journey, 125. 
62 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 310; Frymer-Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible, 181. 
63 Frymer-Kensky, Reading the Women of the Bible, 181. 
64 Ibid.; and “Virginity in the Bible”, 86; also see Black, George, and Postgate, 435; Sarna, 233. 
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outside’ (hrb tqpn or simply )qpn).65  Indeed, in Gen. 34.31, when Dinah’s brothers 
ask, ‘Should he treat our sister like a prostitute?’ the Targums represent the Hebrew 
term hnwz with hrb tqpn.  Interestingly, in v.1, the same verbal root, qpn, is used to 
translate )cy; Dinah ‘went out’ (tqpnw), only to be later likened to ‘one who goes 
out’ (hrb tqpn), in a strictly pejorative sense, by her brothers.66  According to 
Nahum Sarna, this particular meaning attributed to the Aramaic cognate of )cy, as 
well as its Akkadian equivalent, certainly appears to suggest that the Hebrew verb 
was fraught with sexual innuendo, denoting ‘coquettish or promiscuous conduct’.67  
He thus concludes, ‘The text casts a critical eye upon Dinah’s unconventional 
behaviour through the use of the verbal stem y-ts-’, “to go out”’.68  Indeed, as 
discussed above, the rabbinic tradition of Genesis Rabbah 80 explicitly attributes the 
same nuances of ‘whorish’ behaviour to the Hebrew )cy as these cognate terms, by 
referring to Dinah as a tyn)cwy or ‘gadabout’, which, according to Frymer-Kensky, 
is the Hebrew equivalent not only of hrb tqpn but also of the Akkadian wa4s[itum.69  
Moreover, she notes that the Yiddish word napqah, derived from the root qpn, the 
Aramaic cognate of )cy, is a common contemporary expression for ‘prostitute’, 
bearing the same meaning as the English term ‘streetwalker’.70  This in turn leads 
her to infer that, within the biblical traditions, a woman’s presence outwith the 
household for no explicit domestic purpose was indicative of her sexual availability 
and receptivity, whether or not this was intentional on the part of the woman.71  As 
she notes, ‘one who left the house without a specific chore was viewed with 
suspicion and condemnation’.72   
Taken together, this linguistic evidence is enough for Wenham, Sarna and Frymer-
Kensky to conclude that, like its cognate equivalents, the verb )cy carries pejorative 
                                                
65 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, 310.  This translation of hnwz is found in the Aramaic Targums in Gen. 
34.31 (Targums Onqelos, Pseudo-Jonathan, Neofiti), Gen. 38.35 (Targum Onqelos), Deut. 23.18 
(Targum Pseudo-Jonathan), and 1 Kgs. 14.24 (Targums Onqelos, Pseudo-Jonathan, Neofiti).  See M. 
Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic 
Literature (New York: Pardes Publishing House, 1950), 1:188; 2:926. 
66 Bernard Grossfeld has likewise pointed out that the Mishnaic Hebrew term for ‘prostitute’ is t)cy 
Cwhh (lit. ‘one who goes out’), and that hrb tqpn is probably the Aramaic equivalent of this phrase.  
See B. Grossfeld, The Targum Onqelos to Genesis: Translated, With a Critical Introduction, 
Apparatus, and Notes (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 121, n.14.  
67 Sarna, 233.   
68 Ibid. 
69 Genesis Rabbah 80.5.  Likewise, Rashi, the medieval biblical exegete, also refers to Dinah as a 
‘gadabout’ (tyn)cwy) in his interpretation of Gen. 34.1.  See M. Rosenbaum and A. M. Silberman, 
Pentateuch with Rashi’s Commentary, (London: Shapiro, Valentine and Co., 1929), 164. 
70 Frymer-Kensky, “Virginity in the Bible”, 86; and Reading the Women of the Bible, 181.   




nuances of sexual impropriety when it is utilised by the narrator of Gen. 34 to depict 
Dinah’s behaviour.  At best, she is considered to have behaved unconventionally and 
incautiously, at worst, her actions take on an undeniably seductive nuance.  Within 
the cultural context that this verse is situated, “Dinah went out” is therefore not 
believed to be an innocuous statement.  As Frymer-Kensky concludes, it ‘carries a 
warning that something is going to happen.  And what happens is a father’s 
nightmare: Dinah, who went out to see the girls, is seen by a boy’.73   
 
Thus, to recap the discussion so far, it would appear that a significant number of 
biblical scholars have, over the centuries, read the statement r#) h)l tb hnyd )ctw 
Cr)h twnbb tw)rl bq(yl hdly in Gen. 34.1 as a deliberate admission by the 
narrator that Dinah’s behaviour was a contributory factor in her own rape.  On the 
one hand, some scholars have validated her culpability by virtue of what they 
perceive to be her sexually provocative behaviour; others, however, have attributed 
to her less a sense of promiscuity than one of naïveté and imprudence.  While these 
two readings of Dinah’s behaviour may have their differences, they do nevertheless 
share a common denominator: both ascribe to the contemporary cultural myth of 
victim precipitation.  Whatever her reasons for going out, be it her youthful 
inexperience, curiosity, or sexual impiety, these biblical interpreters consistently 
hold Dinah culpable for her sexual assault.  Neither she, nor the reader, should 
therefore be surprised by Shechem’s aggressive sexual response because, to put it 
bluntly, she was ‘asking for it’.   
 
In Defence of Dinah: Reviewing the Evidence 
At the start of this chapter, I noted the seemingly innocuous and innocent nature of 
Dinah’s excursion represented in Gen. 34.1; Dinah went out to visit some local 
Canaanite women – what is all the fuss about?  Furthermore, why is she treated in 
the dominant exegetical traditions, discussed above, as though she was either a 
wanton gadabout or a naïve and irresponsible fool?   
To answer these questions, let us now turn our attention to the textual evidence.  In 
particular, I wish to focus upon three issues: firstly, I will take a closer look at the 
                                                
73 Ibid.; and “Virginity in the Bible”, 87. 
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semantic significance of )cy, carrying out a comparative reading of other biblical 
texts, in order to assess whether this verbal form does indeed carry nuances of 
deliberate sexual impropriety and promiscuity when it occurs with a feminine 
subject.  Following this, I will consider the cognate evidence, put forward by 
Wenham, Sarna, and Frymer-Kensky, by which they proposed that, within certain 
contexts, )cy may connote sexually and socially inappropriate female behaviour.  
Finally, I will review the implications conveyed by women’s presence in the public 
sphere or ‘outside world’ of biblical Israel, both in Genesis and within the biblical 
canon, in order to ascertain whether such a presence was considered  dangerous or 
foolhardy for women, and whether cultural gender stereotypes did indeed insist that 
Israelite women were expected to stay at home.  These three analyses will I hope 
shed a little illumination on the particular semantic nuances implicit in the narrator’s 
assertion that Dinah ‘went out’ prior to her rape.  Does this statement really convey 
pejorative overtones of her recklessness, imprudence, or even promiscuity, as so 
many biblical interpreters over the centuries have averred?  
 
Women who ‘go out’: the semantic range of )cy in the Hebrew Bible 
Throughout the Hebrew biblical canon, the primary function of the verb )cy appears 
to be a very literal one, denoting the physical movement of a person from or to a 
specified location.74  Focussing particularly on its occurrences with a feminine 
subject, this verb continues predominantly to represent a dislocative meaning, 
thereby suggesting that a woman’s act of ‘going out’ does not necessarily carry any 
explicit nuances of sexual impropriety.  On the contrary, women go out for a variety 
of utterly non-sexual purposes: to travel or move around (2 Kgs 4.21, 37; 8.3; Ruth 
1.7), to work (Ruth 2.22; Song 1.8), to draw water at the well (Gen. 24.11, 13, 15, 
43, 45; 1 Sam. 9.11), to worship or celebrate (Exod. 15.20; Jdg. 21.21; 1 Sam. 18.6; 
Song 3.11), and to meet someone (Jdg. 4.18, 22; 11.34; 2 Sam. 6.20).  While these 
last three texts do describe a woman ‘going out’ to meet a man, the context in each 
                                                
74 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 422-23; H.D. Preuss, “)cy”, in Theological Dictionary of the Old 
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Green (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 6:227-8; Ernst Jenni, “)cy”, in Theological Lexicon of the Old 
Testament, ed. Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann, trans. Mark E. Biddle (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 1997), 2:562; E.H. Merrill, “)cy”, in New International Dictionary of Old Testament 
Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1997), 2:498.  It 
may also be used more specifically to represent the release or emancipation of female slaves (e.g. 




demands that this is not a sexually motivated manoeuvre.  Thus, in Jdg. 4.18, Jael, a 
Kenite woman, ‘goes out” ()ctw) of her tent to meet Sisera, an army commander of 
Israel’s enemy King Jabin of Hazor, who had fled to her dwelling from the battle 
where his troops had been defeated by the Israelite army (vv.12-16).  The invitation 
she extends to him to enter her tent is, however, motivated less by her sexual desire 
than by her intention of luring this man to his death.75  In v.22, meanwhile, she again 
‘goes out’ of her tent to meet Barak, a commander of the Israelite army, but again 
her intentions are far from sexual; she merely wishes to impart to him the good news 
about Sisera’s demise.76  Likewise, in Jdg. 11.34, Jephthah’s daughter comes out of 
the house to meet her father, so there are clearly no sexual connotations intended 
here, while 2 Sam. 6.20 speaks of Michal ‘going out’ to meet her husband David, 
but only in order to berate him for what was, in her eyes at least, his shameless 
dancing and vulgarity during the procession of the Ark of the Covenant into the City 
of David.  There is no suggestion whatsoever that she seeks a sexual encounter with 
this man whom she now despises (v.16). 
There are, however, a number of texts, in which a woman’s journey from her 
dwelling to the outside world has on occasion been interpreted as either implicating 
the woman in a sexually provocative act or, when read inter-textually with Gen. 
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suggesting that Jael’s initial act of going out of her tent could be interpreted as a deliberate sexual 
invitation to the army commander (Bavli Horayot 10b; Bavli Nazir 23b; Bavli Yebamot 103a-b).  
Nevertheless, this charge of sexual impropriety does not appear to have any basis in the biblical text.  
As a number of scholars have noted, Jael’s actions here seem to speak more of her hospitality or 
maternal compassion than her sexual desire.  She treats Sisera with what appears to be a respectful 
deference from the moment that she encounters him, addressing him as ‘my lord’ (v.18), reassuring 
him in an attempt to assuage his fears (v.18), and providing him with bedding and a milky drink 
(vv.18-19).  Moreover, Sisera, seems to play the part more of an exhausted soldier in dire need of 
sanctuary, rest and refreshment than a man tempted towards sexual adventure by the sudden 
appearance of this woman (vv.19-20).  Indeed, Jael’s depiction within this narrative is entirely 
positive, if not heroic; she acts with great daring and courage, using her wiles to bring down one of 
Israel’s greatest enemies.  Moreover, had she acted in a sexually immoral manner at all within this 
tale, it is unlikely that she would have been lauded by Deborah as ‘most blessed of women’ (Jdg. 
5.24).  See Leila Leah Bronner, “Valorised or Vilified?  The Women of Judges in Midrashic 
Sources”, in Brenner, A Feminist Companion to Judges, 87-89; Athalya Brenner, “A Triangle and a 
Rhombus in Narrative Structure: A Proposed Integrative Reading of Judges 4 and 5”, in Brenner, A 
Feminist Companion to Judges, 103; Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, 212-13; Ackerman, 90, 118; 
Block, 206; Yahira Amit,  The Book of Judges: The Art of Editing, trans. Jonathan Chapman (Leiden: 
Brill, 1998), 212-13; Victor H. Matthews, Judges, Ruth, 72; C.F. Burnley, The Book of Judges (New 
York: Ktav Publishing House, 1970), 92; Schneider, 75-81.  
76 It is worth noting that the phraseology used in v.22  is very similar to that in v.18; in both verses 
Jael goes out ()ctw) to greet (t)rql) a man, yet here in v.22, there is obviously no indication of 
sexual impropriety on Jael’s part – she is simply going out to intercept Barak to whom she has to 
impart some good news.  Thus, one might conclude from these linguistic similarities that on neither 
occasion is the reader intended to infer any sense of this woman’s sexual impropriety. 
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34.1, does suggest to some scholars that Dinah’s behaviour may indeed have been 
sexually motivated.  Let us now consider each of these texts in turn, assessing 
whether they do in fact imbue a woman’s act of ‘going out’ with a sense of sexual 
impropriety and therefore cast a seductive light upon Dinah’s journey. 
 
1. Gen. 24 – is Rebekah’s trip to the well a ‘courtship’ narrative? 
As mentioned above, Ita Sheres has suggested that, like her grandmother Rebekah, 
whose marriage to Isaac was initiated when she ‘went out’ ()cy) from her home, so 
too Dinah’s story might be read as a ‘courtship’ narrative, in which the young 
woman ‘goes out’ with the specific intent of seeking a prospective husband.77  
Furthermore, argues Sheres, by leaving the house to do something other than a 
household chore, Dinah ‘stepped out of the family line’ and was thus punished for 
her rebellion by being raped.78 
While Sheres’ inter-textual reading of Gen. 24 and 34 is both original and creative, a 
number of points ought to be raised, which may cast some doubts on the veracity of 
her interpretive conclusions.  Firstly, Sheres substantiates her argument by stating 
that Dinah’s motives for going out are left deliberately obtuse by the narrator, 
thereby depicting her excursion in a specifically clandestine and pejorative light.79  
This however, does not stand up under scrutiny.  The narrator states quite clearly 
why Dinah went out; she journeyed into Hivite territory to ‘make the acquaintance 
of the daughters of the land’ (Cr)h twnbb tw)rl).  According to Brown, Driver and 
Briggs, the b preposition prefixing the object of the infinitive tw)rl gives a literal 
translation ‘to look into’, which in this context, can be rendered ‘to look at (i.e. with 
interest)’, or ‘to look so as to become acquainted with’.80  Thus, Dinah went out, in 
all likelihood, to seek the companionship of other women, not an unreasonable or 
unexpected step for her to take, given that she was living in a predominantly male 
household.81     
                                                
77 Sheres, 59.  As discussed above, Sheres also describes Gen. 29 as a ‘courtship narrative’, where 
Rachel, who is out tending her father’s flock, likewise meets her future husband.  I have not included 
a discussion of this passage here as the verb )cy is not utilised within it to describe Rachel’s sojourn.  
However, all subsequent discussion of Sheres’ reading of Gen. 24 may equally apply to Gen. 29. 
78 Ibid., 87. 
79 Sheres, 72. 
80 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 908; Alter, 189.  
81 Van Seters, 242; Kass, Beginning of Wisdom, 478.  According to Carol Meyers, the phrase 
‘daughters of the land’ (Cr)h twnb)  probably refers to young Hivite women, who, like Dinah, are also 
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In addition, and contrary to the assertions made by both Sheres and Frymer-Kensky, 
the fact that Dinah did not go out to perform a specifically domestic chore does not 
necessarily mean that her behaviour was in any sense suspect.  As noted above, 
women go out for a variety of reasons, not all of them involving collecting water 
from the well, and they appear to do so without censure or disapproval.82  There is 
therefore nothing to suggest from this rather innocuous remark in v.1, that Dinah 
was acting in an inappropriate manner or, in particular, that her reasons for going out 
were sexually motivated. 
Furthermore, if one wished to read Gen. 24 and 34 inter-textually in order to 
evaluate the semantic nuances of Dinah’s act of ‘going out’, one could equally 
argue, contra Sheres, that Dinah’s behaviour here in v.1, like Rebekah’s in Ch.24, 
was entirely innocent and platonic in its inception.  Just as Rebekah went out to 
gather water, so too did Dinah venture forth for an equally non-sexual purpose.  
Moreover, like her grandmother before her, Dinah may have quite inadvertently 
found herself the object of male attention.  There appears to be no explicit or 
implicit suggestion in either text that these women’s motives for leaving the house 
were to look for a suitable mate; both Rebekah and Dinah were seen quite by 
chance, and the nature of their outing only then took on a sexual significance.  Had 
Dinah really gone out with the specific intent of finding herself a Canaanite partner, 
why did the author simply not state this, rather than couching the underlying 
rationale of her behaviour in such a decidedly platonic and inoffensive light?  
Surely, it is more likely that Dinah’s decision to leave the family home and venture 
into Hivite territory was motivated simply by her desire to search out female 
companionship among the local indigenous women. 
 
2. Genesis 30.16: like mother, like daughter? 
In Gen. 30.16, Leah ‘goes out’ to meet her husband Jacob for the express purpose of 
having sexual intercourse with him that night, in the hope that she may bear him 
another son (v.17).  As mentioned above, this is the verse on which both Nehama 
                                                                                                                                    
unmarried and living in their father’s household (“Gen 34.1, 9, 16, 21, 29: Daughters/Women of the 
Region; Daughters of the Jacob Group”, in Meyers, 182). 
82 See for example the traditions that depict women ‘going out’ to meet someone (Jdg. 4.18, 24; 
11.34; 2 Sam. 6.20), to take part in religious celebrations (Exod. 15.20; Jdg. 21.21), or for no other 
reason than to laud their monarch after a successful military campaign (1 Sam. 18.6) or on a 
commemorative occasion (Song 3.11). 
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Aschkenasy and the rabbinical authors of Genesis Rabbah based their allegations 
regarding Dinah’s promiscuity, claiming that, ‘like mother like daughter,’ Dinah too 
had gone out intentionally to orchestrate a sexual encounter.83   
However, on closer scrutiny, one could contend that the contextual milieus of Gen. 
31.16 and 34.1 are fundamentally distinct, and thus the use of the verb )cy in 30.16 
ought not to be read to infer a sense of sexual impropriety regarding Dinah’s act of 
‘going out’ in 34.1.  Dinah went out, as the narrator makes clear, specifically to 
make the acquaintance of the indigenous women of Shechem; unlike her mother, 
there is no suggestion at all within this statement that she was travelling forth for an 
explicitly sexual purpose.84  As discussed above, the verb )cy is utilised elsewhere 
within the biblical corpus with a feminine subject to denote women’s journeying 
outside in a number of utterly non-sexual scenarios.  It would therefore appear to be 
the context alone that determines whether a woman’s behaviour carries nuances of a 
sexual nature, rather than any etymological feature inherent to the verb form itself.85  
With regards Gen. 34.1, there is simply nothing in the text to suggest that Dinah’s 
outing was in any way sexually motivated. 
Furthermore, the rabbinical assumption of both the rabbinic authors of Genesis 
Rabbah 80.1 and scholars, such as Nehama Aschkenasy, that Leah was behaving in 
a sexually provocative or inappropriate manner in Gen. 30.16, is likewise 
questionable.86  Leah appears to have gone out in order to meet her husband, with 
whom she could legitimately have sexual relations; she was not seeking a 
clandestine encounter or hoping to flaunt herself before lustful local men.87  As the 
rabbinical authors of Genesis Rabbah 72.5 themselves admit, Leah’s sole motivation 
for seeking sexual relations with her husband was to perpetuate the next generation 
of God’s chosen people (Gen. 30.17).  In other words, her desire was driven by a 
                                                
83 Genesis Rabbah 80.1; Aschkenasy, Woman at the Window, 51. 
84 Parry makes a similar observation in Old Testament Story, 230. 
85 Ibid.; and “Feminist Hermeneutics”, 13. 
86 Genesis Rabbah 80.1 states that Leah went out to meet Jacob ‘all made up … just like a whore’.  In 
a similar vein, Aschkenasy offers confirmation of Leah’s ‘sexual aggression’, by noting, not only her 
trading of mandrakes with Rachel for an ‘extra night’ with Jacob, but also for her ‘initial pursuit and 
entrapment’ of him, referring, it appears, to their duplicitous marriage, which was arranged by her 
father Laban in Gen. 29.1-30 (Woman at the Window, 51).  However, the biblical text yields no 
evidence of any such motives on Leah’s part, with regards her connubial aspirations.  There is no 
suggestion that she had any part to play in the deceitful plan that saw her married off to Jacob, nor 
does the narrator of this passage make any mention of her desire to wed this man, who was so in love 
with her beautiful sister Rachel.  Ashkenasy’s suppositions, regarding Leah’s extroverted sexuality 
cannot therefore be substantiated by the textual evidence. 
87 Parry, Old Testament Story, 230.  
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yearning to give Jacob another heir, not by her own need for sexual satisfaction.88  
The rabbinic assertion that she went out ‘all made up … just like a whore’ in 
Genesis Rabbah 80.1 likewise has no textual basis at all.  Rather, it would appear 
that the verb )cy here in v.16 is most likely used, as it is in Gen. 34.1, in its 
dislocative sense, simply as a prerequisite to Leah meeting Jacob and making her 
sexual proposal to him.89  Consequently, the negative associations between mother 
and daughter suggested within these midrashic interpretive traditions, as well as the 
conclusions reached by Aschkenasy, appear to be utterly unfounded and ought not to 
be read as lending support to the supposition that the use of )cy in Gen. 34.1 
conveys any sense of sexual impropriety on Dinah’s part.90  It may well be that 
rabbinical midrashists of Gen. 34.1, driven by their propensity to explain biblical 
traditions through the medium of inter-textual interpretation,91 may have (wittingly 
or unwittingly) used the linguistic similarities in Gen. 30.16 as a vehicle for 





                                                
88 Bronner, From Eve to Esther, 121.  The rationale underlying this hypercritical rabbinic judgment of 
Leah’s behaviour is not entirely clear.  It is highly unusual within the biblical material to find wives 
taking the initiative to instigate a sexual union with their husband.  It may be therefore that the authors 
of Genesis Rabbah were uncomfortable with the fact that the two women, Rachel and Leah, were 
‘bartering’ for Jacob’s sexual services, behaving as though the sexuality of the esteemed patriarch, the 
progenitor of YHWH’s covenant people, were an exchangeable commodity.  Certainly, in the midrash 
on Gen. 30.15-16, the rabbinic authors take offence at Rachel’s apparent slight on Jacob’s sexuality, 
by her suggestion that sexual intercourse with him was worth only some mandrakes (Genesis Rabbah 
72.3).  Strangely enough, however, despite the rather unflattering depiction of Leah’s actions in 
Genesis Rabbah 80.1, the midrash of Gen. 30.16 in Genesis Rabbah 72.5 is far more sympathetic to 
her behaviour.  In other words, for these rabbinic interpreters, the end justified the means, though why 
their opinion of Leah then became so acerbic in 80.1 is left unexplained.  For further comments on 
Genesis Rabbah 72.2-3 see also Freedman and Simon, Midrash Rabbah: Genesis, 2:663, 665. 
89 Parry, Old Testament Story, 230. 
90 Ibid. 
91 As Renée Bloch explains, ‘The principle method by which the rabbis clarify the sacred text and 
probe its depths is by recourse to parallel passages.  The Bible forms a unit; it comes from God in all 
of its parts and it therefore offers a broad context to which one should always return.  Since they knew 
the Scriptures by heart they were constantly explaining the Bible by the Bible … The recourse to 
scripture took on various forms: the author could refer to isolated passages taken from different 
places, but he usually used a motif,  Ordinarily only a few sources were used, and one senses among 
the midrashists a tendency to be selective’.  See “Midrash”, in Approaches to Ancient Judaism, ed. 
William Scott Green (Missoula Scholars Press, 1978), 1:32.  For further discussion of the role of 
inner-biblical exegesis in the midrashic traditions, see also Timothy H. Lim, “Origins and Emergence 
of Midrash in Relation to the Hebrew Bible”, in Encyclopaedia of Midrash: Biblical Interpretation in 
Formative Judaism, ed. Jacob Neusner and Alan J. Avery-Peck (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 2:595-612.   
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3. Proverbs 7.15 – the ‘lady of the night’ 
Proverbs 7 appears to be one occasion that the verb )cy is utilised within a context 
that is, it must be admitted, unequivocally steeped in illicit and promiscuous female 
sexuality.  This text reads as a warning to senseless young men to steer clear of the 
wayward woman who, dressed as a harlot, goes out (yt)cy) to meet them on street 
corners (v.15) and lures them with seductive speech into committing adulterous 
sexual acts that will undoubtedly lead to their downfall (vv.6ff).  Her feet, we are 
told, do not ‘stay at home’ (v.11), suggesting that she has perhaps rejected the 
traditional role of a wife, living at home under the authority of her husband, and 
instead, prefers to prowl the streets in search of sexual prey.92  Clearly then, within 
this context, )cy connotes a woman’s behaviour, which is motivated by a very 
explicit sense of licentiousness and sexual immorality. 
What is perhaps interesting to note about this particular use of )cy is the fact that 
Prov. 7.15 bears some linguistic similarities to Gen. 34; in both texts, the woman 
who ‘goes out’ is likened to a prostitute (hnwz).  In Prov. 7.10, the woman who 
departs her house looking for an adulterous sexual adventure is described as wearing 
‘the garment of a harlot’ (hnwz ty#$).93  Meanwhile, in Gen. 34.31, Dinah’s brothers 
answer their father’s furious criticism of their bloody revenge on Shechem by asking 
the rhetorical question, ‘Will he (that is, Shechem) treat our sister as a harlot?’ 
(hnwzkh wntwx)-t) h#(y). Is it possible that Simeon and Levi have assumed that 
Shechem mistook Dinah for a professional prostitute because she too ‘went out’ 
alone?  Is the narrator thus subtly laying some of the blame for her attack on her 
shoulders because she had behaved like a woman in search of an illicit sexual 
encounter? 
In order to challenge this suggestion, however, one need only reiterate the point 
made earlier, regarding women ‘going out’ elsewhere in the Hebrew biblical corpus.  
                                                
92 Gale A. Yee, Poor Banished Children of Eve: Women as Evil in the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2003), 155. 
93 The noun ty#$ is only found here and in Ps. 73.6, where again, it appears to refer to some sort of 
garment.  It is unclear exactly what form such a garment would have taken, or if prostitutes wore an 
identifiable style of dress.  Both Michael Fox and Bruce Waltke suggest that the hnz ty#$ worn by the 
woman in Proverbs 7 may have been a veil, like Tamar’s in Gen. 38.14, which would have been both 
seductive and would have hidden her real identity, as the wife of a local merchant.  In Jer. 4.30, 
prostitutes appear to be identified with a particular style of dress, including the wearing of crimson, 
adornment with gold jewellery and kohl eye make-up.  See Bruce Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: 
Chapters 1-15 (Grand Rapids and Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2004), 373-74; Michael V. Fox, 




As demonstrated in a number of texts, women appear to venture out, sometimes 
alone, for a number of non-sexual purposes, entirely without reproof or any apparent 
risk that they too may be likened to the wayward woman of Prov. 7.  There is 
absolutely no suggestion made elsewhere that a woman’s departure from the house 
conveys an inherent sense of sexual immodesty or licentious intent.94  Prov. 7.15 
states plainly that this woman, who was dressed like a harlot, goes out with the sole 
intention of luring unsuspecting men into an unlawful sexual liaison; it is her reason 
for ‘going out’ that makes her behaviour morally suspect and therefore 
reprehensible.  Where Dinah is concerned, however, the narrator appears to be at 
pains to stress the utterly chaste nature of her outing; she ventures forth ‘to become 
acquainted with the daughters of the land’.95  Perhaps, through his choice of words 
in v.1, the biblical writer was even encouraging the reader to avoid the 
misapprehension that Dinah behaved in any way other than innocently.96 
Furthermore, if Shechem had mistaken Dinah for a professional prostitute because 
she was out alone, this still does not explain why he sexually assaulted her.  Rape 
and prostitution were two very distinct and unrelated sexual phenomena in the 
worldview of biblical Israel; there is nothing within the texts of the Hebrew Bible to 
suggest that harlots could be raped with impunity or indeed that sexual violence was 
in keeping with the code of behaviour that normally governed sexual interactions 
between an Israelite man and a prostitute.97  Compare Shechem’s aggressive sexual 
response to that of Judah, for example, when he approached his daughter-in-law 
Tamar, presuming her to be a woman offering a sexual service (Genesis 38).  Judah 
first seeks Tamar’s permission to have sexual intercourse (v.16) and then, before 
proceeding to do so, arranges with her the financial terms of their arrangement 
(vv.16-18).  In contrast, Shechem does neither of these things; he simply seizes 
Dinah and forcefully violates her (Gen. 34.2). 
                                                
94 Parry, Old Testament Story, 229. 
95 Ibid.; Cotter, 253. 
96 Cotter, 253; Kugel, 415. 
97 This is not to say however that a prostitute cannot be a victim of sexual violence, as Bechtel 
suggests (‘harlots are not raped’, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 31).  Human history bears 
unfortunate witness to the fact that prostitution and sexual violence have never been strangers to each 
other, either now or in the past.  The notion that prostitutes cannot be victims of rape stems from the 
belief, mentioned earlier in this chapter, that women whose sexuality and sexual history does not 
accord with the traditional sex-role stereotypes found in patriarchal society are assumed to have been 
complicit in their sexual assault.  Thus, when a woman has given her consent to sexual intercourse in 
the past, it is as though her consent for all future sexual encounters is simply assumed.  Thus, women 
in the sex industry are regarded as unrapable, because their consent is always taken for granted 
(Tetreault, 248).  
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To be sure, one could suppose that Shechem did mistake Dinah for a professional 
prostitute, but decided to sexually assault rather than pay her.  Yet, this would seem 
unlikely, given his behaviour following the rape.  For, if he truly believed that she 
was a prostitute, why did he and his father go to such extreme lengths to secure her 
family’s permission before marrying her?  As we discussed in Chapter 3, within the 
biblical traditions, a prostitute was regarded as a woman who was sexually 
autonomous; her sexuality was not under the control of any man, be it her father or 
husband.98  Had Shechem really believed that he had fallen in love with such a 
woman, he would therefore not have felt it necessary to seek the consent of her male 
kin before marrying her, but would simply have taken her home with him and 
established her, without further ado, within his household.  The elaborate 
proposition offered by Shechem and his father to Dinah’s family in vv.8-12, 
including the young prince’s offer of a bride price and bridal gift in keeping with 
normative marriage protocol (vv.11-12), as well as his eagerness to undergo the 
painful procedure of circumcision (v.19), strongly suggest that Shechem was fully 
aware that the woman whom he sought to wed was still regarded as the sexual 
property of her father and was thus by no means a prostitute. 
Returning to Proverbs 7, it would therefore appear that, while the woman in question 
does indeed ‘go out’ for an illicit sexual purpose, the pejorative nuances implicit in 
her behaviour are not conveyed primarily by the verb )cy itself, but rather, are 
suggested by her appearance, her words, and her actions, which make explicit her 
reasons for going out.  In other words, this woman’s very negative depiction does 
not in itself stem from her act of leaving the house per se; rather, it is her 
motivations for going out, that is, her adulterous sexual appetite, which marks her as 
a sexually wanton woman.  It stands to reason then that the use of )cy within this 
text has no bearing on our evaluation of Dinah’s own behaviour in Gen. 34.1, as she 
‘went out’ simply to meet ‘the daughters of the land’. 
 
Given the discussion thus far, it would appear that the verb )cy, when used with a 
female subject within the biblical texts, conveys no inherent sense of sexual 
impropriety, or indeed any form of sexually motivated behaviour, illicit or 
otherwise.  Indeed, the semantic connotations conveyed by a woman’s act of ‘going 
                                                
98 Bird, “‘To Play the Harlot’, 222; Bechtel, “What If Dinah Is Not Raped”, 31; Fleishman, 110; Hall, 
1123; Erlandsson, 101. 
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out’ seem to be dependent solely on the context in which this verb is used, rather 
than on any etymological considerations intrinsic to the verb form itself.  In other 
words, a woman’s departure from the house may intimate her sexual promiscuity, as 
is the case in Prov. 7.15, but only when such a departure is motivated by her desire 
for illicit sexual adventure.  As Robin Parry states, the narrator’s judgement of 
women who go out, ‘all depends on what the women “go out” to do’.99  In Dinah’s 
case, any contextual evidence of sexual immodesty is entirely lacking within Gen. 
34.1.  On the contrary, her outing is presented by the narrator as unquestionably 
innocent and free from sexual motivation; she goes looking for female company, not 
a sexual encounter.   
 
Evidence from the cognate forms of )cy   
As discussed above, Sarna, Wenham and Frymer-Kensky are among those scholars 
who have appealed to cognate evidence from Akkadian and Aramaic to argue that 
the narrator’s use of )cy in Gen.34.1 suggests a deliberate allusion to sexual 
impropriety on Dinah’s part.  However, the semantic range of cognate equivalents 
from other languages related to biblical Hebrew should not be considered in 
themselves sufficient evidence that the Hebrew verb form in question necessarily 
encompassed this same diversity of meaning.  Although cognate terms in Akkadian 
(wa4s[itum  and wa4s[iat) and Aramaic ()qpn and hrb tqpn) may have been used to 
convey pejorative sexual overtones, there is nothing to suggest from the biblical 
evidence discussed above that such semantic nuances were regularly ascribed to )cy 
at the time the Genesis 34 narrative was written.100  To be sure, the authors of 
Genesis Rabbah and medieval exegete Rashi understood the narrator’s choice of  
)cy in v.1 as an implicit assertion by this ancient writer that Dinah was a tyn)cwy 
(‘gadabout’).101  However, the above survey of the biblical usage of )cy strongly 
suggests that this root did not inherently denote sexual impropriety or inappropriate 
behaviour during the biblical period.102  The term tyn)cwy does not appear in the 
                                                
99 Parry, Old Testament Story, 230. 
100 Ibid., 229. 
101 Genesis Rabbah 80.5; Rosenbaum and Silberman, 164. 
102 This proposition is indeed substantiated by the Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, edited by David 
Clines.  This dictionary does not rely on diachronic cognate evidence to ascertain the meaning of 
classical Hebrew vocabulary, but instead, focuses on the synchronic function of words within the 
language as an operating system.  In other words, Clines relies heavily on syntagmic analysis of word 
forms; that is, the meaning of a word as it is used within its contextual environment.  Under “)cy”, 
there is no reference to this verb conveying any sense of sexual impropriety when it is used with a 
feminine subject, suggesting therefore that such a semantic nuance was not commonly attributed to 
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Hebrew biblical corpus; in fact, there are no alternative forms of the root )cy that 
convey the sense of ‘awhoring’ or ‘gadabout’.103  Thus, it would appear probable 
that such pejorative nuances became attributed more regularly to )cy only at a later, 
post-biblical date, that is, after the composition of the Genesis 34 narrative.104   
Furthermore, as Parry notes, even if a certain verb carries negative connotations 
within a particular context, it does not necessarily follow that these connotations are 
present whenever the verb is utilised.105  One can therefore propose that its function 
within this text was not to alert the reader to any dubious motives underlying 
Dinah’s behaviour, but more likely, to state simply that she was away from her 
home when subsequent events overtook her.  Interpreters who insist on reading v.1 
as some form of implicit criticism of Dinah’s behaviour by the narrator may well be 
relying on a particular semantic value of the verb )cy that is anachronistic to the 
time in which this narrative was originally composed.  In Parry’s words, ‘the idea 
that Dinah went out to get “picked up” by some dishy young bloke traces its roots 
way back into the history of interpretation’, rather than back to the Hebrew text 
itself.106 
 
The ‘outside world’ in biblical Israel: was it a dangerous place for women to be? 
As discussed above, a number of scholars have suggested that, within biblical Israel, 
the act of ‘going out’ was, for women, an intrinsically dangerous occupation and not 
in keeping with the traditional gender expectations of appropriate female behaviour.  
Thus, while not explicitly sexual in its motivations, Dinah’s journey was, they argue, 
nevertheless naïve and irresponsible; she courted disaster by flouting societal 
protocol, thereby recklessly rendering herself susceptible to unwanted male sexual 
attention.  Like so many of her contemporary sisters who are survivors of sexual 
violence, Dinah, it is contended, must therefore shoulder at least some of the 
responsibility for her own violation. 
                                                                                                                                    
this verb form during the time that these texts were written.  See The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, 
ed. David J.A. Clines (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 4:255-61.  For further information 
regarding the underlying rationale of this dictionary, see David J.A. Clines, “The Dictionary of 
Classical Hebrew”, Zeitschrift für Althebraistik 3 (1990): 73-80. 
103 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 425-26.  
104 Parry, “Feminist Hermeneutics”, 13. 
105 Parry, Old Testament Story, 229. 
106 Ibid., 230; and “Feminist Hermeneutics”, 15.   
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Is this an accurate reading of the biblical traditions?  Was the outside world really 
conceptualised within the texts as both an unsuitable and sexually perilous place for 
women to venture?  Well, on surveying the biblical traditions where women ‘go out’ 
()cy) into the public sphere, it is certainly true that there are a number of occasions 
where their departure from the house appears to render them susceptible to sexual 
danger.  Thus, in Jdg. 21.19-24, the daughters of Shiloh, who go out (w)cy) to dance 
at the festival of the Lord, are, like Dinah, abducted and raped, in their case by 
Benjaminite tribesmen, in order to provide these men with sufficient wives to 
perpetuate their depleted numbers following a bloody Israelite civil war.   
Moreover, earlier in Judges, the theme of the outside being a dangerous place for a 
woman is nowhere more shockingly reiterated than in the story of the Levite’s 
unnamed concubine (Judges 19), whose husband seizes her and ‘forces her outside’ 
of the house in Gibeah where they are residing (Cwxh Mhyl) )cyw) to be gang raped 
by a lawless mob of Benjaminites (19.25).  While this woman does not go out on her 
own volition, her unwilling journey from the house renders her fatally vulnerable to 
a brutal sexual attack; as Bal notes, the story would appear to infer that once a 
woman stepped over the threshold away from the safety of the house, she essentially 
became male ‘public property’, to be sexually used and abused by any man she then 
encountered.107   
Outwith Judges, a number of scholars have likewise noted that in Ruth 2.8-9 and 
2.22, Boaz’s and Naomi’s respective words of caution to Ruth appear to read as 
implicit reminders that a woman who ventures outside into unknown territory leaves 
herself susceptible to the dangers of sexual impropriety or violence.  Thus, in 2.8-9, 
Boaz advises Ruth to stick close to his female reapers when she is gleaning in his 
fields, while reassuring her that he has warned the young harvesters not to ‘touch’ or 
‘harm’ her (K(gn ytlbl).108  This advisory warning appears to be an indication that, 
left to her own devices, Ruth the Moabitess may have become the object of 
unwanted harassment or abuse by Boaz’s Israelite male harvesters.109  Similarly, 
                                                
107 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, 216. 
108 ‘Boaz said to Ruth, “Listen my daughter, do not go to glean in another field.  Do not go elsewhere 
but stay here close to my young women.  Keep your eyes on the field that they are reaping and follow 
them.  I have ordered the young men not to touch you”’.  For a fuller discussion of the verbal root (gn 
and its use to indicate aggressive behaviour, see Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 619; Koehler,  
Baumgartner, and Stamm, 2:668; L. Schweinhorst, “(gn”, in Theological Dictionary of the Old 
Testament, eds. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry, trans. David E. 
Green (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), 9:205-6. 
109 Tod Linafeld, Ruth, in Tod Linafeld and Timothy K. Beal, Ruth and Esther (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 1995), 34, 35, 44. 
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Naomi’s advice to Ruth in 2.22 echoes Boaz’s words of caution, when she tells her, 
“It is better, my daughter, that you go out [to glean] with [Boaz’s] girls, so they do 
not trouble you (Kb w(gp )lw) in some other field”’.  Ruth’s mother-in-law appears 
to be suggesting here that Ruth, as a woman ‘going out’ ()cy) to work away from 
the safety of the family home, may be in a potentially dangerous space, at risk of 
sexual attention or even sexual assault.110  
Before conceding, however, that the biblical traditions do indeed confirm that the 
outside world was a dangerous space for women to venture into, some further points 
ought to be noted.  Firstly, while it is true that, on certain occasions, biblical texts 
may suggest that women’s presence outwith the household did increase their 
vulnerability to sexual danger, such danger is by no means presented within these 
texts as an inevitable reality within biblical Israelite society.  If one were to cast an 
eye over all the passages listed earlier, which depict women ‘going out’ ()cy), it 
becomes apparent that it is far more common for women to venture forth into the 
public realm without any suggestion of endangerment than it is for them to face any 
sexual threat when they are out.  Furthermore, these women neither appear to be 
rebuked for doing so, nor are they regularly warned of the dangers that they may 
encounter on their travels.     
Similarly, other texts, which do not utilise the verb )cy, but which depict women 
present and active within the public sphere, likewise offer no suggestion that such 
behaviour was either inappropriate, imprudent or naïve on the part of the woman 
concerned.  Thus, for example, Rachel goes out alone to tend her father’s flock in 
Gen. 29.2-12, while Abigail sets off without her husband’s consent to seek out David 
(1 Sam. 25), in order to attempt to prevent an escalation of the hostilities that existed 
between the two men.  Neither woman is castigated for their sojourn; indeed, Abigail 
is presented in a positively laudatory light, as a woman with both the brains and 
beauty to outwit her churlish husband and temper David’s hot-headed impetuosity 
(vv.3, 23-35).  Furthermore, in Num. 27.2, the daughters of Zelophehad meet with 
Moses at the entrance of the Tent of the Meeting in order to request a landholding 
among their kin.  As Karla Shargent has noted, this meeting place was in all 
likelihood analogous to the city gate of Israel’s settled existence, where important 
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social, economic, or judicial matters were addressed – in other words, a very public 
place within the community.111  Yet, these women are not castigated for being there, 
nor was their personal safety or sexual integrity threatened in any way by their public 
appearance within such a male domain.  Indeed, their presence goes unquestioned, 
while Moses treats their petition with the utmost seriousness.112   
Moreover, as Shargent again points out, the idea that the outside world was 
specifically designated as a dangerous space for women within the biblical traditions 
does not necessarily stand up to close scrutiny, when one considers that women were 
not always safe from the threat of sexual assault when they remained within the 
private sphere of the household.113  One need only think for example of Tamar in 2 
Samuel 13, who is raped by her brother Amnon in the ultimately private space of his 
bedchamber, after she had been sent to him at the behest of her father (vv.7, 14).  In 
addition, while the Levite’s concubine in Judges 19 was sexually assaulted outside 
the house where she and her husband had been residing, one could argue that her 
fate was sealed inside that house, as both the elderly host and her husband conspired 
to safeguard the latter’s sexual integrity by denying the woman the right to any 
protection of hers (vv.23-5).  As Bal notes, she is given up by these two men ‘in an 
ultimate act of power and violence’.114  Do not forget, at the start of the narrative, 
this woman had apparently travelled the long journey by herself, in apparent safety, 
to her father’s house in Bethlehem (19.2).  It is only after she is inside again, back in 
the company of her husband, who was supposed to be responsible for her protection 
and security, that she faces a lethal threat to her bodily and sexual integrity.  
Furthermore, the violence done to this unnamed woman does not end after her rape; 
once the Levite is back in the house that he shared with his concubine in Ephraim, 
he continues her abuse by dismembering her already broken body into twelve pieces 
to send out to all the tribes of Israel.  The brutality of this act is not only implicit in 
the physical act of dismemberment, but may also be read as a symbolic re-enactment 
of her rape; by sharing her body among many men throughout Israel, the Levite 
repeats this woman’s gang rape experience on an even greater scale than before and, 
most significantly, within the house where she ought to have been safeguarded from 
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harm.115  For this woman, neither the patriarchal home nor the outside world was a 
safe space; she faced a lethal violence in both. 
Indeed, such a threat was also confronted, though not realised, by the virgin 
daughter of the Levite’s Gibeite host, when, in v.24, her father also offered her to the 
Benjaminite mob as sexual fodder.  While this woman was spared the fate of the 
concubine, it is clear that the being inside the family home did not guarantee her 
shelter from the risk of sexual abuse.  A very similar situation also arises in the 
parallel text of Genesis 19, when Lot offers his two virgin daughters to the men of 
Sodom who had surrounded his house, demanding sexual access to his male guests 
(v.8).  While these women also avoided having to endure the same ordeal as the 
Levite’s concubine in Judges 19, it is nevertheless true that, within the apparently 
safe space of the family household, Lot’s daughters were made to confront a very 
real threat to their sexual integrity.  Thus, just as women today can by no means 
guarantee their sexual safety when inside their home,116 biblical women could 
likewise face the danger of sexual violence even when they remained within the 
private sphere of the household. 
Finally, when considering biblical attitudes to women’s presence in the public 
sphere, it is important to note that in the legislation of Deut. 22.25-7, which refers to 
an unequivocal case of sexual violence, the woman who is raped when she is out in 
an isolated part of the countryside is accorded no part in the precipitation of her 
assault.117  While rape victims today often face recriminations for having been by 
themselves in secluded locations prior to their assault, this piece of biblical 
legislation actually emphasises quite the opposite.  Indeed, while her rapist must 
face the death penalty, the lawmakers emphasise this woman’s innocence at length: 
‘But to the girl you will do nothing; she has committed no sin deserving of death.  
For, just as the man rises against his neighbour and murders him, it is the same in 
this case.  For the man found her in the country; while the betrothed girl screamed, 
there was no one to rescue her’ (vv.26-7).  There is absolutely no suggestion within 
this piece of legislation that by going out alone, the woman had provoked her rape, 
or that she was in any sense behaving irresponsibly or injudiciously.  On the 
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contrary, she is regarded – like the murder victim – as the unwilling casualty of an 
unsolicited violation and was thus completely blameless of all wrongdoing.  
Thus, the above discussion has raised the possibility that, within the cultural milieu 
of biblical Israel, the outside world was not necessarily always regarded as a place 
where women would encounter the inevitable risk of sexual assault.  The biblical 
traditions yield no evidence of an unequivocal correlation between the private/public 
dichotomy and women’s sexual safety; in other words, there appears to be no 
explicitly and unreservedly safe or unsafe space designated for women, with regards 
their sexual integrity.  Women who did ‘go out’ were therefore not deemed 
inevitably at risk of sexual assault, nor were women who remained under the 
protection and supervision of their family by any means guaranteed protection from 
such a risk.  Furthermore, there does not appear to have been any pervasive demand 
on women not to go out, nor were those who did go out and who were subsequently 
raped necessarily held accountable for their violation.  While texts such as Ruth 2.8-
9 and 2.22 may suggest that women venturing forth into unknown territory may find 
themselves facing the threat of male sexual aggression, such a threat did not appear 
to deter these women from going out.  Ruth, for example, still went to work in 
Boaz’s field, after simply following some basic precautions to ensure that, while she 
was there, any risk to her personal safety was minimised. 
Indeed, one could also argue that Dinah had at least attempted to take similar 
precautions as those followed by Ruth in the wake of the advice given to her by both 
Boaz and Naomi.  Contrary to scholars who, as discussed above, judge Dinah’s act 
of venturing into alien territory as an act of irresponsible and injudicious naïveté, it 
could be contended however, that Dinah was indeed taking responsibility for her 
own safety, in that her behaviour consciously followed the logic of Boaz and 
Naomi’s precautionary counsel.  After all, she makes no effort to seek out the 
company of any local men who may have taken advantage of a foreign woman 
travelling alone; indeed Dinah seems to be attempting to minimise the risk that such 
an encounter would take place; like Ruth, she specifically intends to go out to a 
place where she will be relatively safe: within the company of other women.  In 
other words, Dinah is taking no chances here; it is simply her misfortune, not her 






At the start of this chapter, I noted that within biblical scholarship, there has been an 
overwhelming tendency for exegetes to judge Dinah’s behaviour in Gen. 34.1 
unfavourably.  This tradition of interpretation credits the narrator with deliberately 
using the verb )cy both to criticise Dinah’s intentions for going out to visit the city 
of Shechem and, by implication, to place the onus of responsibility for her rape 
squarely upon her shoulders.   
However, on reviewing the linguistic and contextual evidence of Gen 34.1, it 
becomes apparent that this reading simply cannot be substantiated.  Instead, the 
textual considerations discussed in this chapter would seem to support a reading of 
v.1, which refuses to accept that the ancient author deliberately sought to condemn 
Dinah for wandering out to visit the Hivite women.  Instead, her characterisation 
here appears to be that of the victim, rather than protagonist, of a violent sexual 
encounter, with her outing depicted as entirely innocent in both its inception and its 
motivations.  Dinah was not being deliberately promiscuous here, nor did she appear 
to be flouting any societal expectations regarding appropriate female behaviour; she 
therefore does not deserve to be burdened with accusations of culpability for her 
rape simply because she ‘went out’. 
Furthermore, I would suggest that the cultural myth of victim precipitation does not 
appear to have been an integral part of the biblical conceptualisation of sexual 
violence.  Contrary to the belief held by so many biblical interpreters, Israelite 
women who left the private domestic sphere of the household and ventured forth 
into the outside world were neither routinely judged as acting in a promiscuous or 
injudicious manner nor were they blamed for any act of sexual violence that befell 
them.   
Nevertheless, we are still left with the question of why these exegetical traditions, 
which attribute blame to Dinah for her rape, predominate biblical scholarship on the 
text of Gen. 34.1.  As suggested earlier in this chapter, I would contend that such 
traditions might have been influenced less by textual considerations than by the 
interpreters’ reliance on the insidious myth of victim precipitation, which has been 
deeply entrenched within their own particular cultural ideation of sexual violence.  
In other words, the representation of Dinah as a ‘gadabout’, a femme fatale, or even 
a thoughtless and irresponsible daughter may well be the result of biblical 
interpreters reading Gen. 34.1 within the ideological context of this myth, thereby 
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imposing it, wittingly or unwittingly, onto this text.  However, by doing so, they 
only serve to perpetuate the insidious influence of this myth by drawing up 
‘evidence’ in an attempt to substantiate its universal validity, by ignoring, or at least 
leaving unspoken, the injustice of the patriarchal imperative that insists upon 
preserving women’s safety at the expense of their freedom, and by consistently 
failing to condemn the rapist’s misogynist aggression.  Interpreters, such as Ita 
Sheres, who claims that Dinah went out ‘looking to be raped’,118 thereby 
consistently fail to take into account the brutality of rape and the lasting traumatic 
effects that it has upon the victim.  No woman would ever go out ‘looking to be 
raped’, no woman deserves to be raped, and no woman is ever responsible for her 
rape; culpability for sexual violence rests solely and utterly with the men who 
commit this dreadful offence. 
Furthermore, these dominant exegetical traditions of Gen.34.1, which blame Dinah 
to some extent for her own rape, have critically undermined the narrator’s own 
attestation that Dinah was the victim of an unprovoked and brutal act of male 
violence; by doing so, however, they effectively deny her a just representation.  In 
effect, this young woman’s pain, not to mention her status as the casualty of a 
terrible crime, has thus been denied a voice by centuries of interpretive blame, which 
insists on perpetuating a rape myth that, ironically, appears to have no representation 
within the biblical text.  How would Dinah feel, if she could hear the recrimination 
and censure within the voices of those who have repeatedly judged her so unfairly 
within their readings of this narrative?  Perhaps, like the rape survivor quoted at the 
very start of this chapter, she would begin to believe in her own blameworthiness, 
thereby suffering a crippling sense of guilt and self-loathing.  Perhaps she would feel 
utterly bewildered that, as the victim of such a brutal assault, she was not being 
shown sympathy or compassion but was rather confronted by such an outpouring of 
blame and hostile recrimination.  She may therefore have believed that, given such a 
response, her experience of violation and humiliation would become an inescapable 
and continuing presence in her life.119  Alternatively, like the rape survivor who said 
that people treated her like ‘the offender, not the victim’,120 she may simply ask 
these interpreters, ‘Why are you blaming me, the victim, not Shechem, my rapist?’  
Such a propensity to hold the victim responsible for her rape is, I believe, as deeply 
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flawed and ethically reprehensible within the interpretive traditions of Genesis 34 as 
it is within contemporary patriarchal cultures.  It would therefore be a valuable 
exercise for all of us, sitting down to read and interpret this narrative, to firstly read 
and remember the following words:   
Rape, we must remember, is a crime; women are the victims of it.  Rape is not 
the just desert of any woman who dresses casually, goes out at night, or lives 
alone.  And women do not cause rape by their growing freedom.  If we want to 
place the blame anywhere other than on the criminal himself, we must look at 
the society that creates him.  Rape victims have been treated as the guilty ones, 
















                                                






Throughout this work, we have witnessed the fact that, within contemporary 
patriarchal cultures, rape survivors are consistently and repeatedly denied access to a 
means by which to make their voices heard.  All too often, their experiences of 
sexual violence have been and continue to be eclipsed and stifled by androcentric, 
sexist, and at times misogynistic rape myths and ideologies, which are so pervasive 
and so deeply entrenched within patriarchal cultures the world over.  As a result, 
these women are frequently denied empathy, dignity, and the vital support from their 
community that is acknowledged by survivors to be a fundamental source of their 
healing.  As Deena Metzger admits, ‘The social community is the appropriate centre 
for the restoration of the spirit, but the rape victim is usually shamed into silence’.122   
Similarly, through our exploration of Genesis 34, we have learnt that Dinah too is 
denied the ability to enter into her own discourse of suffering.  She is granted no 
words by which to express herself, while the occasion of her rape is transformed 
discursively into another quite different event, focalized and given meaning solely 
within the framework of these same patriarchal rape myths, which silence victims of 
sexual violence today.  In effect, through his conceptualisation of her rape, the 
author of this tradition essentially perpetuates Dinah’s suffering, by denying her 
subjectivity and autonomy, devaluing her worth, and relegating her to the margins of 
what should have been her narrative.  As Ulrike Bail notes, the voices of women 
such as Dinah become ‘locked into texts from which no sound escapes … [they] 
beat against the walls of the texts and are beaten back; they are overwhelmed by the 
voices of those who order silence’.123 
It is not, however, only the narrator of this biblical text who may be called to 
account for the systematic erasure of Dinah’s voice and the silencing of her 
suffering.  Within the interpretive traditions surrounding Genesis 34, we have 
discovered that there is a common proclivity among some biblical scholars to ignore, 
or pass over in a silence of their own, the circumscription of Dinah’s personal rape 
experience.  These scholars appear to overlook the fact that Dinah is denied the role 
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of focalizer for her own rape; certainly, many make no mention of the fact that her 
encounter with sexual violence is perceived through all eyes except her own.  
Instead, they choose to focus, as the narrator does, on the reactions of the male 
characters to this rape event, while suppressing any consideration of Dinah’s 
personal experience of her assault.  Furthermore, many of them appear to have, 
wittingly or unwittingly, allowing their readings to be coloured and influenced by 
the myths, attitudes and values, pertaining to sexual violence, which may not be 
given explicit voice within this biblical tradition, but which, nevertheless, are an 
insidious influence within their own cultural milieu.  As a result, Dinah’s silencing 
and marginalisation within this tradition is further reinforced and validated, thereby 
leaving her bereft of a just and honest representation. 
However, as Toni Morrison has suggested, ‘All of us, readers and writers, are bereft 
when criticism remains too polite or too fearful to notice a disrupting darkness 
before its eyes’.124  As readers and interpreters of this biblical narrative, reading and 
interpreting within a global rape culture, we surely have an ethical obligation to 
challenge Dinah’s silencing, both by the author and within the text’s interpretive 
traditions.  For, as I have noted throughout this work, biblical texts, such as Genesis 
34, which express insidious and misogynist myths pertaining to sexual violence, 
only serve to validate and perpetuate these myths within the reader’s own 
community.  Given the pervasiveness of rape within patriarchal cultures across both 
space and time, the task of recognising rape survivors’ silencing and refusing to let it 
go unchallenged is therefore surely as imperative within biblical studies as it is 
within contemporary culture.  Therefore, it is with this in mind that I have 
endeavoured throughout this work to highlight Dinah’s silence and to read into it a 
significance that enables us to comprehend more fully the extent of her suffering. 
Nevertheless, we should not forget that inhabiting a space in which one may lend 
one’s imagination to the experience of rape survivors is far from easy; as Kristen 
Leslie, a pastoral theologian and rape victim advocate, notes, to do so, one must 
‘stand in the midst of suffering and evil’.125  Such a task is nevertheless necessary if 
these women are to be accorded the support and the justice that is theirs to demand.  
Dinah has been denied the chance to tell her story to her community; it is now up to 
the community of those who read and hear this story then to give her space to speak, 
to listen to her pain, and, hopefully, to let her heal.  For, as philosopher Susan 
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Brison, herself a victim of sexual violence, testifies, ‘It is only by remembering and 
narrating the past – telling our stories and listening to others’ – that we can 
participate in an ongoing, active construction of a narrative of liberation, not one that 
confines us to a limiting past, but one that forms a background from which a freely 
imagined – and desired – future can emerge’.126 
I will end this work as I began it, with the testimony of a rape survivor, who I 
believe sums up with real clarity the reason that searching for the hidden voices of 
rape victims, both within the biblical literature and within contemporary culture, and 
letting their voices speak to us is so important.  It is written by Nancy Venable 
Raine, who only began to speak and write about her rape after seven years had 
passed – seven years in which she had remained silent, both because of her own 
sense of trauma and shame and also because of the perpetual refusal of those around 
her to listen to her story:   
‘Silence has the rusty taste of shame.  The words shut up are the 
most terrible words I know.  I cannot hear them without feeling 
cold to the bone.  The man who raped me spat these words out over 
and over during the hours of my attack … It seemed to me that for 
seven years – until at last I spoke – these words had sunk into my 
soul and become prophecy.  And it seems to me now that these 
words, the brutish message of tyrants, preserve the darkness that 
still covers this pervasive crime.  The real shame, as I have learned, 
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